JiHlil 

■III 

HH5BH9 



WfllSMSS 



■ 



%m 



iflWfflfll 

iftfra 



gig 



butt 



mil 






BbHbI 



SK 



-■ X* ^ 







v 5 r V 

\ * 

- 



: .#>""* 







'"o o 



^ ^ 



o 01 







^, '0 K* •(.■> < " , ^ A 

v <^ * - 




a. 






\ v 







OO 









NEW AND EXTENSIVE 



ANALYTICAL EXAMINATION 



t mtitts of lEittial Btltntt 



CONTAINING 

EVIDENCES OF DIFFERENCE, DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN ELE- 
MENTS OF MIND WHICH LIE AT THE FOUNDATION OF 
MENTAL ACTION, AND ELEMENTS OF MIND 
WHICH LIE AT THE FOUNDATION OF 
MORAL ACTION. 

BY REV. MOSES SMITH, A. M. 

IN TWO VOLUMES. 
VOL. I. 



"Know thyself." 



dhuinnatx: 



PRINTED AT THE METHODIST BOOK CONCERN, 
FOR THE AUTHOR. 

R. P. THOMPSON, PRINTER. 

1855. 




^ 






Entered, according to Act of Congress, in the year 1855, 

BY MOSES SMITH, 

in the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the United States for the 
District of Ohio. 



PREFACE. 

The design of laying this work before the pub- 
lic, is to present the Philosophy of Mind in as 
clear a light as possible — adapting the sentiments 
and arguments to the demands of the present age, 
and freed from many embarrassments hitherto con- 
nected with the examination of the elements of 
mind. It is most ardently desired, that the true 
principles constituting the science should be cor- 
rectly defined, and that the entire work be auxil- 
iary to the investigation and knowledge of truth. 
Yet the best efforts are of humble pretensions and 
partial claims. We could not aspire to solicit 
recommendations favoring the circulation of these 
volumes, unless they can exist in the judgment 
and by the decisions of the student and the phi- 
losopher, who carefully and understanding^ exam- 
ine each page and sentence of the work. 

The Author. 
3 



ADVANTAGES. 



The advantages of this work are only partially 
expressed in the following order: 

1. An Introduction, designed as preparatory to 
the science intended to be taught, commencing with 
man, an existent — a compound being; his primi- 
tive, present, and future state. 

2. Psychology, established from the nature, har- 
mony, and distinct qualities of elements only adapted 
to an immaterial existence. 

3. Anthropology, established from the nature and 
distinct qualities of elements, which are only adapted 
to the existence of matter. 

4. The speculations of materialists examined and 
refuted, which closes abstract examinations of ele- 
ments belonging to physical science. 

5. This work is divided into two volumes. The 
first volume embraces the examination of elements 
of mind which lie at the foundation of mental ac- 
tion. The second volume embraces the examination 
of elements of mind which lie at the foundation of 
moral action. 

6. Reasons naturally arise as to the necessity of 
such a distinction in tracing each faculty, either ab- 
stractly or in its combined relationship with other 
powers. 

7. Elements which have not hitherto been ac- 
knowledged as having any important place in the 

1* 5 



6 ADVANTAGES. 

philosophy of mind, have been inserted in this work, 
with reasons why they should be acknowledged. 

8. Some of the primary faculties of the mind hav- 
ing ever been left in great obscurity, are defined, 
with a brief defense in favor -of their position and 
claims. 

9. The value of this work has been increased by 
the correct opinions and sound arguments of all the 
principal philosophers who have written upon men- 
tal science; but we have avoided referring to their 
various speculative opinions foreign to the true ex- 
amination of the elements of mind. 

10. A design of this work is to present each item 
distinctly, and with few words. The subjects and 
items are all numbered in the chapters and sections. 
Immediate reference can be had, from the Index, to 
any part or item of the work. 

11 . "When any element appears to have a mental 
and moral position, or influence in the mind, it will 
be so defined. 

12. As far as ability and labor could go, the effort 
has been to adapt this work to the science as it is, 
and not to adapt the science to the work. 

13. A decided advantage is, that the student is 
under no obligations to receive the contents of this 
work, in whole or in part; yet the objector should 
be willing to render an equivalent, or give better 
reasons against the arguments used, than can be 
given in favor of them. 



an 



INTRODUCTION. 

SECTION I. 
1. Man exists. Of non-existences we can have no 
satisfactory, knowledge, and to define them would be 
utterly impossible. But man is a definite existent, 
occupying a point in unbounded space. The cer- 
tainty of his being is neither imaginary nor ideal; 
but he is a certain entity, possessing a real place as 
truly as he does a relative position in the range and 
limitless extent of existences. He vies in reality 
and importance with all finite elements and beings 
around him, and the idea of his entity transcends 
all possibility of doubt. 2. He either exists or has 
no existence. If he has no existence, all arguments 
about that which is incapable of occupying any 
point in space, or of having being, either in entity 
or nonentity, must necessarily pause in perpetual 
silence. But it is impossible to conceive of nonen- 
tity as tangible, and having form, size, weight, and 
action, or that entity could be, in nature and essence, 
non-existence. Therefore, all existences may be de- 
nominated truths, or facts. 3. These facts, or truths, 
may be made known to us by demonstration, or be 
received as self-evident realities. The former will 
produce a result worthy of full confidence, when 

7 



8 

correctly deduced from true premises. The latter 
may be regarded as an axiom of knowledge, being 
independent of either proof or disproof. Then the 
certainty of our existence is not a matter of either 
conjecture or of doubt, but of knowledge. 4. The 
reasonableness of our existence is found in the limit- 
less goodness of God. He is the antecedent power or 
cause of our being. It is impossible for us to con- 
ceive that any imperfect or unhappy designs were 
originally intended by him, but that the created 
should glorify the creator, and be happy in his un- 
ending favor. A being perfectly holy and happy 
could not create shame, misery, and death as an ob- 
ject of pleasure to exist in the midst of his absolute 
perfections ; if so, we can not understand the perfect 
purity, will, action, and infinite glory of Deity, by 
whose creative power man is, and holds so high a 
position in the range of the intellectual universe. 
But it is reasonable for him to live to enjoy God, 
and to perpetuate that blissful communion by love, 
service, and obedience. 



SECTION II. 
1. He exists, moving with freedom over the earth; 
has been called the noblest work of God, and lord 
of this world. He has been styled a compendium 
of creation, standing midway the kingdom of nature 
and that of immortal spirits. He studies to know 
every thing below himself — the earth, compounded 
of its various qualities, and all appertaining to it. 
He desires and labors to comprehend all unexplored 
laws connected with zoology, vegetation, and crys- 



HIS BEING INDESTRUCTIBLE. 9 

tallization. Looking abroad upon yonder heavens, 
he traces the rolling orbs of the vast universe — 
watches tempest and calm, rain and drouth, heat 
and cold, seed-time and harvest. Why, then, should 
he not go still higher, and study to know himself? 
2. His faculties of mind are inalienable, and have 
power of motion. He is rationally constituted a 
being who feels, reflects, thinks, judges, contrives, 
wills, and acts. He has power to command ideas 
and communicate them to others by articulated 
sounds or speech, by the art of writing, or by sig- 
nonical representations of thought. 3. As a point 
or dot upon canvas, ever moving uniformly in size 
and direction, forms a continued and unending line, 
so is the existence of man; though disconnected with 
the infinity of the past, yet his being will extend on 
through the interminable future, incapable of lim- 
itation. 



SECTION III. 
1. His being is indestructible , and can never be 
discontinued by annihilation. The very nature and 
action of all the elements of mind are averse to any 
thing like a return to non-existence, or to any idea 
that we shall ever cease to be. We can have no 
conception that an all- wise Being could or would 
create us for the purpose of causing our non-exist- 
ence. This conclusion can be sustained by the inde- 
structibility of matter. 2. Matter may be decom- 
posed, the elements united or consolidated, may 
have the laws of affinity and power of adhesion sus- 
pended or destroyed; but we have no evidence of 



10 HIS STATES. 

any possible annihilation of properties. Actual ex- 
periments will show that the existence of elements 
or atoms of matter can not be rendered inane by 
any refining or destroying process. The elements 
of a block of wood having been burned with fire, 
still exist; the fire has only separated the compound 
into its natural primary elements, and no property 
has been annihilated. ~Eo evidence has ever been 
found that any property of either the body or of the 
soul can or will ever cease to be. If this be true, 
and we acknowledge that both matter and mind are 
now real existences, we are forced to the conclusion 
that those existences will continue to exist in some 
way forever. 



SECTION IV. 
1. The existence of man has been divided into 
periods, or states, arising from important changes. 
(1.) His primitive state was one of innocence and 
happiness, and to have been perpetuated by love, 
service, and obedience. He was constituted with a 
holy nature, and capable of ever acting from pure 
motives. The understanding, affections, and will 
were obedient to, and in harmony with, the perfect 
law of God. The injunction requiring this law to 
be kept inviolate, was not the law itself, and a sub- 
ordinate or contingent law would have been imper- 
fect, and, therefore, could not exist. Hence, the 
injunction, suspended upon conditions, could not be 
properly a law, till it was signed and sealed as such 
by the voluntary act of our federal head. (2.) His 
fallen state is a departure from the primitive one. 



HIS STATES. 11 

The change was caused by a perverted act of voli- 
tion. The object of his creation was to be, to have 
enjoyment, and to act in glorifying his Creator. 
Without action in rendering obedience and praise, 
the design of his existence would have been de- 
stroyed. If action is indispensable in glorifying the 
Creator, then he must act, and he can not act unless 
he has self-power to act. For if compelled to glo- 
rify God, it follows that it is the compulsatory power, 
or law, which acts, that renders service or glory, 
while man was and is wholly passive. If such a 
power or law is operative, and is the source of all 
glory to the Creator, it had that power to as great a 
degree without as well as with the existence of man. 
Hence, there could not have been any object in view 
in our creation; and if there was no design to be 
met, we have never had being, and never can exist, 
for all the acts of Deity exist in infinite wisdom. 
But if man was the actor, he must have had power 
to act; and if he had power to act, that power was 
within himself, and was self-power, or volition. The 
law of God and volition in man are not one and the 
same thing. The latter can act without the former, 
otherwise the object of our creation would have been 
wholly destroyed by law ; then our existence would 
have been impossible. (3.) ^probationary state we 
understand man's recovery, through a Savior, from 
the fall. This has been called a gracious state, in 
which life and immortality have been brought to 
light through the Gospel of peace. (Jr.) His future 
state is that in which the soul, and, finally, the body, 
shall have an inseparable reunion and an intermina- 
ble duration of life. 



12 MAN A COMPOUND BEING. 



ese 



SECTION Y. 

1. Man is compounded of spirit and matter; these 
united constitute but the one being. The ties of 
affection connecting the two natures seem to be so 
arranged, that when severed by death the soul sus- 
tains no perceptible loss, either of faculties or of 
true knowledge. The body without the soul is life- 
less clay. Therefore, it is incapable of containing 
any power of action or item of knowledge. If the 
soul is possessed of powers and knowledge before 
death, it has them after death, unless death has anni- 
hilating power, which is contrary to all evidence, 
and must be absurd. 2. The spirit contains the ani- 
mating principle, or is the principle of life. The 
science of psychology can not be untrue; for the 
soul is indispensable to life and a knowledge of self. 
3. The soul of man is the intelligent part of his 
being. Reason, judgment, and knowledge can not 
be matter, nor a result of material elements. 4. It 
is an immaterial or spiritual existence, as a whole, 
one and indivisible. It can not be inert, neither is 
it ponderous, or capable of annihilation. 5. It is 
immortal — limitless in duration. Its faculties are 
very numerous, vivid in action, and powerful in con- 
ception and demonstrations. 



SECTION VI. 
1. Matter is distinct from mind. Anthropology 
can furnish no material element which, in quality or 
essence, can be called mind in whole or in part- 
Matter is divisible, tangible, and ponderous — pos- 



MIND AND MATTER. 13 

sessing density and extension, with gradations and 
dissimilar organic properties. 2. Matter is said to 
be inanimate when insensible and inactive within 
itself. Inert elements act only from impinging 
causes, and in conformity to the law or force of 
gravitation, but they can not possess any self-power 
of action. 3. It is animate when it possesses sensi- 
tive motion or action within itself. But the anima- 
ting principle is not matter; for then all matter would 
be sensitive, and have action and life. Sensitive 
action belongs to that which has life ; but matter 
may have motion or action without having sensation 
or life. Otherwise the vast globe might be an ani- 
mal or a being of life, by reason of its diurnal mo- 
tion and orbicular flight. But matter has no power 
of self-action. 



SECTION YII. 
1. Mind is not matter. It is an internal and 
intellectual power. From the essential nature of its 
being, such an intellectual power, when in action, is 
knowledge. Mind must either act itself, or act from 
impinging causes. The natural tendency of matter 
is to inactivity, and its nature is to be and remain 
at rest. If moved by any external cause, rest is 
restored so soon as the impinging agent is wholly 
removed. Having no action within itself, it is im- 
possible for it either to act or cause action. 2. But 
the mind acts independent of remote, contingent, or 
intermingling causes. It has power to understand, 
conceive, judge, reason, and feel. These principles 
can not apply to or constitute insensible and inert 

2 



14 MIND AND MATTER. 

matter. 3. The term mind is applied to a combina- 
tion of faculties, or an internal power, which feels, 
thinks, reasons, and wills. It is known to us by 
these faculties, and they are made known to us by 
our consciousness, the affirmations of which we can 
not doubt. 4. The essence of mind has been referred 
to something back of these faculties, or forming a 
still deeper foundation of their being. We can have 
no clear conception or certain knowledge of such 
occult qualities. To advance in search of such ele- 
ments would only plunge us into darkness and 
doubt. All' such speculations would be uncertain, 
from our ignorance of the subject; therefore, it is 
useless to try to decide upon uncertainties, and such 
a process would add nothing to true science. 5. 
Imagine that we remove consecutively all the facul- 
ties of the mind, and it would be very difficult to 
conceive of some remaining something called es- 
sence. And if we could, how could we analyze it, 
further than to call it the power or influence which 
affinitates, in common, all' the functions constituting 
the soul? This is stated to start the mind to think- 
ing, but to dwell on it would not be profitable. 
Though this subject has been the origin of many 
speculative arguments, and in a way that it is not 
capable of, words can not define it or make it known 
to us. It exists in facts or truths wholly the objects 
of consciousness. 



SECTION VIII. 
1. Knowledge, the result of reasoning, is not so 
clear, strong, and unerring as that arising from 



MIND AND MATTER. 15 

intuition. The latter is the only primary source of 
receiving facts as facts, without either proof or dis- 
proof. In argumentation an appeal to conscious- 
ness may be the last acknowledged resort, but it is 
the most conclusive and certain. Finite objects of 
the external world, which strike the sense, can never 
vie with this internal influence or power, nor be the 
anterior cause of its existence. 2. We feel intui- 
tively a power within entirely distinct from all prop- 
erties of materiality. This combination of elements 
or internal power, which feels, thinks, reasons, and 
wills, can not be questioned or doubted. Yet we 
have real knowledge of such elements only by con- 
sciousness. Matter combines properties which are 
solid, ponderous, extended, and divisible. They are 
known to us as such by our senses. 3. If the power 
constituting the faculties of mind, or of blending 
them together in action, be matter, how could it act 
within itself in recalling the past, and in contempla- 
ting the future — the events and occurrences of the 
one, and the objects and the hopes of the other? 
And how could it act in examining the nature and 
properties of tangible existences, and the design, as 
evidenced in the symmetry and harmony naturally 
adapting them to the purposes and ends of their 
being? Could it send out pioneer thoughts through 
unexplored creation and interminable duration? 
How could it examine the properties and laws of 
existences, and reason from nature up to nature's 
God? 4. If the principle within us which thinks 
and acts is matter, we are plunged into total dark- 
ness, and are entirely ignorant as to the power of 
perception or knowledge of the existence of any 



16 MIND AND MATTER. 

fact; for that which thinks is known to us only by 
thinking. Matter is known by solidity, weight, and 
extension. The former is known by properties en- 
tirely different from the latter. Matter contains no 
principle by which we love, hate, fear, triumph, 
rejoice, sorrow, and suffer remorse or despair. 



SECTION IX. 

1. Matter is not mind. The substances compos- 
ing the material universe are severally ponderous, 
divisible, and possessing density and exteDsion; also 
existing in liquids or air form. The principles of 
these existences are known as principles of matter 
and not of mind. All properties of matter are nat- 
urally inert. There are no elements or atoms be- 
longing to the science of physics which can have 
action within themselves, or self-action. All action 
or motion produced in them by operative causes, 
tends to inertness or rest at the suspension of the 
power of those causes. 2. All material elements 
tend naturally to rest. And rest, or that which is 
at rest by natural tendency or law, can not originate 
action, neither can it pervade with action either rest 
or a series of entities at rest. But mind at rest has 
power to act within itself, and to cause action in 
insensible bodies by voluntarily causing them to be 
impinged while at rest, and by accelerating or by 
counteracting their inertia. 3. Matter presents a 
^phenomena distinct from mind. Its properties, or 
combination of substances, possesses solidity and 
divisibility. Our knowledge of their existence and 
qualities is gained by observation and the test of 



MIND AND MATTER. 17 

the senses. 4. The essence of matter is difficult 
to define. That properties exist is clearly demon- 
strable; but to go back of these in search of 
some occult principle or essence of being, would be 
attended with difficulty, and add confusion to true 
analysis. Yet the mind should be tested to its 
utmost power in trying to trace |:>roperties back to 
essence, or in discriminating between them by dis- 
tinguishing their inhesive affinity in the union of 
compounds, which, if dissevered and all the clus- 
tering properties removed, there is something re- 
maining as unknown or imaginary, to which the 
term essence may be applied. But we can have no 
satisfactory knowledge of any thing in physics ante- 
rior to, or, more correctly, primary than properties. 



SECTION X. 
1. If the ideas of materialists be true, that there 
is nothing but matter in the vast universe ; and that 
at farthest, the soul of man is only the result of a 
particular organization of matter in the body, we 
have no reasons favoring the knowledge of any ex- 
istence. 2. For inert properties can have no knowl- 
edge of their own existence, nor of external existen- 
ces. But we can not conceive of an immensity of 
space filled with nothing. Nonentity can have no 
perception or knowledge of non-existence, neither 
can it have knowledge of entity. There can be no 
knowledge without existences ; and if there be enti- 
ties, and they exist as insensible and inert matter, 
they can not have knowledge of any existence. 
Then there must be an existence capable of thinking 

2* 



18 MIND AND MATTER. 






and knowing, and something capable of being the 
object of thought and knowledge. 3. If all bodies 
consist of unextended atoms, moved only bj some 
law or influence of attraction or resistance, how 
could we account for the existence and action of 
that law or laws? If law can not think, reason, and 
act within and of itself, it is clear that there can be 
no power to think and act contained in inanimate 
and inert atoms of matter. 4. The non-existence of 
matter is more reasonable than that nothing exists 
but matter; for if nothing exists but matter, we 
have seen that there could be no knowledge of any 
reality; and if nothing could be apprehended or 
known, then if there could be existences, all knowl- 
edge of them would be lost in non-existence. Our 
knowledge of the existence of mind is as extensive, 
and more to be relied on, than is our knowledge of 
the existence of matter. 



SECTION XI. 
1. If the soul is matter, it has power to think and 
act. And as matter is matter, it follows that all 
matter has power to think and act, which is absurd. 
If some definite portion possesses this power, the dif- 
ference is the result of the different modifications, 
magnitude, figure, or motion of some parts of matter 
in respect to other parts, or to the mass, or the power 
of thinking and acting must be given to some sys- 
tems of it and rejected from others. What irregu- 
larity in the regular, onward course of nature could 
have being and power to make this difference, when 
no such power can naturally exist in the particles 



MIND AND MATTER. 19 

themselves? Surely no one will contend for such a 
position. 2. If all matter is cogitative, it is contrary 
to all experience and knowledge we have of its 
nature. And if so, our senses and faculties are 
formed only to deceive us. A rock possesses no 
sign or evidence of either cogitation or of sense. 
The head is the great battery of thought, and there 
all the ministers of sensation make their appeal; 
but if all matter be cogitative, the feet would contain 
proportionably as much thought and understanding 
as the head, and there would be as much in the 
mountain rock as in either. Matter is not self-oper- 
ative but inert, and is no more than a substance 
extended and impenetrable to other matter. 3. Ma- 
terialism, in more recent and modified forms, main- 
tains that mind is a result of organization, or a 
function of the brain ; that the physical and mental 
faculties coinhering the same primary substances, 
grow, mature, decay, and cease together. If the 
brain is only the organ of the mind, it can not be 
the mind itself. It may form the center in which 
exists that influence on which depends sensation and 
motion. This organ is delicately connected, to a 
limited extent, with the mind's states and develop- 
ments. Chemical analysis will show that all nerv- 
ous matter in the entire system possesses precisely 
the same properties as that of the brain. Then if 
mind be matter, or the result of that kind of matter, 
it would be located all through the system ; and if 
we could live we could have knowledge, to a propor- 
tionable extent, as well without the head as with it, 
in some instances, or as well without it as without a 
hand or a foot. 4. The various diseases of the 



20 MIND AND MATTER. 

brain often modify, impair, or destroy the manifesta- 
tions of mind. This sequence, if uniform, would 
not make mind to be the result of material elements, 
but would prove the brain to be the organ through 
which the mind acts and has access to external 
things. An object reflecting light to a perfect eye 
can be seen; but without light sight would be lost — 
one of the bodily senses is suspended ; yet the mind 
has power still to retain a knowledge of the object 
seen. Therefore, the power of the mind to act is 
not limited to the senses, for it can act when they 
are suspended. 



SECTION XII. 
1. Mind is independent of matter as to existence, 
and as to properties or essence ; but it is dependent 
in the origin of its knowledge in regard to them. 
"With this knowledge attained, its manifestations are 
operative and independent of impressions from ex- 
ternal things. It possesses self-consciousness and 
motion. It can retain distinctly and at pleasure 
correct ideas of that which has ceased to exist, and 
can recall long-forgotten events. It can go further, 
and call up chains of existences, arrange them in 
order, symmetry, beauty, and grandeur, and present 
them as facts, independent of either nonentity or of 
material reality. 2. Matter can exist and be matter 
without the power to either think or act. Mind 
without these ceases to be mind. If we are wholly 
material, and matter can think as matter, then we 
must continue to think always, and in proportion 
to the number and size of the particles contained in 



MIND AND MATTER. 21 

each compound. Then a large body can think more 
and more powerfully than a smaller one ; and both 
must continue to think on forever, or till their being, 
with all their elements, are annihilated. 3. If mat- 
ter can not be annihilated, then materialists are im- 
mortal unawares and contrary to their purposes and 
desires, but in perfect accordance with the premises 
of their own assumption. At least they must have 
a conscious state of being as long as there are any 
elements of the body existing after death. There- 
fore, embalmed and petrified bodies must have con- 
sciousness, thought, and action for ages and cycles 
of ages unnumbered. 4. If matter thinks through 
the future, it must have always thought in the past, 
and there has been no time of our actual physical 
existence when the mind was not active and think- 
ing. But this is contrary to all experience and 
knowledge, and must be absurd. 



SECTION XIII. 
1. "What principle of materiality can possess sen- 
sation unilvm itself or in common, or can constitute 
that which loves, fears, joys, and sorrows, and is 
capable of being ecstatic with hope, quickened and 
excited with enthusiasm, or plunged into remorse and 
despair? These changes exist and often alternate, 
without any reference to changes impressed by ex- 
ternal things or of physical debility. In perfect 
health passion, anger, regret, and remorse may fill 
the soul ; and peace, tranquillity, and hope often pos- 
sess the mind when the body is suffering intensely 
or is even dying. "Whatever may be the uniformity 



22 MIND AND MATTER* 

of physical entities and laws, they can not produce 
a corresponding uniformity of mental states. 2. The 
septennial revolutions, or renewing of the system by 
the changes of its particles, does not change the 
identity of self, nor the one continued being in 
which man lives, and which he feels and knows,to 
be himself. If self-action, self-consciousness, and 
thinking constitute the elements of matter, or 
are essential to them, all elements of matter, ab- 
stractly or combined, in every system must contain 
them ; and then they would be impossible to any, 
for every system of materiality would possess self- 
action and a consciousness of its own existence indi- 
vidually in self-thought or thinking; and no self- 
consciousness or thought of an individual property 
can exist in common with other properties, or of the 
compound. Then no element or atom of matter in 
the vast universe could have knowledge of the ex- 
istence of any thing beside or beyond itself; and 
having no power of self-knowledge, it can not determ- 
ine its own existence. Therefore, there can be no 
knowledge of the existence of any thing. The near 
affinity and position of properties can not blend 
them as one, while matter is divisible and incapable 
of self-action. 3. If impressions made upon mate- 
rial organs constitute the knowledge of existences, 
the occurrences of early life could not be commanded 
or recalled in old age; for the particles of the sys- 
tem so often changing, and being incapable of self- 
action, could make no transfer of their knowledge 
to those succeeding them. Then all knowledge of 
the past would cease to be, and we could know noth- 
ing back of the present moment. 






MIND AND MATTER. 23 

SECTION XIV. 
1. Mind is dissimilar and distinct from matter, 
or even a result of materiality, only so far as matter 
may be the organ of the mind, or through which it 
holds intercourse with the external world. Think- 
ing can not arise from the figure, size, or motion of 
the properties which think; for this would only 
result in gradations of size, or as to the appearance 
and celerity, which would differ from thinking. The 
power of the senses can fully test that these changes 
and affections of matter are different from the prin- 
ciple or causes of thinking and motion. They are 
the effects or results of the action of other material 
particles in motion by some acting cause, which 
shows that matter within itself is inert and can not 
be cogitative. 2. The human body is incapable of 
annihilation. So far as we can analyze and under- 
stand, it appears that temporal death has no power 
to annihilate the constitutional elements of the body. 
The earth, air, and water consolidated in the forest 
oak, may be decomposed or separated by fire; yet 
not one element or particle of the primary principles 
can be utterly destroyed. Death sunders the ties of 
affection connecting the soul and body, and the 
effect of the change in the body appears to be no 
more than the change of the arrangements of its 
essential elements. Chemical analysis will show 
that it is utterly impossible to annihilate any of its 
elements or particles of elements. 3. We have no 
evidence of the annihilation of any existent, and our 
conception of such a result is impossible. There is 
no evidence of such a possibility in physical analy- 



24. MIND AND MATTER. 

sis, or taught in revelation, and onr experience and 
belief are against it. If any element or atom of a 
constitutional function of the body or of the mate- 
rial universe, which ever existed, has or can ever 
cease to be, we have no proof of the fact from any 
source. Decomposition can take place in fallen ele- 
ments, but that is no part of non-existence. 



SECTION IV. 
1. The accumulating weakness of age and the very 
decay of the body indicates no annihilation of mat- 
ter, but a change in the affinity and position of its 
elements, and is an additional proof of the continu- 
ation of the soul; for this decay is continued exist- 
ence in change and under a new form or abstracted 
entities. We may prove by experiment or analysis, 
that all physical properties or particles of elements 
are indestructible, being incapable of cessation. If 
this be true, death has the power only to separate 
the constituent elements, and that they exist as 
fully when separated after death as they did before 
it. The term resurrection does not convey the idea 
of a new creation, but a resuscitation of the very 
identical body that went down to the grave, in the 
recalling of the primary elements to their wonted 
affinity and order in the new organized body; thence- 
forth their union will be unbroken. Should this be 
true of the material system, and that it is dissimilar 
and distinct in properties from the immaterial na- 
ture, who can doubt the immortality of the soul? 
2. Animal life, as found in the lower orders of natu- 
ral existences, is not denominated an intellectual 



MIND AND MATTER. 25 

one, but it contains much of the phenomena of mind, 
which is far superior to mere vegetable life or the 
growth of rocks. Only call it instinct, and it pos- 
sesses properties which differ from the properties of 
matter. 3. They have the power of voluntary mo- 
tion, and a sense of danger, and to avoid it ; also, a 
knowledge of causes. Some have been observed to 
go still further, having comparison, and, seemingly, 
an intuitive principle of affection or friendship, 
capable of being cultivated to a limited extent. The 
fox has been known to run through a fence with a 
chunk in his mouth the size of his intended prey, 
then to return and gather his prey from the herd 
and run through the very same avenue in escaping 
from danger. The Newfoundland dog evinces natu- 
ral affection and care for the safety of children ; and 
often, in rescuing them from drowning, they have 
appeared to give evidence of judgment, as well as 
affection and compassion, by going to the best, and, 
sometimes, the only place of escaping from the 
water. 4. It is absurd to say that these traits of 
the phenomena of mind are the properties of mat- 
ter, possessing solidity, extension, and divisibility; 
for they are connected with the power of life, sensa- 
tion, and action. Vegetable life has no self-action, 
and can only move in expanding or growth by the 
laws and influences connected with the seasons. 
Petrifaction, crystallization, and the growth of rocks 
is a still lower and more uninterrupted order of life, 
being independent of and almost unaffected by 
either the vernal ray or tropical shadow. 

3 



26 MIND AND MATTER. 

SECTION XVI. 
1. Though, we do not know matter to be eternal in 
duration, yet we have no evidence to believe that 
its properties will ever be annihilated. Then, if 
matter will exist in some way forever, it follows that 
there is something connected with animal life and 
motion which is superior in nature to mere matter, 
and it is of a mental character and nature, clearly 
distinct from matter, and must be called an imma- 
terial or immortal principle; and we have as little 
or less proof of its pending annihilation as we have 
of the final non-existence of matter. 2. The soul is 
superior to matter in the knowledge it has of its own 
existence, and of the existence of matter, and its 
power of self-action. These distinct differences show 
an immaterial independence, and its states and 
manifestations are incomprehensible — almost an in- 
finity of meaning within itself. To our certain 
knowledge we can feel something within us that acts 
from an internal principle; we experience liberty, 
the power of choosing, and we have self-government. 
There is an internal spiritual dominion or umpiracle 
principle, in which thoughts arise and are com 
manded, and by and from which they are sent forth 
through limitless creation like exploring lights, dis- 
persed all abroad. The materialist has this power, 
and is conscious that he can employ his thoughts 
voluntarily about any business he may choose or 
desire. 3. Matter is naturally insensible and mo- 
tionless, and unless motion is communicated to it by 
some other acting agency, it must remain forever 
stationary and dead. But the soul has power of 



MIND AND MATTER. 27 

self action, with a design in acting, with, a view of 
an end to be attained, while, at the same time, the 
means to effect it are fully considered. Such an ex- 
istence as this, with such energetic and vivid capaci- 
ties and powers within itself, can be neither material 
in nature nor accidental in being and results. Mat- 
ter, abstractly, can not be excited within itself, or 
moved by arguments, admiration, love, sympathy, or 
sufferings. But we are moved to action by reasons 
existing within ourselves and those imparted to us 
from others, and by words spoken or written. 4. 
To hear of or to see suffering will naturally move 
the feelings of the soul, and words written often cre- 
ate joy or excite alternately weeping and laughter. 
The self-inactive characters on the paper can not 
mechanically or naturally move the observer in any 
way. If words are spoken there can be nothing in 
the simple pulsations of the air that can effect mat- 
ter creating self-motion, neither to effect in any way 
the feelings or knowledge. That power which per- 
ceives and apprehends the force and sense of these 
things is far different from any principle of matter. 
Articulated sounds can awake sensibility and arouse 
the soul in feelings or passion ; and they can pro- 
duce mirth, tranquillity, or gloomy despair. These 
results can not be the physical effects of the terms 
used, or else the effect would be the same and as ex- 
tensive if not understood as though they were. When 
we imagine things to have been said, the mind is 
affected in the same way as though they had been 
spoken, till such impressions are corrected by the 
judgment. It is wholly the sense conveyed, or sup- 
posed to be conveyed and received, which is imma- 



MIND AND MATTER, 



terial in itself, that excites the soul and influences 
physical action. 



SECTION XYII. 
1. He who believes that matter possessed prima- 
rily causation, or that it can of itself come out of 
nonentity into self-existence, coalesce its particles 
and then live, think, and act by any process of re- 
duction or arrangements of elements, possessing fig- 
ure, or is excited to motion by laws of affinity or of 
repulsion, should first discover and define the degree 
of fineness existing in a divided hair, and be able to 
tell all the points of intersection, angling the direc- 
tions of their localities respectively. Then should 
he proceed to define the alteration in the situation 
of the particles of matter in which they begin to 
breathe life from naught, and live, act, and cogitate. 
2. The self-power of particles to change to or from 
each other, or in degrees of difference, is impossible ; 
and if they could, it would still remain, that form, 
figure, and magnitude are all material accidents. 
The substance is matter, and, in this respect, can 
not differ in parts one from another. Then if one 
part can think and act, all matter can think and act. 
Therefore, all particles of matter possess causation 
and action, and must be cogitative. And if there 
is such a thing as matter thinking, that influence or 
power must be superadded, which implies a princi- 
ple differing in essence or nature from matter, and 
can not be a result of it, but must have been con- 
ferred by a superior or an omnipotent cause. 3. JSTo 
accident of matter can produce action or cause cogi- 



MIND AND MATTER. 29 

tation, either regularly or irregularly; and it can 
not superadd that influence or power, for matter is 
divisible, and that which thinks must be one, or of 
parts united, so that the action is one. But matter 
is not one and indivisible. However closely the 
particles adhere together, they still exist as parti- 
cles and without self-motion, and are powerless in 
adhering to or in penetrating each other. If the 
power of thought existed in those particles, it would 
exist whether they were in contact or remotely loca- 
ted; and if these are divisible, or are capable of 
being sundered and scattered abroad, there must be 
as many minds as there are particles in matter. 
Then the mountain, the globe, the sun, moon, and 
stars are all built of mind, or of a combination of 
innumerable immaterialities, which is absurd. 4. 
On the other hand, if it requires a union of the ele- 
ments of matter in order to constitute a power to 
think and act, there would be no power to classify 
these elements, and it would require all of the mate- 
rial elements in the vast universe to form one mind 
or soul. Should there be some influence or essence 
in which they unite or center, so their action or 
thoughts may be but one, that influence or power is 
not merely superadded, but is an existent superior 
to and independent of matter. 



SECTION XVIII. 

1. Matter can not contain abstract ideas of any 

thing, for the particles could not reflect upon what 

passes within themselves, much less contemplate 

that which was beyond ; for within themselves they 

3* 



30 MIND AND MATTER. 

could find nothing but limited material representa- 
tions or impressions, and these could not form ideas, 
neither could they be formed by ideas, abstracting 
themselves ; nor have they self-power to form them- 
selves into trains of thought and metaphysical argu- 
mentation. Mind being matter, our inward percep- 
tion of external things could only be in accordance 
to the impressions they make upon matter. For the 
notion or idea of that which would be conceived in 
the mind, could have no existence while the object 
was prospective or distant; but now the idea is 
present and exists as it is in itself, while the mind 
has power to instantaneously grasp the object and 
scan every part. 2. Matter, within itself, possesses 
no power capable of correcting a/pjpea/rcmces or im- 
pressions. In seeing the topsail of a ship, far away 
at sea, the natural idea would be like the appear- 
ance, the existence of something very small ; but as 
it is, there is something within which forms a more 
correct idea, bringing into consideration the rotund- 
ity of the sea and the feebleness of sight. That 
which commands our senses and reasons correctly 
against appearances is not matter. Matter by and 
in itself is lifeless and strictly passive, and acting 
only when moved by some separate cause, or in 
conformity to laws of adhesion and gravitation. 3. 
Man is conscious that he lives and has liberty of 
motion, in thought and in changing position of place, 
and by an instantaneous thought change his course 
or purpose, and counteract, in some instances, the 
laws both of capillary attraction and gravitation. 
Inert elements can not of themselves voluntarily 
suspend the operations or arrest the tendency and 



MIND AND MATTER. 31 

action of the laws of nature. Before matter can 
effect this its nature must be changed ; it must be 
brought from death to life — from incapacity of self- 
consciousness and thinking to feeling, breathing, and 
cogitation. And if its nature is changed, it ceases 
to be matter, for inertness or passiveness is essential 
to its entity. 4. No faculty or influence capable of 
thinking can be superadded to matter, for then by 
such a connection it would be rendered incapable of 
action. And if matter could constitute the power 
of cogitation, still our idea of the soul would be im- 
perfect; for it has many faculties, and with the 
thinking principle we must superadd perception, 
apprehending, reflection, judging, comparing, will- 
ing, reasoning, making deductions, and putting in 
motion material existences. 



SECTION XIX. 
1. The soul is not a faculty of the body, nor a 
result of matter, but it dwells within the body, and 
governs it in whole or in part, as the hands, feet, 
eyes, and tongue. That which governs the body is 
not the body nor particles of it, neither is it a super- 
added materiality or accident, but a superior spir- 
itual power or soul. 2. The soul is incapable of an- 
nihilation, as it is distinct and superior to matter; 
and matter, so far as w r e can understand, is imper- 
ishable, or its elements can not cease to exist in 
some way. We know nothing of the nature or the 
essence of either mind or matter; and to try to 
define them, or the nature of their mysterious union, 
would be fruitless. We may reason on these sub- 



6Z MIND AND MATTER. 

jects with some degree of satisfaction, though cer- 
tain knowledge is not at our command. 3. We 
have no evidence that any existent can or will ever 
pass into non-existence. If the elements of matter 
are imperishable, so far as we can comprehend 
them, and the immateriality of the soul is estab- 
lished, which would render it more incapable of 
non-existence, so far as our knowledge of its ele- 
ments and being can extend, how can we deny an 
unwavering belief of its immortality? This truth 
is accredited and exists in the moral constitution 
resting upon evidences tested and known by the 
power of intuition. The soul has naturally an in- 
disposition to tarry with the present moment and 
circumstances ; there is ever a disposition to pass on 
to the future, and a desire for immortality. It can 
now feel an awe of the future and of God. This 
varies with its shades of conscientious rectitude or 
sense of wrong. We look to the future with fear or 
hope, according to our sense of guilt or innocence; 
and without the need of argument we naturally feel 
that we are responsible to some being for all our 
acts. How can all these be attributed to inert 
matter? Such an assumption requires no arguments 
to reveal its falsehood. 4. Conscience has power 
of self-action, and it is often impinged or influenced 
to action by some unseen cause, both in accordance 
with and contrary to our will and natural desires. 
He who follows its dictations, and he who repels 
them, are both compelled to acknowledge its quick- 
ening influence and its power. In contemplating 
the infinite future, the righteous rejoice while the 
wicked sink under feelings of remorse; and in both 



MIND AND MATTER. 33 

cases they are conscious that their feelings can not 
result from impressions made by external things, or 
from argumentation. 



SECTION XX. 
1. The soul has a conscious knowledge of self 
with its continued being, while in health or in the 
wane of life. There is no condition of helplessness 
or suffering, this side of death, while reason re- 
mains, but that the soul feels its nature and being to 
be immortal. The immortality of the soul is reason- 
able, from its vast capacities and dread of annihila- 
tion. It is evident from its great improvements, 
boundless desires, natural dissatisfaction with time 
and things present, a desire for the future and for 
some kind of religion. Again: it is immortal by 
the consent of all nations. It is demonstrated to be 
such in the providence of God, and is made known 
by the unequal infliction of Divine justice and 
judgments in this life. 2. The high moral obliga- 
tions resting upon a rational, immaterial, and im- 
mortal spirit, are clear and of boundless importance; 
for the real existence of the human soul is beyond 
all possibility of doubt: and in the acknowledgment 
of the great government of an infinite Creator, we 
are necessarily compelled to acknowledge that all 
elements and existences should be adapted to the 
claims and purity of the same, and all that is im- 
pure must be rejected from the limitless purity of 
God in the future world. If the soul was constitu- 
ted of material properties, and could those proper- 
ties be dissevered and dispersed by temporal death, 



34 MIND AND MATTER. 

he who had power to create them from naught 
has power to affinitate those elements in a reunion, 
and in a future organization. 3. One great object 
of our being is to cultivate the powers bestowed 
upon us for usefulness, subjecting them all to the 
will and service of God. There are impressions 
connected with the consciousness of every rational 
being, assuring him that the soul must live forever. 
We have power to deny this, but there is an internal 
voice ever arising from intuitive authority, thunder- 
ing in affirmative appeals of truth, reversing all 
such false assumptions ; and it can never be silenced 
by any confession or avowed faith to the reverse. 
This source of truth is unerring and irresistible. 4. 
If materialism or any kind of infidelity be true, 
adherents to such doctrines are more reasonable in 
rejecting them, upon the grounds assumed as the 
basis of their own systems and faith, than they are 
to adopt them in violation of revelation and its re- 
quirements ; for if the former be true, we shall all 
fare just alike in the future world. Then, if we 
believe them to be true, and act accordingly, and 
they should finally prove to be false, our loss would 
be irreparable — all hope would be involved in ruin. 
But if we should adopt the Christian system and 
religion, and it should prove to be true in the final 
test, we would be perfectly safe forever. 



SECTION XXI. 
1. It is more reasonable for an Atheist skeptic or 
a materialist naturally to believe in revelation, the 
immortality of the soul, and that that immortality 



MIND AND MATTER. 35 

of being may be pure and holy, than it is for them 
to reject them as false. It is more reasonable for 
them to believe in them as true, and to live accord- 
ingly, even if they should prove finally to be false, 
than it is to reject them, from the following reasons : 
(1.) There is no book on earth which claims to be a 
revelation from God but the Bible. If it be true, 
we are perfectly safe in believing it ; and as it is the 
only book of the kind, we could sustain no loss in 
receiving it as true, even if it should prove in the 
next world to be false; for then it would have had 
no power to change our condition from what it was 
going to be, nor to render it worse. (2.) As this is 
the only revelation we have claiming to be inspired, 
should it be false, we will all share the same fate at 
last, and can lose nothing by believing it, and in 
living accordingly. Then, if it be true, we have 
gained every thing calculated to constitute us happy, 
and if it be false, it is as equally clear that we can 
lose nothing by believing it. But if we reject it, 
and it proves to be true at last, w T e are lost forever. 
(3.) Then, if from reason we can believe revelation 
to be true, who can doubt but that the soul is im- 
mortal? (4.) If the soul is immortal, according to 
revealed truth, it is capable of an immortality of 
purity and happiness. 2. Man is not a skeptic by 
nature, neither can he become one by the authority 
of revelation. He has an internal conviction that 
that principle which thinks, acts, reasons, and wills, 
must live forever. And if the great moral and 
infinite government of God is infinitely pure and 
holy, we must be prepared for it and adapted to it, 
in order to enter into the joys of a peaceful immor- 



36 MIND AND MATTER. 

tality. 3. As matter belongs to physical science, 
we now close this part of our inquiries, and refer 
the reader to that part of this work devoted more 
exclusively to the philosophy of mind, where the 
mental powers of the student can be fully tested in 
examining mental elements. He should study to de- 
fine as clearly as possible the existence and office of 
the various properties of mind. It will increase his 
confidence in the true existence of immaterial ele- 
ments, the self-power of the soul to act, and of its 
immortality. His belief will be established as to 
the existence and limitless power, wisdom and good- 
ness of the great first Cause. As standing midway 
the ascending and descending series in two worlds 
of existences, he should rejoice in trying to contem- 
plate all demonstrable truths, possessed of submis- 
sive composure amid the infinite mysteries con- 
nected with the government of an all-wise Creator, 
knowing that duty more imperatively requires him 
ever to wonder and adore, to love and praise. 



tmnt* nf HUntRl Stunt*, 



OB 



THE ELEMENTS OF MIND 



LIE AT THE FOUNDATION OF MENTAL ACTION. 



ELEMENTS OF MENTAL SCIENCE. 

CHAPTER I. 

PRELIMINARY ARGUMENT. 



SECTION I. 
1. The mind of man is truly and clearly a spir- 
itual existent, immaterial in essence or nature, and 
unending in its duration. 2. In the philosophy of 
mind there are elements which may be called mental 
elements. These elements lie at the foundation of 
the philosophy of mind, and are the source of men- 
tal action, and without their existence mental action 
is inane. 3. If moral feelings can exist in the mind, 
and if moral action can proceed from it as an entity, 
or from its states or motion, there must be elements 
of mind connected directly with the origin of moral 
influences, or no moral feelings could ever exist as 
appertaining to or as a part of self; neither could we 
ever be capable of moral action. 



SECTION II. 
1. Those powers which lie at the foundation of 
moral action, or are connected with the origin of 
the moral influences of the soul, may be called 
moral elements of mind. 2. If there is neither 
mental nor moral elements in the mind, there can 

39 



40 PRELIMINARY ARGUMENT. 

be d either mental nor moral science, which can be 
known to us as such. But mental and moral science 
are acknowledged to exist and to be true; hence, 
there must exist in the philosophy of mind both 
mental and moral powers, when we compare the 
nature of the actions which proceed from them; 
otherwise the idea of the power, or the existence of 
either mental or moral action, is absurd; for an 
effect to exist without a foundation or cause is utterly 
impossible. 



INTELLECTUAL POWERS. 41 



CHAPTER II. 

INTELLECTUAL OR MENTAL POWERS. 

SECTION I. 
1. There are various orders of mind. Finite 
minds, from the lowest up to the highest gradation 
of intelligence, are justly responsible to the author- 
it}' of the great infinite mind and sovereign Kuler 
over all, to whom we should ever be wholly submis- 
sive and obedient in adoration, service, love, and 
praise. 2. The inferior orders of animated and self- 
acting beings possess something of the phenomena 
of mind. These properties, if they be only called 
instinct, are properties entirely dissimilar to and 
differing from those of matter. 



SECTION II. 
1. Matter has neither conscious sensation nor self- 
motion, but it has inertness, which is essential to its 
nature and existence, and without which it ceases to 
be matter. 2. That which is analogous to the states 
and manifestations of mind in beasts, birds, and 
fish, if it is perceptible at all, it may be denomina- 
ted or called instinct; yet instinct alone may be 
called imperishable, from the fact that it is distinct 
from and is superior to matter; and we have no 
evidence to believe that any properties or particles 
of matter will ever cease to be. Hence, the intel- 

4* 



42 INTELLECTUAL P0WEB8. 

lectual and immortal powers of the human mind are 
now prominently before us, and form the true objects 
of our inquiries. 




EXISTENCE AND NATURE OF MIND. 43 



CHAPTER III. 

OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE EXISTENCE AND NA- 
TURE OF THE HUMAN MIND. 

SECTION I. 
1. Mind is immaterial in nature, and exists in 
essence, or, as to elements, dissimilarly to that of 
matter, and has a continued being, which is inde- 
pendent of any essential loss or elementary destruc- 
tion by temporal disease or death. 2. It is not con- 
stituted by thought, feeling, or any emotion or act, 
but it is that which feels, thinks, reasons, and acts. 
Though we examine severally the elements or prop- 
erties of mind, it can not be regarded as divisible, 
but it is one in essence or nature, and the union of 
properties in its existence is forever indivisible. 3. 
Our knowledge of the existence of mind or of self, 
independently of demonstration, falls back upon in- 
tuition, and is knowledge, known to be true, in an 
unerring assurance received and fully tested by self- 
consciousness. If the power of knowing existing 
facts be not referred back to innate elements as 
truths or axioms, which lie at the foundation of the 
philosophy of mind ; and if they be not the primary 
source of the knowledge of all real entities to us, all 
our knowledge would be inane, and all entities non- 
existences. In an important sense we know that we 
exist, because we intuitively feel our existence to be 
real, and the knowledge of it to be true. 4. Our 



44 EXISTENCE AND NATURE OF MIND. 

knowledge of the existence of mind may be tested 
by the known existence of certain facts. It has 
power to think and will, remember and reason. It 
holds intercourse with external things by means of 
the corporeal senses, and receives impressions from 
them. These operations and results are known to 
us as facts, which facts are evidences of the exist- 
ence of a power capable of knowing them to be 
such, and this primary power, which is capable of 
knowledge within itself, is mind. 



SECTION II. 
1. These results, which are of the operation or 
motion of the mind, are not the primary knowledge 
of its existence, else the whole of mind would exist 
in motion, and motion can not exist where there is 
no power of self-action, or cause capable of moving. 
But the power of knowing all these acts and results 
falls back upon self-consciousness and intuition. 2. 
In matter such essences as possess solidity and ex- 
tension, or that which is essential to its entity, are 
called primary properties. But contact with a smell 
or odor awakens a conviction in the mind that there 
is somewhere an unknown cause of this known sen- 
sation. This, with color, temperature, and taste, 
have been styled as secondary properties of matter. 
Yet these are only the effects or results, as proof of 
primary elements. 3. If a knowledge of mind, as 
an entity, is wholly and only known by its motion, 
then any knowledge of it is an accident; for motion 
or action may or may not exist; and if there be no 
abiding, primary elements capable of self-motion, 



EXISTENCE AND NATURE OF MIND. 45 

and intuitively the origin of all knowledge, we can 
not have certain knowledge of any existence. 4. 
Any speculations as to the cause of mind are far 
beyond philosophical inquiries. It is not the cause 
of its own existence, neither can entity be a result of 
non-existence. These things go beyond the reach of 
the human understanding. The true cause can only 
exist in the wisdom, goodness, and power of Deity, 
to whom we should bow in submissive awe, amid 
the yet unrevealed mysteries of the past, the present, 
and the future. 5. The nature or essence of mind is 
unknown to us. We know nothing of the essence 
of either matter or mind ; yet we are certain of the 
reality of that mysterious principle within us, which 
is a permanent existent of various phenomena or 
properties. If that principle or power be called the 
essence of mind, in whole or in part, and it be 
unknown to us as to its nature, yet it is not unknown 
to us as an existent. 



SECTION III. 
1. Philosophers generally agree with Mr. Stewart, 
that "we are not immediately conscious of mind's 
existence, but we are conscious of sensation, thought, 
and volition ; operations which imply the existence 
of something which feels, thinks, and wills." To 
what extent we are immediately conscious of its ex- 
istence, anterior to the mind's operations, is difficult 
to define with words. But to say that the power of 
self-consciousness can extend no further back, in any 
way, than the consciousness of sensation, thought, 
and volition, and they admitted to be mere opera- 



46 EXISTENCE AND NATURE OF MIND. 

tions of mind, is absurd. Operations of mind are 
no more than the original power or primary ele- 
ments in motion. It is impossible for those opera- 
tions, which are only sequences or results, to derive 
no power from the primary cause and supporter of 
such operations ; otherwise the operations or acts of 
the mind would be the only primary principle or 
elements of its being. Then, whenever the mind 
was wholly inactive it would be annihilated, or, at 
least, we could have no certain knowledge of self, 
as the mere operations of mind may or may not 
exist; but if they can "imply something which 
feels, thinks, and wills," they imply a power which 
is capable of being the origin of the conscious knowl- 
edge of all the acts of the mind ; otherwise an effect 
must be the origin of the cause of itself. 2. Axioms, 
in numerical science, may, in some respects, repre- 
sent axioms in the philosophy of mind. The whole 
of mathematical demonstrations or calculations can 
not be known to us as certainly true or false, were it 
not for the fact that they are based upon self-evident 
facts or truths called axioms. We are compelled to 
admit that things which are equal to the same thing, 
are equal to one another. If equals be added to 
equals the wholes are equal. All right-angles are 
equal to one another. A square block is a square 
block. Two added to two make four. We know 
all these to be truths or facts ; but it is an absolute 
impossibility for us, by any process of reasoning or 
demonstration, to prove them to be either true or 
false. And without axioms there can be neither 
mathematical demonstrations or science. 3. How 
can we know such truths to be self-evident facts? 



EXISTENCE AND NATURE OF MIND. 47 

"No power can receive them as facts, independently 
of all proof, but the intuitive self-evident axioms 
which are the foundation of the philosophy of mind. 
The innate principles of the soul form the final and 
conclusive source of appeals, and are the primary 
test of the knowledge of facts to us. The knowledge 
of self-evident facts, as such, is tested by an intui- 
tive satisfaction or by self-consciousness, in which it 
is impossible for us to doubt them. 4. Why may 
not these self evident facts, or axioms of the mind, 
have a knowledge of their own existence ; and can 
not the primary power of the perception and the 
understanding of external facts be traced back to 
intuition? The origin of the power of knowledge 
must exist in and arise from the innate elements of 
mind, or otherwise an effect must be the primary or 
antecedent cause of itself. "We can believe facts to 
exist, and to be self-evident truths, because we have 
within an intuitive power to feel and know them to 
be true independently of either proof or disproof. 



48 EXISTENCE AND NATURE OF MIND. 



CHAPTER IV. 

EXISTENCE AND NATURE OF MIND. 
SECTION I. 

1. Our inquiries as to the phenomena of mind 
are more properly confined to properties or elements. 
The origin and nature or essence of mind is beyond 
the limits of philosophical demonstrations. There 
is not so much mystery connected with the examina- 
tion of the elements of mind. 2. The mind is capa- 
ble of a threefold division. (1.) Those which ar 
clearly mental elements. (2.) Those which may b 
called moral elements of mind. (3.) The mani- 
festations or acts of the mind. Mental elements 
are connected with all mental acts, and without their 
existence mental motion or action can not exist. 
They are the foundation or origin properly of such 
action or character of action. Moral elements of 
mind are connected with the origin of all moral 
action, and without such for a foundation no moral 
action can exist. 3. The operations or acts of the 
mind have hitherto been regarded as involving, (1.) 
Our duties to God. (2.) The duties we owe to our- 
selves. (3.) Our duties to one another. All these 
have been claimed as the principal embodiment 
of moral philosophy. 



i- 
e 



EXISTENCE AND NATURE OF MIND. 49 
SECTION II. 

1. To every philosopher it is clear that the present 
order of works on mental and moral science is in- 
correct; for the natural character of the elements of 
mind, according to the books, without any sufficiently 
clear distinction, has been lost sight of from the fact 
that they have been called only mental elements. 
No separate work has been arranged exclusively 
upon mental action, further than is found in connec- 
tion with the examination of the mental elements; 
while, on the other hand, the action of the mind 
has been, by common consent, called moral action, 
connected with moral duties as it is contained in 
moral philosophy. But we should bear in mind 
that there are elements of mind which may be called 
moral elements, growing out of their relation to and 
influence or position in the mind. 2. This work is 
intended, as far as possible, to define, in the first 
place, mental elements, and, secondly, moral ele- 
ments of mind. Then there should be a work 
adapted to the character, power, and nature of the 
actions, which are the results of elementary existen- 
ces which are truly mental. If moral philosophy 
can apply to the action of mind, which arises in 
connection with and from moral elements of mind, 
and in relation to moral objects, so may action, 
which is wholly mental, arising only from mental 
elements, be defined as mental action in nature and 
character. 3. From the position of many writers 
we would be led to suppose that moral action, or 
that moral philosophy was based wholly upon men- 
tal elements, while the works on mental philosophy 

5 



50 EXISTENCE AND NATTTBE OF MIND. 

do not contain moral elements of mind properly ac- 
knowledged and sufficiently defined. But they will 
be defined hereafter in discriminating the difference 
in the nature or character of mental and moral ele- 
ments of mind. 4. The mind, so regularly and nat- 
urally arranged, contains within itself immediate 
power to Ictiow and to extend knowledge by examin- 
ing elements, laws, and affinities of existences. This 
is the comparison of phenomena, and the discovery 
of their agreement and disagreement. Though we 
can not arrive at the nature of the essence of mind, 
yet we are certain of something existing within, 
exhibiting a permanent subject of certain varying 
phenomena, of which we are conscious, and to doubt 
it would be impossible. 



SENSATION. 51 



CHAPTER V. 

SENSATION. 

SECTION I. 
1. Sensation is the mind's reception of an action 
felt and known to exist, or it is an impression made 
upon it. The senses form the medium through 
which such an effect is realized. In another point 
of light it may be regarded as a simple state of the 
mind, in a peculiar way, and connected with action. 
Abstractly it is incapable of self-action, and must 
be, to a certain extent, a result of some influence or 
impingement, which may arise in different ways. 2. 
It may be connected with the change or influence of 
some one or more of the organs of sense, or in being 
closely accessory to the change of the physical pow- 
ers. A change in the internal state and condition 
of the body may awaken the sensation of fatigue, 
pain, or heaviness. 3. Sensation can not he separa- 
ted from the mind. All sensation is in the mind, 
and is nothing more nor less than the mind itself in 
a certain state. Our sensations are diversified and 
are almost innumerable. The body has parts, and 
can exist with the loss of some of its members ; but 
the mind and sensation are forever indivisible. A 
sensation must be the mind influenced, and is the 
mind in a certain state. But sensation is not wholly 
the mind itself. By the term mind we understand 
an indefinable essence, of which only the elements 



52 SENSATION. 

can come under philosophical analysis ; but sensa- 
tion can be the mind in a certain way. 4. Sensa- 
tion is wholly in the mind, and the cause of sensa- 
tion may exist in the changes or condition of the 
body, or it may arise from objects of the external 
world. Hearing, touch, and seeing are connected 
with physical organs ; but those organs have no self- 
power to hear, feel, and see. They may be con- 
nected with and may be organs of sensation; but 
sensation within itself is in the mind, and is the 
mind in a peculiar state. 



SECTION II. 
1. In another shade of meaning sensation is feel- 
ing awakened by objects of the external world. 
The knowledge it gives of external objects is quite 
imperfect. It requires a combined action of several 
faculties in conveying to us a general idea of real 
existences. The various senses, acting separately, 
can give us no correct idea of existences, nor of the 
properties of compounds. Sensation can convey to 
us a result of a known or of an unknown existence; 
but of itself it can not give us a knowledge of 
either the essence or of the properties of existences. 

2. Sensation may be a state of internal feelings, 
which is capable of being excited by spiritual influ- 
ences, or by sensations of humility and awe in the 
presence of the great God. It can be realized in 
the bare remembrance of startling events in the past. 

3. In receiving impressions from external objects, 
we are to bear in mind that our sensations are not 
the appearance or images of those entities, for the 






SENSATION. 53 

true place of sensation is in the mind. No external 
property can form any part of sensation, neither 
can it be added to it. It is entirely different from 
all material properties in essence or in nature. And 
it is distinct in nature, so far as we can understand, 
from all spiritual influences beyond the reality of 
self. 4. The connection between sensation and the 
physical organs is involved in mystery. External 
objects make an impression or they affect the phys- 
ical organs, and through the medium of the senses 
they awake sensations in the mind. To explain the 
change effected in those organs, or to define their 
connection with the senses, is impossible. 5. The 
awakening of sensation, by external objects, through 
the medium of the senses, is evidence that it is, to a 
great extent, consequent to the senses, so far as it 
relates to action from these sources. In this respect 
only it is immediately successive to the action of 
some one or more of the organs of sense ; yet the 
power of sensation is in the mind, which power can 
and will act independently of the physical organs 
connected with the senses, in feelings of awe in the 
Divine presence, or in bare remembrance of past 
emotions of the soul, which existed either with or 
without a known cause. 6. As sensation is in the 
mind, and is the mind, in a certain way, we are 
compelled to acknowledge its connection with the 
primary elements of mental science; for sensation 
can not exist only in connection with the existence 
of mind. 

5* 



54 SENSE. 



CHAPTER VI. 

SENSE. 

SECTION I. 
1. Sense, as connected with the human mind, is 
that principle or faculty which has power to appre- 
hend the existence, and, to some extent, the qualities 
of external objects. 2. It appears to hold a midway 
relation between the existence and change of the 
physical organs and the existence of real sensation. 
3. In this position only it is immediately succeeded 
by sensation, being the medium through which im- 
pressions from external objects wake up the power 
of sensation in the mind. 






SECTION II. 
1. Sense, at least, apprehends some of the quali- 
ties of the substances which cause sensations, such 
as possess hardness, extension, and weight, which 
comes in contact with physical organs. 2. Its sim- 
ple state is spontaneous , and its action may be 
wholly voluntary, as well as a result of either volun- 
tary or invoked causes. 3. It may be regarded as 
the perception of the senses, or is that influence or- 
motion which is immediately successive to impres- 
sions made upon physical organs toward the reality 
of that which is felt ere sensation refers it to the 



SENSE. 55 

consideration of the mind. 4. It may, in another 
point of light, be regarded as the discernment of the 
senses, which takes place on contact with an object, 
and in relation to the real existence of such an ob- 
ject, almost at the same time the beginning of the 
impression thus made is realized. 



56 THE SENSES. 



CHAPTER VII. 

THE SENSES 



SECTION I. 

1. The senses connect, in one respect, the sensa 
tions of the mind with the organs of sense in the 
body, and have power to report to us the existence of 
external things when they come in contact with the 
physical organs, and can convey a knowledge of 
their properties in connection with the action of 
other powers of the mind. 2. The connection ex- 
isting between the senses and the organs of sense in 
the body can not be defined. 3. "We are wholly 
dependent upon our senses as the medium through 
which we have knowledge of external things. While 
the senses apprehend external things, and are a 
source of knowledge to us, as to their real existence, 
yet we have other sources of knowledge ; otherwise 
the senses would be the embodiment of all the facul- 
ties of the mind. 



SECTION II. 
1. "We are dependent upon the senses only so far 
as it relates to existences in the external world, as 
the primary medium of access in knowing their ex- 
istence to be real. Abstractly we can not call the 
senses the knowledge of external things. They are 
only the knowledge of external things in connection 



sa- 



THE SENSES. 57 

with other powers of the mind. 2. The importance 
of the senses as a source of knowledge in regard to 
external objects is indispensable. If we were de- 
prived of smell, taste, hearing, touch, and sight, it 
would be utterly impossible for us to know any thing 
of external physical existences. 3. Yet the loss of 
all these could not annihilate the mind, neither could 
they deprive it of sensations within itself, nor from 
other spiritual influences or existences. 4. We are 
now about to enter upon the order of the five senses. 
In examining the senses as they occur in their order, 
it is not intended that we should define the power 
of the senses as they exist in the mind, disconnected 
with the physical organs of sense ; but to define, as 
far as possible, their office and power as they exist 
in their mysterious connection with the organs of 
the body. 



58 THE SENSE OF SMELL. 



CHAPTER VIII. 

THE SENSE OF SMELL. 

SECTION I. 
1. The organ of smell is said to consist in the ex- 
tension of nerves to every part of the delicate mu- 
cous membrane, with which the cavities of the 
nostrils are lined. These are connected to the sin- 
ews and extend up to the brain. So that by real 
physical entities the organ of smell is delicately and 
sensitively connected with the brain, which is re- 
garded as the organ of the mind. 2. The sense of 
smell is clearly connected with the nerves, and it is 
impossible to separate it from them only in the de- 
struction of the physical organs ; then that power of 
the mind may remain inactive, so far as it relates to 
the power of apprehending external objects. 3. The 
substance of the nerves contains precisely the same 
properties as that of the brain. That part of any 
nerve which has been severed by disease or by vio- 
lence, loses all sensation, and is doomed to perish. 
If all the nerves of the system are sensorial, and are 
connected in some way with the brain, then all the 
physical organs of sense are connected with the 
brain. And the senses are inseparably connected 
with the nervous system. 4. The nasal nerves, or 
physical organ of sense, may be affected by the odor 
of a rose, and simultaneously is, or exists, the sense 



THE SENSE OF SMELL. 59 

of smell. The nerves and the sense of smell are 
not one and the same ; yet to define the connection 
of the two is impossible. SeDsation is immediately 
successive to the sense of smell, and conveys to the 
mind the impression of the external object, which 
was apprehended by the organ of sense. 



SECTION II. 
1. The sensations of smell are received by means 
of the organ, which is the mind's primary, yet the 
most remote test in apprehending the existence of 
external things. 2. The nature and elements of that 
which affects the organ may elude our knowledge, as 
to a correct understanding of the manner of the op- 
eration ; yet there is a state of mind produced by it, 
varying, in a great measure, voluntarily with the 
nature and elements of that which produced the 
impression. This peculiar mental affection is inva- 
riably successive to the organic change. And the 
nature of the connection blending the two in one 
action is beyond all explanation. 3. We can not 
classify, but to a limited extent, the sensations re- 
ceived by the sense of smell, for they are numerous 
and diversified. "We may use such terms as sweet, 
sour, and musty; but as a general rule they are 
classed, being distinguished by their connection with 
the object which causes the sensation, as the smell 
of a peach or an apple. The sensations received 
through the organ of smell are naturally pleasant or 
disagreeable. Some of the objects which produce 
them throw off an effluvia which is delightfully ex- 
hilarating, and others produce death. 4. The sen- 



60 THE SENSE OF SMELL. 

sation of smell, through the means of the organ, has 
an important influence upon life and health. It 
aids in the right use of medicines, detecting the 
harmless from the poisonous. It detects poisonous 
odors emitted from objects, or that which is destruct- 
ive in vapors in the air. It aids in the selection of 
the right kind of food, as well as to impart to us a 
knowledge of the thousands of sweet odors which 
are wafted upon the winds of heaven. 5. It is the 
■properties of external bodies which produce these 
sensations. Odoriferous effluvia, or small particles, 
are emitted from certain substances, and are diffused 
through the atmosphere. The air which is drawn 
through the nostrils is impregnated with these parti- 
cles, and it brings them in contact with the organ 
of the sense of smell. 



SECTION III. 

1. The "perceptions of smell" are not in distinc- 
tion from sensation; for perceptions of smell can 
not exist. Smell, within and of itself, is incapable 
of perception. We can have perceptions of that 
which is the object of the sense of smell, and we 
may have certain perceptions of or in relation to the 
condition and existence of the organ or sense within 
or of themselves, but not as many writers define 
perceptions of smell. 2. The argument must differ 
from former writers ; for there can be no sense of 
smell till that organ has been affected. The action} 
then, which is sensation, conveys the impression to 
the mind. Till that action reaches the mind there 
can be no perception. If we can have perception 






THE SENSE OF SMELL. bl 

of smell, then perception must precede sensation, 
which is impossible. There can be no smell, known 
to us as such, till the organ is affected. Then if 
perception precedes sensation, it must act without 
direction to any definite object. And it will not do 
to say that sensation within itself is the perception 
of itself or of the cause of its own action. 3. "We 
can have perceptions of the objects which are the 
cause of the action of the sense of smell, and these 
perceptions are in distinction from sensation. 

6 



62 THE SENSE OF TASTE. 



CHAPTER IX. 

THE SENSE OF TASTE. 

SECTION I. 
1. The organs of taste consist of nervous papillae, 
covering the surface of the tongue, and particularly 
that of the apex and sides. It exists also in the mu- 
cous membrane, which lines the palate and the cavity 
of the mouth. The entrance of the alimentary canal 
is so guarded that the suitableness of every thing 
which enters into the stomach is fully tested by the or- 
gan of taste. 2. The sense of taste is realized when 
the organ comes in contact with substances of differ- 
ent natures or qualities of properties. These effect a 
change in the organ, which is immediately followed 
by a corresponding influence of mind. 3. To the 
sense of taste is connected the sensations of taste, 
conveying to the mind, to some extent, something 
of a corresponding impression arising from the qual- 
ities of properties, or from the nature of the external 
motive cause. This position has been denied; and 
it has been maintained that sensation can not con- 
vey any thing of the nature or condition of its cause, 
but that it is reserved for some other power or fac- 
ulty to have perceptions of the qualities and nature 
of that which causes sensation. 4. If any faculty 
or faculties have power to convey to the mind any 
thing of the qualities or nature of objects causing 
sensation, why may not sense and sensation influence 






THE SENSE OF TASTE. 63 

the mind in regard to the cause of sensations, and 
favorably to the apprehending of the qualities of 
the same? for they are by nature adapted, as the 
inlet to the mind, to the reality of such existences, 
and are designed to be more closely connected with 
such objects than any other faculty or power of the 
mind. 5. The doctrine that sense and sensation, 
which are more nearly and more closely connected 
w T ith the causes which affect them than any other 
power, can not affect the mind favorably to the 
qualities and nature of such causes, is too absurd to 
require refuting arguments, and especially so, when 
all that has ever been said to the reverse consists 
wholly in assumptions. 6. The nature of the sensa- 
tions of taste are known, and are items of experi- 
ence. The mind having been impressed by sensa- 
tion, the affections are immediately moved in search 
of some external cause. Sensation, unaided by 
other affections and faculties of the mind, and with- 
out any assistance from experience, can not convey 
to the mind a full knowledge of the various quali- 
ties of external substances; yet there is a natural 
adaptation in external objects to produce in the 
mind a sensation, to some extent, corresponding to 
their nature, which may be called the sensation of 
sweet, sour, or bitter, according to the nature or 
qualities of the objects. 



SECTION II. 
1. The modifications of taste consist in its power 
to change, or in the inclination of the organ to 
adapt itself, or to be adapted to the nature of the 



64 THE SENSE OF TASTE. 

various qualities of sapid objects. There is hardly 
any quality of the objects of taste so disagreeable 
but that use can make them to be endured, and, per- 
haps, finally agreeable. And on the other hand the 
pleasurable may lose its agreeableness by continued 
use. 2. The properties of bodies which give rise to 
the sensations of taste are called effluvia or flavors. 
The nature of the essence of these flavors is un- 
known to us ; yet we know that such flavors exist. 
3. Immediately upon the sensations of taste a state 
of mind ensues which refers them to the external 
cause, and, in part, correspondingly to the peculiar 
quality of some sapid object, like unto those which 
are acrid, sweet, or bitter. 



THE SENSE OF HEARING. 65 



CHAPTER X. 

THE SENSE OF HEARING. 

SECTION I. 
1. The ear is the organ of sound or of hearing. 
Its location is convenient and wisely arranged. Its 
projection forms an external koilon, which is suita- 
ble to the gathering of every pulsation of the air as 
they are wafted from every direction. The internal 
cavity consists of circular winding passages. These 
are partitioned or divided by the tympanum, which 
is a delicate membrane, called the drum of the ear, 
and which has a nerve delicately and beautifully 
spread out upon its internal surface. This is called 
the auditory nerve, and is connected to the brain. 
2. The sense of hearing consists in the power or in- 
fluence which is principally and mysteriously con- 
nected with the union of the tympanum and the 
auditory nerve. This is affected by the action of 
the atmosphere. The undulations, waves, or pulsa- 
tions of the air move upon or impress the tym- 
panum. 3. The sensations of hearing are realized 
when the vibrations of the agitated air are transmit- 
ted through the labyrinth, impressing the transpar- 
ent membrane or drum of the ear, and affecting the 
auditory nerve, which is connected with the brain. 
The sensation is almost simultaneously conveyed 
from the organ, when affected, to the mind, which is 

6* 



66 THE SENSE OF HEARING. 

followed by a new state of mind, in which we have 
perception, and an inquiry as to the external cause. 



SECTION II. 
1. The varieties of the sensation of sound are 
almost innumerable. It has been said that the ear 
is capable of detecting about five hundred variations 
of tone, and as many variations in strength. We 
are informed that when these are combined they 
number about twenty thousand, varying in simple 
sounds, degrees of strength, and difference of tone. 
Many human voices may sound the tone represented 
by three in the octave or stave, and each one will 
differ from all the rest, though sounding the same 
tone. Fifty different instruments may sound the 
same note and the ear be capable to distinguish a dif- 
ference in all of them. A difference can be detected 
which may arise from light or heavy atmosphere, 
the good or bad repair of the same instrument, and 
also of the voice in sickness contrasted with the 
same in health, and a pleasant with an angry mode, 
or age with youth. 2. The cause of these sensations 
is remotely in the object or agent which produces the 
vibratory state of the atmosphere, as the air has not 
irregular self-motion. A sonorous body, when struck, 
agitates the atmosphere around it; this agitation 
recedes from it in all directions in wave-like undu- 
lations, resembling the concentric encircling waves 
on the surface of water at rest when ruptured by a 
falling stone. Yet the air in motion may be re- 
garded as the operative and impressing cause of the 
sensations of hearing. 3. The knowledge which 



THE SENSE OF HEARING. • 67 

simple sounds convey to the mind is not intuitive. 
The power of the sensations of sound belongs to 
intuition ; but the knowledge we receive of the ex- 
istence and properties of external objects, as a se- 
quence of the impressions made by sensations, is 
aided by other faculties in connection with experi- 
ence. The new state of mind consequent upon the 
action of these sensations, is that in which we have 
perceptions and full knowledge of the existing cause. 
4. We can not tell the direction of sound, neither 
the distance it is from us, nor the qualities of the 
cause wholly unaided by other faculties and experi- 
ence. But in gaining a knowledge of the direction, 
distance, and existence of the cause, we can and 
must depend, to a considerable extent, upon the 
sense of hearing. As to direction and distance, 
more depends upon the sense of hearing than expe- 
rience. 



SECTION III. 
1. To have knowledge of sound it is indispensable 
that we be in the direction and under the influence 
of the waves of air as they strike the ear. The nat- 
ural course and motion of sound is always from the 
cause. There can be no sound without a motion of 
the air, and if there is motion it recedes from the cause. 
If we depend upon experience for its direction and 
location, we can arrive at them amid high and strong 
winds as though all were calm. But this is absurd. 
2. We gain our knowledge of location principally 
from the direction of the motion of the undulations 
or pulsations of air which strike the ear, producing 



68 THE SENSE OF HEARING. 

a corresponding sensation; and also of distance by 
the peculiar modifications of the strength or force 
of such pulsations; for if there be nothing in the 
sensation corresponding or agreeing in any way with 
the properties or nature of its cause, then it follows 
that the mind, in trying to determine the true cause 
by perception, acts without a guide, and the result is 
wholly accidental; for no faculty is calculated by 
nature, or has more power to give correct direction 
to the perception of cause than sense or sensation, 
which are affected or are created by it. 3. Further 
proof that we are in a degree dependent upon the 
peculiar manner and way in which sound strikes the 
ear in determining the cause and its location, is 
found in the fact that when we have a confused idea 
of the direction of sound we intuitively turn the 
head in different directions to get the direction of 
the waves of air on the tympanum, in order to know 
the true direction of the cause, and from the pecu- 
liar modulations and force of the sound thus con- 
veyed we judge of the distance to the cause or 
object. 4. The sense of hearing is of great import- 
ance. By it we are made acquainted with the music 
of nature, the melody in the concordant sounds of 
instruments and of the living voice. Music has 
charms which are exhilarating and soothing. Verbal 
language is wholly dependent upon this sense. Ar- 
ticulated sounds or speech in the reciprocal expres- 
sion of feelings, fears, and hopes, forms one of the 
principal mediums and sources of human happiness. 
For such inestimable gifts praise should ever re- 
dound to the great Creator. 



THE SENSE OF TOUCH. 69 



CHAPTER XL 

THE SENSE OF TOUCH. 

SECTION I. 
1. The organ of touch may be said to be blended 
with and exists in the muscles or papillae, extending 
over the whole surface of the body. The hands and 
fingers have been regarded as the principal organ 
of touch ; but it is not clear that there is naturally 
much more minute delicacy or acute sensations in 
the tendons, fibers, nerves, muscles, or skin of the 
hands and fingers, than exists internally and over 
the entire surface of the body. Yery much depends 
upon the frequent use of the hands and the concen- 
tration of the faculties to their use in realizing sen- 
sations of touch. 2. The sense of touch is far more 
extensive than the other senses which we have just 
examined ; for in one sense it includes them all in 
itself, possessing the surface of the whole physical 
frame; yet a distinction can be made and does natu- 
rally exist in the senses. 3. The sense of touch is 
not the essence or properties which compose the 
nervous system ; but it is that power or influence of 
the mind which is mysteriously and inseparably con- 
nected with the tendons, fibers, nerves, and muscles, 
extending its connection with them to the very apex 
of the papillse spread over the surface of the body. 
Here it comes in contact with and realizes the exist- 
ence of external objects. 4. The sensations of touch 



• 



70 THE SENSE OF TOUCH. 

constitute that which conveys to the mind impres- 
sions of objects which affect the physical organs. 
Consequent upon the action of these sensations is a 
new state of mind which has perceptions of the 
cause. But to define the mysterious union of the 
power of the sensationsof touch with the physical 
organ, or nerves, is utterly impossible. 



SECTION II. 
1. The extent and variations of the sensations 
touch differ from those senses which we have no- 
ticed. By the sense of smell we acquire a knowl- 
edge of the effluvia or odors of external objects. 
By the tongue and palate we gain a knowledge of 
tastes; and by the ear we hear sounds. The knowl- 
edge gained by these senses is restricted to the sin- 
gle medium of appropriate operation peculiar to 
each one. But by the sense of touch we acquire 
knowledge of various objects and of different quali- 
ties, such as solidity, softness, hardness, roughness, and 
smoothness, and such as heat, cold, and extension 
and form. 2. The influence of the qualities of ex- 
ternal bodies upon the mind, through the medium 
of the sense of touch, may and does, to some extent, 
impart a knowledge of those properties correspond- 
ing to the peculiar nature of their existence. This 
can be tested by contact with hardness, extension, 
and form, solidity, softness, roughness, smoothness, 
and motion. 3. Whether these properties be of pri- 
mary or of secondary knowledge, in whole or in 
part, does not prevent them from producing, when 
brought in contact with the sense of touch, an in- 



THE SENSE OF TOUCH. 71 

ternal sensation or feeling corresponding, to some 
extent, with the peculiar condition, state, or nature 
of the cause. 4. Knowledge in the mind, which 
arises from these sources, can not be perfect, received 
only through the medium of any one of the senses 
without the aid of other faculties. All sensations 
are in the mind; and the idea that they have no 
power, when produced by external objects, to influ- 
ence the mind in any way or to any degree, as to 
the nature or properties of the affecting cause, is con- 
trary to true analysis and our conceptions of truth. 



SECTION III. 
1. All sensation is in the mind, and can not exist 
either with or without external causes. Sensation 
is known to be true, and within itself is nothing else 
than what it is felt to be. 2. The nature of the sen- 
sations of touch is very different from the nature or 
qualities existing in the external causes of sensation. 
External causes can exist independently of the sen- 
sation of touch, and sensations may exist without 
any external cause. But when we are brought in 
contact with external objects, sensation reports the 
existence of such objects to the mind. And in con- 
nection with the sensation thus reporting to or im- 
pressing the mind, is the origin of the idea of the 
properties of such external cause or causes. 3. Con- 
nected with the sense of touch is the origin of the 
idea of extension, hardness, roughness, and smooth- 
ness, and also of edges, corners, and sharp points. 
The notion of such qualities must first arise in con- 
nection with and be conveyed to the mind through 



72 THE SENSE OF TOUCH. 

the medium of the sense of touch. And with it is 
connected the origin of the idea of the form or the 
figure of bodies. 4. Connected with the sense and 
sensation of touch is the origin of our knowledge of 
the temperature of bodies. When heat and cold 
affect the organs of the sense of touch, the sensa- 
tion may be capable of a corresponding action in 
the peculiar state, nature, or modulations within 
itself. And with the nature of its action upon the 
mind is the origin of the idea of the qualities caus- 
ing action ; for without the medium of the sense of 
touch we can have no knowledge of either heat or 
cold. 5. The sensation is not within itself the idea 
or the knowledge of the existence of heat or cold ; 
but connected with the sensation is the origin of the 
idea of such existences; for if the origin of such 
ideas be not connected with the sense of touch, then 
we can have no knowledge of either heat or cold. 
This position is not affected, whether the sensations 
arise from internal or external causes. It is easy to 
determine whether the sensation arises from the 
remote apex of the organ of touch, or from some 
influence affecting the internal tendons, fibers, or 
nerves of a healthy system. 



SECTION IV. 
1. A sentient being may know that heat and cold 
do exist, but as to the qualities of realities which 
are called heat and cold we know nothing. There 
is a difference between a sensation and an idea. A 
sensation may be immediately antecedent to an 
idea, and we may form an idea of the cause of & 



THE SENSE OF TOUCH. 73 

sensation after the sensation is gone; yet the origin 
of the idea may be connected with sensation, though 
that idea or notion may be matured after the sensa- 
tion is gone. 2. That the origin of the idea of ex- 
ternal qualities which affect the sense of touch, is 
connected with the sensation of touch, has been ac- 
knowledged by all the leading philosophers of past 
time; but many of them contradict their assumed 
premises in the conclusion of their own arguments, 
by denying the origin of our knowledge of any ex- 
ternal substance as being connected in any way with 
the sensation of touch. They have fallen into this 
error by trying to keep up a logical distinction be- 
tween the elements of mind, severing the affinity of 
their united being by wild, abstract analysis. 3. In 
essence there is no similarity between the sensation 
and the external cause. How this dissimilar sensa- 
tion can carry with it the origin of the idea of the 
external cause we can not define, but we can not 
doubt the fact. Sensations are not the knowledge 
of external things ; but what can we know of exter- 
nal objects without the medium of the sense of 
touch? It is the basis of the mind's action in 
knowing their existence. 4. This sense can not, 
within itself, convey to us a matured knowledge of 
external existences; yet the sensations may be af- 
fected by the qualities of their cause, sending them, 
with various modulations, to the mind, and varying 
in degrees of strength. How far these can impress 
the mind in regard to the qualities of the external 
causes we can not tell ; but connected with the sen- 
sations of touch is the origin of our knowledge of 
the cause of such sensations. 

7 



74 THE SENSE OF SIGHT. 



CHAPTER XII. 

THE SENSE OF SIGHT. 

SECTION I. 

1. The eye is the organ of the sense of sight. Its 
location is wisely arranged for convenience and use- 
fulness, and where it can be most readily defended 
from harm or danger. It consists of transparent 
substances. The humors are of various refractive 
powers. They are called the aqueous, crystalline, 
and vitreous humors. The first refraction of the 
rays of light takes place when they fall upon the 
convexed surface of the cornea of the eye. This 
exterior surface receives the rays of light and trans- 
mits them to the aqueous humor. This transparent 
fluid exists between the cornea and the crystalline 
humor. The pupil is the center of the iris, and is the 
avenue to admit, and is for the transmission of the 
rays of light passing from the aqueous humor to the 
crystalline lens. It is maintained that here they are 
rerefracted and transmitted to the retina, which is 
surrounded by the vitreous humor. 2. The retina 
is a delicate membrane, which lies at the bottom of 
the eye, and contains upon it the expansion of the 
sensitive optic nerve. Rays of light affect the sense 
of vision while passing through the eye, and are 
undergoing several refractions; but they produce 
upon the retina or optic nerve the true image of the 
object which reflects the light. This sensitive organ 



THE SENSE OF SIGHT. 75 

receives the image of the external object impressed 
upon it, and tins impression is the origin of vision. 
The primary power of vision is connected with the 
optic nerve, and connected with this nerve is the 
origin of the sensations of sight which report to the 
mind. 3. The importance of the sense of sight to 
our happiness and knowledge is self-evident. We 
can not fully estimate the true value of sight with- 
out supposing ourselves to have been always de- 
prived of it. Yet in that case we could depend 
upon others ; therefore we must try to imagine the 
condition of the whole world without the power of 
vision. One glance of vision can survey hill and 
valley, mountain and lake, the verdant plain and 
rock-bound coast, flying clouds and rolling seas. In 
an instant of time it traverses a great variety in ter- 
restrial existences — matches the flight of the vast 
globe, then ranges amid the revolving orbs of the 
planetary universe. But in the absence of vision 
these might exist and move, yet all would be night — 
eternal night to us. 



SECTION II. 
1. The mysterious arrangement of the internal 
structure of the eye, in adapting it to the effects pro- 
duced by it, displays a design, skill, and wisdom 
infinitely above the power of atheistic arguments ; 
for it is conclusive evidence of an omnipotent Crea- 
tor, who fashioned it according to his infinite wis- 
dom. The rays of light are refracted to a proper 
point by the different coats and humors. The mus- 
cular tendons command the action of the ball in 



76 THE SENSE OF SIGHT. 

turning the pupil to the desired object. A circular, 
prominent, and strong orbit is set for its defense. 
It is protected by lids, lashes, and glands, secreting 
tears which promote its lubricity, supplying moisture, 
and, after washing the eye, the fluid passes through 
the outlet into the nose. This exquisite, mysterious, 
and successful arrangement can not be a result of 
accident or of chance. 2. The sense of sight must 
be connected with the retina or optic nerve. It is 
not the nerve within itself, neither is it the object of 
vision; but it is connected and has its origin with 
the sensitiveness of the optic nerve. 3. When we 
consider the acute sensitiveness of the optic nerve, 
if rays of light reflected from objects paint or im- 
press the optic nerve with the images of such objects 
in order that they may be seen, may they not, in 
part, be felt by the optic nerve when seen? 4. The 
sensations of sight are awakened when rays of light 
from the object of sight affect tjie retina or optic 
nerve. These sensations impress the mind. A state 
of mind ensues in which we have perception of the 
cause of such sensations. 5. What modern philoso- 
phers mean by "the perceptions of sight" we can 
not understand. If they mean that sight has per- 
ceptions of objects within and of itself, we beg leave 
to differ from them, as that would be utterly impos- 
sible. And if they mean that we can have percep- 
tion of the origin of sight, by which we see an 
object, then sight would be a sequence of percep- 
tion, and is dependent upon it for its existence, 
which is not true. Therefore, there can be no such 
thing as the perceptions of sight, but we can have 
perceptions of the objects of sight. 



THE SENSE OF SIGHT. 77 

SECTION III. 
1. Colors have been regarded as the principal 
cause of the sensations of sight. But as to how 
colors are produced, or as to where they have their 
origin, is left in obscurity. They may arise partly 
in the essence or qualities of the objects seen, as 
well as from the various refracted rays of light re- 
flected from those objects, and which fall on the 
power of vision. Some bodies, and even some prop- 
erties, possess power to reflect some rays more 
abundantly than others. That light within and of 
itself consists of rays of different colors, unaffected 
by contact with other existences, is very doubtful. 
Light passing through a glass prism presents differ- 
ent colors ; why can we not have the same result 
when it passes through prisms of other transparent 
substances? 2. "We find, to some extent, that colors 
vary with the essence and qualities of the objects 
refracting and reflecting the rays of light. They 
may possess naturally a difference within themselves, 
but if so we have no knowledge of the fact. It is 
more reasonable to believe that color arises from the 
nature of the objects which reflect the light to the 
eye, or that it results from a modification of the 
principles of attraction, adhesion, density, or repul- 
sion of such objects. 3. It is light reflected from 
external objects which affects the fibrous expansion 
of the sensitive optic nerve, and awakens sensations 
which extend to and impress the mind of the exist- 
ing action of the reflected light, together with the 
images of the objects which cause such sensations. 
The modulations or change imparted to the rays of 

7* 



78 THE SENSE OF SIGHT. 

light by the objects which reflect and refract them 
is carried by them to the sense of sight, and a cor- 
responding sensation extends to the mind. This is 
reasonable, unless we deny that sensations are capa- 
ble of change or modulations. 4. If we can not 
deny the degrees, or that there is a difference in the 
strength of the sensations, which correspond to the 
variations of the action of the rays of light reflected 
from a bright object, compared with those from an 
opaque body, may we not conclude that sensations 
may vary with modulations of light in other re- 
spects % But this fact we do not know to be true : 
yet there is more reason in support of it than can be 
found on or in regard to a thousand other points 
assumed by philosophers when they have been una- 
ble to render one argument in support of them. 
This far we can go, that the origin of our knowledge 
of visual objects may be and is connected with the 
sensations of sight. 



SECTION IY. 
1. "We have power to modify or change the rays 
of light which come from visual objects by interven- 
ing transparent substances, and correspondingly our 
notions of those objects. Though light is the pri- 
mary object of sight, yet, in order to see external 
things, there must be objects from which light is 
reflected, and the change and modulations of the 
reflected rays carrying with them the image of such 
objects to the power of vision, or the eye of coats, 
humors, and retina, or optic nerve. To define the 
precise office, nature, and powers of any or of all 



THE SENSE OF SIGHT. 79 

these is beyond human wisdom or philosophical 
analysis. 2. The knowledge we receive through the 
sense of sight. This sense can be affected by gradu- 
ated rays of light and shade coming from an innu- 
merable variety of objects and qualities. At once 
we see the relative position of bodies, with their 
magnitude, figure, distance, and color, aided by per- 
ception, suggestion, association, and experience. To 
say that the sense of sight, within itself, has power 
to impart to us a full knowledge of visual objects is 
absurd. And to say that within itself it has no 
power to aid in arriving at a knowledge of such 
objects is false; for our knowledge of visual ob- 
jects, as such, has its origin with the sensations of 
sight. 3. Philosophers have erred in denning the 
senses so as to abstract them from their affinity to 
the other faculties of the mind, thereby rendering 
them powerless in aiding to the real knowledge of 
existences, whereas we should bear in mind that the 
elements are forever indivisible. 4. Our knowledge 
of color is derived from the sense of sight, and the 
origin of this knowledge is original with the power 
of vision. ]STo one of the other senses can be in- 
volved in the primary detection of color. Color 
may be a property inherent in light, consisting in a 
difference or condition in the rays of light and 
shades, refracted and reflected, or are so changed, 
which is a result from contact with the bodies the 
appearance of which they present or impress upon 
the optic nerve. If white is not to be called a color, 
yet it may be regarded as the primary quality from 
which colors gradate, as red, orange, yellow, green, 
blue, indigo, and violet. These are imparted to the 



80 THE SENSE OF SIGHT. 

mind by the sensations of sight only. And if the 
origin of our knowledge of color is conveyed to the 
mind by the sensations of sight, may not the pecu- 
liar manner or way in which the sense of sight is 
affected, produce corresponding sensations in their 
modulations or nature in regard to the knowledge 
of other existences? And may not the same be true 
of the other senses? We know that philosophers 
have taught differently, and the substance of their 
reasons are that it is not so because it is not so, and 
no higher reason has been rendered by them. 



SECTION V. 
1. The idea of extension as visual is not wholly 
original. from sight, but it is dependent upon it for 
self-correctness. Light is the primary object of vi- 
sion, but it is not the only object of vision. The 
modulations and inherent nature of its refracted and 
rejected rays present the appearance of objects to 
the sense of sight. If the power of vision extends 
no further than the retina of the eye, and that vision 
consists in the first contact of light with it, then 
when the image of an object was impressed upon 
the optic nerve, it would continue to be seen, though 
the object should be intercepted with a cloud or 
darkness. May we not have power, in some way, 
to see the extension of the surface of real bodies? 
If there was one clear reason to the reverse we 
would gladly adopt it, and we will do so when such 
reason or reasons are to be found. 2. If a solid 
body can present to the eye nothing but colors and 
light, will that prove that there is no connection 



THE SENSE OF SIGHT. 81 

existing in any way between those colors and light, 
and the object which causes them to fall on the 
power of vision ? We can see the effect of a strong 
wind, but we can not see the element itself. But it 
is different with a solid body ; it is the cause of a 
peculiar light and color as the effect upon the eye; 
these are continuously supported there by the object; 
hence, the light and color either see for us the cause 
which continues their stay, or the eye can see, first, 
the primary objects, light and color, and, secondly, 
by means of these the real objects. If the optic 
nerve has power to feel the action of the rays 
of light and the image impressed upon it, may 
it not have power by means of them to feel the 
object which causes their action upon the nerve, and 
continues it as long as the eye is directed to such 
objects? 3. The origin of our knowledge of the 
extension, figure, and magnitude of bodies, is prop- 
erly connected with the sense* of touch, and is 
strengthened and greatly increased by the sense of 
sight. Beginning with the sense of touch and sight 
we arrive at a knowledge of the extension of bodies 
by association and comparison. 4. Our knowledge 
of objects, through the sense of sight only, is lim- 
ited and confused. It has been ascertained by re- 
moving the cataract from the eyes of adult persons, 
that at first visual objects appeared to be touching 
the eye; and it requires the aid of some of the other 
senses, and of the action of the mind, to correct 
these appearances. But as all our senses and facul- 
ties are improved by action or use, so is sight, and 
it tends to correct itself in regard to visual objects. 



82 THE SENSE OF SIGHT. 

SECTION VI. 
1. If the sense of sight has no power, in any way, 
or to any degree, of receiving visible extension, 
length, and breadth, we can not tell how we are to 
judge of the real size of objects, as we can do but 
very little in association and in comparing distant 
objects by the sense of touch only 2. In judging 
of the magnitude of visual objects, we are much 
influenced by the peculiar nature and way the mod- 
ulations of light strike the organ of sight, and in 
comparing such objects with other objects, the size 
of which is known. Objects, in a murky atmos- 
phere, often appear larger and nearer to us than 
they would in clear air. This may be caused by 
their dim appearance, and the refraction of the rays 
of light passing through a denser atmosphere. The 
sun and moon appear larger in the horizon than they 
do in the zenith. The principal cause of this is, that 
the rays of light coming from them strike the atmos- 
phere obliquely, and the oblique portion of the at- 
mosphere, which refracts the rays, occupies an en- 
larged space in the field of vision and subtends a 
greater angle at the eye. The refraction makes the 
appearance of the sun and moon greater than they 
really are, and this difference increases in proportion 
as the rays pass parallel with the earth's surface in 
the denser part of the air. 3. The purer the atmos- 
phere the more accurate is our estimation of the 
distance to objects. And an object upon a smooth 
plain or a ship at sea, where there are no interme- 
diate objects, always appear to be nearer to us than 
they really are. 4. Our perceptions of distance, 



THE SENSE OF SIGHT. 83 

through the medium of sight, are principally ac- 
quired. This is clear from the testimony of persons 
born blind that have been suddenly restored to sight. 
At first all objects appeared to touch the eye, and 
there was confusion in locating them ; yet experience 
in associating and in comparing them aided in cor- 
recting the false appearance. 5. Though the above 
position is correct, yet we find, by correct analysis, 
that the primary power of our perception of visual 
objects and of distance is original or intuitive. Take 
a child, before it can reason, when it first begins to 
notice, and place a candle near its face, and its hand 
will be but partially extended in order to grasp it. 
But turn its face to the moon or some distant object, 
and intuitively the arm will be extended at full 
length. 



84: SOURCES OF KNOWLED&E. 



CHAPTER XIII. 

PRIMARY AND SECONDARY SOURCES OP 
KNOWLEDGE. 

SECTION I. 

1. The senses may be regarded as a secondary 
source of knowledge, when compared with knowl- 
edge which is direct, or is imparted to the mind or 
spirit as the result of the mind's own internal action, 
or is received by a superhuman spiritual influence 
without the medium of physical organs. 2. If mat- 
ter has no self-power to impress or to move material 
entities, only when it is connected with spirit, then 
it follows that self-motion belongs to spirit, and that 
spirit can impress or move spirit or mind independ- 
ently of material organs. Therefore, the internal 
feelings, influences, and impressions, imparted by 
the infinite Spirit to the mind, may be regarded as 
knowledge direct, or that which comes to us inde- 
pendently of any feeble, diseased, and perishable ma- 
terial organs, which, from their nature and condition, 
are liable to deceive us. Then that which we expe- 
rience from imperishable sources is not only knowl- 
edge direct, but such sources are primary sources of 
knowledge to us, and are worthy of far more confi- 
dence and belief than any fact or knowledge we 
receive through the medium of the senses, which 
are connected with diseased, deceptious, and perish- 
ing physical organs. 3. According to the preceding 






SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE. 85 

argument the senses may be regarded as a secondary 
source of knowledge. And the order of this world 
is to rely upon the senses in testing the reality and 
nature of external things with the highest degree of 
confidence or belief, while knowledge of direct evi- 
dence to the mind is often disregarded and rejected 
as worthless. 4. The senses can not, in connection 
or otherwise, give us a perfect knowledge of external 
things; otherwise each power of the senses would 
be a perfect mind within itself. But they are lim- 
ited in conveying a knowledge of external objects, 
which, however, is perfected when brought under 
the inspection of the mind. The deception exists 
wholly in the nature and condition of the physical 
organs. 



SECTION II. 
1. Spirit being imperishable, is incapable of dis- 
ease destroying its action or of decay ; but the phys- 
ical organs are subject to be enfeebled or rendered 
inactive by disease, or they may be entirely de- 
stroyed. While under the influence of disease we 
can not depend upon them with much certainty. 
The correctness of their reports is accidental, and 
the mind often has great difficulty in correcting 
wrong impressions which have been made by them. 
2. Our reliance upon the senses, and our power to 
believe in the correctness of their reports, does not 
arise in the existence and nature of the senses, but 
has its origin in connection with an internal convic- 
tion or consciousness that what they report is true. 
But as no one is disposed to doubt the testimony of 

8 



86 SOTJKCES OF KNOWLEDGE. 

the senses when they are free from the power of 
disease, we will not spend time in proving the neces- 
sity of greater confidence in them. 3. The skeptic 
professes the most positive helief in the existence 
and nature of facts tested by the senses, while he 
rejects internal convictions and moral demonstra- 
tions. A correct knowledge of external facts re- 
ported to the mind depends upon intuitive power. 
"We can have no knowledge of external facts, as 
such, but for the presence of intuition, to which all 
facts may be referred in order to be fully known and 
the mind satisfied. If internal affirmations and con- 
victions of truth are to be wholly rejected, then it is 
utterly impossible for us to have knowledge of any 
existent in the external world. 



SECTION III. 
1. It will be seen by the preceding argument that 
the primary source of knowledge is contained in the 
internal powers and nature constituting the soul or 
mind which possesses self-action and an immortality 
of being. 2. By the sense of sight I test the ap- 
pearance of a proposition in mathematics, and say 
that it is correct, because the calculation is based 
upon certain self-evident axioms upon which the 
whole science stands. He who rejects internal intu- 
itions and moral demonstrations, believes all this 
with unwavering confidence ; but ask him how he 
knows such truths or axioms to be self-evident, by 
which we understand that they are incapable of 
either proof or disproof, and he will not refer to any 
one or all of the senses as the source or power by 






SOUKCES OF KNOWLEDGE. 87 

which he knows them to be self-evident truths, but 
he has to refer to the intuitive principle within which 
only has power to receive any fact as such, or any 
self-evident reality as such, without any possibility 
of proof. 3. So if we reject internal convictions, 
feelings, and intuitive affirmations, we are compelled 
to reject all knowledge. Then, to be consistent, we 
must declare that we are incapable of any knowl- 
edge, and that our own existence is non-existence. 
4. Then it follows that all knowledge of direct evi- 
dence to the mind, and of which the mind is sus- 
ceptible, independently of the organs of the decay- 
ing earthly tabernacle, is less liable to deceive us 
than that which comes through the medium of the 
senses. Therefore we should watch to be directed 
by this internal source of knowledge, as it can not 
lead us to deception or disappointment, either in 
this life or the life to come, if we strictly adhere to 
the voice and dictates of conscience. 



CHAPTER I. 

PERCEPTION. 



SECTION I. 
1. Perception is that faculty of the mind which 
has power of perceiving internal and external 
changes and existences. And in action it has power 
of perceiving and of receiving a knowledge of ex- 
ternal objects by means of the impressions they 
make on the senses, or it leads to the full action oi 
the mind in arriving at a knowledge of real exist- 
ences. 2. Sensation and perception are regarded as 
the properties of mind, b} r which we arrive at a 
knowledge of external things. Sensation refers to 
the physical organs and their mysterious union with 
the immaterial sensibilities, and perception refers to 
the power and action of mental influences and ele- 
ments. Perception has been regarded as an asso- 
ciation formed between the impressions made upon 
the organs of the senses and the external substan- 
ces which are the cause of such impressions. But 
the acting power of this association is connected 
with the primary elements of mind. 3. Perception 
is immediately successive to the action of sensation, 
or it arises with the new state of mind which fol- 



PEKCEPTION. 89 

lows the impressions made by sensations. Sensa- 
tion within itself can have no perception of its own 
existence, nor of the cause of such an existence; 
but impressions made through the medium of sensa- 
tion upon the mind are followed by a peculiar state 
of mind, in which we have immediate perception of 
the affecting cause. 4. Whether perception is a 
sequent of impressions conveyed by sensations to the 
brain we know not. The inlets of the mind, for 
comprehending external things, appear to be myste- 
riously connected with the entire nervous S} r stem. 
The nerves are connected with the brain, and thence 
receive their influence. But this great medium of 
sensation may not require sensations to go from the 
extremities to the brain before there can be any 
action of perception. The mind may have power to 
perceive the affecting cause upon its action upon the 
organs of senses ; but to determine the precise mode 
of operation is impossible. 



SECTION II. 
1. Perception may be regarded as a voluntary act 
of the mind. That aggressive influence or power 
which strikes out in maturing a knowledge of exter- 
nal objects, requires an effort of the mind in order 
to a full degree of perception which can be retained. 
2. Sensation is not necessarily followed by percep- 
tion. The mind may be employed in thought or in 
conversation, while a numerous variety of objects 
may pass through the field of vision and none of 
them be retained in the mind. This results from a 
want of the perception of those objects. We may 

8* 



fort 



90 PERCEPTION. 

have experienced the sensations of them, but no effor 
of the mind was made in retaining the impressions 
of them : for the mind must attend to what is passing 
in order to a real perception of external objects. 3. 
To a limited extent perception may be regarded as 
involuntary. "We may open our eyes upon a beau- 
tiful forest ; the first tree seen may claim our atten- 
tion till we suddenly turn away; yet we may have 
faint perceptions of other trees in that forest which 
are still retained in the mind, and they were not 
voluntary objects of either sight or perception. If 
we cast our eyes upon a canvas of pictures and fix 
our mind upon one of them, so that all the rest are 
almost as though they did not exist, yet they are 
unintentionally seen, and our perception of them is 
involuntary. In leaving our room in eager quest of 
some object, we pass two men in descending the 
stairway, one small and the other large — the percep- 
tion of the difference in their size is wholly involun- 
tary. 4. But voluntary perception involves an act 
of the mind in attending to the cause of sensations; 
and connected with this act or action of the mind is 
our perception of external substances and qualities. 



SECTION III. 
1. Perception makes us acquainted with external 
things, and has its origin in a peculiar mental state, 
in which the influence or action refers to internal 
affections of the mind, and also to external causa- 
tion. It carries the mind out of or beyond the ex- 
istence of self, and introduces us to the external 
world. It has power to cause external things to pass 



PERCEPTION. 91 

in review before the inspection of the mind. Per- 
ception is not the only medium through which we 
are made acquainted with external things. Our 
knowledge of external things commences with sen- 
sation, and sensation is a sequence of the impinge- 
ment or of contact with external things; and per- 
ception following sensation fully presents to the 
inspection of the mind the cause of such sensations. 
2. If perception should only be regarded as an 
affection or influence of the mind, and as consequent 
upon the action of sensation in apprehending exter- 
nal existences, yet in reality it must be regarded as 
more than a secondary appendage of psychology or 
of the mind when we contemplate its power to act 
in perceiving the internal changes, action, and pow- 
ers of the mind. 3. If it could be separated from 
the primary elements of mind and still retain its 
identity and power to act in whole or in part, then 
we might reject its connection in every way with the 
original elements of mind. But its existence is 
either with or is dependent on its connection with 
the existence of the elements of mind ; for an affec- 
tion or influence of the mind is no more than an 
original element or elements in action ; otherwise 
such an affection or influence would be a divisible 
entity, and an independent active being within itself 
and superadded to the mind, which is absurd. 



SECTION IV. 
1. Ox\r perception oi primary properties of matter 
differs from that of sensation. Primary properties 
are essential to the existence of all material substan- 



92 PERCEPTION. 

ces, and are known to be such as solidity, extension, 
figure, and density, with divisibility. These quali- 
ties belong to all real material bodies; but as to 
their essence we know nothing. 2. Sensation is a 
result of contact, in some way, with external sub- 
stances, and implies their existence as the cause of 
such sensation or sensations. Perception refers or 
leads the mind to a knowledge of the cause of a 
known sensation. 3. "We have perception of the 
difference between primary and secondary properties 
of matter. The latter are such as hardness, soft- 
ness, roughness, and smoothness, smell, taste, heat, 
and cold, sound, and color. These may cause cer- 
tain effects in the mind, or awaken sensations which 
are immediately followed by perception, bringing 
the affecting cause under mental inspection. 



FALSE PERCEPTION. 93 



CHAPTER II. 

FALSE PERCEPTION. 

SECTION I. 
1. False perceptions take place when there are 
no external objects corresponding with them, and 
which are the cause of them. When there are no 
external causes, as real existences, we are left to 
conclude that false perceptions exist within ourselves 
and in the mistake which the mind makes of its 
own perceptions. 2. False perceptions can arise 
first in the organs of sense. The organs of sense 
can be affected in various ways, and the succeeding 
sensations are followed by perception, as to the act 
of the mind, when there are no external substances 
as cause of such sensations, or as objects of percep- 
tion. These organs can be changed or affected so 
as to produce the appearance of realities by disease 
or by excitement, fear, or grief. And they change 
within themselves, being affected by age. 3. Again : 
false perceptions may exist in connection with the 
changes in the states of the mind. The mind is 
capable of an internal error or delusion in believing 
in the existence of objects as real when they are not. 
It can be deceived in its own conceptions of real 
existences. 4. False perceptions, which arise in 
connection with the organs of sense, are caused gen- 
erally by bodily disorders. These perceptions may 



94 FALSE PERCEPTION. 

be corrected, as we shall notice in the order of the 

following section. 



SECTION II, 

1. By the concentrated action of the mind, as af- 
fected through the medium of the other senses. 
Corresponding sensations, resulting from affecting 
causes upon the organs of sense, contribute, in their 
united appeals to the mind, toward correcting false 
perceptions. 2. False perceptions can be corrected 
by comparing our perceptions of objects we suppose 
to exist or of objects which exist in a different way 
from their appearance, with the perceptions of oth- 
ers in regard to them. The deliberate decision of 
several persons, by means of the same organs of 
sense, while in health, and at the same time, will 
not mislead. 3. A correction can be made by a 
proper exercise of judgment in comparing with some 
known object. 4. If we have perception of two or 
more objects of the same or differing in kind, we 
can turn to some one that we know to be single, and 
if there appears to be more than one, we know our 
perception in that respect to be false. But in cor- 
recting all false perceptions we are dependent upon 
a correct exercise of the judgment. 






PERCEPTION AND SMELL. 95 



CHAPTER III. 

PERCEPTION AND SMELL. 

SECTION I. 
1. "We will now turn attention to our perceptions 
of objects which affect the mind through the medium 
of the sense of smell. The office and the powers of 
the sense of smell have been already defined. Our 
perceptions of the objects of smell are successive to 
the sensations of smell. And these sensations are a 
result of the action of odors or of effluvia upon the 
organs of smell. Sensation reports its cause, and 
perception brings that cause under the inspection of 
the mind in order that our knowledge of it may be 
matured. 2. Habit, in relation to smell and in de- 
tecting qualities, tends to higher maturity by re- 
peated and continuous effort in discriminating differ- 
ences. If there are habits of smell, and if this 
sense can be cultivated, it follows that there must be 
something capable of being cultivated. This culti- 
vation is not acquired by the physical organs ab- 
stractly, but is conferred upon them by the action 
of the immaterial influence or power connected with 
them, and the direction of the mind to them. 3. 
The origin of our knowledge of the existence and of 
the difference in odors commences with the sensa- 
tions of smell. May not the modulations and nature 
of the sensations of smell impress the mind favora- 
bly to the knowledge of the affecting cause, and the 



PERCEPTION AND SMELL, 






qualities of that cause? We know that our knowl- 
edge of the degrees or difference in the strength of 
odors commences with and is conveyed to the mind 
by sensation. And why may not sensations affect 
the mind in some way, and to a limited degree, as to 
the qualities of the cause of such sensations? To 
say they do not is more absurd than to say they do. 
But to say and to prove either position to be clearly 
true is impossible. 



SECTION II. 

1. If it is impossible for sensations to affect the mind 
in any way corresponding to the object and qualities 
of its cause, then there is no connection between 
the action of sensation and that of perception. Then 
when we receive sensations from the smell of a rose 
or jasmin, we would be as apt to have percep- 
tion of a rock or mountain as the cause as any other 
existent; and our perception as to the true cause 
being wholly unguided, would be accidental in its 
results. 2. If there is no connection between sensa- 
tion, and perception it would be true that when we 
have sensation we may or may not have perception ; 
and if, in any case, perception is immediately suc- 
cessive to sensation, it could only be regarded as an 
accident. Hence, it is reasonable to believe that 
seDsation, in some way, impresses the mind to a 
limited degree as to the nature or properties of its 
cause, and that perception brings that cause under 
the inspection of the mind. 3. It requires all the 
elements of mind to constitute a sentient being, and 
each one contributes in its office and action to our 



PEKCEPTION AND SMELL. 97 

knowledge. Dr. Abercrombie mentions a blind phi- 
losopher who could distinguish a black dress by the 
smell of it. The origin of this knowledge did not 
commence with perception, but with sensation. And 
the sensation of smell, in this case, appears to have 
impressed the mind with a knowledge of the object 
and some of its qualities unaided by the other 
senses. Mr. Stewart speaks of James Mitch el, who 
was deaf, speechless, and blind, yet by smell he 
could detect the presence of a stranger and give the 
direction to him. This knowledge of the stranger 
and of the direction to him commenced with the 
sensations of smell, and that without the aid of the 
other senses. In this case the mind must have been 
influenced to correct decisions, in some way, by the 
peculiar nature or character of the sensations of 
smell. 4. Sensation reports the cause of its exist- 
ence to the mind, and perception brings that cause 
under the full inspection of the mind, the result of 
which is real knowledge. 

9 



98 PERCEPTION AND TASTE. 



CHAPTER IV. 

PERCEPTION AND TASTE. 

SECTION I. 
1. Our perception of objects which affect the 
mind, through the medium of the sense of taste, 
should be carefully examined. It has been said 
that sixteen different simple tastes exist. In the 
different combinations there are almost innumerable 
modifications, as in the degrees of strength, intens- 
ity, and weakness, quickness, and slowness. The 
properties of external substances which affect the 
organs of taste, awakening sensations, are called 
flavors. Our perceptions of these flavors or proper- 
ties properly follow the sensations of taste. 2. Habit, 
in relation to taste, enables us to distinguish differ- 
ences by repeated or continuous efforts. In this way 
the epicurean distinguishes the flavor and qualities 
of the luxuries of the table to a degree which would 
pass unnoticed by others. And in the same way 
the physician can tell the difference in drugs which 
are similar in appearance, and also in taste, to one 
not accustomed to them. 



SECTION II. 
1. Under the law of Tidbit some wine-dealers, by 
the repeated exercise of this sense, are said to have 
increased its strength and power of discrimination 



PERCEPTION AND TASTE. 99 

till they could distinguish the flavor of one wine 
from that of another, and tell where each or all were 
made. 2. The proper direction of the action of per- 
ception toward the true cause which affects .the sense 
of taste, must be, to a limited extent, connected with 
and dependent on the nature or modulations of the 
sensation received ; for if there is no connection in 
this respect, or in any way, our perception as to 
being immediately successive to sensation, and in 
bringing the true cause of such sensation to the 
attention and inspection of the mind, would be 
wholly an accident. 



100 PERCEPTION AND HEARING 



CHAPTER V. 

PERCEPTION AND HEARING. 

SECTION I. 
1. The perception we have of objects which affect 
the mind through the medium of the sense of 
hearing is worthy a passing notice. The sense of 
hearing is more acute in some persons than in oth- 
ers, yet the power of discriminating sounds and the 
difference in tones or modulations of sound may be 
cultivated. 2. The sense of hearing has not within 
and of itself the power of perceiving the affecting 
cause, neither can we have simultaneous perception 
of the action of external things or of sounds upon 
the organs of hearing. All we can have is sensa- 
tion, and sensation may be strong or weak, corre- 
sponding to the cause. 3. The sound of a cannon pro- 
duces a stronger sensation than that of a rifle. Who 
can say that perception receives no influence as to 
the cause of sensations, from the peculiar way they 
affect the mind? If mind was divisible, then this 
might be impossible. But the elements of mind 
can not be abstracted, like blocks of marble, from 
the same mountain, and examined by the rules of 
superfices and solids and the laws governing inert 
elements. All the elements of mind are operative, 
and are connected together in constituting the living 
soul, and they can and do influence each other, and 
also each one of them the whole mind. 



PERCEPTION AND HEARING. 101 

SECTION II. 
1. The application of Tidbit to the sense of hear- 
ing renders the power of hearing more acute as 
repeated efforts are made. There are instances of 
blind persons who can call the names of persons 
from the sound of their voices, though they may not 
have heard them for several years. Others can tell 
when they are approaching a precipice or a wall, by 
the peculiar sound of their feet upon the ground. 
2. If there is no connection in any way between sen- 
sations produced by sound and our perception of 
the cause of such sensations, then our perception of 
the true cause may be accidental. 3. Our knowl- 
edge of the existence of sonorous bodies commences 
with the sensations of hearing. Sensation and per- 
ception hold a peculiar relationship to each other, 
from the fact that they may and do belong to one 
and the same mind. 

9* 



102 PERCEPTION AND TOTTCH. 



CHAPTER VI. 

PERCEPTION AND TOUCH. 

SECTION I. 
1. "We experience perceptions of objects which 
affect the mind through the medium of the sense of 
touch. The sense of touch is more extensive than 
any other one of the senses, from the fact that in 
one sense it includes all the other senses. 2. It in- 
creases in proportion to repeated efforts in appre- 
hending external bodies. And our perception of 
external existences is clear in proportion to the 
acuteness of touch through which such existences 
are reported to the mind. 3. Habit in regard to 
touch increases its strength as we rely on and attend 
to its repeated action. And in proportion to the 
increase of the exquisite acuteness in detecting and 
reporting external substances to the mind, is the 
clearness and proper action of our perception in 
bringing such substances before the mind. 



SECTION II. 
1. Blind persons can, with greater safety, pass all 
through a house in a dark night than any one who 
has the power of vision. Some of them can tell the 
distance to a burning fire by the action and degree 
of heat, and also of approaching contact with exter- 
nal bodies by the peculiar action of the air. And 



PEKCEPTION AND TOUCH. 103 

by the sense of touch they can be taught to read by 
means of large raised letters, which are made by 
heavy type. The sense of touch can be so cultiva- 
ted that they can have perception of the different 
letters, and read correctly when as many as four 
thicknesses of a silk handkerchief intercepts be- 
tween their fingers and the letters. 2. Our knowl- 
edge of that which affects the sense of touch com- 
mences with the sensations of touch, and is more 
fully developed to the mind by the action and power 
of perception. 



104 PERCEPTION AND SIGHT. 



CHAPTER VII. 

PERCEPTION AND SIGHT. 
SECTION I. 

1. Our perception of objects which affect the mind 
through the medium of the sense of sight is worthy 
of attention. Expansion of surface and color have 
been regarded as primary objects of vision, but that 
of distance and magnitude have been rejected. Yet 
it is maintained that we can judge of limited distan- 
ces by sight alone. If we can judge of small distan- 
ces by sight alone, why not, to some extent, judge of 
greater distances aided by the same power? 2. The 
inclination of the axis of vision, which directs both 
eyes to the same object, and the peculiar way in which 
the reflected rays of light fall on the eyes, appears 
to give rise to an influence which affects the mind 
in deciding upon the true distance of such an object. 
To touch any object immediately before us with one 
eye closed is accidental, but certain with the aid of 
both. 3. A child, before it can reason or compare, 
shows an intuitive knowledge of distance by sight, 
in extending its hand no farther than the desired 
object when it is near, and at full length when the 
object is distant. Our knowledge of the distance 
and magnitude of visual objects commences with 
the sensations of sight. In some way sensations 
appear to be conveyed to the brain and nervous sys- 
tem, which are followed by perception ; but to define 



PEECEPTION AND SIGHT. 105 

this process, or to tell how the mind is connected with 
and is affected by the nervous system, is impossible. 



SECTION II. 
1. Habit, in relation to the power of vision, ren- 
ders it acute in detecting the existence of objects. 
And in proportion as we try to discriminate visual 
objects will we have clear perception of the objects 
which affect the organs of sight. By continued 
effort the mariner can discover a ship as it nears in 
the distance, when it can not be seen by a person 
not accustomed to maritime observations; and he 
can call its name when nothing more than a blur 
can be seen by the untrained eye upon the surface 
of the ocean. Under the law of habit there is a 
quick and vigorous action of the power of vision, 
and in proportion to its improvement is the clear- 
ness and power of our perception of visual objects. 
2. A man existing without the power of hearing 
may supply the defect, to a limited extent, by the 
habits of sight. We know a man who has not heard 
the sound of speech for about twenty years ; yet he 
can converse with us without much difficulty, by 
watching the expression of the countenance and the 
motion of the lips. 3. The keen discrimination of 
visual objects and qualities, which is possessed by 
the deaf and dumb, gives evidence that the senses 
can be cultivated, and that in the absence of some 
of them others can be so cultivated as to supply the 
loss sustained to a considerable extent. 4. If the 
mind could exist without having access to external 
things, through the medium of the senses, how could 



106 PERCEPTION AND SIGHT. 

we have perception of external things t It is evi- 
dent that the action of perception, in one respect, 
has its origin in connection with the states of mind 
caused by sensations; and if these states of mind 
are not influenced in any way by the modulations 
and nature of the sensations received, and if these 
sensations do not correspond in any way with the 
nature and qualities of their cause, then there is no 
connection between sensation and perception ; hence, 
any action of perception in perceiving and in bring- 
ing under the inspection of the mind the true cause 
of a certain sensation, is wholly accidental. But 
this is not true, for a connection does exist, from the 
fact that they may and do belong to one and the 
same mind. 



HABIT IN RELATION TO PERCEPTION. 107 



CHAPTEE VIII. 

HABIT IN RELATION TO PERCEPTION. 

SECTION I. 
1. Habit, in relation to perception, should not 
pass unnoticed. It has been said that men, chil- 
dren, idiots, and brutes acquire perceptions by habit; 
that they are not original with them. Our remem- 
brance of past events or existences may be regarded 
as weak or strong in proportion to the interest we 
had in them. 2. We have many perceptions which 
are not remembered for the want of attention and 
interest in them, and by them our knowledge is not 
increased; yet when a necessity awakens mental 
exercise in attending to them, they can be called up 
as auxiliaries in forming correct decisions. 3. There 
is a law of lidbit, in relation to perception, under 
which we may delineate the natural method or proc- 
ess of its action. Perception is connected with the 
existence and action of the powers of the mind; yet 
its action in perceiving is at first weak and confused. 
That it depends upon habit for the origin of its ex- 
istence is impossible. 



SECTION II. 
1. By repeated efforts perception is increased in 
power and its action is made rapid, easy, and is 



108 HABIT IN RELATION TO PERCEPTION. 

matured. Its maturity depends upon distinct and 
successive acts. 2. Though objects of many forms 
and of different elements may be simultaneously 
presented to the eye, yet our perception of them all 
can only be regarded as concentrated into one act. 
And if there is naturally a distinct difference, the 
true order can not be clearly defined. 3. The acts 
of perception, in perceiving the different forms of an 
object, are so rapid that the effect upon us, in regard 
to all of them, may be said to be instantaneous. 
The power of perceiving is connected with the states 
and elements of mind. 



iHsiflw Qj [firl*. 



CHAPTER I. 

OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE DEFINITE AND CONTIN- 
GENT PHENOMENA OF THOUGHT. 

SECTION I. 
1. It has been said that the phenomena of mind 
consists of certain thoughts and feelings, and that 
the true inquiry is as to the order in which they 
arise, and of what these elements are constituted? 
Though they are of great importance, yet w T e can 
not imagine that within themselves they constitute 
all of mind. 2. Thought exists in the mind, or it is 
that which is formed in the mind as an idea or con- 
ception. Thought may be formed by the united ac- 
tion of mental elements. It can arise in connection 
with internal spontaneous affirmations, or from the 
affecting influence of imagination, or from con- 
science. At certain states of the mind thoughts 
appear to arise in one connected chain, and at other 
times and under different circumstances, they have 
a more abstracted existence. 3. We can not doubt 
the real existence of thought in connection with the 
mind's states. Of the existence and action of 
thought we can form some idea and have a satisfac- 
tory knowledge. The nature of elements, which 
have been called the original elements of thought, 
10 109 



110 PHENOMENA OF THOUGHT. 

can not be clearly denned, though they must have 
their origin in connection with the existence and 
action of the primary elements of the mind. 4. 
Thought is that which the mind thinks, and it may 
be said to be that, in part, which acts in thinking. 
And it is that which is prominent and leads in cogi- 
tation, reflection, contemplation, and meditation. 



SECTION II. 
1. Thought is not only real within and of itself, 
but it expresses action, as in thinking. It is the act 
or operation of the mind when attending to any par- 
ticular subject or existent, and in another sense it 
may be regarded as the idea consequent on that ope- 
ration. 2. The mind may act, in pursuing any sub- 
ject, by a succession of thoughts. One thought 
introduces another thought, in accordance with a 
certain order which is preserved in the succession 
of thoughts. Some thoughts seem to be a result of 
other thoughts, by which some persons have sup- 
posed the latter could have been predicted by a 
strict observance of the nature of the former; but 
the idea of their inseparable union is only a mere 
sequence of their near, yet distinct relationship. 
Though any train of thoughts may be said to be 
invariably found together, yet the mind is only capa- 
ble of a peculiar order of divisible succession of 
thoughts. All that we can know of the phenomena 
of thought is the result of observation aided by 
experience. 3. Thought can not exist as a part of 
the mind if separated from it. Hence, our thoughts 
are nothing more than the mind itself in a peculiar 



PHENOMENA OF THOUGHT. Ill 

way or in different states : yet the proper office of 
thought has been defined. 4. The importance of 
thought to our being, knowledge, and Jiappiness is 
forever beyond all power of description. By con- 
tinued thought the student ever expands the powers 
of his mind with useful knowledge. Think, think, 
always thinking, is the motto of true greatness. It 
will lead to the possession of that true eminence 
where the mind, with triumphant composure, scorns 
the perishable glory of earthly fame. 



112 IDEAS. 



CHAPTER II. 

IDEAS. 






SECTION I. 
1. The term idea, as that of notion, applies to 
that which perceives or observes in the mind ; hence 
the form or image of any thing in the mind pos- 
sessed by it for contemplation or inspection. It ex- 
ists in the mind, and can be a result of mental 
action. 2. Our ideas may be said to vary with or 
to correspond to their objects in regard to their 
nature and mode or condition of existence. 3. Our 
idea of physical existences may be regarded as con- 
tingent, from the fact that it is natural for us to have 
conceptions of them as mutable, and that it is pos- 
sible for the power that made them to cause them to 
cease to be. 4. Our idea of physical entities may 
be said to be relative, as the very notion of that 
which has bounds or unity will suggest the oppo- 
site, which is infinity or non-limitation. 5. Our idea 
of duration may be regarded as absolute. We know 
that duration is and must continue, and that its an- 
nihilation is impossible. 



SECTION II. 
1. Our idea of space has been said to be necessary 
or absolute. To conceive of the annihilation of all 
physical entities is possible, but to conceive of the 



IDEAS. 113 

annihilation of unbounded space is utterly impossi- 
ble. Hence, the idea of space is necessary; for we 
can have conception of the real existence of the 
object of such an idea, and to try to conceive of the 
non-existence of space is beyond our power. 2. 
Our idea of space is absolute, which arises from the 
condition of its existence. We are immediately 
impressed of the fact; and our belief is unwavering 
that space must be, and that it can not cease to be. 
Though we can conceive of the non-existence of all 
physical elements, yet to doubt the existence of 
space is impossible. 3. The idea of space implies 
the absence of limitation. We can not conceive of 
it only as real and infinite. Our ideas of material 
elements, or of the finite, are contingent and rela- 
tive; and those of space, or of the infinite, are 
necessary and absolute. These exist in the mind, 
and are distinct in their orders. 4. If the idea of 
space and of the infinite is necessary and absolute, 
bo may we regard the idea of cause. Therefore, it 
is reasonable for the Atheist, when looking on the 
works of nature, which are sequences, to intuitively 
infer a cause of their existence, and to believe that 
such a cause is all-powerful and all-wise, from the 
vastness and skill evidenced in visual and tangible 
existences. 



SECTION III. 

1. If effects or events are contingent and relative, 

their very existence infers and even demonstrates 

the existence of a cause; for they could not create 

themselves and arrange themselves with such infi- 

10* 



114 IDEAS. 

nite wisdom. 2. But though we are finite, yet the 
idea of personal identity, or of self, is necessary. 
The knowledge we have of our own existence is real, 
and to doubt it is utterly impossible. 3. Hence, the 
Atheist is compelled to acknowledge the existence 
of self, and that God is necessarily the author of 
such existence, and to whom he is reasonably and 
lawfully amenable. 






onr 



SECTION IY. 
1. Though our idea of self is necessary, yet our 
idea of the phenomena of mind may be regarded as 
contingent. We have intuitive knowledge of self; 
but the mind is composed of many faculties, and 
each faculty, in existence and action, holds a certain 
relation to the other faculties. 2. By primary ele- 
ments of mind, we are to understand the original 
elements, first in order of time. The appropriate 
position and action of the primary powers relatively 
to each other will be defined in analyzing those pow- 
ers. It will be seen that some faculties which have 
been defined as primary by some philosophers, are 
dependent for their existence upon other faculties. 
And the idea that there are only two or three pri- 
mary elements in mind is absurd. 3. Intuitive ele- 
ments, which have been denominated primary ele- 
ments, apprehend their objects, the action arising 
from intuition. Each one unites in testing and re- 
ceiving truths as knowledge by a simple intuitive 
inspection, and independently of argument or tes- 
timony. 



KNOWLEDGE WITHOUT TESTIMONY. 115 



CHAPTER III. 

POWER OF KNOWLEDGE WITHOUT TESTIMONY. 

SECTION I. 
1. The primary elements of mind may be regarded 
as the axioms, or self-evident truths, within them- 
selves, which are the foundation of the philosophy 
of mind. That they have a real existence, and that 
such existences are true within themselves, is knowl- 
edge which we have no power to doubt; and the 
primary elements are truths, the reality and correct- 
ness of which are incapable of either proof or dis- 
proof. 2. There is no possible way of proving the 
axioms or self-evident truths, which are the founda- 
tion of mathematical science, to be either true or 
false, yet we receive them as truths. The power to 
do this is not contained in those axioms or truths, 
but it lies back of all these, and can only exist in 
the intuitive powers of mind. Therefore, it is more 
reasonable for us to regard the primary elements of 
mind as self-evident truths; for our knowledge of 
them, and of all other facts or objects, turns upon 
their intuitive power to know them to be true, and 
to reject that which is false. 3. The primary ele- 
ments of mind are truths known to be true only 
from the fact that we know them to be such ; and 
all the power we have of knowing any thing of their 
existence, nature, action, or of any other truth or 
fact in the vast universe, arises in connection with 



116 KNOWLEDGE WITHOUT TESTIMONY. 

and from the existence, nature, and action of these 
original elements. 



SECTION II. 
1. We can not arrive at a knowledge of their ex- 
istence by any form of argument or from any exter- 
nal testimony. They are their own witnesses, testi- 
fying within, of, and to themselves, of their own 
existence, which is knowledge. 2. With them is the 
origin of the power to receive within and of them- 
selves the knowledge of their own existence. 3. 
With them is the origin of the power to arrive at 
and to know truth in regard to external things, either 
without or from testimony. 



KNOWLEDGE FROM TESTIMONY. 117 



CHAPTER IV. 

KNOWLEDGE FROM TESTIMONY. 

SECTION I. 
1. We have intuitive power to arrive at a knowl- 
edge of facts and of truth from testimony. The im- 
mediate self-knowledge we have of external things 
is tested by and received through the medium of the 
senses; but the greater part of our knowledge, in 
regard to such existences, is obtained from other 
persons upon the evidence of testimony. 2. Testi- 
mony is a solemn declaration or attestation made for 
the purpose of establishing or making known some 
fact. Testimony is the declaration of a fact, and 
evidence is the effect of that declaration on the 
mind, or the degree of light imparted, by it. Facts 
are received by us from personal observation far 
more readily than from the declaration of others. 
We must first have confidence in the ability and 
veracity of the narrator in order to give full cre- 
dence to the facts revealed. If what he says comes 
true, we believe him more readily at another time ; 
but if once deceived, his future testimony is apt to 
be rejected. We can believe the statements of a 
tried friend more readily than we can those of a 
stranger. 3. Our intuitive power, which is referred 
to in the reception and belief of external facts, is 
influenced by the corresponding agreement of such 
facts with those already known. We should look 



118 KNOWLEDGE FEOM TESTIMONY. 

well to the evidence upon which we receive facts, 
and to the capacity of the narrator. A weak mind 
is apt to have boundless credulity, and seldom ever 
thinks or reasons for itself. The contracted mind is 
generally captious, skeptical, and always inclined to 
reason from imperfect premises, and arrives at 
false conclusions. An ignorant mind or person re- 
jects the testimony of all philosophers. He believes 
the earth to be flat and its position fixed immovably. 
He gives only one foot diameter to the sun, and 
drives him through the heavens. 4. When we are 
limited in our views and acquirements, there is a 
tendency to rely on our experience, and to reject all 
knowledge for which we have not the evidence of 
our senses. A proper understanding of self, and of 
the true method of arriving at a knowledge of ex- 
ternal facts, will remedy false perceptions and con- 
clusions. 



SECTION II. 
1. In judging of the credibility of any fact from 
testimony, we are not to rely wholly upon our expe- 
rience of similar events, but we must proceed upon 
the knowledge which we have received by other 
means of the nature or properties of that which is 
presented for our inspection. 2. We can receive 
facts upon the authority of testimony, and the power 
we have to receive them must have its origin in 
intuition. The conclusive action of this constitu- 
tional power turns upon the fact that the witness is 
honest. 3. The principal ground of our credence is, 
that the witness had a sufficient opportunity of 



KNOWLEDGE FROM TESTIMONY. 119 

knowing the facts set forth in his testimony, that he 
was capable of judging correctly, and that he was 
not improperly influenced in testifying. 4. Our 
confidence is increased in proportion to the number 
of tried witnesses who unite in the same testimony. 
This kind of testimony the whole world of intelli- 
gences are in the habit of receiving and of believ- 
ing. The principal foundation of incredulity is ig- 
norance. The enlightened mind, in forming correct 
conclusions, is influenced by a thousand contingen- 
cies, which pass wholly unnoticed by the thought- 
less or inactive mind. 



SECTION III. 
1. A well-regulated mind is influenced by the 
recollection of facts, which appeared at first to be 
deceptions or even false, but subsequently they 
prove and are known to be true. Hence the con- 
clusion that there may be and that there does exist 
many elements and facts, though they may be de- 
cidedly marvelous or appalling to us at first. "We 
have power to know from experience alone, that 
facts may and do exist, both in accordance with or 
independent of our experience. 2. The mind is 
greatly influenced in deciding upon the truthfulness 
of that which is presented for consideration if we 
perceive known principles connected with it, if it 
contains some element of probability, or if it is in 
any way allied to facts or a chain of known entities, 
either as an antecedent or sequence. We have 
power to believe in the existence of realities pre- 
sented to the mind from the fact that other truths, 



120 KNOWLEDGE FROM TESTIMONY. 

at one time, were marvelous, which are now known 
to be true. And we can go still further and believe, 
by reason of facts already known, that other facts 
unknown to us may exist.. 3. We have power to 
arrive at a correct knowledge of facts from testi 
mony. And we have power to discriminate credi 
ble testimony from that which is not, by contrasting 
the manner, the arrangement of parts, or the condi- 
tion. When a sufficient amount of the right kind 
of testimony has been received, we feel an internal 
satisfaction in relying upon it without doubt. 4. 
Infidelity assumes that we can not believe testimony 
which differs from our uniform experience and the 
uniform course of nature; but we have seen already 
that this position is false. The influence or power 
sustaining and containing the elements of our belief 
in regard to testimony, has its origin in intuition. 
To receive proper testimony is natural, but to con- 
scientiously doubt it is unnatural and impossible. 



SECTION IT. 
1. To arrive at a distinct belief of a miraculous in- 
terposition or act, requires something more than to 
give credence to facts which are in accordance with 
the uniform laws or course of nature. 2. Miracle 
we understand to be that which takes place in vio- 
lation to, or deviating from, the established course 
of nature, and that which is contrary to our uniform 
experience. If miracles exist in violation of or de- 
viating from the regular course of nature, their 
existence can not be a result of this uniform course 
of nature, nor of the laws governing the material 



KNOWLEDGE FEOM TESTIMONY. 121 

universe. Then, if miracles exist, the cause of their 
existence must be distinct from and superior to the 
course of nature. Therefore, they exist by a direct 
interposition or act of Divine power. Their nature 
and relation to the course of nature forever pre- 
cludes the idea of their origin with, from, or by such 
a uniformity of action. Miracles, as results, and 
considered as they are, within themselves, clearly 
demonstrate that their cause must be distinct from 
and infinitely superior to any uniform course of 
nature. 3. Divine revelation is regarded as a mi- 
raculous gift of Heaven, and, as a result, clearly 
demonstrates or proves an adequate cause of its own 
existence. All the miracles recorded in the Bible 
aid in proving the existence of Deity and his power 
to establish laws and suspend them at pleasure. If 
he has power to order and arrange common events, 
which are called natural, he has power and does 
order uncommon events, which are called miracles. 



SECTION V. 
1. Infidels assume that events happening contrary 
to the course of nature and our experience should 
be rejected, and that it is more reasonable for men 
to lie, and that several concur in propagating the 
same lie, than that a miracle should take place, ac- 
cording to their testimony, which would be a result 
contrary to the course of nature and experience. 
The rejecters of the Christian system hold and teach 
that the uniform course of nature is true, and that it 
is the unerring truth of the universe. 2. Mr. Hume 
says, in regard to the resurrection of Christ, "I 

11 



122 KNOWLEDGE FROM TESTIMONY. 

must admit one of two things — either that twelve 
men agreed to tell a lie, or that a man arose from 
the dead. It is more probable that men should lie 
than that one should return to life again." That is, 
if Christ rose it would be contrary to the uniform 
course of nature, which course of nature he regarded 
as infallible truth. He then asserts that it is more 
reasonable for men to lie than that Christ should 
arise from the dead. According to his own premi- 
ses, arguments, and belief, such a lie could not be a 
part of the course of nature, which is truth, neither 
can it be a result of it in any possible way. Hence, 
such a lie being contrary to truth, is contrary to th 
uniform course of nature, which is truth. Then, 
according to his own creed and belief, this lie would 
be a miracle; yet he regards it as that which is the 
most reasonable, and adopts it as the foundation of 
his faith and future hope. He then tries to disprov 
the miracle of Christ's resurrection by assuming, in 
lieu thereof, the existence of another miracle, ac- 
cording to his own faith and teachings, which mira- 
cle, he says, is more reasonable, though he acknowl- 
edges it to be a lie. And, of course, if in this 
respect the foundation of his faith or belief be a lie, 
all the arguments and conclusions drawn from it 
must be wholly and forever untrue. 3. And as this 
is the only argument which has ever been referred 
to, which can have any claims to be an argument 
against the resurrection of Christ, it is, therefore, 
true, that Christ rose from the dead, and the truth- 
fulness of our holy Christianity is forever incontro- 
vertible, notwithstanding the great and celebrated 
argument of Mr. Hume. 



JiitiiWK Jf0nrt| 



CHAPTER I. 

CONCEPTION. 

SECTION I. 
1. Conceptions exist in connection with peculiar 
states and operations of the mind, by and in which 
they appear to arise. 2. Conception of and within 
itself is the power, and acting is the act of conceiv- 
ing and of receiving, or of admitting facts to the 
inspection of the mind. It is closely connected with 
our sensations and perceptions. When we have con- 
ceptions they are revived and followed by certain 
mental states, in which present or past ideas, sensa- 
tions, or impressions can be and are examined. 3. 
In a certain sense we may have conceptions of ideas, 
images, sentiments, and thoughts. And in another 
sense it may apply to re-occurring facts and to re- 
existing emotions and sensations, which we, at one 
time, had realized. The mind, in the peculiar states 
with which they are connected, is moved and influ- 
enced in reference to both external facts and internal 
feelings and sensations of the soul. 



SECTION II. 
1. Conceptions in nature and action appear to 
differ from sensations and perceptions. Perception 

123 



124 CONCEPTION. 

is characterized by an egressive action, or by its 
striking out in apprehending objects, while concep- 
tion is more passive, with internal power to be re- 
vived or awakened as an inlet to the mind of exist- 
ing facts, and of the re-occurring of facts, feelings, 
and ideas which had been real in the experience of 
the past. 2. Conception differs from memory and 
from the action and objects of remembrance. The 
causes and objects of conceptions are absent, which 
is not true with sensations and perceptions. Sensa- 
tion and perception act from and in reference to 
their causes and objects; but we have conceptions 
of truths in the remembrance of past feelings and 
ideas, when the causes and objects are not taken into 
the account. In this way we may have conceptions 
of any thing within the control of memory, inde- 
pendently of time, condition, or place. Our con- 
ceptions of past occurrences take no account of the 
time when their causes were present; and the regu- 
lation of our conceptions are influenced by the power 
and laws of association, and can arise under the 
action and controlling power of volition. 3. Con- 
ception is not confined to our impressions of jpast 
time, but can be connected with our feelings in re- 
gard to present existences. We can not only have 
conceptions of present and real existences, but we 
can have them in connection with peculiar mental 
states or conditions, upon which depends the pecu- 
liarities of illusions, dreaming, and partial insanity, 
though such conceptions may be misguided or be 
entirely false. 



CONCEPTION AND THE SENSES. 125 



CHAPTER II. 

CONCEPTION AND THE SENSES. 

SECTION I. 
1. Our conceptions of facts or influences con- 
nected with the objects of the sense and sensations 
of smell may be explained in few words. When 
any odoriferous body, as the rose or jasmin, is pre- 
sented to us, the effect experienced is a sensation ; 
this, in the course of time, may appear to be erased 
from memory — the power which replaces memory 
and perception, in recalling it, and revives in the 
mind any thing of the nature, kind, or qualities of 
that which is brought to remembrance, is concep- 
tion. And in this way we may have conceptions of 
other qualities of the objects of smell once known, 
which are detected and revived in memory by 
reason of corresponding qualities or resemblances. 
And when we have conceptions of any thing for- 
merly perceived, it becomes an object of thought. 2. 
Our conceptions in regard to objects of taste may be 
clear or confused, in proportion to the ratio of differ- 
ence as to qualities. He who has ever tasted the 
bituminous water of Lake Asphallities, or of the 
mineral water of some celebrated spring, will be at 
no loss in forming proper conceptions of them. 
And the same is true in tasting that which is sweet 
or sour. Our taste can be followed by vivid con- 
ceptions of any thing pleasant or unpleasant. The 

11* 



126 CONCEPTION AND THE SENSES. 

qualities we taste in one object may affect the mind 
in recalling and in replacing our conceptions of sim- 
ilar qualities in some other object, 3. In regard to 
hearing, we may have conceptions of sound or 
sounds, as to their existence, the difference of tones, 
degrees of strength, and of their harmony or dis- 
cord. Any peculiarity connected with sound or 
sounds that we have ever heard may be recalled and 
our conceptions of them be vivid, having been ex- 
perienced; and we can have brilliant conceptions of 
the nature or character of such sounds. 4. We can 
have conceptions of the objects of the sense or sen- 
sations of touch. Having once experienced severe 
heat or cold, we are at no loss in having proper con- 
ceptions in relation to them at any subsequent 
period. Some philosophers say they have knowl- 
edge of men having been blind through life, who 
had true conceptions of the forms of letters and of 
figures once known, and that they could even de- 
tect colors, and have true conceptions in relation to 
them. 



SECTION II. 
1. Conceptions of objects of sight revive and are 
replaced in recalling visual objects, especially great 
objects, or those pervading the field of vision with 
that which is wild or is filled with terrific grandeur. 
The conceptions of visual objects are, perhaps, more 
easily recalled, and appear to be more vividly con- 
nected with the mental states, than those immedi- 
ately connected with that which affects the other 
senses. This may arise from the fact that there are 



CONCEPTION AND THE SENSES. 127 

a great variety of particles in each object of sight, 
which taxes the power of attention, association, and 
comparison. The conceptions of objects once seen 
are apt to be very clear ever afterward. There are 
examples of persons having been blind for years, yet 
their conceptions were strong, and, aided by them, 
they could give lucid and correct descriptions of 
that which had been seen. A descriptive writer or 
speaker must necessarily have vivid conceptions of 
truths or facts in order to present them full of inter- 
est. 2. The power of conception and of correctly 
conceiving facts is essentially important in consti- 
tuting a well-regulated mind. We are greatly de- 
pendent upon it in distinctly delineating objects and 
influences once experienced, their synchronizing 
properties, differences, and their resemblance. 3. 
The power of conception or of conceiving facts has 
its origin in connection with the original powers of 
the mind, and from its nature and office it is worthy 
of higher claims than to be regarded as a mere acci- 
dental and indefinable halo, wandering amid ele- 
ments called primary lights or entities constituting 
the soul. 



SECTION III. 
1. The power of conceiving facts can be cultiva- 
ted by repeated efforts to paint and repaint, dis- 
tinctly to the mind, the scenes and facts described 
by some other mind. 2. It can be cultivated by 
carefully and repeatedly painting to the mind the 
scenes of the landscape, mountain, or ocean, or by 
impressing the mind with the features and traces of 



128 CONCEPTION AND THE SENSES. 

beauty and grandeur as exhibited in the scenery of 
nature. 3. Different minds manifest different de- 
grees of vividness and of power in conceiving facts. 
A mind of vigorous and clear conception is apt to 
be gifted in lively descriptions. Some artists can 
paint the likeness of a friend from recollection, but 
it is necessary for them to have vivid conceptions of 
their features in order to give a correct expression 
of the countenance. It has been stated that some 
artists have such brilliant conceptions of paintings 
once seen, that in their absence they can paint a fac 
simile, so that when they are compared no difference 
can be detected. 4. When we are brought in unex- 
pected contact with objects which suddenly arrest 
our attention, we rely on our conceptions of them as 
true till they are corrected. Either from education or 
from debilitation we may be led to believe in noctur- 
nal apparitions or ghosts, and when involved in the 
gloom of night, in some lonely place, our concep- 
tions of the features and countenances of dead per- 
sons whom we have seen in time past become 
quick, vivid, and extravagant. Such conceptions 
can be corrected when tested by reason and experi- 
ence; yet it can be done only with great labor and 
care. 



SECTION IY. 
1. When the attention is given to fictitious or 
tragical scenes, though we know them to be untrue, 
yet at some exciting appearance or incident, our con- 
ceptions are attended with a belief that what we 
witness is true; yet this is soon corrected when we 



CONCEPTION AND THE SENSES. 129 

appeal to reason, unless the mind is verging to a 
state of derangement. 2. If we are suddenly af- 
flicted by contact with some object, the cause Js nat- 
urally the subject of revenge, from the fact that for 
the moment we conceive it to be capable of suffer- 
ing, though, in fact, it be really inanimate. And 
our vivid conceptions as to how much greater the 
injury might have been is attended with a moment- 
ary belief that a greater injuiw has been really 
received. Some persons in turning unexpectedly to 
the likeness of an absent friend, have had such vivid 
and strong conceptions of them as to involve a mo- 
mentary belief that the person was really before 
their eyes. 3. The influence of habit on our con- 
ceptions aids in correcting those which are incorrect 
or confused, and in strengthening, with distinctive 
clearness, those which are true. Further we will 
not speak of the influence of habit upon our concep- 
tions of objects, and influences affecting the mind 
through the medium of the senses. The influence 
of habit upon our conceptions of internal and moral 
truths and feelings will arise and be defined in the 
moral department of this work. 



130 MEMORY. 



CHAPTER III. 

MEMORY. 

SECTION I. 
1. Memory is that faculty of the mind by which 
we retain the knowledge of past events, or ideas 
which are past. It is the 'power of retaining im- 
pressions, facts, or events ; and remembrance, or rec- 
ollection, is the act of recalling them, and of pre- 
senting them, by a voluntary effort, to the mind for 
inspection. By conception we recall perceptions or 
the impressions of scenes or events without reference 
to time, causes, or objects, but memory retains past 
ideas or events with but little effort in connection 
with time, causes, and objects. Ideas, facts, and 
events seem to be spontaneous or abiding realities 
in the existence of memory; but remembrance, or 
the act of recalling past events or ideas, is controlled 
by an effort of the will. 2. Memory is that power 
or susceptibility of the mind which contains and re- 
tains ideas or events without any special, voluntary, 
or involuntary action. Within itself its capacity or 
power contains facts in connection with either active 
or inactive states of mind. It is the retentive power 
of events or realities which become the objects of 
thought and of knowledge. This power, in vigorous 
and voluntary action, calling up past events or 
truths, is remembrance, or recollection. Memory is 
not the origin of knowledge, but it is a source of 



MEMORY. 131 

knowledge, in connection with other mental powers, 
and it is essential in forming ideas of realities. 3. 
The existence, nature, and power of memory are 
closely connected with those of conception, percep- 
tion, suggestion, association, and imagination. 4. 
When we speak of an object of memory, we have 
immediate conceptions of its appearance and quali- 
ties. 5. In remembering objects which afflicted us 
in the past there is an immediate recalling of percep- 
tions or impressions, in regard to which we have 
perceptions of the relation of past time. 6. It is 
common for us to say, when we think of a fact 
within the compass of memory, that it suggests to us 
another fact, perhaps from the similarity or their 
nearness in the order of time. 7. Memory has been 
called a department of association, or, under and 
within the extent of its power, there is an affinity of 
ideas or events, forming a chain or association, in 
which they naturally recall each other. 8. Imagin- 
ation is dependent on memory in forming new com- 
binations of ideas from materials stored up in the 
memory. 



SECTION II. 
1. There appears to be original differences in the 
power of memory. Some persons have remarkably 
strong and retentive memories, which are essential 
to a rapid and extensive acquisition of knowledge ; 
but when memory is very prominent or predominant, 
it is seldom connected with a properly-balanced and 
well-regulated mind. The strength of the endow- 
ment of such minds depends principally upon what 



132 MEMORY. 

has been seen and heard, as they are apt to be very 
much limited in originality, yet quick and untiring 
in the pursuit of an object, with but little caution or 
judgment. Some have been known to repeat almost 
any number of words which they had heard with- 
out any connection or meaning. One writer speaks 
of a man who could repeat the entire contents of a 
newspaper, and of another who could retain words 
spoken to him to the number of six thousand, while 
their other intellectual powers were of an inferior 
order, though this is not universally true with per- 
sons of such remarkable memories. 2. Memory 
founded upon and embracing real analogies is an 
element of mind more important to true mental cul- 
tivation and the acquisition of knowledge, than that 
which remembers facts only in the order in which 
they occurred. The former is an important auxil- 
iary in forming and arriving at intellectual attain- 
ments and character, while the latter is connected 
with but little judgment; yet it appears to be more 
sprightly, attended with show, and embraces that 
class of facts in common demand. 3. We have em- 
braced and implied, in the nature and power of 
memory, in its peculiar connection with the action 
of the intellectual principle, (1.) A sensitive im- 
pression, or a certain mental state, resulting from 
contact with some previous existent, and synchro- 
nizing with the perception of the cause recalled. 
(2.) The involuntary recurring of internal impres- 
sions and feelings, or of those which may arise from 
their similarity to some existent of present knowl- 
edge. (3.) An involuntary recurrence in the mind 
of some previous existent related to the object or 









MEMORY. 133 

cause apprehended in close affinity or order of time. 
(4.) It not only implies suggestion, but conception 
of past events with the perceptions of epochs in past 
time. 



SECTION III. 
1. Local memory, which refers to and has power 
over local entities or facts once known, existing 
either in matter or mind, is generally combined with 
but little caution and judgment. It merely remem- 
bers facts or events in the order of their occurrence, 
resting upon local or incidental relations, especially 
in regard to place, order of priority, and aposteri- 
ority. It is not founded upon general principles, 
clearly known or understood, nor upon real analo- 
gies, but upon facts more abstracted or disconnected 
in existence and relationship. 2. Memory contrib- 
utes to true knowledge and the belief of truth. If 
the power of memory to retain and remember facts 
be removed, our knowledge of past events is swept 
away. Then knowledge would principally depend 
upon our consciousness of present existences and 
our perceptions of those things which are the objects 
of research. Events of the past could not suggest 
any thing in regard to the present or future; but 
having knowledge of past events, through and by 
the power of memory, we believe in and know them 
to have been real existences. 3. There are degrees 
in the power of memory in different persons. There 
are some who can not retain facts in the mind for 
any length of time when compared with others. 
Some recollect that which they have seen, but soon 



134 MEMORY. 

forget that which they have heard. Others recollect 
that which they have read or heard, but can not 
remember objects of sight. Some of the greatest 
and most affecting orators known in history could 
write in two hours more than they could memorize 
in a week. It is true that some persons can give a 
long chain of facts narrated by an author, only in 
the author's words; while others can give all the 
facts, only in their own language. 4. Philosophic 
memory embraces general principles and universal 
truths. General principles are of more importance 
than minor items, and also the facts appertaining to 
and which are explanatory of such principles. This 
description of memory is sustained principally by 
the relations of cause and effect, resemblance and 
contrast. Thus, our inquiries extend to the nature 
and origin of existences, scanning their analogies 
and oppositions, causes and results. 5. This species 
of memory is more clearly distinguishable in some 
minds than others. The mind naturally possessing 
philosophic perceptions and remembrances corre- 
sponding, is often more tardy in the acquisition of 
general knowledge than one of lively local or cir- 
cumstantial memory. The former is best adapted 
to the theoretical department, or principles of sci- 
ence, and the latter to the practical department, or 
facts of relevance and rules of proceeding. These 
facts and rules form mediums of rapid progress in 
circumstantial memory. Philosophic memory is 
connected with minds which look into principles, 
analogies, classifications, and deductions. Circum- 
stantial memory may lose its interest and power 
over facts and rules, while the other, commencing 



MEMOKY. 135 

with principles, traces out the analogies and tenden- 
cies, bursting through or rending in sunder all op- 
posing difficulties. 



SECTION IV. 

1. A ready memory embraces qualities, resem- 
blances, and rules of progression with ease, and with- 
out any special process of exploring and of under- 
standing the truths or facts illustrative of general 
principles. Local or circumstantial memory is brill- 
iant and ready in common composition or hasty 
and desultory conversation. 2. A retentive memory 
is connected with that species of memory called phi- 
losophic. It is supported by facts and realities, con- 
nected with general principles, and in remembering 
any fact the action is apt to be prolonged by recall- 
ing the general principles with which it is connected. 
Though it may be slow, yet it is generally progress- 
ive and irresistible in conquest. 3. Artificial mem- 
ory is cultivated and attained by connecting things 
easily remembered with those not so readily recalled. 
This operation is connected with and is dependent, 
to some extent, upon suggestion in a modified form. 
The whole system of mnemonics principally depends 
upon suggestion, as when in recalling two synchro 
nizing objects, with one and the same state of mind, 
the object of easiest recollection exciting the mind 
in recalling the other of more difficult remembrance. 
This system may be useful to a limited extent ; but 
much effort in carrying out the system is injurious 
to the mind, by burdening or overloading the mem- 
ory with many useless and foolish items and influ- 



136 MEMOS Y. 

ences, in order to the suggesting and remembrance 
of other things difficult to recall synchronizing with 
elementary agreement or disagreement. 4. An effi- 
cient memory has power to retain facts, with vivid- 
ness of action in recalling them. There is an acute- 
ness and peculiar quickness of retentive power 
connected with the memory of some persons which 
is not exercised by others. A good memory is not 
only tenacious and quick in the reception of facts or 
existences, but it retains impressions or ideas with a 
great degree of freshness and vividness amid the 
crumbling of mutable elements and the blight of 
time. 5. Another feature of an efficient memory is 
the readiness and ease with which it recalls and pre- 
sents to the mind facts or impressions. 6. The ab- 
sence of these good qualities may arise, (1.) From 
weakness or incapability of the tenacious reception 
of facts or impressions. (2.) It may result from the 
inefficiency of the retentive power. 3. It may be 
attributed to a habit of inattention or carelessness. 



SECTION Y. 
1. The memory of persons at advanced age is not 
efficient as in earlier life. There is an apparent 
weakness in the retentive power of memory, and an 
inability to recall ideas and facts. The loss of the 
power and activity of memory can not be regarded 
as wholly arising within and of itself, but is princi- 
pally attributable to the state or condition of the 
medium through which it acts, though it has been 
accounted for in different ways. 2. This feebleness 
can not arise from an impaired state of the organs 



MEMOEY. 137 

of perception so much as it does from a defect of 
the organs or medium of its own immediate action. 
The organs of perception are no more liable to de- 
rangement than the organs or medium through 
which memory acts. Therefore, memory is not de- 
pendent upon the organs of perception further than 
it is dependent upon perception itself. 3. Memory 
is dependent upon perception for facts with which it 
is stored, only so far as perception aids in the be- 
stowment of such facts. But it can not be regarded 
as dependent upon it for its retentive power, nor for 
its action in the recalling of ideas or facts. 4. Mem- 
ory may be weakened by defects in attention from 
its close connection with it ; for with attention there 
is an emotion of interest which is not so acute and 
tenacious in old persons ; yet it is necessary to im- 
plant facts upon the mind so as to be readily remem- 
bered. 5. The faculty or power of memory, in aged 
persons, is not capable of any diminution or loss 
within and of itself. The defect is attributable to 
the change and enfeebledness of the organs or me- 
dium through which its manifestations are realized. 
Otherwise the mind of an aged person would be an- 
nihilated in proportion as it ceases to be developed. 
But this is contrary to experience and knowledge. 
The memory of the aged can retain the events of 
early life so that they can be correctly rehearsed, 
while present events or truths are forgotten by 
them in an hour. This shows that the original 
power within itself has suffered no elementary loss, 
and that it is free from any annihilating power. 

12* 



138 MEMORY. 

SECTION VI. 
1. The improvement of memory depends upon the 
tenacious manner which attends it in the perception 
of facts. Many facts or truths may come within the 
compass of a careless or inattentive memory and not 
become the objects of its retentive power. By strict 
attention we may cultivate acuteness in the manner 
of receiving facts, which are to be the objects of the 
retentive power of memory. 2. The retentive power 
of memory can be cultivated by repeated efforts to 
impress upon it the facts we wish to recollect; and 
by often pausing in order to impress that which is to 
be remembered upon the mind by associating it 
with objects known, easily retained, and readily 
recalled. 3. In order to improve memory, the effort 
should be to deeply and distinctly impress the mind 
with those things which are to be the objects of 
memory. Hence, our attention should be turned to 
the distinct differences of objects, and we should 
form distinct conceptions of all facts and objects 
which we wish to remember. In this way memory 
can be cultivated. 



SECTION VII. 
1. Memory may be aided by carefully considering 
the condition and relationship of that which is to be 
remembered, together with the time and circum- 
stances of, and in connection with, the objects of 
memory. .2. The memory will often retain facts 
better by writing them down, and also by classify- 
ing them, or by tracing them back to first principles. 



MEMORY. 139 

3. He who fears to trust memory will always feel 
embarrassed in delivering what he knows on any 
subject. In order to conquer and to feel at home on 
any or all subjects, we must make memory responsi- 
ble, and freely throw ourselves upon it. 4. Memory 
should be constantly exercised and burdened only 
with the most important facts. 5. We should receive 
the impressions of things to be remembered in their 
natural order — from premises to relations and re- 
sults, from elements to manifestations and from 
causes to effects. 



140 DURATION OF MEMORY. 



CHAPTER IV. 

REMEMBRANCE, RECOLLECTION, AND THE I 
TION OF MEMORY. 



SECTION I. 
1. Remembrance is the retaining or the continu- 
ing in the mind ideas or facts which have been pres- 
ent at previous mental states, or it is an idea or 
impression previously received from some object 
recurring to the mind at a subsequent period without 
the presence of its cause. 2. Remembrance implies 
the occurring of ideas or facts to the mind spontane- 
ously, or with but little mental effort. 3. The ease, 
distinctness, and readiness with which we remember 
an impression or fact, is proportionably to the tenac- 
ity with which they are received. Deep impressions 
are lasting, and are continued as property of the 
mind without any special voluntary mental effort. 



SECTION II. 
1. Recollection is the act of recalling impressions 
or facts which have been the objects of memory at 
some former time. 2. Remembrance differs from 
recollection. The former implies that an idea or 
impression occurs to the mind spontaneously or with 
but little voluntary exertion. The latter implies not 
only the power, but it is the act of recalling ideas or 
facts which do not spontaneously recur to the mind, 






DURATION OF MEMORY. 141 

and with seemingly voluntary efforts. 3. Recollec- 
tion, in one sense, is voluntary, and in another sense 
it is not. We can not remember because we merely 
choose to remember. To will to remember any fact 
or facts, implies that such facts were once the objects 
of memory, and that they are still in the reach and 
subject to the power and the act which recalls them. 
4. Memory may be said to be the power which 
receives and retains ideas or facts. Remembrance 
appears to preserve facts once known from passing 
away from the mind so as to be utterly beyond 
recovery. Recollection is the act of recalling facts, 
once the objects of memory, for the inspection and 
use of the mind. 



SECTION III. 
1. The duration of memory is clearly evidenced 
in its power to recall and present to the mind the 
events of its past experience. Memory, within it- 
self, is absolutely imperishable, and thoughts which 
are the objects of memory are indestructible. If 
the impression is revived with which any thought in 
time past was connected, the thought itself can be 
reproduced. The reviving of any impression once 
realized necessarily involves the presence and the 
action of a power which can affect the recalling of 
thoughts coexisting with it. 2. Thoughts and feel- 
ings, which have been forgotten for years, often recur 
unexpectedly. It is believed by some that the mind 
possesses within itself power in its different states, 
and while affected alternately by innumerable exist- 
ences and influences, to recall, at different periods, 



142 DURATION OF MEMORY. 

all the events and feelings which have ever been the 
objects of memory. 3. The different conditions and 
states of the physical system exert an influence over 
the power of memory. But no influence of this 
kind has absolute control over memory itself, or any 
object of memory, so as to annihilate any thing 
which is essential to them. 4. If all that is essential 
to memory can not be in whole or in part annihila- 
ted by physical elements, what must be the power 
of memory when freed from all entanglements in 
the future world ? This is no more than memory as 
an abstract entity. Its present indestructible exist- 
ence is only the beginning of its immortality. The 
memory is said to become weak and to lose its re- 
tentive power, and also its vividness of action in 
recalling past events; yet we have no proof that 
memory within itself has suffered any elementary 
loss. So that this defect in the memory of aged 
persons must be attributed to the change, enfeebled- 
ness, and inactivity of the physical organs or me- 
dium through which it acts. 



SECTION IV. 
1. Memory can be and is affected by the physical 
organs, when those organs are under the power and 
influence of disease. There is a connection between 
the mind and the physical organs, in which each 
exercises a reciprocal influence. The action of the 
mind may be increased or diminished in proportion 
to the manner and intensity of the influence of dis- 
ease upon the body. Accordingly as the body is 
affected the mind may be retarded or quickened in 



DURATION OF MEMORY. 143 

action. 2. Memory may be impaired from injuries 
of the bead or affections of the brain. An English- 
man has been mentioned who was in a state of stu- 
por, the result of an injury of the head, who, when 
reviving, spoke only in Welsh. He had been thirty 
years from his native country, and previous to the 
injury he had forgotten his native language, and 
when restored to health he recovered the English 
language again and could not recollect the Welsh. 
This was evidence that the power of memory had 
not been destroyed, and that its inactivity in recall- 
ing facts can not be attributed to any defect within 
and of itself. A Frenchman on going to England 
when quite young, finally lost the power of speak- 
ing French; but while suffering from an injury of 
the head he spoke only French. 3. When the body 
is affected in different ways the effect upon memory 
differs. A boy has been mentioned who seemed to 
be insensible under the operation of trepan for a 
fracture of the skull, and when he was restored to 
health he had no recollection of it ; but during the 
delirium of a fever eleven years after he gave a cor- 
rect description of the operation, and of the persons 
present. An Italian gentleman, when first attacked 
with disease of the brain, spoke English ; as the dis- 
ease progressed he spoke French, and for some time 
before his death he spoke only Italian. These facts, 
with many others, show that diseased organs have 
an influence over memory, and also that memory 
must be imperishable. 



144 DURATION OF MEMORY. 

SECTION Y. 
1. Often when the mind appears to be in an inact- 
ive state of coma, the result of violent fever, the 
powers and action of memory are not wholly sus- 
j:>ended. There are instances of persons thus af- 
fected, and supposed to be perfectly unconscious, 
who, on recovery, have had a perfect recollection of 
the events and conversation which took place. And 
on the other hand, an attack of disease often sus- 
pends the action of memory, so that all anterior 
knowledge, for some length of time, is lost. Some 
recover correctly the ideas of things, but can not 
recollect their names. These facts go to show that 
the most intense disease can not destroy the element- 
ary power of memory. Hence, we can but come 
to the conclusion that temporal death has no power 
to annihilate the elements of mind. 2. States of 
stupor or coma are often the result of intemperance, 
or other habits of dissipation. In the case of some 
memory is suspended, but with others there is a 
brilliant recollection of impressions and facts. 3. 
When the subject of intemperance is under the 
influence of delirium tremens, it would appear im- 
possible for him to retain any thing of what was 
passing; yet there is a vivid and horrible recollec- 
tion of real feelings and of facts which are regarded 
as true. "When the drunkard revives from this state 
of mental torture, he can recall and give appalling 
descriptions of snakes, hooks, pincers, and devils. 
With tremors of horror he can describe the wailings 
of the lost and the undying flames of an intermina- 
ble hell. That which was true to him, and that 



DURATION OF MEMORY. 145 

which appeared to be true, were of tenacious recol- 
lection, showing the power of memory. Though he 
may try to drown his sorrows and forget his sins in 
the lethean poison of earth, yet faithful memory, in 
the future world, will gather them all around him 
with more than scorpion sting of unrelenting re- 
morse. If this be the real condition of the mind, 
what will be the future hope of the soul while de- 
scending amid the melting bowlders of the flame- 
encircled walls of woe, as though it were seeking a 
deeper electricity of more fervent wrath eternal ! 



SECTION VI. 
1. Truths.^ which are the first objects of memory 
in the minds of the young, are those which are of 
most importance. Though they are the first re- 
ceived, yet they are the last to be forgotten. Those 
things which we learn first are generally closely con- 
nected with our education, and they greatly influence 
our course in life, and aid in forming our characters 
for eternity. Therefore, there can not be too much 
care in selecting proper truths for the mind in the 
beginning of its education. 2. In view of the judg- 
ment of the great day, what manner of persons 
ought we to be? Memory will then and there pre- 
sent to the mind all the impressions, ideas, feelings, 
and acts of our whole lives. All, all will be remem- 
bered. From the very nature and duration of 
memory we should be guilty of no act that we will 
dread remembering in that day, or to have revealed 
before the countless millions of the vast universe. 

13 



146 ATTENTION. 



CHAPTER V. 

ATTENTION. 
SECTION I. 

1. Attention is that faculty of the mind which 
has power to attend to or Jieed any object or fact. 

2. By general consent it has been defined to be the 
action in, or the act of attending to, objects or facts. 

3. If it has power to act, or if it can be acted upon, 
then it is a real entity. And if it is a real entity, 
it must be capable of being called an element of the 
mind. 4. If it is an element of mingl, it can not 
be a result of any other element or elements. 5. 
The strong efforts made by some to prove that it is 
not an original power of mind, has convinced us that 
the reverse is true, from the fact that their conclu- 
sions failed for the want of correct arguments. 6. 
Attention expresses not only the state of mind, but 
the act by which it is directed to any object or fact, 
to the exclusion, for the time, of all other considera- 
tions. Though it is closely connected with percep- 
tion, yet we may have perceptions of objects, to 
some extent, before the attention is directed to them. 
The musician can perceive the order of the bass of 
a piece of music which he is playing on an instru- 
ment, while his attention is at the same time upon 
the air he is singing. When our attention is stead- 
ily fixed upon an object, other objects may pass 
within the field of vision unheeded till our attention 
is withdrawn ; then, without difficulty, the mind can 



ATTENTION. 147 

be directed to the' object which had received no pre- 
vious attention. While the attention is intensely 
fixed upon some object, a friend may ask a question 
which may seem, for some time, to be lost; but 
when the attention is diverted and turned to the 
question, it can be answered with ease. 



SECTION II. 
1. Attention is said to be voluntary when it is 
under the power and action of the will. An object 
may have our attention so as to lead us to a general 
examination of its appearance ; but we can determ- 
ine to attend to the nature or elements of such object 
or objects, upon which a penetrating investigation 
takes place. 2. Attention is said to be involuntary 
when it is suddenly arrested and turned to an unex- 
pected object before the consent of the will is ob- 
tained to forsake an object of previous pursuit or 
investigation. 3. The degrees of attention differ 
from small to great. The mind may be but slightly 
and momentarily arrested by an object, and the 
attention may not be quickened by any voluntary 
action or powerful emotion; therefore its action is 
feeble. But attention is tenacious and intense when 
it acts under the continuous earnestness and power 
of volition. 4. Intense and successful attention de- 
pends upon our determination to thoroughly investi- 
gate and understand the objects or facts to which 
the mind is directed. This determined persever- 
ance is, or soon will be, accompanied with a 
desire to conquer, and a love for the investigation 
of truth. 



148 ATTENTION. 

SECTION III. 

1. Much depends upon & proper exercise of atten- 
tion in listening to the truths and arguments of a 
discourse. If we listen with seemingly an involun- 
tary indifference or carelessness, that which is 
learned, cogent, and beautiful is to us almost if not 
entirely lost. And if we give attention in a hurried 
and confused manner, our remembrance of that 
which was heard will be confused and defective. 2. 
In attending to truths we read in the perusal of 
books, the mind should be concentrated upon that 
which we read with earnestness of thought and with 
calm and mature deliberation. If we are apt to 
become weary and inattentive, it is better to read 
less at any one time; and we should read but few 
books, and they should be of the best selection. 3. 
Memory is dependent upon attention. In proportion 
as our attention to facts is intense or slight, so is our 
remembrance vivid and of long continuance, or brief 
and imperfect. That which receives our undivided 
attention becomes the object of remembrance. If 
the peculiarities of a tree in the midst of the grove 
receives our undivided attention, it will be remem- 
bered, while all those which surround it, with equal 
peculiarities and within the field of vision, if remem- 
bered at all they will be remembered as almost 
indistinct entities. Any object of which we can 
have knowledge through the medium of the senses, 
if it does not become the object of attention, our 
remembrance of it will be imperfect, if not entirely 
lost. 



ATTENTION. 149 

SECTION IV. 
1. Attention is easily influenced by disease. Many 
persons under only a slight influence of febrile affec- 
tion, are often discovered to be incapable of fixing 
their attention upon any thing with any degree of 
certainty. 2. Bodily diseases, in most cases, seem 
to affect this faculty of the mind first. And as dis- 
ease advances its victim becomes so far incapable 
of exercising attention that present occurrences, with 
him, can not be remembered. When the mind is so 
much affected by disease that we are incapable of 
receiving correct impressions from external objects, 
and we begin to regard the objects of our thoughts 
as real existences, we are in the first degree or state 
of delirium. 3. Fever, intemperance, and old age 
so affect the body, that in the majority of cases the 
attention can not be concentrated upon a long chain 
of arguments, neither can it be fixed for a long time 
upon any one object. Though diseased physical 
organs may exert a great influence over attention, 
yet the power of attending to facts is in the mind, 
and is incapable of any essential destruction or an- 
nihilation within and of itself. 

13* 



150 ASSOCIATION 



CHAPTER VI. 

ASSOCIATION 



SECTION I. 
1. The power of association is in the mind. This 
power has its origin in connection with conscious- 
ness, original and relative suggestion, and by it the 
objects of their action seem to be blended for the 
inspection and use of the mind. Its action is the 
associating of ideas where two or more ideas con- 
stantly or naturally follow each other in the mind, 
so that one almost infallibly produces the other. 2. 
The act of associating is sustained by a remarkable 
tendency, in which facts or conceptions, having been 
contemplated together or in immediate succession, 
become so connected in the different mental states, 
that one of them, at a subsequent period, recalls the 
others, or introduces a train of thoughts which suc- 
ceed each other in the order of their original asso- 
ciation. 3. Association may be regarded as volun- 
tary, to a certain extent. There can be a mental 
effort made in calling up ideas or facts which have 
been associated with those which are clearly the 
objects of volitive action. 4. But we are led to 
regard association principally as involuntary. It is 
spontaneous when any fact present to the mind sug- 
gests another resembling or having some kind of 
affinity to itself; this may suggest a third and so on 
till many arise. This may take place with but little 
or no mental effort, and without attention, so that 



ASSOCIATION. 151 

the facts can not be remembered till something oc- 
curs to arouse the attention ; then, by a mental effort, 
we are confident that facts have intervened since the 
attention was withdrawn from some fact far back, 
which is the object of remembrance. 



SECTION II. 
1. If association consists only in the adhering, 
natural affinity and the blending of our ideas, or 
thoughts, or feelings, then philosophers have argued 
cogently and effectually. But if "resemblance, con- 
trast, contiguity, in time and place, and cause and 
effect" are primary laws of association, we can not 
understand their undefined definition of the primary 
power of association. If there is a power in the 
mind capable of associating ideas, that power lies 
back of the act of associating them ; and if the act 
is acknowledged, the cause of that act belongs to 
and is in the mind. It is impossible for the original 
power of association to be a result of the action of 
one or more of the elements of mind. No primary 
element of mind has power to form itself, and conse- 
quently it can not, by mere action, form a power 
which fills the office of a mental faculty. 2. It is 
not contended that the associating of ideas or facts, 
as a result, is an original element of mind, nor that 
it is any thing more than an ultimate existent in 
mental phenomena, but that the power which acts 
is in the mind. 3. Association is furnished with 
materials in the occurrences and facts which are 
connected with the laws of cause and effect, resem- 
blance, contrast, and contiguity in time and place. 



152 ASSOCIATION. 

SECTION III, 
1. Objects which are connected, or those which 
sustain to each other the relation, to any degree, of 
cause and effect, do suggest each other as objects of 
the power of association. 2. Resemblance, in the 
form or qualities of objects, will mutually suggest 
each other to the mind, and the objects or facts thus 
presented are the property of the power of associa- 
tion. 3. Contrast appears to contribute to associa- 
tion. A very large man seems to suggest to the 
mind of the beholder the idea of a dwarf, the rivu- 
let a river, and a lake the ocean. 4. Association is 
aided by facts connected w T ith the law of contiguity 
of time and place. The nearness of time in which 
facts occurred or feelings existed, and the close con- 
nection of localities or places aids the power of sug- 
gestion and contributes to association. Some par- 
ents can always tell the ages of their neighbors' 
children by recalling to the mind the birthdays of 
their own children, which correspond to or are near, 
in time, to the birthdays of their neighbors' chil- 
dren. When we think of the cities of London and 
Paris, we immediately think of the countries where 
they are located. 



SECTION IV. 
1. Natural association takes place when any fact, 
which is the object of attention, is by the mind as- 
sociated with some fact of previous knowledge to 
which it has a resemblance or a relation. In this 
way associations may be formed. The referring of 



ASSOCIATION. 153 

facts to some principle or subject, which they are 
calculated to illustrate, fixes them in the mind, and 
the association is easy and natural. If a question 
arises which we can not at the time decide, any sub- 
sequent information deciding the question will be 
referred by the mind to such question; whereas, 
such information might have passed unnoticed or 
have been forgotten but for the original question. 
2. Association can arise out of the natural and real 
relations of facts to each other, or to objects of 
thought which have long existed in the mind. The 
remembrance of facts or truths does not wholly de- 
pend upon the acuteness of attention, but it depends, 
in some degree, upon the previous existence of truths 
or facts in the mind, with which new ones can be 
and are readily associated. And to these subse- 
quent facts or truths which may arise can be added, 
extending the power and increasing the energy and 
activity of the mind. Thus, every new thought or 
truths received by the mind are valuable within 
themselves, and each one forms a new basis for a 
new and extended association of facts by which we 
progress in knowledge. The same facts, associated 
in the minds of different persons, may vary with 
their intellectual habits and be associated in various 
ways. Many truths thus associated in the mind are 
so related to each other in their affinitating tendency 
as to readily recall each other in the various mental 
states. 



SECTION V. 

1. The calling up of facts is voluntary when we 
direct the mind to a particular train of truths or 



154 ASSOCIATION. 

thoughts best calculated to lead to those we wish to 
command. We may have an impression of some 
item of knowledge which we have been in the pos- 
session of, and from the present knowledge of a por- 
tion of facts belonging to a certain class or associa- 
tion be enabled to recall all others of the same 
association. We can turn the mind to the examina- 
tion of the known truths till they lead to the recall- 
ing of those we desire to have at our command. In 
remembering a part of associated facts we can com- 
mand and direct our attention to them till all of the 
same connection are revived and recalled. 2. Asso- 
ciations recur involuntarily when the mind is turned 
to some subject which is calculated, in its nature, or 
by its elementary existence or tendency, to lead to 
them. The mind can pursue trains of thought with- 
out any volitive effort, and often without any con- 
sciousness of its action, till some object arrests the 
attention. The process which leads to such an object 
of thought appears to be lost till we trace the asso- 
ciations of thought back to some existent of previous 
and intentional examination. In this way ideas, 
truths, and occurrences which had not been the sub- 
jects of thought for years are revived and recalled. 
Thus they may recur spontaneously, being associated, 
according to their natural and real relation, to each 
other. 3. Casual associations are formed only in 
connection with persons, incidents, or place. An 
idea or thought is associated with the source it was 
received from — the person, the book, or the place, 
of whom, or of which, or where we came in pos- 
session of any truth or fact. Such truths or facts 
are recalled in the mind whenever the source is 



ASSOCIATION. 155 

thought of, seen, or mentioned. If we think of a 
certain city where we have been, the mind is imme- 
diately presented with direct facts, incidents, or 
occurrences in connection with it to almost an innu- 
merable extent. 



SECTION VI. 
1. Facts or occurrences associated with places or 
localities are revwedwhen we think of or visit them. 
The Christian loves to revisit the place where his 
manner of life was changed, and to think of and 
review the associations connected with it. And 
even on the other hand, the murderer dreads to 
think of or to revisit the places of his dark criminal 
deeds, and he shudders in dwelling upon the asso- 
ciations which there arise as portentous of wretch- 
edness and woe. 2. Associations formed in connec- 
tion with localities seem to impress the mind with 
facts almost independent of memory. In some in- 
stances occurrences, which have been experienced 
in connection with certain locations, have been en- 
tirely forgotten till the place or places were revisited, 
when the facts associated with them were revived 
and recalled. 3. If we meet with a person or per- 
sons who know us, but of whom we have no recol- 
lection, and being unwilling to ask their names, we 
continue to converse with them till we learn the 
location of their homes, or the places where we met 
with them, from some fact connected with the former 
associations, and even their names revive and are at 
our command. If we wish to call the attention of a 
friend to any item or truth he has forgotten, we 



156 ASSOCIATION. 

speak of the circumstances which were associated 
with it till some one which he remembers recalls the 
fact, and probably all that was connected with it. 



SECTION VII. 
1. Intentional association involves a volitive men- 
tal action. The truths associated are not connected 
so much by the external relation they sustain to each 
other as that existing in the states and action of the 
mind. We can establish a connection between the 
thing we wish to remember and some other known 
object, which may have no relation to that which is 
to be remembered. 2. Often, when persons go in 
the pursuit of two or more objects, and fearing that 
some one will be forgotten, they will select some 
familiar phrase, carry something in their hand or in 
their pocket, only as realities, to prevent them from 
forgetting the object desired. 3. "We can associate 
any thing we wish to remember with some known 
existent, which does not resemble that which we 
wish to remember, so that it can be recalled. Mer- 
chants can tell the prices of their goods from marks, 
which can have no resemblance to prices in any 
way. The order of successive periods, or the observ- 
ance of the commemorative rites in the Christian 
system, must be regarded as intentional. 4. Differ- 
ent objects can produce impressions which excite 
similar feelings in the mind, and they mutually sug- 
gest or recall each other. This arises from the natu- 
ral resemblance in their mutual relation. Thus ob- 
jects of natural resemblance can not but excite 
similar feelings. Similar feelings are the result of 



ASSOCIATION. 157 

entities, which have any thing in common assimila- 
ted to the original principles or nature of our being. 
And any thing of such resemblances or relationship 
may suggest or recall another object which will pro- 
duce a similar result upon the mind. 



SECTION Till. 
1. The principle of intentional association is fur- 
ther illustrated by the way in which the mind is 
affected in regard to the real existence of the Chris- 
tian system and the truths connected with it. Infi- 
dels who have urged that the common course of 
nature is the only truth that is universal and infalli- 
ble, have, on the other hand, denied that human 
testimony is sufficient to establish the events con- 
nected with our holy religion. Though this is a 
sophism, yet it should be met. If we had no means 
or way of judging of the lapse of time, or of the 
remote ages of the world, than the testimony of inert 
elements as contained on the face of the globe, or 
those which are now regarded as being contained in 
the stratified archives of its own periods and ages, 
we would as readily infer that the existence of the 
earth was an accident of recent occurrence as to 
have any other supposition. 2. A proper belief in 
the arrangements and occurrences of such facts de- 
pends upon human testimony and experience in rela- 
tion to the chain of associated truths in the past. 
By means of traditional and written testimony we 
are led to the belief that the earth is more than five 
thousand years old; but without this testimony it 
would all be in the confusion of uncertainty, and in 

14 



158 ASSOCIATION. 

darkness. 3. The commemorative rites or periodical 
observances, can be transmitted from age to age by 
traditional testimony, or that which has been written 
by many individuals, and at different times, during 
the lapse of thousands of years; yet there is the 
regular return of the fact, the occasion and the day 
associated with them, the unbroken series which 
carry us back to the time of the original events, and 
the persons who witnessed them. Hence, we have 
as much faith or belief in the real existence of such 
facts as we have in the series of years which have 
marked the course of time and the existence of the 
globe. 4. By the association of the events and facts 
connected with these observances we are freed from 
every impression of false testimony, from the fact 
that we are conducted back by regular steps and 
periods to the time of the original events. An im- 
postor can not fabricate a system of theology which 
can be even the object of investigation till it is 
marked w T ith rites, periods, and events; then the 
harmony and regular occurrence of them would be 
of the utmost importance. But such a system as 
this, bearing a sufficient resemblance to the Bible 
to be believed, has never been known; while the 
Bible has them in the series of facts extending 
through the past and described as pending in the 
unbounded future to a degree and extent infinitely 
beyond all other books, systems, or facts ever known. 



ASSOCIATION. 159 



CHAPTER VII. 

ASSOCIATION CONTINUED. 

SECTION I. 
1. The true analysis of language will not allow 
the terms law or laws to be applied to the principle 
of association, nor to those principles or existences 
closely connected with it, only as such connected 
entities are clearly contingent in nature or relation- 
ship. 2. Truths may sustain such" relations to one 
another as to mutually suggest each other; this rela- 
tionship can not reveal the law or laws of the prin- 
ciple of association ; but it is that by which objects 
suggest each other upon the ground of a common 
influence or impression made by them upon the 
mind. Objects which have no known relation to 
each other are often associated from the fact that 
the effect of them upon the mind is similar. 3. A 
variation of the associating principle may be found 
in, and in connection with, the original difference in 
mental powers. It may arise from the difference in 
primary elements and their action, all of which may 
affect the associating principle. One mind may 
differ from another by possessing one or more facul- 
ties of a higher order than those corresponding to 
them in the other mind; yet when all the faculties 
of both minds are examined they are found to con- 
stitute them equal in strength, yet the associating 
principle varies, being affected by them. The ac- 



160 ASSOCIATION. 

tion of many minds differ, and these differences 
influence the associating principle. Three men of 
equal minds in strength journey together; one of 
them is naturally inclined to notice the face of the 
country, a second the road and internal improve- 
ments, and a third the manners and customs of the 
people. All these different objects give rise to cor- 
responding associations. 4. The associating princi- 
ple varies with the energy and strength of the emo- 
tions. Objects which cause or have in connection 
with them realities, giving rise to intense feelings of 
sorrow, are readily recalled ; as permanent columns, 
amid ruins, they stand out, the enduring objects of 
memory, while facts connected with slight emotions 
are soon numbered with things that were. And in 
like manner those things which excite feelings of 
joy, becoming the objects, not only of feeling, but 
of attention and thought, will be readily at our com- 
mand, together with all the associated facts. 



SECTION II. 
1. The influence of the lapse of time affects the 
existence and action of the associating principle. 
Facts occurring last evening can, at the present 
time, be recalled with clearness and far more readily 
than those of many years' standing, from the fact 
that there is no perceptible loss in the strength of 
the connection by which the facts thus associated 
revive and restore each other. This view of the 
subject is in accordance with the common experi- 
ence of mankind. But however far the associating 
principle can or may be affected by the lapse of 



ASSOCIATION. 161 

time, its original power must be imperishable, and 
all facts thus becoming a part of knowledge will live 
and be known beyond the bounds of change. 2. 
The lapse of five years may erase many truths from 
the memory of aged persons, while the associated 
facts of early life readily recall each other. This 
shows that the original power is not lost, but that it 
still lives ; and when death is shaking down this 
clay tenement, the internal animating flame, long 
compressed, will burst forth from amid the ruins 
with imperishable powers, and with all its resources 
of knowledge. 3. The associating principle is influ- 
enced by the original differences in the natural incli- 
nations or disposition. Some persons naturally love 
that which is grave or solemn, and associations of 
facts are formed corresponding to their natural dis- 
position or feelings ; others have only lively feelings; 
and a different class are attracted with the romantic, 
or that which possesses natural sublimity or beauty. 
So that facts become prominently associated corre- 
sponding to all the different inclinations or disposi- 
tions, together with even the times and circumstances. 



SECTION III. 
1. Associations can be revived and recalled when 
present objects are reported to the mind, through 
the medium of the senses, being the immediate ob- 
jects of perception. There may be something in or 
connected with such objects which causes the recall- 
ing of truths and trains of facts which had not been 
thought of for many years. Often there is some- 
thing in the sound, the taste, the odor, the appear- 

14* 



162 ASSOCIATION. 

ance, or touch, which revives some occurrence or 
fact of early life. 2. The vividness and duration 
in the reception and retention of realities which 
have been the objects of the senses and of percep- 
tion, depends upon the strength or force and charac- 
ter of the action thus received. When an object 
affects directly and forcibly the organs of the senses, 
and is fully the object of perception and thought, 
accompanied with appropriate emotions, it can not 
be readily classed with fleeting objects of memory. 
It appears to have been impressed upon the mind in 
a durable way. 3. Mental associations may be 
under a direct volitive power and action. By vol- 
untary action we can not create associations nor the 
facts entering into such combinations. And we can 
not will the existence of truths to be associated with- 
out first having some idea or perception of those 
things we wish to have exist; but we can will that 
facts or trains of thought may be present with and 
under the full inspection of the mind ; and we have 
volitive power to retain them as objects of such in- 
spection. And on the sudden perception of some 
unpleasant reality we can instantly divert the atten- 
tion and refuse to contemplate it, or the facts which 
may be associated with it. 4. Associations can be 
and often are under indirect voluntary power. A 
volitive power may be regarded as incapable of cre- 
ating, by direct action, either mental associations or 
the facts thus connected. But when we have per- 
ception of some truths, which appear to be of an 
association or chain of events, we can will to use 
them and contingent facts in arriving at, and in 
being able finally to contemplate and comprehend 



ASSOCIATION. 163 

other existences which are at the time unknown. 
When we stop such succession of mental states or 
action, or check the regular tendency or course of 
our thoughts, there will arise associations under the 
control of indirect voluntary action. In pursuing a 
train of thought or events we often arrive at some- 
thing remarkable within itself; here the regular ac- 
tion of the mind is arrested, when, from the peculiar 
qualities or resemblance of such an existent, remote 
facts arise and new associations are formed. 5. In 
noticing the skill and design interwoven and con- 
nected with the works of nature they lead us to think 
of the great first Cause. Here we pause as though 
we would wish to comprehend the infinity of such a 
power or Being; yet the regular course of such 
thought is no sooner checked than the silvery trains 
of innumerable rolling worlds or orbs, which he has 
made, fly through the field of mental action and 
contemplation, ever burning with the glow of imper- 
ishable light. 



SECTION IV. 
1. The influence of association upon our ideas of 
correct taste is worthy of notice. Great care should 
be observed in receiving truths according to the rules 
of correct taste. Orators famed for wisdom, a ready 
and forcible delivery, often indulge in imperfections 
as to language, gestures, or manner of delivery, 
which would be regarded as revolting and disgust- 
ing but for the influence associated with the speaker. 
Though such defects are noticed at first without 
pleasure upon the part of admirers, yet in the course 



164 ASSOCIATION. 

of time such defects, being associated wi'h the man 
and his zeal, are regarded as marks of great dis- 
tinction. Hence, such defects are copied and imita- 
ted, while traits of true excellence pass unnoticed. 
2. Our ideas of fashion vary with the influence of 
association. The odd insignia or the peculiarity of 
the escutcheon upon which is emblazoned the glory 
of some great warrior, however ludicrous they may 
appear within themselves, yet they are soon regarded 
as tasteful and glorious from their connection with 
such a personage. This is true, to some extent, in 
regard to almost every extravagance in dress. 3. 
That which would be abhorred, if introduced by 
common persons, can be introduced by others, and 
be extolled by almost universal consent, only from 
its association with such persons. When the multi- 
tude lay aside any extravagance, should any one 
perpetuate it they are regarded as being destitute of 
refinement. It would appear that any person ever 
conforming to the rules of a correct taste and fash- 
ion, independently of the varying influence of asso- 
ciation, would be regarded as a wonder in the earth, 
being unworthy of imitation. 4. Habit gives effi- 
ciency to the power we have over our associations. 
It is constituted by the repetition of efforts in at- 
tending to associating operations, till we gain a 
facility and readiness in them and in regard to them. 
Trains of thought or associations, which have been 
long familiar to us, are attended to with ease and 
precision. The mind has a natural tendency to re- 
turn or recur to the states of previous experience, in 
which associated truths or events receive and re- 
call each other. The formation of habit is volun- 



ASSOCIATION. 165 

tary when we determine to repeat the efforts of at- 
tending to such mental operations. And it may be 
the result of indirect volitive power. 



SECTION V. 
1. The tendency and the effects of improper asso- 
ciations are worthy of notice. Associations may 
descend in degrees from those of simple error to 
those of vicious and malicious tendencies and re- 
sults. Many descriptive writers associate with 
wicked tendencies, deeds, and events language full 
of imagery, exciting the feelings with sublimity, 
beauty, grandeur, and delight, till that which is sin- 
ful can be contemplated without any feelings of ab- 
horrence, and the mind becomes inclined to crime. 
This course once entered, without almost a miracu- 
lous interposition of Divine power, the immortal 
soul is soon entangled and black with crimes, at- 
tracting the electricity of unending wrath under the 
just claims of infinite law. 2. "We here close with 
the tendency and results of correct associations. 
That which is pure within itself becomes the object 
of pure mental action. A pure mind appears to be 
naturally so corelated to objects that if some of 
them were not of a high order of purity, yet the 
associations, if permitted to be formed, would be 
pure and harmless. 3. He who wishes to succeed in 
any branch of science must know that he has first 
correctly fixed the primary principles, and then asso- 
ciate with them those truths which are naturally 
adapted to and are connected with their existence, 
in order to arrive at, and to clearly comprehend cor- 



166 ASSOCIATION. 

rect results. We can not speak of all the endlessly- 
diversified applications of the associating principle, 
yet their existence is indispensable in the acquisition 
of knowledge. 



ifrbbn Jfifijh 



CHAPTER I. 

MENTAL STATES. 

SECTION I. 
1. A simple mental state may be regarded as only 
expressing the presence of one thought or object, 
which appears to be disconnected and indivisible. 
Such a state of mind seems to be natural; for a sim- 
ple notion, feeling, or idea is indivisible; yet they 
can be the object or objects of mental states. 2. If 
two or more elements or existences, collected or con- 
nected together, enter into mental states, such states 
are not simple, but complex. 3. Though simple 
mental states can not be defined, yet, like axioms, 
they may be regarded as self-evident truths, always 
to be known as real entities within themselves. 4. 
Our belief in and reliance upon simple mental states 
as real may be with boundless confidence; for there 
can be no imaginary existent in a single idea, feel- 
ing, or fact abstracted and indivisible. Here is nat- 
ural truth, in which we can trust without the fear of 
deception. 5. Simple mental states may be re- 
garded as preceding those which are complex. A 
simple idea, feeling, or fact must first enter into 
mental states and be known, in order to the knowl- 
edge of the relationship of many truths in the ex- 
istence of complex states. If compounds are made 

167 



168 MENTAL STATES. 

up of simple elements or facts, so many complex 
states of mind exist, being affected with the presence 
of a plurality of realities capable of being discon- 
nected or reduced to simple indivisible entities. 



SECTION II. 
1. The existence of complex mental states may be 
regarded as being affected with the presence of a 
collection, assemblage, or a complication of ideas, 
feelings, or realities. If we think of any external 
existence, as a tree, mountain, lake, or river, there 
are properties and qualities embraced in the action 
of the mind in relation to each or all of them. But 
inert elements have no self-power of uniting by pen- 
etration, and remain only in juxtaposition. There is 
a higher degree of blending and in the union of the 
elements and the inclinations or influences of the 
mind. 2. Our thoughts and feelings may arise from 
many objects or causes, but all unite in the soul 
under the immediate inspection of the mind, which 
can take into the account the oneness severally in 
their origin. 3. Our mental states are complex in 
contemplating external objects. We form an idea 
of the existence of ice from its properties, and we 
describe it only by giving those properties, weight, 
friability, color, and hardness. Similar complexness 
exists in regard to any other combination of proper- 
ties. 4. Complex mental states may exist in rela- 
tion to that which is connected with external objects, 
differing from abstract elements. In connection with 
qualities there may be presented to the mind tend- 
encies, appearances, and influences. And we may 



MENTAL STATES. 169 

be ready to acknowledge an essence or foundation 
without being able to define it. The only way that 
we can study the existence and nature or essence of 
material compounds, is by their elements and inert- 
ness. And the only way that we can study the 
nature or essence of mind, is by its elements and ac- 
tion. From the peculiar impression existing ele- 
ments often make upon the mind, it is natural for us 
to receive the idea of the existence of something, 
though its nature can not be defined. 5. Complex 
states of mind are often the result of internal influ- 
ences or realities. As a lake receives from tributary 
streams, on every hand, so the mind may be re- 
garded as the receptacle of knowledge, being affected 
by almost innumerable influences and impressions. 
We can judge of these as correctly as we can of 
those arising from external existences. 

15 



170 ABSTRACTION, 



CHAPTER II. 

ABSTRACTION. 
SECTION I. 

1. Abstraction is the act or operation by which 
elements are separated from each other and are ex- 
amined individually. The original power of such 
action, and by which it is known to exist, is in the 
mind. It may take place when the mind is occupied 
with separated facts, or when we contemplate some 
particular part or property of a compound, or of a 
complex object, as disconnected from other existen- 
ces of such combinations. 2. By the mental exercise 
or the acting power of abstraction, we can examine 
many objects, selecting definite properties in which 
they agree and can be classified. And it can be 
still more comprehensive in selecting a property or 
fact which is common to an extensive collection of 
adhering or complex entities. 3. An abstract notion 
or thought may arise upon the ground of detected 
resemblance and difference in objects or properties, 
and in the special notice or attention given to them 
individually. In the presence of compounds we can 
have conceptions of density, form, or friability with- 
out the introduction of other properties. Proper- 
ties may be so separated from the combination as to 
be the objects of abstract thought, and any element 
may be so contemplated in its separation as to be 
the object of special observation. If I say this 



ABSTRACTION. 171 

apple is red, the color only may be the object of 
abstract thought. 



SECTION II. 
1. Mental operations in separating facts, or in ab- 
stracting certain ideas, is worthy of a passing notice. 
The power of abstraction is in the mind. If the 
mind has the power of motion, and if it does act, 
we must admit that notions or ideas arise in connec- 
tion with or in such action. In the origin of our 
ideas they may be simple, or may exist separated 
from each other. There appears to be a natural 
tendency uniting them, giving rise to complex men- 
tal states. If this union is formed of many simple 
ideas or truths, the power in the mind, or that is 
connected with mental operations, which is capable 
of separating these united facts, in whole or in part, 
may be called abstraction. The union of ideas 
forming complex mental states may be either inten- 
tional or involuntary; but the separating or abstract- 
ing of them appears to be voluntary. There must 
be an intentional action in the examination of any 
individual thought or idea in the mind by which it 
is separated or abstracted. 2. Abstraction can not 
be implied in the examination of simple elements or 
ideas unless they could be capable, in some way, of 
being decomposed, or are divisible within and of 
themselves. But abstraction will apply in the sepa- 
rating of the oneness of their existence from all 
other facts or realities existing in the mind. 3. Ab- 
straction is implied in the examination of complex 
notions or ideas, when every simple element or idea 
involved in the compound or collection are analyzed 



172 ABSTRACTION. 

individually or separately. The act of distinctly 
separating the elementary parts of a compound or 
certain entities of a collection from each other is 
called abstraction, and this work can only be effected 
by abstraction. 4. We may be said to h&ye particu- 
lar abstract ideas on the presentation of an object to 
us having color, fragrance, form, density, and exten- 
sion, when the mind is so entirely occupied with 
some one of these qualities as to be almost insensi- 
ble to the existence of the others. The particular 
abstraction takes place when the action of the mind 
is limited to one quality. "When any object or qual- 
ity existing in a state of combination is separated 
by a mental process for inspection, the idea we form 
of it may be said to be of particular abstraction. 
This may take place in the mind either with or with- 
out a real separation of the combined entities. 



SECTION III. 
1. The power of abstraction and the right exercise 
of it is of essential importance in the acquisition of 
true knowledge. It is indispensable to a correct 
knowledge of material existences in analyzing the 
constituent elements or component parts, bringing 
them separately and consecutively under the test of 
the senses and the power of perception. It enters 
into the process of correct deductive and demonstra- 
tive argumentation or reasoning. It is involved in 
the mental operations of the exciting orator, the 
descriptive writer, and the efficient architecturalist 
in abstracting each form of beauty, elements of 
taste, and superior excellence, contributing to that 



ABSTRACTION. 173 

which is to be accomplished in true interest, sublim- 
ity, or grandeur. 2. Abstract notions or ideas may 
be said to be simple, complex, or general. Our 
ideas of objects which have many elements, parts, 
or qualities may be said to be complex; but general 
abstract ideas may exist in relation to classes of ob- 
jects when they are contemplated separately — dis- 
tinct from, or are abstractedly from those of other 
classes. The term man may be used to convey the 
idea of the existence of our race, while the term fish 
may apply to the existence of all in that department 
of creation. These classes can be contemplated by 
separating them from each other, or from any other 
class of existences, under the law of general abstrac- 
tion. 3. Primary truths or principles may be classi- 
fied and examined under the law of general abstrac- 
tion. Such truths or facts may be combined in 
classes entering into trains of thought or reasoning 
in arriving at permanent conclusions or results in 
the general divisions or departments of knowledge. 
4. General abstraction may apply to numerical sci- 
ence. General abstract propositions, though brief, 
may involve almost a world of meaning or reality. 
Though a series may arise, extending to innumerable 
powers, yet it can be represented by a general no- 
tion or term, which, in reality and effect, is the work 
of abstraction. General reasoning depends upon 
classification as a result of abstraction. 



SECTION IV. 
1 . General abstraction may apply to classification 
when we examine one class of objects separate and 

15* 



174 ABSTRACTION. 

apart from other classes. Objects classified under 
the terms of genera and species, may be contempla- 
ted or examined under the law of general abstrac- 
tion. When a variety of objects are before us, it 
is easy and almost natural for the properties or 
qualities of agreement and disagreement to be pre- 
sented to the mind, giving rise to associations 
or classes. These classes of many objects may be 
represented by a single term, and any one of them 
become the object of mental action separate or ab- 
stracted from the others. 2. General abstract ideas 
will apply to almost innumerable classes of objects — 
the different orders or classes in zoology, ornithol- 
ogy, vegetation, and crystallization. 3. The process 
of abstraction is essential to a well-regulated mind. 
Without it we can not proceed correctly in analyzing 
the qualities or elements of objects ; and we could 
not control the attention, concentrating the action of 
the mental powers in the examination of any one 
object separated from the thousands bestudding the 
field of vision, or that are present with and are con- 
tained in the mind. 4. It is influenced and affected 
by the power of disease, and can be so impaired or 
weakened, as disease increases, that all objects are 
in a state of confusion to the mind, and it naturally 
varies as to degrees of acuteness and power in dif- 
ferent minds. 






IMAGINATION. 175 



CHAPTER III. 

IMAGINATION. 

SECTION I. 
1. Imagination is that power or faculty of the 
mind by the action or exercise of which we form 
new combinations within the mind, gathered from 
real elements, scenes, or facts. It is that which 
forms new associations of ideas from the truths which 
are the property of memory, being subject to its 
power. From the materials stored up in the mem- 
ory it produces new combinations, on the one hand, 
more pleasing, more brilliant, or more sublime, or, 
on the other, more awful, more terrible, or more hor- 
rible. 2. Imagination has been regarded as an ulte- 
rior element of mind, or that it is a result of certain 
primary elements when in action. If its origin and 
existence wholly depends upon the action of certain 
primary elements, then when those elements are 
inactive the power and action of imagination would 
be annihilated ; and if ever its being and action are 
recalled they would exist by the creative action of 
those primary elements. That any primary ele- 
ments of mind have such creative power is absurd. 
The power and the action of imagination is wholly in 
the mind. Though it may be called an ulterior fac- 
ulty, yet to define it to be an imaginary nothing is 
incorrect; if it is a real existence it is capable of 
being so defined. 3. Imagination is closely con- 



176 IMAGINATION. 

nected with the power of the understanding and our 
conceptions and perceptions of objects and facts. 
Under its influence and action we are enabled to 
combine objects and qualities of which we have 
conceptions, and extend our thoughts to the contem- 
plation of similar ones, or of other facts as real, 
though unknown to us before, and we can imagine 
such existences as being more pleasing or awful than 
any fact of real existence in nature. In some in- 
stances we can pursue and describe them to a greater 
degree of clearness, beauty, and grandeur than is 
contained in any similar fact or object of material- 
ity. 4. Imagination may extend to the operations 
of apprehending and contemplating the arrange- 
ments, qualities, resemblances, or influences con- 
nected with objects of mental action, and the exten- 
sion of our thoughts in the formation of new ideas 
beyond those which may be regarded as primary 
ones, together with the relative position and influ- 
ence of the same to and upon each other, and to the 
original ideas. It recombines our ideas of the rela- 
tive condition of things, and influences mental states 
in relation to the beautiful, grand, and sublime, 
which transcends the original ideas as our thoughts 
pass beyond them and ascend higher. 



SECTION II. 
1. Imagination influences mental states, in and by 
which the mind conceives and forms ideas within 
itself, and of real and imaginary external objects. 
It assembles images and paints them upon our minds 
and on the minds of others. By it we can go be- 



IMAGINATION. 177 

yond all these in adding ideas and thoughts to those 
already in the mind, and in adding any image or 
reality necessary to fill or complete the scene or proc- 
ess of apprehending till the mind is satisfied, or 
there is a suspension of further action. Thus there 
is a pleasure realized as we advance to new facts 
and in the reception of every new idea. 2. Imag- 
ination is incapable of being resolved into any other 
element or combination of mental faculties, from the 
fact that no element of mind has self-power to cre- 
ate or aid in creating any other faculty, the office 
and action of which can be defined, and upon which 
other faculties are dependent. The origin, power, 
and action of imagination belongs to and is in the 
mind. Therefore, it is a power or faculty of the 
mind, though the ulterior process of its action may 
be regarded as of secondary relationship. The idea 
that this faculty is wholly created by some other fac- 
ulty or faculties is absurd. 3. Imagination leads in 
Mending elements of diverse existences. Those 
which belong to widely diversified scenes can be 
combined into one beautiful conception. It blends 
the ideas or the elements of thought in harmony, 
either with some real conception or the elements of 
it. And it blends diversified elements, presenting 
to the mind that which is beautiful, grand, or par- 
takes of true sublimity. 



SECTION III. 
1. The operations or exercise of imagination may 
be said to be involuntary, when there is action with- 
out any volitive effort of the mind. And such 



178 IMAGINATION. 

action can take place when we are not immediately 
conscious of the fact till some object 01 fact arrests 
our attention, and we recall beautiful combinations 
which have been the work of imagination. 2. In- 
tentional imagination involves artificial combina- 
tions, by means of which the mind acting passes on, 
while extended thoughts and facts arise, forming 
new objects of contemplation. 3. Fictitious deline- 
ations are dependent upon imagination for transac- 
tions, scenes, and imaginary facts. Aided by this 
faculty the narrator or actor paints images and char- 
acters with any appropriate qualities or influences. 
4. Productions of the imagination are chaste and 
of a high moral character in proportion to the moral 
principles, taste, and habits of the author. 5. The 
combinations of images, elements, or facts which are 
produced by the imagination being vile, demoraliz- 
ing, and destructive in their nature and tendency, 
correspond with the bad motives, the corrupt princi- 
ples, and the perverted habit of the author. 



SECTION IV. 
1. Imagination differs from fancy in forming new 
combinations from the materials stored up in the 
memory, graduating them from the beautiful to the 
sublime, or from the awful to the more terrible. 
Fancy is that by which the mind forms images or 
representations of facts or existences, while imagina- 
tion is the power of combining and increasing, or ot 
diminishing the interest of mental states. 2. Im- 
agination differs from admiration / for the latter is 
no more than wonder mingled with emotions of love 



IMAGINATION. 179 

or veneration, or of that which is novel or great. 3. 
It differs from fictions in the results of its action. 
Fictions can only be regarded as fictions; but im- 
agination blends elements of beauty, grandeur, and 
sublimity into one grand conception, the elements 
of which can not be abstracted from true existences. 
The creations of the imagination are true to thought, 
and are objects of mental action. 4. There is a dif- 
ference between the imagination and ooiribast. The 
former may command, combine, and blend elements 
into forms of beauty, grandeur, and sublimity, while 
the latter consists in high-sounding words in an in- 
flated style. In this way persons often use high- 
sounding terms, but without any connection of ideas 
or cogency of thought, and without a proper concep- 
tion of that which they wish to express. A speaker, 
while enforcing the truthfulness and claims of his 
theme, had moved his audience with a general feel- 
ing of excitement under his thrilling eloquence, and 
closed with great applause and triumph in the fol- 
lowing manner : "Now, my audience, if I had power 
I would plant one foot upon the Andes and the other 
upon the Rocky Mountains; thrusting my tongue 
into the thunder's mouth, I would proclaim these 
truths to the ends of the world." Subsequently a 
young speaker attempted to use the same while- 
delivering a discourse in a loud tone of voice and 
with great confidence: "Now, my audience, if I 
had power I would plant one foot upon the Andes 
and the other upon the Rocky Mountains, and I 
would thrust my tongue into the thunder's mouth, 
and I'd, I'd, I'd howl like a wolf." Here is evidence 
that the action of the imagination was imperfect, 



ISO IMAGINATION. 






and that at first he had but a meager conception of 
what he wished to say. Bombast is without a cor- 
rect blending of the beautiful, and without the proper 
presence and arrangement of ideas and of thoughts, 
and it is without a maturity of conception, all of 
which belong to or are connected with a vigorous 
and active imagination. 



SECTION Y. 
1. Imagination differs very much in nature and 
action from that of burlesque. The solemn thought- 
fulness or real nature of the latter is only feigned for 
the purpose of exciting amusement or laughter by 
ludicrous images or representations. It is the pecu- 
liar influence manifested in a contrast between the 
subject and the way in which it is treated, tending 
to excite laughter or ridicule, while the active im- 
agination carries with it real interests, thrilling the 
soul with the liveliest emotions of the beautiful and 
sublime. 2. Imagination differs from sarcasm. The 
latter may abound with imagery or beautiful lan- 
guage, but at the same time there is an ironical sig- 
nification or expression. Though there is a granting 
of the claims of any person or people, yet there may 
be a keen, reproachful expression or satirical re- 
mark, with an influence, expression, or feeling of 
scorn, while imagination must be regarded as free 
from such peculiarities. 3. Feelings of sympathy 
are not wholly dependent upon imagination, though 
they may be aided by it. Though sympathy can 
and does not originate with or from imagination, yet 
a quick, active, and powerful imagination can and 



IMAGINATION. 181 

does combine images of suffering, gloom, and de- 
spair. A man whose moral sensibilities are still 
alive to action always has sympathy intuitively on 
the presentation of any object of suffering, if his 
attention is arrested by it. But his feelings are 
much increased when he begins to imagine himself 
in like condition. 4. The imagination can be exer- 
cised in works of fiction without injury only when 
such fiction is immediately connected with truths or 
facts in nature, and possessing the high moral char- 
acter which infinite Wisdom has connected with all 
that he has made. 5. The influence of fictitious 
writings upon an active imagination and upon the 
mind is decidedly injurious. It weakens mental ac- 
tion in the examination of real and important truths, 
tends to fickleness and whimsicalness of mind, insta- 
bility of character, and often leads to certain ruin. 
The divine Being has filled an infinite space with an 
eternal range of existences or facts, so that the im- 
mortal mind of man can dwell on real facts or truths 
without number, and to endless ages increasing in 
majesty and glory. When all these truths have 
been scanned till they have become dim with age 
and their glory exhausted, then, and only then, has 
an undying spirit time to breathe its energies out 
upon puffs of empty air, or excite its restless powers 
over the dreams of some drunken lord which were 
kindled by the exhalations of rum; or they may be 
the result of a perverted and vicious purpose of 
heart. 6. The improvement of the imagination, or 
the injury it receives from popular works of fiction, 
depends principally upon the purity of the author's 
motives and the manner in which the elements of 

16 



182 IMAGINATION. 

thought are combined. A chaste and spirited nar- 
ration of facts, as they are mapped or arranged in the 
universe around us, tends to enliven the imagination 
in advancing and combining or blending of new 
forms of beauty or grandeur. A chain of real enti- 
ties present that which can give rise to the creations 
of imagination and its rapid improvement. 



SECTION VI. 
1. The utility and importance of the imagination 
must be regarded as of no ordinary character. In 
neglecting the cultivation of this noble and import- 
ant faculty of the mind, is to impede the power and 
action of the whole mind. 2. A vigorous and active 
imagination, in conveying our thoughts or in de- 
scribing facts in writing, is of great importance. 
To present imagery, or to correctly delineate scenes, 
facts, or transactions, or to paint them in their com- 
binations and qualities, is effected principally under 
the control and action of the imagination. 3. An 
active imagination is essential to true oratory. To 
conceive of a speaker's power to excite, move, and 
thrill an audience without the aid of imagination to 
assist him is utterly impossible. True, affecting, and 
exciting eloquence can never exist in connection 
with that mind which is destitute of an active im- 
agination. Under its combinations and blendings, 
derived from the language of trope and metaphor, 
the orator may launch thunder-peals, startling the 
feelings or emotions of all around him. The elec- 
trifying power, drawn from imagery, illustrations, 
and resemblances, will ever stir with life and thrill 



IMAGINATION. 183 

with joy or awe. 4. The combinations, blendings, 
descriptions, and painting of the poet are without 
any pleasing interest unless the action of the mind 
is pervaded by an active imagination. 5. The sculp- 
tor's chisel can not trace upon the marble the living 
and desired expression or features of a friend if he 
is destitute of the power or influence of imagination. 
It is this which enables him to render every form 
graceful and beautiful. And it is this faculty which 
causes others to admire the work when it is com- 
pleted. 6. The simple tones or sounds in music, if 
abstracted, are monotonous if the}' do not cause con- 
fusion; but the relation of those sounds, when prop- 
erly blended or harmonized, thrills the soul with the 
most pleasing emotions. 



SECTION VII. 
1. The development or improvement of the imag- 
ination can be secured by attending to the manner 
of its exercise or action, by continued or repeated 
efforts to extend its power and influence. It should 
not be exercised out of its proper sphere, but in the 
most natural way and upon its appropriate objects. 
2. The influence of disease may affect the imagina- 
tion ; its action may be directed to an improper ob- 
ject or in a wrong channel. 3. It can lead us to 
misconceptions and improper action unless it is con- 
trolled by reason, motive, and virtue. We are apt 
to imagine that great warriors or statesmen, who 
have left the world, have died happy and are gone 
to heaven, when they have not, at any time, given 
one clear and conclusive evidence of such a result, as 



184 IMAGINATION. 

is required by the Gospel law. 4. Imagination will 
lead to deception, if it is allowed to wander uncon- 
trolled amid myriads of imaginary beings, or scenes 
of wealth and pleasure. It soon tends to abstract 
the mind from real existences, and causes it to dwell 
on the beautiful forms of imagination, which are 
false, and upon the most whimsical speculations. It 
ceases to contemplate real existences at hand as 
worthy attention. It soon withdraws from all ob- 
jects of worth and dwells in a world of imagination. 
"When the mind advances to this point it is midway 
from a rational state to that of insanity. 5. A con- 
tinued love of and an untiring pursuit of fiction 
often diseases and sends out the entire desires of the 
mind upon the wing of imagination — feasting such 
desires with inaccessible enjoyments and perishable 
glory. Finally, the mind becomes wearied with the 
staleness of all demonstrable truths, and fictions ap- 
pear as realities. The sympathies and affections of 
the heart become cold and die for the want of real 
accessible objects upon which they can act. Often 
false opinions and lies become the dreams of life, an 
additional gloom in death, and the bitterness of eter- 
nal remorse. It would be far better to suffer, if pos- 
sible, a thousand temporal deaths, than for the im- 
mortal soul to perish with invoked madness. Never 
let the mind dwell too long upon only one and the 
same idea if you would be sane on all points. 



DHnn0tt fjtrfj 



CHAPTER I. 

INTELLECTUAL STATES OF EXTERNAL ORIGIN 

AND INTELLECTUAL STATES OF 

INTERNAL ORIGIN. 



SECTION I. 
1. The powers of mind arranged under the pre- 
ceding divisions of this work, or the greater number 
of them, have, by the common consent of many 
writers in time past, been arranged under the gen- 
eral heading of intellectual states of external origin, 
and the faculties, the denning of which we are now 
commencing, have been arranged under the heading 
of intellectual states of internal origin. In this ar- 
rangement there appears to be a distinction without 
a philosophical difference. There is a difference, 
but it is contrary to the meaning conveyed by the 
first heading referred to. 2. We object to the doc- 
trine of intellectual states of external origin. Intel- 
lectual states may exist as results of external causes; 
but for intellectual states to arise in the external 
world, or out of or beyond the limits of the mind 
itself, is clearly incorrect, and this is a philosophical 
deduction from the heading referred to. 3. If it is 
impossible for intellectual states to have external 
origin, then it is more absurd to regard the faculties 

16* 185 



186 ORIGIN OF INTELLECTUAL STATES. 

or powers of the mind couched under such a head- 
ing, as having their origin externally or in the exter- 
nal world. There are external causes of mental 
states; but mental states and faculties can not have 
external origin till they arise out of the mind, which 
is impossible. 4. It is utterly impossible for us to 
conceive that mind is matter, or that matter can be 
mind. All the faculties of the mind belong to and 
exist in the mind. All the mental states of which 
we are capable have their origin and existence in 
the mind. Therefore, no state or faculty of the 
mind can have an external existence or origin unless 
such existence or origin takes place beyond the self- 
limits of mind, and, consequently, in the external 
world. 



SECTION II. 
1. If we should say that any element or power of 
mind was of external origin, as to either its exist- 
ence or action, would it not convey the idea that the 
origin, or that the commencement of its being was 
in connection with some inert element or existences 
of the external world? But if we refer to the origin 
of its action, would it not imply that such action 
might commence with distant objects of matter, 
thence advance to the mind in order to be known? 
2. If we say that any mental state is of external ori- 
gin, would it not convey the idea that external phys- 
ical elements have self-action, which action must first 
take place in order to affect the ,mind, which is at 
rest, creating new mental states? This would seem 
to indicate, that while the mind was at rest mental 



ORIGIN OF INTELLECTUAL STATES. 187 

action of the same mind could take place in connec- 
tion with inert, distant objects, which finally affects 
the mind in creating new mental states. If such 
conclusions be true, we are not capable of so under- 
standing them. 3. The action of some faculties of 
the mind may be regarded as more closely related 
to and connected with external objects than that of 
others, and their position and claims must be de- 
fined accordingly, which can not be done to any 
great extent by any general heading. 



SECTION III. 
1. There can be no impropriety in saying that 
there are intellectual states of internal origin; for, 
although external objects may affect the mind 
through the medium of the senses, yet the mental 
state which follows must be wholly of and within 
the mind. And this state, though it follows an ex- 
ternal cause, can not of itself be said to be of exter- 
nal origin. While the cause may be external, yet 
the origin of the mental state, as such, is not the 
inert cause, nor the sensation received by contact 
with it, but is wholly of and within the mind. 2. 
The origin of all knowledge known to us, as such, 
is in the mind. The true study of psychology is of 
boundless importance. The undying soul may be 
said to contain within itself an eternity of meaning, 
being, and destiny. Through the medium of the 
senses we become acquainted with the realities, 
beauty, and grandeur of the external world; but by 
means of internal powers we can and do have knowl- 
edge independent of material entities, or of the 



188 ORIGIN OF INTELLECTUAL STATES. 

power and action of the senses. 3. The most ulte- 
rior origin of knowledge, in regard to external 
things, must begin with sensation. This knowledge 
can only embrace the fact that a sensation has been 
received, and that we have the presence of such an 
existent. This sensation in and of itself can never 
generate or impart to the mind, thoughts and ideas, 
which are the true beginning of intellectual or 
rational knowledge. 4. The action of sensation af- 
fecting the mind is immediately followed by a new 
mental state, which is the result of a reviving influ- 
ence or action of the internal power of the soul. 
By and in the action of this internal power, modi- 
fied into certain mental states, arises the formation 
and existence of thought; and with the formation 
of thought commences intellectual or rational knowl- 
edge. 5. The existence of simple thoughts and ideas 
must arise by and within the action of the internal 
power of the soul. The advancing of these from 
simple to complex, and the blending of them into 
combinations, is real knowledge. Thinking, believ- 
ing, hoping, and doubting have their origin wholly 
and only in the active internal power of the soul. 
They are not objects of the senses, nor of sensa- 
tions, caused by external things. So we are forced 
to the conclusion that knowledge is of internal ori- 
gin, and the power we have in knowing all truths or 
facts, whether they exist in the external world or 
within the imperishable soul, is an internal power, 
the test of all facts. 



SUGGESTION. 189 



CHAPTER II. 

SUGGESTION. 

SECTION I. 
1 . Suggestion appears to be the presentation of 
an idea to the mind without the immediate aid of 
the senses. It has power within and by its own ac- 
tion to give rise to thoughts. We have notions, 
thoughts, and ideas which appear to be inspired, and 
arise from the internal action of the immaterial con- 
stitution, without the aid of combining and compar- 
ing ideas or facts. There are certain thoughts and 
ideas which arise and can be called natural sugges- 
tions. 2. Simple suggestions may be regarded as 
primary and natural. They have been regarded as 
a spontaneous result of intuitive power, or that they 
arise in the action of internal emotions or sensations. 
The action of these may suggest the idea of real 
existences which may become the objects of mental 
action. 3. The internal action of the mind, in and 
by which suggestions arise, may be regarded as the 
real or clearly-definable origin of their knowledge 
or known existence. In connection with these we 
have power to believe in their real existence. 4. 
From this internal action or states of the mind is 
suggested the notion of self, or of the mind as real, 
and the cause and reality of change. That which 
suggests the idea of our being, or the notion of du- 
ration, is independent of the power and action of 



190 SUGGESTION. 

the senses or of sensation as to its origin. Such 
suggestions appear to arise from intuitive power and 
become the objects of consciousness, and such inti- 
mations appear to be essential to the nature of mind, 
and its power of primary action, which is the origin 
of all knowledge to us, capable of demonstration. 



SECTION II. 
1. The idea of self-existence can not be tested by 
the senses. We can not see, hear, taste, or smell 
such an idea or fact, neither can we feel to originate 
the same, but it arises from the mind itself. It is 
suggested spontaneously, from the very nature of 
the mind, as it is constituted by its sovereign Crea- 
tor. It is so closely connected with the nature and 
existence of mind that it is impossible for us to 
define the time or the beginning of its origin. 2. 
The origin of the idea of mind, as an existent, can 
not commence with the senses; for the senses are 
properly affected by external things, and no idea of 
mind can result abstractly from the existence of ma- 
teriality. The origin of the notion is suggested by 
and from the nature of the mind within itself. The 
beginning of our ideas of the primary elements of 
mind is suggested by the mind, though they may be 
matured by the feelings and action of the mind in 
various ways. 3. The origin of the notion or idea 
of personal identity is with the internal power of the 
mind. It can not arise from inert elements of the 
external world, neither can it arise from the same- 
ness in qualities or nature of any mental existence 
beyond and distinct from self; but the beginning of 



SUGGESTION. 191 

its being is suggested by the internal and intuitive 
power and nature of the mind. 4. The idea of our 
real existence must arise from the natural existence 
of the mind. We can not exist without having an 
idea of our existence. The beginning of such an 
idea is connected with the power of suggestion, and 
may be regarded as a simple idea, forever undefina- 
ble. But an idea or thought implies and is action ; 
therefore, the self-acting power is of and within the 
mind itself. 



SECTION III. 

1. Simple suggestion may embrace certain states 
of mind which arise out of states previously experi- 
enced, when the relationship is not an object of 
memory or of present mental action. 2. Simple 
ideas arise from the internal power of the soul, and 
from the nature and origin of some of them we may 
come to the conclusion that there is such a thing as 
natural suggestion. Connected with such ideas is a 
belief that their existence is true. 3. Simple sug- 
gestion can apply to past thought or events. If we 
visit a natural curiosity, which we have formerly 
visited, in company with a friend, the different ob- 
jects of former attraction and conversation will 
revive the thoughts and even the words used by us 
on that occasion. In passing the different objects 
of former conversation they often cause the former 
language and words to be revived by the power of 
suggestion. 4. This kind of suggestion extends not 
only to the action of the mind in regard to past 
thoughts or facts, but will apply to mental action in 



192 SUGGESTION. 

regard to that which may become the object of men- 
tal action, though it may have never before been 
the object of any mental action. One idea often 
introduces another into the mind. The sight of a 
peculiar object may suggest others of the same class, 
but differing in certain facts or features, or may, and 
often does, give rise to certain trains of thought 
never before experienced. 



SECTION IV. 

1. Suggestion is involuntary when thoughts arise 
in connection with other thoughts which are not at 
the time the special objects of the attention or of 
mental action. And it is clearly involuntary when 
the thought or idea appears to arise in connection 
with or from the intuitive power of mental and 
moral action. 2. This power may be said to be vol- 
untary when we, by intentional cogitation, use cer- 
tain thoughts, feelings, or bearings of facts in order 
to trace out other or similar things of which we have 
had no clear perception before. The discovery of 
each new fact suggests the idea of something as real 
still beyond. 3. The importance of this faculty is 
incalculable. It is a revealer to us of the past; it 
enables us to contemplate the future, and upon it 
memory is dependent for much of its power in call- 
ing up past thoughts or facts. It is an original tend- 
ency of the mind to exist in certain states after 
certain other states. 4. In suggestion there is a 
tendency to relative conceptions. All ideas or ob- 
jects so affinitated as to sustain a relation to each 
other may and often do suggest one another. These 



SUGGESTION. 193 

relations are experienced, or are so perceived by the 
mental faculties, that in trying to comprehend them 
the power and majesty of the mind augments our 
conceptions of its limitless reality. 5. In suggestion 
there is also a tendency to relative perceptions, in 
which all facts or truths, sustaining a relation to 
each other, suggest similar facts or truths, which, 
without their presence with the mind, would have 
never been the objects of perception. 



SECTION V. 
1. The origin of the idea of material existences 
may be imparted to us through the medium of the 
senses, but we could not, from sight or touch alone, 
judge of the qualities or properties of a compound 
beyond the surface which is seen or felt. But that 
which is tested by contact with the senses can and 
does suggest an idea of those properties which exist 
within or beyond the outer surface. 2. Suggestion 
involves our experience in noticing successive mental 
states. This chain of successive events suggest other 
chains, and all the individual facts serve to suggest 
corresponding facts or truths. 3. We are princi- 
pally dependent upon suggestion as to the origin of 
our idea of motion. We can test the abstract ex- 
istence and qualities of objects which are in motion, 
but there is a difference between that which moves 
and motion itself. Our idea of that which changes 
the relative position or order of things must be sug- 
gested ; for motion can not be regarded as a real 
object of the sense; hence the idea or notion of it 
can not arise from the power of the senses, but is 

17 



194 SUGGESTION. 

suggested in the change and relative position of 
things. 4. "We are dependent, in an important 
sense, upon suggestive power for our notion or idea 
of the relation of effect to its cause. The character 
of an effect may suggest the cause, guided in part 
by the presence and action of the senses : but the 
origin of the idea of the cause is wholly of sugges- 
tion. If it requires strength to raise a small stone 
from the earth, the thought of lifting a larger one 
naturally suggests the idea of additional power; 
hence, the presence of the vast globe naturally sug- 
gests a first Cause, or the omnipotent power which 
caused the being or real existence of the globe or of 
the vast universe. 



SECTION YI. 
1. The origin of the idea of time is connected 
with the suggestive power. Time is duration meas- 
ured by the revolutions of the heavenly bodies. We 
can not have clear conceptions of duration existing 
in succession, though we can have of duration which 
can be measured. The events which take place in 
time, and the relative positions in the flight of the 
orbs which measure it, can not give us a satisfactory 
idea of time; hence, such an idea arises from an 
internal suggestive power. 2. If duration measured 
can be called time, then it would appear that dura- 
tion without being measured, or being unfinished, 
may be called eternity. The succession of events, 
under the law of measurement, has a natural tend- 
ency to the suggestion of the idea of the permanency 
of duration unchecked by a succession of periods or 



SUGGESTION. 195 

the flying returns of revolving worlds. 3. We can 
not recall the time when we first received an idea 
of space. It appears to have arisen spontaneously, 
or that it is a result of an intuitive suggestive power. 
There is no way to represent space to the senses; it 
is without form, figure, or bounds. It is not depend- 
ent upon the existence of any thing else, so far as 
we are capable of judging, and when we have con- 
ceptions of any existent, it is impossible for us to 
think of it out of or beyond the bounds of space. 
4. Resemblance may be regarded as an ulterior 
law of suggestion. The primary power of sugges- 
tion is connected with the intuitive powers of the 
mind, as the previous argument will show. The 
mutual or reciprocal resemblance of objects often 
suggest each other, and is the occasion of recalling 
past existences by means of the suggestive power 
and its action. The house of a stranger may replace 
in the mind clear or vivid conceptions of the old 
homestead. The appearance of yonder grove, or 
the banks of that rolling river instantly revives the 
place of my childhood sports, and where my little 
brother and sister sleep peacefully waiting the sound 
of the last trump. The peculiar voice of a stranger 
may recall to my mind, as from the grave, that of 
my father. The peculiar state of mind affected by 
one object hils a tendency to suggest other states or 
objects. 



SECTION YII. 



1. The internal action of the suggestive power is 
aided by the contrast involved in the nature and 



196 SUGGESTION. 

existence of objects. The presence of the dead 
body of a celebrated warrior, statesman, or divine 
is almost instantly followed by their appearance 
when living and in their glory. 2. The extremes of 
conditions, in existences, suggest their opposites. 
In connection with the idea of a suffering beggar by 
the wayside is suggested the thought of prosperity 
and happiness. The prairie which has smiled under 
the rays of a thousand summer's suns only affects 
the mind by the introduction of the thought or idea 
of dark, silent groves, or of majestic forests waving 
in the living emerald of beauty and grandeur. The 
action of the mind in passing from one object to an- 
other is a wise arrangement of Deity, else all of 
earth would become monotonous and uninteresting. 
3. In thinking of some one of cotemporaneous ex- 
istences often others of the same epoch are suggested 
to us. If objects distinct from each other, yet united 
by an invariable connection, as the batteries at the 
extremities of a telegraphic wire, the thought of the 
one often suggests the other. 4. Without lively sug- 
gestive powers mental action would be confused. It 
appears to be indispensable in furnishing new materi- 
als, amplifying the thoughts of the writer or of the 
speaker; and in proportion to the activity of the 
suggestive power will be the readiness of language, 
cogency of thought and sentiment, and the force of 
appeal. 5. Real entities are the objects of sugges- 
tion, and when thus presented to the mind they be- 
come the objects of notice and reason. The great 
truths which lie at the foundation of that process of 
reasoning by which we are compelled to acknowl- 
edge the existence of God, together with our own 



SUGGESTION. 197 

being and our obligations to him as the Father and 
donor of all good — they are the direct intimations 
and objects of the suggestive power of the mind. 



SECTION VIII. 
1. The suggestive intellect is capable of being 
strengthened and rendered lively and efficient by 
attentively directing the mind to those thoughts and 
feelings of our choice, and which will be most likely 
to suggest each other and in trying to retain them 
as distinctly and as long as we possibly can. Facts 
thus collected become as encamped or collected 
materials 1 for the egressive action of the mind. 2. 
This power can be rendered 7nore vigorous by attend- 
ing to those truths which are most naturally affinita- 
ted, or are blended in a state of union. 3. It can 
he aided in attending to those facts which differ most 
abstractly from others, and produce sensations and 
feelings peculiar, or that differ in kind and nature 
so as to attract the greater attention. 4. This power 
can he increased by attending to that temperance, 
care, and economy necessary to secure the health of 
the bodily powers, contributing thereby to the natu- 
ral capability and readiness of mental development, 
so far as mind is dependent upon physical organs. 
The mind can not be perfectly developed through 
either a diseased skull or brain. 5. The activity of 
the suggestive power of the mind depends much 
upon the Tidbit or manner in which it is exercised. 
It should be tested and exerted with care and with 
repeated egressive efforts in presenting the mind 
with new and delightful truths or facts. In the con- 

17* 



198 SUGGESTION. 

templating of these natural truths the mind rises, 
admiring the power and goodness of Him who 
reared the forest, commands the storm, rolls the 
ocean, and eliminated, as from the uncreated light of 
Lights, the planetary lamps which ever move in 
boundless space around us, outnumbering, if possi- 
ble, an infinite flight of years. 



RELATIVE SUGGESTION. 199 



CHAPTER III. 

RELATIVE SUGGESTION. 

SECTION I. 
1. In contemplating objects the mind is capable of 
receiving impressions, or of being influenced in re- 
gard to certain relations which such objects mutually 
sustain to each other. That which awakens a feel- 
ing or a mental state in regard to the natural rela- 
tionship of objects is called relative suggestion. 
Without doubt the mind is capable of such an influ- 
ence, but it is difficult to clearly define its office, as 
it appears to be midway between the nature or char- 
acter of simple suggestion and that of the judg- 
ment. Yet a suggestive power, in any way or to 
any degree of strength, is clearly distinct from that 
of the judgment. 2. The mind is capable of expe- 
riencing certain influences, which are affected by a 
peculiar relationship of objects of similar or dissim- 
ilar co-ordinate properties or qualities, which give 
rise to a new class of feelings and mental states. 
The presence of such objects appears to affect in the 
mind the process of comparing, so as to give rise to 
the cognizance of the first intimations or ideas in 
relation to them, in which we realize their relation 
in a certain way or respects. This is an original 
susceptibility of the mind, and is connected with 
the action of intuitive principles. The mind is not 
only capable of realizing or experiencing the pres- 



200 RELATIVE SUGGESTION. 

ence and relations of objects, but of being affected 
by the condition or character of those things which 
are like or unlike, agreeing or disagreeing as to 
equality, time, or place. 3. Influences of relation 
may arise and be suggested, or experienced by the 
mind, in the notice or contemplation of a great va- 
riety of realities or facts. The degrees of difference 
which glow in the emerald hues of a summer forest, 
are the occasions of giving rise to the first appre- 
hensions, or perceptions, of the different kinds of 
trees composing that forest and other relative facts. 
In the sound of the national band, one instrument is 
loud, and another soft; in the touching of frozen 
mercury and cotton, or in the tasting different kinds 
of fruit, there are natural differences, the relations 
of which affect or influence the mind in regard to 
them. The relation of any class of objects is dif- 
ferent from the objects of, and within themselves. 
That which is involved in such relationship affects 
the mind in regard to the objects themselves, and 
also in respect to the degrees of the mutual contrast 
in the properties related. 4. Terms of correlative 
character may involve and express that which is 
intended to be explained. The mere mention of 
them involves the relation they sustain to other 
objects, which relation is the immediate occasion 
giving rise to mental influences, or states ; while the 
object expressed by the use of the term was lost 
sight of. In the use of the terms father, mother, 
governor, or commander, the relations are the more 
direct causes of a full mental action. 



BELATIVE SUGGESTION. 201 

SECTION II. 
1. Relative suggestion does not depend upon the 
power of the senses for its existence, else brutes and 
birds would have it as fully developed as man ; for 
they can see and hear as well as we can ; but as to 
their power of suggestion, or their perception of 
relations being well developed is very doubtful. 
The idea of the tallness of a tree could not be con- 
veyed to us by sight only; for if no tree of any 
kind existed save that one, it would, doubtless, ap- 
pear to us neither tall nor short; but if we know 
that tall and short trees are before us, it is evidence 
that their relation has been suggested to the mind, 
and has been an object of mental action. 2. We 
are not dependent upon the action of the senses in 
recognizing, and in realizing the mutual relation- 
ship of hope and expectation, love and joy, or that 
joy and grief are opposites ; yet these relations give 
rise to mental influences and new states of mind. 
The number of relations which affect or cause the 
action of the suggestive power, in consequence of 
which new mental states are experienced, or take 
place, are almost as the stars of heaven for number. 
What a limitless variety of objects and facts con- 
tribute to the action and resources of the mind ! 
What must mind be contemplated in the perfection 
of its powers! What an eternity of duration, and 
infinity of feeling, memory, knowledge, action, and 
being within and of itself! Imperishable gem, as- 
sert the power of thy immortal faculties ; for living 
thou shalt never cease to be. 3. The extent of this 
power, and the number of objects and facts involved 



202 RELATIVE SUGGESTION. 

in its action, can not readily be defined. Its action 
is connected with relations of coexistence, resem- 
blance, diversity, degree, and position. It may 
extend to the relation of cause and effect. But 
it is useless to dwell longer upon this subject. 
We will pass to the examination of the next 
topic, with increased humility, gratitude, and awe 
in contemplating the powers and the being of 
mind, and the goodness of that Creator who con- 
stituted it progressive to endless ages. With more 
than lightning speed it sends forth its pioneer 
thoughts upon the road of interminable duration, 
without ever arriving at the ulterior bounds of its 
dominion. 4. Who can define and contemplate 
the soul perfected in its departure from earth? 
Progressive flight! when millions of rising series 
in knowledge have been numbered, comprehended, 
and passed, still onward in its towering flight, know- 
ing more, and still more, of the incomprehensible 
fullness, love, and goodness of that Being to whom 
it owes its existence ! 



THE JUDGMENT. 203 



CHAPTER I?. 

THE JUDGMENT. 

SECTION I. 
1. The faculty of the human mind that is called 
judgment has often been acknowledged, while some- 
thing else has been denned in lieu of it. Its exist- 
ence can not but be acknowledged, for it is a real 
faculty, and as such it should be denned. 2. It is 
that faculty of the mind by which we are enabled 
to compare ideas or thoughts, and to determine upon 
the evidences as to preferences, or that which is 
right or wrong. By it we not only compare ideas 
and thoughts, but we advance to compare the rela- 
tions of terms, of propositions, and of arguments ; 
also to determine upon that which is correct. 3. 
It is that which may be called the determination of 
the mind, in which we become satisfied from the 
evidence and influence received in comparing the 
relations of ideas, thoughts, propositions, and argu- 
ments. 4. It is not only the act of judging, but it 
is the power by which such a process or action is 
concluded. And if it has power to examine the 
agreement or disagreement of things in order to 
arrive at the truth, it has power to determine or to 
decide upon that truth after it is found or defined. 
It not only has power to examine and to determine 
upon relations, and the correct stages of argumenta- 
tion, but it is the concluding action of the mind in 



204 THE JUDGMENT. 

regard to the determining of the truthfulness of ob- 
jects or entities, and of determining the mind favor- 
ably to truths, whether casual or substantial. 5. 
The faculty of judgment is a particular power 
within itself ; it is not to be taught in order to 
have being, and the power of its origin is connected 
with the existence and action of the primary ele- 
ments of mind. It is not originated by education, 
but exists only to be exercised. If it is naturally 
deficient — and this appears to be true in some 
minds — there is no process of instruction that can 
supply the defect. The understanding may be nat- 
urally perfect, and the same may be true of sugges- 
tion, or other powers ; but if the judgment is defi- 
cient, the mind generally acts hastily, and at the 
first intention. 6. The judgment has not only power 
to determine an action, or of concluding, or of 
finishing that which may be called a mental process 
satisfactorily, but it can analyze, abstract, classify, 
and generalize. By it we can class an individual 
existent under a general notion in the affirmation, as 
that is an animal of a certain kind, or that is a tree 
of a special kind, or from a certain mountain. The 
powers of the mind are in motion, uneasy, or rest- 
less till the object of its action is decided by the 
judgment. This decision once made, rest generally 
pervades the whole of the mental faculties. 



SECTION II. 
1. A naturally-defective faculty of judgment — 
and many there are who appear to be almost totally 
wanting in regard to a well-developed power of 



THE JUDGMENT. 205 

judgment — is attended with great uncertainty, and 
much confusion, as to a proper discrimination and 
action in regard to what is right or wrong. Such 
minds may desire to do right, and to act conscien- 
tiously in all things, but there is plainly a want of 
proper and safe decisions. They should share of 
the charity of others rather than suffer severe pen- 
alties in case of wrong acts. An allowance should 
be made for their imprudence, while the purity or 
impurity of their motive, at the time of their error, 
should be the object of the judgment of others in 
acquitting or in condemning them. 2. The judg- 
ment presupposes the understanding. The latter 
may exist without the former, but the judgment can 
not exist with any special manifestation without the 
understanding. The latter furnishes the materials, 
or facts, upon which the former acts. It furnishes 
to the judgment that which is capable of being an- 
alyzed, abstracted, classified, or generalzied. With 
a well-developed understanding, we may have dis- 
tinct and vivid conceptions of objects presented to 
the mind ; but if the judgment is deficient, we can 
not properly discriminate between them in marking 
the features of difference, and in bringing such dif- 
ference, or differences, into the decision, each one 
contributing to the final decision or conclusion. 3. 
The understanding only knows objects as they really 
exist, and as they are presented to the mind ; but 
the judgment must discriminate by arranging them 
together, and by evolving those things which agree 
or disagree; and it depends upon this power to give 
a decision accordingly and correctly. 4. The judg- 
ment, then, must be that which has power to determ- 

18 



206 THE JUDGMENT. 

ine, or of decision ; but, in another point of light, 
its action, in connection with a mental apparition, is 
the recognition of facts, feelings, and differences in 
the relations of things presented to the mind, which 
are the objects of conception, or are made known to 
the understanding. By its action we are impressed 
with the relations of resemblance, and of dissimi- 
larities which may, or does, exist between two ob- 
jects, and can arrive at a conclusion in regard to 
them. 5. Judgment, properly exercised, is con- 
nected with the various mental operations guiding 
them to the discovery and knowledge of truth. It 
enables us to compare facts with facts, feelings with 
feelings, and truths with truths, weighing their bear- 
ings, relations, tendencies, and differences, and to 
give to each its proper importance, or influence, in 
the final conclusion: hence the importance of a 
fully-developed and well-regulated judgment. By 
it we can be rendered safe in life, can judge prop- 
erly of men and things, and pass above and beyond 
the sorrow which so often rafters the moral condition 
of earth with prison environs, and vails the spiritual 
sky with augmenting darkness, closing out true hap- 
piness from perishing thousands. * 



SECTION III. , 
1. The action of the faculty of judgment is so 
closely connected with reason, that a reference to 
the one may aid in explaining the other. Reason 
embraces the ground of an opinion, or the premises 
of an argument upon, and from which the argument 
is based, and carefully carried through to the con- 



THE JUDGMENT. 207 

elusion. The judgment appears to inspect this proc- 
ess, and weighs the facts presented in the different 
objects so as to decide upon them, or the correctness 
of the conclusion of an argument, by deciding upon 
all the facts involved in the argument, even to the 
correctness of the premises, unless such premises be 
free from confusion or doubt, and then the judgment 
must approve of the same. That the judgment is 
really and only reason is absurd. Reason, unaided 
by judgment, does not appear to know any thing 
but the premises and conclusion, with the regular 
argument, or successive steps in going from the one 
to the other, while the judgment appears to decide 
upon the truthfulness and the amount of weight that 
should be attached to all the facts, together with the 
justness of the conclusion. 2. Under the active 
power of the judgment may be comprehended the 
relations of properties or qualities of entities by 
which they are distinguished and recognized. The 
geologist marks the differences of the earth's strata, 
containing the archives of its own periods and ages. 
In this way the lapidarian detects the agreement or 
disagreement of the properties and particles which 
are consolidated in the mountain cliffs and crags, 
which defy the wastings of time or the violence of 
storms. This is also true of the zoologist and orni- 
thologist, in regard to certain characteristics of the 
different tribes, or divisions of those vast families of 
existences. 3. A correct development of the ref- 
lations of resemblances, and a satisfactor}^ knowl- 
edge of the same, depends very much on a vivid 
judgment. Here is the power of arranging the 
relations of resemblances, and of classifying prop- 



208 THE JUDGMENT. 

erly, by discriminating the certain number of sub- 
stances or properties necessary to class them to- 
gether as one species. The correctness of all such 
arrangements, of individuals forming the genus or 
properties of the compound, or existences of classes, 
with the elements of differences, relations of resem- 
blances, and analogy, embracing the points or de- 
grees in which there is a difference, depends upon 
a well-developed and active judgment. 



SECTION IY. 
1. "We may readily decompose a compound, but 
it requires the presence of the judgment in attend- 
ing to the agreement or disagreement of the proper- 
ties and the relations of resemblances — the natural 
adaptation and agreement of the parts to each 
other and to the whole. It is the work of the judg- 
ment to clearly discriminate these facts, and to so 
satisfy the mind in regard to them. Reason may 
connect or follow a chain of truths in arriving at 
conclusions, but it requires the exercise of judg- 
ment in satisfying the mind in relation to them, so 
as to produce uniformity of our belief, purpose, and 
action. 2. The character and relations involved in 
regard to cause and effect can only fully be recog- 
nized through the medium of the judgment. If the 
nature or qualities of a cause are known, then it 
requires the exercise, or an act of judgment in form- 
ing an opinion of the nature or character of the 
approaching effect or pending result. The exercise 
of this faculty is especially necessary to prevent 
confusion, in case of joint causes, followed by a 



THE JUDGMENT. 209 

common effect, or, if there be joint effects, of a com- 
mon cause. There may be sequences introduced to 
our notice, which will require us, from their charac- 
ter, or nature, or relations, to look for, and judge of, 
the true antecedents or causes, as well as the form- 
ing of an opinion of the character of the results. 3. 
The truthfulness of axioms, and the relations of 
angles and propositions, are objects of the judgment. 
If we say that all axioms which lie at the founda- 
tion of mathematical science are self-evident truths, 
and are incapable of either proof or disproof, it 
requires the exercise of the judgment in order to 
receive them as such free from doubt. Otherwise, 
doubt and confusion would pervade all our efforts in 
acquiring knowledge, and in relying on them as 
true. 4. The skill and success of a physician 
greatly depends upon this faculty, or mental power. 
He must be able to judge of the symptoms by which 
a disease may be known, though they may resemble 
those of other diseases, as well as the effect of cer- 
tain remedies upon disease, and upon different phys- 
ical constitutions. Without judgment we can not 
foretell the probable result of an action under par- 
ticular circumstances, and on different kinds of 
objects ; but in this way we are enabled to arrive at 
truth, and know it to be such from a careful discrim- 
ination of the facts which are evolved, and the ap- 
proval of conscience. 



SECTION V. 
1. The action of the judgment is essential in 
regard to our knowledge of intellectual science. It 

18* 



210 THE JUDGMENT. 

is the process or method of judging correctly of the 
facts evolved in argumentation, or events and rela- 
tions, giving due weight to each one in the final 
result. The power of memory may call up an ex- 
tensive array of facts, but judgment must form them 
into classes, genus, or combinations, or it must ab- 
stract them according to the various elements or 
points of difference connected with each or all of 
them. 2. Decisions may be true or false, in propor- 
tion to the clearness and distinctness with which we 
judge in weighing all the facts and influences con- 
nected with the premises, argument, and conclusion. 
He who arrives at conclusions upon slight, partial, 
or imperfect evidence, and is unwilling to admit of 
corrective facts, will be almost invariably wrong in 
his decisions. If, with pure motive, he attempts to 
regulate his own conduct, and is not guided by a 
proper judgment, he is liable to be led by the most 
hasty impressions or feelings, which will lead him 
to quick and rash conclusions, too often only to la- 
ment the want of proper and timely consideration; 
or, having formed his opinions, he is more tenacious 
and arbitrary in regard to them than the man of 
sound judgment; therefore, we should be careful to 
form our opinions with care, properly judging of all 
the facts which would naturally lead to sound re- 
sults. 3. This principle, or power, appears to be of 
universal adaptation, whether it be applied to the 
investigation of scientific truths, or the affairs con- 
nected with every day's occurrences or events. It 
pre-eminently aids in deriving from all sources of 
facts that which is essential to correct motives, acts, 
and conclusions connected with our belief, and the 



THE JUDGMENT. 211 

rule of right. When our conclusions are thus 
formed with care and deliberation, we should al- 
ways be free to be influenced by new facts as cor- 
rectives, yet we should first know them to be true 
within themselves. 



SECTION VI. 
1. A great natural defect in the judging power is 
incurable. There are some minds which are want- 
ing in the power of reason, and are unskilled in the 
strict exercise of attention. Such minds are easily 
shaken in their conclusions; whenever new facts are 
urged, whether they are legitimately connected with 
the subject or not, they are ever changing. But by 
care and repeated efforts the want of attention may, 
in a great measure, be corrected, and the power of 
judging become more perfect. There are others 
whose judgment is so deficient that they hastily 
form an opinion from the first evidence, however 
imperfect or deceptious it may be, with a stubborn 
firmness; and then, with such, all arguments or 
facts, which may be brought as correctives, are to 
them not only worthless, but aggravating. If their 
motive be pure, they may escape, while their work 
is lost; but if their motive be uniformly impure, 
there is but little or no hope ; for it is impossible to 
remedy a radical defect of judgment by any kind 
of training or education. 2. In. order to judge cor- 
rectly, all selfish motives and feelings should be 
buried a million of feet under ground ; then all the 
facts connected with the case should be carefully 
and impartially considered, and due weight of each 



212 THE JUDGMENT. 

and all should contribute to the final decision. De- 
cisions made in this way are worthy of confidence. 
3. Connected with the power of judging is the proc- 
ess of classification, which embodies an idea not 
only of the power, but of the act of forming into 
classes, or of distributing into sets of classes. 4. 
This may take place in the mind, to some extent, 
involuntarily. When no special mental effort is 
put forth, the qualities of some contingent existent, 
under the law of resemblances, may give rise to a 
state of mind embracing realities as such. 



SECTION YII. 
1. In certain respects classification may be re- 
garded as necessary, when it arises in connection 
with our conceptions of primary facts or self-evident 
truths ; and if our attention is attracted by a tree, 
it exists in common with all trees : hence it requires 
the exercise of a special power to discriminate the 
differences, and to classify so that it may be dis- 
tinctly an object of clear perception and thought, 
and that power is the judgment. Then qualities or 
properties may be the immediate work of classifica- 
tion, which can not be correctly arranged without 
the special discriminating action of the judgment. 
2. In certain respects the work of abstraction is 
connected with the power of judging. The mind 
takes cognizance of the character of the qualities 
or elements of objects through the medium of the 
judgment, by which the properties are abstracted 
and arranged under the clear conceptions of their 
natural differences. Henceforth an abstract ele- 



THE JUDGMENT. 213 

ment can be a special object of thought without 
involving the obscurity of the compound, or mass, 
whence it was evolved or eliminated. 3. General- 
ization is, in part, connected with the power and 
action of the judgment; for the power of correctly 
reducing particulars to generals, or to their genera, 
must be exercised with a due reference to those 
features, or qualities, which would designate them 
as naturally belonging to a certain class or combi- 
nation. Such properties of differences, or of agree- 
ment, must be determined by the judgment. In 
this way we determine that a fact is general by 
finding it in each member of a certain class of 
existences, and we determine, in a similar way, 
that facts are not general when they are found only 
in certain members of different classes. 4. The act 
of judging may be preceded by perception. We 
may have perception of a variety or a mass of 
objects which, at first, are apprehended in a con- 
fused way, but by comparing the appearance, or 
qualities of properties, we are enabled to decide 
upon them without doubt : hence we arrive at gen- 
eral conclusions from their applicability to each and 
all of the entities of any one, or of each particular 
class, which are the immediate objects of mental 
action. 



SECTION VIII. 

1. The faculty or power of judging differs from 

that of the understanding. The understanding 

seems to know notions or objects as they appear, 

but it requires the exercise of judgment to abstract 



214 THE JUDGMENT. 

or classify accord lng to natural principles and dif- 
ferences, so we can have a clear and real knowledge 
of their existence. That which is the object of the 
understanding is that which is decided upon by a 
well-developed judgment. If the power of the un- 
derstanding be vigorous and well developed, and 
that of the judgment radically deficient, the mind 
will have experienced the presence of many facts 
without the power of combining them, so as to have 
distinct and decisive use of them : hence the knowl- 
edge of many things, but the control of almost none 
of them to advantage. 2. The power of judging is 
closely connected with that of suggestion. The lat- 
ter consists in the first intimation, or presentation, 
of a fact or ideas to the mind, but the former has 
decisive power in regard to them, which proceeds 
upon the notice of, and the influence or weight of 
all the differences compared and balanced. The 
action of the power of judging is clearly different 
and distinct from that of suggestion. 3. The power 
and action of relative suggestion is not one and the 
same with that of judgment. The former takes 
place when the mind experiences the first effects, or 
influences, which arise out of the certain relations 
that different objects mutually sustain to each 
other. The making known to the mind, merely, the 
first intimations of mutual relationship may be 
called relative suggestion, but it requires an act of 
judgment to decide upon the causes of these rela- 
tions, and the importance that should be attached 
to each, or all the facts connected with them; and 
we can not have clear conceptions of them, and a 
distinctive command over them, only as it is given 



THE JUDGMENT. 215 

by the correct exercise of judgment. That the 
judgment only acts under the controlling influence 
of suggestion, or that of relative suggestion, is ab- 
surd ; but it has the natural right, and does act 
upon and in regard to all the facts or influences 
which are the objects of mental action, being em- 
braced in the power of suggestion, or of relative 
suggestion. And it is clearly and unquestionably 
true that it differs from them both as to its nature 
and office in the mind. 4. The importance of a 
well-developed and active judgment is incalculable. 
The acquisition of knowledge, and a right use of it, 
in adding to our own happiness and to the happi- 
ness of others, depends upon it. If we are deficient 
in regard to the power of this faculty, we never can 
act with that degree of prudence and discretion that 
the laws of propriety and right require ; but with a 
mature and well-regulated judgment we are fur- 
nished with facts from all sources, together with an 
unshaken belief in, and command of them, upon 
which we can depend with the utmost confidence, 
and can arrange either to hide from the dangers 
and storms of earth, or to triumph over and beyond 
their power. 



jpifrimn j&t&entj. 



CHAPTER I. 

REASON. 
SECTION I. 

1. Eeason is a faculty of the mind, having power 
to act, or of remaining at rest. It is connected 
with the intuitive elements of our being, and can be 
cultivated so as to increase its power of vividness in 
action, but it is impossible for its origin to be the 
result of education. It is that principle of the mind 
by which it distinguishes truth from error, and good 
from evil. In the exercise of this function of the 
mind other faculties appear to harmonize, and can 
be called into action as auxiliaries in the investiga- 
tion of truth, and in distinguishing between that 
which is correct and that which is false. With the 
power, and the correct exercise of reason, the mind 
is capable of deducing inferences or results from 
facts or from propositions. 2. This principle ena- 
bles us to allege or assert, with confidence, the 
ground or cause of opinion upon which is to be 
built the elements of argumentation, or facts lead- 
ing from the cause to the conclusion. It aids in the 
selection and use of that kind of facts and positions 
in the argument which naturally support and jus- 
tify the final conclusion or result. 3. Ratiocination 
216 



REASON. 217 

can not exist without a power competent to be the 
foundation of such action, or exercise of reason. It 
is this power which enables us to arrive at a knowl- 
edge of the process of demonstration, both as to the 
facts involved and the correctness of the process. 
The reception of, and our confidence in the facts as 
true within themselves, together with the results, de- 
pends upon the power and. correct action of reason. 
4. Reason appears to be the foundation upon, or 
in the power of which rests ideas or facts for the 
purpose of correct arrangements, and the right use 
of thoughts and arguments. It leads to the devel- 
opment of primary principles in nature, and the 
exploring of hidden fields of truth. It invests the 
mind with power to define, to some extent, the pow- 
ers of our being, and rises by and through con- 
nected chains of facts, from nature up to a real 
belief in the existence and power of a sovereign 
Creator and Euler of the universe. 



SECTION II. 
1. Reason is not only a power existing in the 
mind, but it is a power capable of action. It is a 
faculty capable of acting, and such action is reason- 
ing when appropriate facts are involved as materials 
of argumentation, and influences and results are 
correctly deducted from the premises. Reason, as 
to its natural and real existence in the mind, is 
correct, and so we may regard it when in action ; 
for we can not have conceptions of incorrect reason- 
ing. The judgment will admit of degrees, but the 
moment reason is incorrect it ceases to be reason. 

19 



218 REASON. 

The chain of facts is broken, or the relation of effect 
to cause, or of cause to effect, is unjointed, and the 
action of reason being intercepted, ceases to be 
either reason or reasonable. 2. Reason, in another 
sense, is to examim, discuss, or support fty facts^ 
connected in argumentation. Nothing can be re- 
ceived by us as true which opposes the dictates of 
reason. It is utterly impossible for us, at one and 
the same time, to receive truth and error, or that of 
correct and false propositions ; but certain truths 
and correct propositions, at first, may appear decep- 
tions or false ; yet often, when they are traced out in 
their proper connection, or chain of facts, in argu- 
mentative form, we become satisfied that they are 
correct. 3. Reason differs from the understanding. 
The latter is that which apprehends and embraces 
things presented to it, but reason proceeds, in the 
investigation, to the certain knowledge of their real 
existence and character. Notions may arise with, 
or be given by the understanding, but reason ena- 
bles the mind to investigate the truthfulness of 
them, or to know that which is true and that which 
is false. The understanding can not blend those 
things which are presented, involving such things, 
or truths, in a certain connected train, in order to 
give a knowledge of the real results, as well as the 
correctness of the steps taken in arriving at such a 
conclusion ; but reason can bring all into the ac- 
count, and arrive at certain conclusions and a 
knowledge of them. 4. Our ideas of right and 
wrong are tested by reason, with the exception of ax- 
ioms or self-evident truths, both in matter and mind. 
They are received by us as truths without reasons 



REASON. 219 

either for or against them ; for we are incapable of 
reasoning in regard to them ; yet the intuitive, self- 
evident truths, which are the foundation of mind, 
receive self-evident truths as such, independent of 
proof in any way. All our ideas of other facts, or 
existences, are, or can be, tested by reason, and, 
by the same process, our knowledge of them be 
matured. 



SECTION III. 
1. The power of reason exists in the mind, and is 
connected with its intuitive faculties. Its. origin is 
neither the result of habit nor of education, and the 
objects of its action can not be numbered. 2. There 
are certain intuitive facts, and self-evident truths, 
which can not be tested by reason. Such self-evi- 
dent existences are in the mind, and lie at the 
foundation of reason; but their truthfulness can not 
be tested by reason. Reason in action advances 
from one fact, or degree, to another, founding the 
one upon the other, till we reach the conclusion. 
And in tracing the chain of connected facts from 
the conclusion backward, we will arrive at primary 
facts, or self-evident truths, both in the existence of 
mind and matter. All such truths can not be made 
known to us by any kind of reasoning or proof, for 
they are incapable of either. 3. Self-evident truths 
may be divided into two classes: (1.) Those truths 
which lie at the foundation of the philosophy of 
mind ; and, (2.) Those truths Which belong to, and 
are connected with, the science which appertains to 
external things. The axioms, or self-evident truths, 



220 REASON. 

upon which the whole of mathematical science 
stands, or is based, are incapable of either proof 
or disproof; yet we are compelled to receive them, 
and to receive them as facts, independently of any 
power of reason; therefore, what power is capable 
of receiving the primary, self-evident facts which lie 
at the foundation of all external science or knowl- 
edge, but the intuitive, self-evident elements which 
lie at the foundation of the philosophy of mind? 
4c. These intuitive principles are the foundation 
and origin of all knowledge to us : hence intuitive 
internal facts, or elements, with our feelings and 
experience, are to be depended upon as true with 
more absolute certainty than the knowledge of all 
external things; for the latter are tested by and 
through the medium of the senses, which may 
deceive us by reason of their connection, often, 
with diseased physical nerves, while internal feel- 
ings, or facts, are objects of direct knowledge, with- 
out the interception of physical elements, which 
may be imperfect or diseased so as to deceive us. 
5. All self-evident facts are not, and they are inca- 
pable of being, the results of reason in any way. 
They are received by us with a conviction of infal- 
lible certainty. Though incapable of either proof 
or disproof, yet they are received by us, and are 
known to be true. It is utterly impossible for any 
one to doubt their existence, or their truthfulness, 
and all men are guided by them in the acts of life. 
Such facts, or truths, are received as such by the 
intuitive powers of our existence, independently of 
all proof. 



REASON. 221 

SECTION IV. 
1. A knowledge of our own existence arises in 
connection with tlio power and action of the pri- 
mary elements of the mind. Self evident truths, 
which are the foundation of the philosophy of mind, 
have power to affirm and know our own existence; 
and in their existence and power we have knowl- 
edge of all other facts within the bounds of mental 
action. With them arises the conviction of our own 
existence ; and being identified with their being and 
nature, it is utterly impossible for us to avoid the 
knowledge of our real entity. With the same pow- 
ers arises the conviction as to the distinct nature of 
the mind from the body, and that the mind is capa- 
ble of thinking and acting without the aid of the 
material organs. Knowledge implies a power capa- 
ble of knowing, and objects capable of being 
known. Those elements which are capable of ex- 
periencing a conviction of their own existence, and 
that of other existences, may be regarded as pri- 
mary, self-evident principles. 2. These truths are 
unchanging in their essence and nature of action 
within themselves. Our physical powers are con- 
tinually changing, and the same may be said to 
be true, to some extent, of elements tested by the 
senses ; but a knowledge of all these changes is 
realized by the unchanging intuitive powers of the 
mind. Facts tested in this way are of direct knowl- 
edge, and can not admit of either sophistry or 
doubt ; therefore our knowledge of the existence of 
our own minds as certain, is more absolute in nature 
than the knowledge we can have of our material 

19* 



REASON. 

being, or of any thing beyond that of self. 3. In 
these self-evident, primary elements of the mind is 
contained the power of receiving and of knowing 
self-evident truths, or axioms, in external things, or 
that lie at the foundation of all scientific demonstra- 
tions and knowledge beyond that of self. If we 
can not depend upon the internal being, convictions, 
feelings, and processes of the mind, it is utterly im- 
possible for us to have real knowledge of any fact 
or existent beyond the self-bounds of the mind. 4. 
In the intuitive being and power of the mind arises 
the conviction and belief of our personal identity. 
Present mental states, or internal affections and 
feelings, are the occasion of the calling up of past 
mental states, or feelings, each or all existing in the 
same mind, and at the same time, imparting the 
idea of duration to the same sentient being, and the 
certainty of the sameness of that which was pres- 
ent, or was capable of commanding and retaining 
such knowledge. Change belongs to all physical 
entities, and the various acts of the mind ; but amid 
every and all possible abbreviations, or changes, the 
sentient being experiences and retains a certain 
conviction that spiritual self does not, and can not 
change, but must ever be the same in essence ; and, 
with this conviction and knowledge, all our notions 
of external things are regulated. 5. Connected 
with the power of reason arises the notion that every 
result must have a cause. It is natural for us to ex- 
perience a conviction of cause from effect, and to 
have an idea of the character of the cause from the 
magnitude or nature of the result. The uniform 
and natural tendency is, that the same cause under 



REASON. 223 

the same laws will have a similar or the same effect. 
If there were no uniformity in these things, we 
could have no confidence in the laws regulating ex- 
ternal things ; therefore, accident would be the only 
law regulating all objects of external knowledge. 
"We have intuitively a conviction, confidence, and 
belief in the uniformity existing as to degrees, na- 
ture, and character involved in the relations of ante- 
cedents and sequences, of causes and effects ; and 
to doubt these is contrary to nature and all experi- 
ence, and is utterly impossible. 



224 REASON 



CHAPTER II. 

REASON, CONTINUED. 

SECTION I. 
1. In connection with the power of reason is our 
confidence in the uniformity of the laws of nature. 
The cognizance of the exactness, or uniform manner 
in the succession of phenomena, evolving the rela- 
tions of sequences and antecedents, of effect and 
cause, gives rise to a conviction and notion of their 
order and obedience to law, all of which enters into 
our experience and knowledge. The origin of such 
a conviction is connected with intuitive power. Ex- 
perience, guided by reason, enables us to apply it to 
the proper objects, or process, in successive events. 
2. Our immediate confidence in the uniformity of 
phenomena gives origin to the notion of causation. 
The regular tendency of one event to follow another, 
becoming or affecting an abiding experience, gives 
rise to the conviction that the former is that of 
cause, and the latter is the result or effect. We 
then regard the cause as adequate to the effect. The 
next item is, to notice the character or nature of 
both cause and effect, and if these uniformly har- 
monize, we come to the conclusion that the same 
cause, under the same laws, will invariably produce 
the same effect. This uniformity must be thor- 
oughly tested by experience, so as to prevent decep- 
tion in regard to the various phenomena. 3. Reason 



REASON. 225 

must he present in forming correct conclusions in re- 
gard to complicated, or complex and extensive natu- 
ral tendencies, or operations. The first effort to 
contemplate such a mass of realities may be at- 
tended with confusion ; but by extending the effort 
so as to embrace the entire mass, we are impressed 
with a uniform tendency. Yonder waves a beau- 
tiful forest. The different kinds and sizes of the 
trees, at first sight, present a confused scene of 
grandeur. Some individual trees will soon be taken 
away ; but the idea of the forest growing continu- 
ally, and that it can continue to exist in the future, 
can not be doubted, for this accords with reason and 
experience. The seasons, for some length of time, 
may vary, but our observation in relation to these 
changes, for several years, gives rise to the belief 
that, in the lapse of a still greater number of years, 
there will be conformity to a general law and a re- 
markable uniformity. It has been observed, with 
some degree of certainty, that from two to three cold 
winters succeed each other, then there will be about 
as many of milder temperature. The same has been 
thought to be true in regard to very hot or cool sum- 
mers. Another opinion has been partially settled 
in regard to wet and dry years, that the weather 
graduates to the two extremes about every four 
years. Amid all these changes, there appears to be 
a conformity to something like general laws, a 
knowledge of which seems to have been based upon 
experience, and guided by reason. 4. "When the 
uniformity of natural entities exist and conform to 
general laws, and a conviction of such facts enters 
into our experience, we are then enabled to detect 



226 REASON. 

results which are contrary to regular laws. Such 
deviations can easily be made the objects of mental 
action, and such incidental or contingent causes, 
diminishing or interrupting the results, can be as- 
certained, and a reoccurrence prevented. In this 
way dangers can be detected, and even foreseen, 
reasoning from natural relations and tendencies ; and 
often life, safety, and happiness are preserved in lieu 
of such dangers, or even temporal death. 5. There 
are laws regulating mind, but our knowledge of its 
conformity and uniformity thereto is attended with 
greater uncertainty than is our knowledge of the 
conformity and uniformity of matter to the laws by 
which it is regulated. Physical elements, existing 
without self-motive and self-action, can not evade or 
deprecate the force and authority of the laws by 
which they are governed; and, under all circum- 
stances, such elements are subject to the investiga- 
ting action of the mind. But sentient beings can 
evade and deceive, so as to render the true analysis 
of mental phenomena more obscure ; yet mind and 
the laws under which it acts, are as true within 
themselves, and can be depended upon as such with 
as much certainty as any thing that appertains to 
the material world. 



SECTION II. 
1. Self-evident truths, either in mind or matter, 
which are the objects of belief and confidence, with- 
out being capable of either proof or disproof, are 
necessarily involved in all mental processes in guid- 
ing to correct conclusions ; for it is impossible not to 



REASON. 227 

believe them ; and an appeal to consciousness is all 
that is necessary in order to know that they are re- 
ceived by us as true. 2. The power of reason 
within itself can contain and command a certain 
number of truths, and as to their truthfulness no 
reason or evidence can be given, and none is re- 
quired. And unless we admit that the intuitive 
elements of the mind contain power to receive self- 
evident truths as such, without proof, either in 
regard to mind or matter, it is utterly impossible for 
there to be any such thing as reason, reasoning, or 
knowledge in any or all created intelligences ; for if 
all truths could only be known, or made known to 
us by proof, then all knowledge would begin with 
proof; and then proof would have to extend to 
infinity, which is impossible, as they are numerous, 
and, therefore, can not be infinities within them- 
selves ; and the mind, being finite, could not use 
them in proof of ulterior facts. 3. The conduct of 
all persons shows their belief in the existence of 
primary truths, whether they acknowledge or deny 
such existences. ISTo skeptical philosopher can pro- 
ceed in the investigation of any fact without involv- 
ing a reference, and clear evidence of his belief 
in their existence, though he may deny the same at 
every step or degree of his argument. If he is in 
quest of some primary truth, the absence of which 
would soon involve him in sufferings or death, it 
would be revolting to all his feelings to be informed 
that there was no such thing in existence; and his 
dismay would be augmented if he should be re- 
minded that to prove such an existent, is that he 
own his own existence to be utterly impossible. 



228 REASON. 

How can he prove origin to self-knowledge, or the 
beginning in which he knows his own existence to 
be real ? Without confidence in such settled facts, 
how could he contemplate that which, from the 
regular chain of such truths, will affect his interest 
or happiness in the future, or be certain that the 
pain he had received, in time past, was experienced 
by the same person, called by his name, and which 
he now thinks to be himself? 4. If he looks upon 
a beautifully-finished tower, it is natural for the 
mind to run back to the heginning, at the founda- 
tion, and to inquire as to the process of building, 
and also as to who the builder was. Notwithstand- 
ing he is assured by thousands that it exists without 
a cause, builder, or beginning, which would accord 
with his avowed faith, yet an internal, intuitive con- 
viction would appeal to his understanding, and 
thunder the perpetual lie to such defective assertions. 
In all cases, those who labor to deny first truths are 
wholly dependent upon them for facts by which they 
are rendered capable of doubting or of denying the 
very truths which are the foundation of all the 
knowledge their minds are capable of. 



SECTION III. 
1. There is a difference between the process of 
argumentation and the mere action of the reasoning 
power, in arriving at primary truths. The mind, 
which is capable of correct argumentation, has 
power to evolve facts by basing one upon another, 
or by connecting them in a correct chain from the 
first to the final result. This requires natural ac- 



REASON. 229 

tivity and cogent habits of mental discipline. These 
gifts and acquirements are possessed only by few- 
persons ; but the action of reason, in connection 
with our reception and belief of first truths, is nat- 
ural, and common to all rational minds ; and it is 
impossible for them to doubt their intuitive convic- 
tions in regard to them. It is natural and easy for 
us to believe that an effect must have an adequate 
cause. When we look on the trembling fires of 
yonder heavens, we believe in a great First Cause, 
and see the power and design of Deity as written 
in the existing flower, rustling leaf, burning sun, or 
flying orbs. 2. Reason differs from consciousness, 
the latter being the knowledge of mental opera- 
tions and of sensations, or that act of the mind 
which makes known internal objects or feelings. 
The former evolves and connects facts in arriving 
at results, and apprehends truths necessary, abso- 
lute, and universal. 3. Its power differs from that 
of the senses. The latter may be regarded as the 
medium through which sensations make their appeal 
to the mind ; but the former commands the energies 
of the mind in amplifying its research, and in ex- 
tending its knowledge. 4. It differs from the judg- 
ment. It appertains to the latter to discriminate, 
combine, and decide upon the truthfulness of that 
which is used in argumentation, and also the rela- 
tions of facts and the correctness of that state, and 
each position of the argument ; but it requires the 
presence and action of reason to properly connect 
this chain, and in forming a correct process and 
conclusion. The origin of such action is found in 
intuition. 5. Reason differs, also, from the under- 
20 



230 REASON. 

standing. The latter apprehends the real state of 
that which is presented to it, or is the power of 
believing ; while the former leads to a satisfactory 
result, or a certain knowledge. 



SECTION IY. 
1. In connection with the power of reason arises 
convictions in relation to right and wrong. The 
mind is capable of being influenced, and has intu- 
itive power to act in reference to, and in distinguish- 
ing between good or bad, right or wrong. An intu- 
itive influence affects the mind favorably in regard 
to right, and deters it in relation to evil. It has 
power, also, not only to be influenced, but to act in 
exploring or in demonstrating that which is right or 
wrong. This introduces us into the process of rea- 
soning. 2. We soon know, from experience, that 
when we perform certain acts, we have the approval 
of conscience, and are entitled to a peaceful reward ; 
and in the performance of other acts, our con- 
sciences are disturbed, and we can only expect pun- 
ishment. When that which is good is involved in 
the action of reason, there will be a corresponding 
result ; and when that which is bad or impure fills 
the steps or degrees of argumentation, there will be 
a corresponding bad result. 3. This intuitive con- 
viction, influence, and self-affirming power of the 
mind, in regard to right and wrong, is universal. 
All rational intelligences are endowed with it, 
whether they are under the light of Christianity, or 
are under the cloud of heathenism. In every soul 
conscience exists, and intuitions arise and act in 



REASON. 231 

reference to that which is good and evil. Such is 
our nature as ordered and wisely arranged by the 
great First Cause. All men are endowed with 
power to adhere to this light, and, through the 
assistance of Divine grace, to be saved in heaven ; 
and none are under an absolute necessity of being 
doomed to irresistible and irretrievable sorrow. 4. 
In connection with the power of reason, we may 
experience, or have, to some extent, ideas of that 
which is beautiful or sublime. Many objects of the 
same class may differ in degree of beauty : that in 
each one which approaches nearest the most perfect 
one, or to our conceptions of a perfect model, re- 
quires the presence and action of reason, in arriving 
to a correct equilibrium, or balancing of them, and 
to just conclusions. The descriptions of an orator 
may surpass the perfections of that which forms 
the object of his descriptions. The painter may 
surpass the natural beauties of the landscape, or the 
graphic sublimity of some occurrence or reality. 
The arrangement and regularity of these must re- 
quire the presence and action of reason. When 
defects exist with the beautiful in any object, or that 
which agrees or disagrees with a perfect model, we 
must be aided with the power of reason in giving 
each its legitimate place and weight, or the whole 
would be contemplated with confusion. 



232 REASONING. 



CHAPTER III. 

SEASONING. 

SECTION I. 
1. Reasoning is the power of reason in action. 
It is, then, the act or process of exercising the faculty 
of reason, in and by which new or unknown propo- 
sitions or facts are deduced from previous ones, and 
previous facts are established from the relation and 
character of their results or effects. 2. The correct 
exercise of reason is destructive to atheism, or the 
foundation of infidelity. We know that an effect 
can not exist without a cause, and we can not be- 
lieve in a cause that is inadequate to the effect 
which follows it. Universal existences all around 
us confirm our belief in the existence of a great First 
Cause; and the idea of such a cause, or Being, is a 
first truth of reason. 3. Two modes of argumenta- 
tion will settle and confirm our belief. The first 
evidence or proofs are drawn from the necessity that 
such a being must exist independently of the evi- 
dences which are every-where written upon his 
works. The second embraces proofs or evidences 
of his being and perfections as given in his works. 
We now proceed to examine these two modes of 
argumentation. 



REASONING. 233 

SECTION II. 
1. If there be no one being in infinite space but 
such as might possibly not have had a being, it 
would follow that there might j^ossibly have never 
been any existent: hence the possibility that such 
an entity might have arisen from nonentity. This 
is impossible. Then it is impossible that there 
might have been no existence in any way ; there- 
fore, an impossibility of not existing must be true, 
and there must have been a being whose non-exist- 
ence is impossible, otherwise the truthfulness of all 
reason and knowledge would be reversed. 2. All 
the essence and attributes of an unoriginated being 
must be unoriginated, and necessarily self-existent. 
Such an essence, or being, can not give origin to its 
own attributes, unless it had power to act before it 
existed, which would be impossible. Such a being 
must be real, absolute, self-existing, and eternal ; 
for any thing finite, or contingent, must have a 
cause which would be anterior, and show that such 
a finity, or contingent, could not be causation nor 
eternal. 3. The attributes of an unoriginated be- 
ing must be absolute and limitless, otherwise they 
would be imperfect or limited, and that would in- 
volve a modifying cause; but no such cause can be 
acknowledged, as such a cause would be imperfect. 
But the cause of which we speak, being perfect, lies 
back of all things, and may be styled the cause of 
causes, being infinite or eternal. No modifying 
cause can be allowed, as such a one could not be 
absolute in perfection, and could not be eternal;, 
and all imperfect attributes, or any attribute which 

20* 



234 SEASONING. 

is not infinitely perfect within itself, is finite to some 
degree, and must be capable of greater perfection 
by improvement, exercise, and experience. This 
would prove imperfection in an unoriginated being, 
and that he was perfecting his attributes and exist- 
ence by self-action, experience, and a further ac- 
quaintance with his own works. His being, and 
each attribute, must be perfect and unoriginated. 
4. Such an unoriginated and infinite being must 
exist every-where, in the same way and manner he 
does any where, otherwise there must be a cause by 
which his existence and presence is limited. But 
there is and can be no cause limiting the existence, 
action, or presence of Deity; for there can not be 
but one first cause, which cause, from necessity, 
must be unoriginated, self-existent, infinite, and 
eternal. It is utterly impossible for us to have con- 
ception of more than one infinite space, and beyond 
this thought can not travel ; neither can we have any 
idea of any out border, or limitation to the innu- 
merable worlds which are the result of a cause 
lying still back of their origin and motion. Then 
if there is only one infinite space, it can contain 
only one infinite series of points in that limitless 
space; therefore, that reality which is capable of 
filling each point in infinite space must be indivisi- 
ble, one, and infinite. As two or more infinite be- 
ings can not occupy one and the same infinite space, 
filled with only one series of infinite points, without 
being one and the same being, therefore there is 
one, and only one unoriginated, self-existent, infi- 
nite, and eternal cause and Governor of the universe. 



REASONING. 235 

SECTION III. 
1. This unorigmated being must be a reality, 
precisely the same in every place, not consisting 
of parts, as they would naturally exist independ- 
ently; nor of whole, for that would imply a com- 
bination of parts; nor of degree, as that would 
signify imperfection and quantity with comparison; 
therefore, this being is one and omnipresent, with- 
out any thing like degrees, comparison, or limita- 
tion. He exists, and can be, and is to every one an 
object of belief and knowledge, naturally resulting 
from an intuitive conviction within us so effectually, 
and ever making its internal appeals to conscience, 
reason, and judgment, that it is naturally impossi- 
ble to indulge a conscientious doubt. 2. Such a 
being can not be materiality, for this would come 
under the laws which govern it, and would have 
density, divisibility, form with limitation. Non- 
entity can not give origin to matter; and matter 
which is limited can not give origin to matter, for 
it contains no power of self-action ; much less could 
it produce an existent with self-cogitative power, 
being within and of itself unthinking. That which 
is naturally inert, and utterly incapable of self- 
action, can not produce itself or any other inert ele- 
ment; and if a portion of matter was eternal, it 
could not originate other inert elements, much less 
give origin to self-acting and cogitative intelligences. 
3. If matter and motion were both eternal, and 
could be connected together, yet they never could 
produce a cogitative mind. Matter and motion, 
though changed or varied in any possible way, yet 



236 SEASONING. 

the particles could only meet, impel, and resist each 
other ; and they have no power to do more. It is 
impossible for matter to originate any thing, being 
inert. Then, if nothing were eternal, matter could 
never have had origin, as it could not result from 
nothing. If matter without motion were eternal, 
then motion could never have a beginning ; for mat- 
ter has no self-motion, and inertness is essential to 
its nature and being. If only matter and motion 
are eternal, then thought or intellectual action could 
never have a being ; for matter, either at rest or in 
motion, can not originate, within and of itself, self- 
action, cogitation, and knowledge ; neither is it capa- 
ble, abstractly, within and of itself, to act and feel 
joy, pleasure, or grief. These differ from any prop- 
erties or qualities of matter, and are superior to 
them. Then the first being must be infinite, and 
must have self-power to act, think, foresee, and ar- 
range the beginning and real existence of all finite 
things ; and that which is first of all things must 
really possess, of necessity, absolute perfections, as 
nothing which is essential to such an existent could 
ever be added ; for that which was added would be 
finite, and in this respect imperfect, and would be 
created. 4. Such a being must possess wisdom and 
power without limitation, and all other attributes 
must be, within themselves, absolutely perfect. 
Real or natural attributes are considered as belong- 
ing to the essence or nature of a being, and are 
essential to the nature of such an existent. There 
are no attributes of Deity ideal, casual, or contin- 
gent. All his attributes are unlimited and eternal : 
hence nothing can exist without his knowledge, or 



REASONING. 237 

be sustained without his omnipotent power. For an 
atheist to have ever lived without conscious misgiv- 
ings as to the soundness of his doctrine, is utterly 
impossible. 



SECTION IV. 
1. The existence of more than one unoriginated 
being in the universe, or the same infinite space, is 
utterly impossible. Such a being is possessed of in 
finite attributes, and must, of necessity, be present 
in every point in infinity. A second unoriginated 
being must be equal to the first in every respect, as 
both must, necessarily, be eternal, from the fact that 
they are unoriginated ; therefore, as there can be 
only one infinity to be occupied or filled by them, 
that infinity can be no more than perfectly filled ; 
and those two unoriginated and infinite beings must, 
necessarily, be the same in essence or nature, every- 
where present, incapable of any distinction or dis- 
similarity, and, of absolute necessity, they w T ould 
have to be one and the same. To suppose the ex- 
istence of any but one such infinite and eternal 
Being is absurd, and to try to contemplate a second 
or third, is only contemplating, as far as is possible 
for us, the existence and attributes of one and the 
same being. 2. All inferior or subordinate exist- 
ences^ in any respect, or degree, have their existence 
curtailed by finity, and their origin must, necessa- 
rily, take place within the compass of duration ; 
and, as such, they are all wholly dependent upon 
the great First Cause for their existence. There 
can only be one unoriginated essence or being in 



238 REASONING. 

the universe, or in infinite space. 3. All finite ex- 
istences, becoming entities within the bounds of 
duration, or aside and apart from that which is eter- 
nal, implies a cause of their existence. It is impos- 
sible for them to originate themselves, not being 
self-existent ; and that which is self-existent is eter- 
nal, and that which is eternal is unoriginated, one 
and the same. All finite existences owe their being 
to the great First Cause, which Cause, so far as we 
can understand, was under no possible obligations 
to constitute them real entities. 4. The absolute, or 
omnipotent power of Deity, does not make his acts 
either arbitrary or of necessity. They are free in 
their nature and power, and are with effort, other- 
wise such acts would be of necessity, which neces- 
sity would be the cause, and not the free power of 
absolute perfections in unison. "What he willeth he 
can do, yet nothing is done by him only that which 
is right. He is too wise to err, and too good to be 
unkind. 



SECTION V. 
1. His omnipotence does not necessitate his knowl- 
edge ; yet he knows all things, and there is nothing 
hid from him. Necessity would imply something 
that was, or is yet to be explored by him ; whereas, 
if there is any thing which he would not choose to 
know, as contingent or otherwise, it would imply 
that he must first know what that is before he would 
choose not to know it. 2. He has power to act, and 
such action must be according to liberty or perfect 
freedom. As all his perfections are infinite, none 



REASONING. 239 

of his acts can be originated by contingent or out- 
ward causes : hence, the oneness in the harmony of 
his limitless attributes, and the infinity of his good- 
ness and absolute holiness, can not be connected 
with action contrary to his infinite power, wisdom, 
purity, and truth. 3. He has infinite wisdom in 
the exercise of his knowledge and power, and infi- 
nite goodness in the perfection of all his acts. 4. 
From reason we may infer that the object of man's 
existence was to share of the endless goodness of 
God ; his duty was to glorify his Creator ; and that 
the performance of this duty wholly depends upon 
volition ; therefore, he must be created free to serve 
and glorify God. If such service was of necessity, 
or by requisition, then such requisition would be 
the agent in rendering glory, while man would be 
passive: hence, the object of our being would have 
been cut off by law, and, of course, our existence 
would have been impossible. Then, if we are at 
liberty to hold a merciful relation to our Creator, a 
perversion of the same liberty will deprive us of 
happiness. 



240 REASONING 



CHAPTER IV. 

REASONING, CONTINUED. 

SECTION I. 
1. We now proceed to the second mode of rea- 
soning^ which is to establish or to prove the exist- 
ence of Deity, by arguing from effect to cause. This 
process exemplifies the power and action of reason, 
and tends to strengthen our confidence in the cor- 
rectness of argumentation, and also leads us to a 
confirmed belief in the conclusions made, and in 
the facts established, from incontestable evidences 
or proof. 2. Our conceptions of a being of infinite 
power and wisdom would naturally lead us to sup- 
pose such power and wisdom would be evidenced in 
the variety, multiplicity, agreement, dependence, 
mystery, and design which exist in, and in connec- 
tion with all his works. That which we can com- 
prehend, and those things which we can not compre- 
hend, are alike characteristic of his power and 
wisdom, and are evidences of his being. 3. If the 
divine Being is an unoriginated and infinite Spirit, 
he can not be made known to us as such through 
the medium of the senses only, and that abstractly, 
or without any aid or evidence from material exist- 
ences. Spirit may be manifested to spirit, but spirit 
can not be manifested to spirit through the medium 
of our senses, and without any aid or evidence con- 
tained in materiality. The great unoriginated Spirit 



REASONING. 241 

manifests himself to lis through the medium of our 
senses by material existences. Spirit and matter 
might exist independently of each other, so far as 
we can determine ; but material elements, or exist- 
ences, the objects of our senses, may be used as 
evidences proving the existence of spirit. The ex- 
istence of inert matter as a result is evidence of a 
competent self-acting cause. 4. There is evidence 
of the wisdom and power of Deity in the different 
systems of innumerable orbs which glow in the 
heavens. The order, distances, velocity, gravitation, 
and centripetal forces; the diurnal and orbicular 
motions, all of these are conclusive evidences of the 
wisdom, power, and existence of God ; for these 
things are neither of self-origin nor accidental. 5. 
The earth contains, in its own structure, evidences 
of the presence and power of an infinite Creator. 
Its internal structure contains the archives of its 
own periods and ages. Yegetation upon its surface 
is mysteriously promoted by the circulation of nutri- 
tious properties elevated by capillary influences, 
forming ligenous fibers, or is consolidated in trunks, 
boughs, and leaves. The delicate fibers and glow- 
ing tints of almost an endless variety of flowers, can 
only be regarded as so many evidences of the wis- 
dom and goodness of the great Creator. 6. The 
laws of inert matter, or elements, could never ar- 
range and preserve the orders of genera and spe- 
cies, without which the world would be confusion. 
All these are so many marks of infinite skill, wis- 
dom, and goodness. 

21 



REASONING. 

SECTION II. 
1. There is evidence of the existence of Deity in 
the order of providence, which meets the demands 
of all animated or self-moving beings — the regular 
return of the seasons, the descending rain, and 
warming sun, each year yielding a sufficiency, and 
not too much. These things are out of the common 
onward course of nature, and, to a certain extent, 
they are miraculous, as there is no law contained in 
matter that can originate them or govern them with- 
out settled uniformity. 2. Life, sleep, vision, and 
muscular action are evidences, and furnish positive 
proof of the existence of Deity. It is utterly impos- 
sible for any finite existence or influence to originate, 
and keep in regular action, the expansion and con- 
traction of the intercostal nerves, by which, in part, 
the lungs are enabled to inhale the atmospheric air, 
receive the oxygen, and throw off the carbon from 
the blood. We have no self-power to keep up this 
process, yet it goes on whether we sleep or wake. 
Reason, together with the facts in the case, teaches us 
to know this truth, that this process is arranged and 
continued by the wisdom and constant presence of 
a merciful Creator, and the very moment the influ- 
ence of his presence is withdrawn from these nerves 
our breath is paused forever. 3. Another source of 
evidence may be found in connection with the circu- 
lation of the Hood. It is stated that in health the 
heart, in one minute of time, makes eighty pulsa- 
tions, and a little over two ounces of blood are ex- 
pelled into the aorta at each pulsation — about nine 
thousand six hundred ounces every hour, and about 



REASONING. 243 

one thousand four hundred and forty pounds per 
day ! It is also stated, by those who have exper- 
imented in, and have tested these things, that each 
pulsation of the heart propels the blood eight inches, 
making fifty feet in one minute ! The average quan- 
tity of blood in each human body is about thirty 
pounds, and it is said to pass through the heart 
twenty-three times in one hour. In calculating the 
velocity, and the force necessary to effect action to 
the remotest extremities of the arteries, or where 
their anastomosis with the veins take place, and the 
mysterious counteraction of the blood in the veins 
to the heart again, would require the heart, in its 
legitimate office and action, to possess the astonish- 
ing power of four hundred pounds. Who is pre- 
pared to acknowledge that these realities and proc- 
esses of action are the result of inert materiality, 
or of chance or accident ? They are conclusive evi- 
dence that the cause by which they are arranged is 
possessed of infinite wisdom, power, and goodness. 



SECTION III. 
1. But how are we to account for the irregular, 
yet continuous, expansion and contraction of the 
muscles and cords of the heart, which gives motion 
to the blood, upon which depends the perpetuity of 
life ? These muscles and cords, being matter, have 
no self-power to move or act, and the suspension of 
such action is death. Human knowledge has never 
attempted to solve the mystery, and account for it, 
but in one way that had the least appearance of 
reason ; that is, that the pulsations of the heart are 



244 REASONING. 

caused by the stimulating nature of the blood. 2. 
This has been disproved by the following experi- 
ments: (1.) If we apply a stimulus to the muscles 
of the heart of an animal after it is emptied, it will 
dilate and contract as if it were full. (2.) If all 
the large vessels of the heart be entirely emptied, 
the dilations and contractions will continue for some 
time, in the entire absence of the blood, and it will 
be discovered that the dilations are as forcible as 
are the contractions. 3, The continued and un- 
wearied action of the heart is evidence of the infi- 
nite wisdom and presence of its Creator. That 
which exhausts all the other muscles of the body 
increases the power and action of the heart. This 
action is wholly involuntary, and the muscles and 
delicate cords of the heart, unlike any other phys- 
ical powers, may act incessantly, and without weari- 
ness, for a hundred years. Natural laws can never 
explain this. 4. The existence and action of the 
heart is created and arranged by an all-wise Being, 
and its action is given, sustained, and perpetuated 
by the power and continued presence of the same. 
Matter has no self-power to either originate or con- 
tinue action; but the heart continues its motion in 
our waking hours, and in the deep slumbers of the 
night. Having no self-power in either state to con- 
tinue its motion, should we lie down in slumber 
with enmity toward God, how easily, in our uncon- 
scious state, could he withdraw from those tender 
muscles and cords of the heart, and their action 
would be suspended, the wheels of life paused, and 
the spirit fled forever! As such action is irregular, 
and contradictory to the nature and principles of all 



REASONING. 245 

self-power of action and material laws, it is only 

sustained by an abiding, presence of the great Cre- 
ator. 



SECTION IT. 
1. Reason may be regarded, in a certain sense, to 
be the power, and reasoning the action, or process, 
of deducing conclusions from premises. This proc- 
ess adds a second step to that which has been used, 
and a third to the second, and so on to the last, or 
the conclusion. In other words, it may be regarded 
as that process of action which connects a chain of 
facts, or a train of reasoning, involving them as a 
whole, and, in their legitimate order, or appropriate 
fitness, as parts most naturally adapted to the nature 
of the premises or proposition. Reasoning is the 
continued exercise of reason, in the demonstration 
or investigation of subjects, or series of facts, trac- 
ing their relations, arriving at and establishing legit- 
imate conclusions. 2. Reasoning applies to the 
investigation of propositions in science, or existing 
wholly in the mind. We reason in regard to ex- 
ternal things through the medium of the senses, 
but mental or moral reasoning may take place in 
the mind. 3. The value of the reasoning power is 
all-important in the investigation of truth, and in 
selecting it as that which is to us of inestimable 
value. The various objects of our knowledge, how- 
ever diversified, can be the immediate objects of 
reason. It tends to prevent a too hasty action or 
belief, till the whole matter is examined and tested 
with proper caution and deliberation. That which 

21* 



246 REASONING. 

is mysterious in nature, science, or art, must be un- 
raveled by reason, if it becomes to us knowledge 
known to be true. The strength of mental action, 
in the investigation and the proper understanding 
of truths, is matured by a constant exercise of rea- 
soning, first in relation to simple ideas or truths, till 
strength is acquired to command and to comprehend 
complicated propositions and events. 4. Reasoning 
is a source of specific and certain knowledge, giving 
the mind a controlling power over the different 
steps, degrees, or relations of things, or realities, 
which would be too complicated and obscure to be 
known to us in any other way. Those things which 
require intermediate steps, or propositions, in order 
to be directly understood, can be controlled only by 
the reasoning power. It enables the mind to pene- 
trate the unexplored mysteries of nature, and its 
action is the occasion of the origin of new ideas 
and new series of interwoven facts, or chains of 
propositions. 5. The proper exercise of this power 
is the occasion, or is attended with such vivid dis- 
crimination, that we can select those truths, propo- 
sitions, events, or arrangements which are best 
adapted to our views and feelings. This involves 
a reference to consciousness ; as reasoning progresses 
those facts or propositions which are most natu- 
rally adapted to the desired issue, or exploration of 
that which is presented to the mind, will claim our 
feelings or preference; and we will love to reason 
on and in relation to those things which are con- 
genial to intuitive influences. Perception, sugges- 
tion, and judgment can not do the work of reason. 
It is the latter that must build with facts the argu- 



REASONING. 247 

ment, connecting the process, and exploring the 
way to the final result, revealing all the contingent 
truths. 



248 REASONING 



CHAPTER V. 

REASONING, CONTINUED. 

SECTION I. 
1. When effect is the object of a reasoning process, 
its cause is implied ; for such an object, first known 
to us as a result, or effect, would involve reasons as 
to why it is thus characterized, and an investigation 
would employ the power of reason in tracing back- 
ward each step to a cause, and such a cause as 
would be adequate to the effect, and corresponding 
in nature or qualities. 2. The cause of an effect 
may be assumed, and upon a correct process of 
reasoning, we may and can proceed to bring to light 
the proper cause. 3. The final conclusion of prop- 
ositions may be assumed, and a process of reasoning 
be brought to action, involving the relations of in- 
termediate facts and propositions, till we arrive at 
the legitimate conclusion ; yet propositions which 
are known to us need not the aid of reasoning to 
secure the same knowledge. 4. If a process of 
reasoning takes place in connection with or from 
intuitive articles of belief, revealing facts or truths 
to our knowledge, various combinations of facts, or 
objects, involving a diversity of mental processes, a 
strict adherence to reason and reasoning is our only 
guide in using that which is naturally adapted to 
the origin, process, and conclusion. 5. The power 
and action of reason is involved in selecting appro- 



REASONING. 249 

priate facts relating to that which is to be tested by 
reasoning, and to employ nothing in the deduction 
which is not properly added to each position or step 
that has preceded it. All the series in this process 
must be connected by a correct adaptation. If the 
premises be incorrect the conclusion will be absurd ; 
if the premises be correct, and the process of rea- 
soning false, the conclusion will be wrong ; but if 
the premises be correct, and the process of reason- 
ing is also correct, the conclusion will certainly be 
correct. 



SECTION II. 
1. Reasoning a priori deduces consequences or 
results from definitions formed, or facts assumed, or 
infers effects from causes previously known ; and it 
is that process, or kind of reasoning, by which an 
effect or result is proved from a cause. From the 
nature and relation of combined facts, or proposi- 
tions, we can readily assume results corresponding 
to the legitimate tendency of such antecedents or 
causes. That general adaptation or fitness, blending 
and harmonizing existences, naturally leads us to 
infer or believe in other corresponding realities. 
This kind of reasoning is common, whether in the 
mind abstractly, or carried on in relation to external 
tilings through the medium of the senses. The cor- 
rectness of both turns upon the testing power of 
intuition in regard to the reception of self-evident 
truths as such, without which argument could not 
be relied on as true. The statement of terms, defi- 
nitions, and propositions, which are known, or are 



250 REASONING. 

given, involves the idea of other corresponding ex- 
istences, and such known definitions or propositions 
evolving other truths or existences by comparisons 
and inductions. Mathematical calculations are 
based upon primary axioms or definitions ; and dem- 
onstrations commence with these; and, if correctly 
pursued, the result is inevitable, and invariably cor- 
rect. 2. Reasoning a posteriori is drawn or pro- 
ceeds from effect, facts, or results. We might say 
that reasoning a priori is from cause to effect ; but 
reasoning a posteriori is from effect to cause ; yet 
both methods can be varied in accordance with dif- 
ferent varieties of facts or propositions. A process 
of reasoning may commence with an effect or result, 
and extend back to a cause, or to something of ante- 
rior existence. 3. Processes of reasoning must be 
found upon truths or facts, and proceed from them. 
It involves the natural adaptation of facts and prop- 
ositions, with such correlative qualities as will render 
the progressive steps of the argument true in forcing 
a correct result. 4. We proceed, in reasoning or 
argumentation, by using or involving a sufficient 
amount of facts or combinations in the argument. 
This process brings to our knowledge new truths ; 
but, to a great extent, it requires the presence and 
action of the judgment in clearly discriminating 
and in deciding upon that which should be used in 
arriving at a correct result; otherwise, unadapted 
facts might be involved and used in haste, render- 
ing the conclusion uncertain in regard to truth. 



REASONING. 251 

SECTION III. 

1. Reasoning requires that the attention be di- 
rected to the truths of each step in the argument. 
We must know that these facts correctly corre- 
spond to the premises. We must know that the 
premises can not but be true, and arranged accord- 
ingly, so that the process of argumentation may be 
conducted correctly in the truthfulness of the pro- 
gressive degrees or steps, and that these are con- 
nected to the conclusion, or force a conclusion cor- 
responding to the argument. 2. We must also 
know that such a series of facts are so related and 
arranged as to bring out a new fact, or an intelli- 
gent result ; otherwise, they may lead to confusion. 
But in this way the mind may become capable of 
bringing to light, or of disclosing new truths, and of 
forcing new and important conclusions. 3. In every 
correct process of reasoning there are three things, 
as will be given in the following section, which must 
claim our attention. 



SECTION IV. 
1 . We must know the premises to be correct or 
true. If not, we can not proceed correctly ; and if 
there is any doubt in regard to this, we should prove 
the premises true, if susceptible of proof. 2. The 
truthfulness of the premises being established, the 
chain of reasoning, it may be, consisting of numer- 
ous distinct facts, arguments, propositions, or steps, 
must all oe true within themselves, and correspond 
in respect to the same premises, and so connected 



252 REASONING. 

that one step in the argument becomes an essential 
part of the premises of the subsequent one, till the 
entire argument is completed. All the interme- 
diate steps, from the premises to the conclusion, 
must be carefully examined and known to be cor- 
rect. 3. With caution in the preceding steps, the 
conclusion or result will be easy and natural ; but 
we must know that such conclusion is a legitimate 
result of the preceding argument, corresponding to 
the correct force, natural existence, condition, or in- 
fluence of the truths which have compelled such a 
result or conclusion. 4. The reasoning power dif- 
fers or varies in the minds of different persons. 
Some have great difficulty in connecting their 
thoughts, and more trouble in connecting realities 
in a process of reasoning, or in argumentation. 
We will now notice the origin or manner in which 
some of these differences or variations arise. 



SECTION V. 
1. They may arise from the pressure or inactivity 
of the physical organs, in connection with which 
the mind holds intercourse with the things of the 
external world. The mind, with all its faculties, is 
affected by the pressure or imperfect organization 
of the corporeal powers. Doubtless there is not so 
much difference in the natural power of different 
minds, as there is in the physical mediums through 
which they are developed, or are manifested ; but 
we will speak of this in another place. 2. Much 
defends ujpon the manner of information stored 
away in the mind. Knowledge is not only power, 



REASONING. 253 

but the acquisition of it implies, first, mental 
strength or ability to receive it ; and, secondly, that 
there has been much exercise and discipline of the 
intellectual powers in order to acquire knowledge ; 
therefore, the mind is capable of greater cogency 
and correctness in argumentation. 3. The power of 
correct reasoning depends very much upon atten- 
tion and the judgment. Progressive reasoning 
evolves new facts, attention places them under the 
inspection of the mind. The judgment discrimi- 
nates and decides upon their appropriateness and 
truthfulness. 



SECTION VI. 
1. Mathematical reasoning has been regarded as 
being superior to mental reasoning, from the fact 
that there are fewer intermingling or connected con- 
tingencies, and we have not so many things to as- 
sume. This, in part, is true; but we are not pre- 
pared to admit that mathematical propositions, or 
demonstrations, are worthy of as much confidence 
or belief as those which are mental or moral. 2. 
If, in numerical reasoning, nothing is assumed or 
taken for granted, in regard to the truthfulness and 
existence of premises, upon which the reasoning is 
founded ; and if all necessary assumptions are few, 
contingent, and easily freed from intricacy, yet the 
power of knowing and of receiving these as true 
realities, is found connected with and in the intui- 
tive power of the mind. We know nothing of math- 
ematical facts, or reasoning, only as the power con- 
nected with, and existing in the intuitive elements 

22 



254 REASONING. 

of the mind receives, or introduces us to them, and 
thereby they are known to us as realities. 3. No 
fact, tested by the power, or received through the 
medium of the senses, can be known as real and 
true only as the internal, intuitive power of the 
primary elements of the mind enables us to receive 
and to know them to be such. It is this power 
alone which enables us to know that the axioms 
which are the foundation of all mathematical calcu- 
lations and demonstrations, are self-evident truths; 
for no reason can be offered proving them to be 
either true or false ; yet the superior, intuitive 
power can receive them as true independently of 
all proof. 4. Internal mental or moral reasoning 
can not be said to be of remote origin, and received, 
in whole or in part, through intercepting mediums ; 
but our knowledge of such is direct, present, and 
experimental. We may be deceived in testing ex- 
ternal truths through the medium of the senses ; for 
the correctness of the sensations thus experienced 
by the mind depends upon the health and activity 
of the physical nerves, or organs, which come in 
contact with such external things. Diseased nerves 
often are the means of deception in regard to cor- 
rect mental states. A diseased optic nerve often 
gives origin to the perception of something which 
is only a spectral illusion. He who depends with 
more confidence upon the truthfulness of that which 
is made known to him through the medium of the 
senses, than he does upon intuitive power and ac- 
tion, by which the senses are made efficient, and 
are regulated and corrected, should either study to 
know himself more perfectly, or be consistent, and 






REASONING. 255 

deny the existence of all things. It is far more 
reasonable to deny the existence of all external 
things, the knowledge of which we receive through 
the medium of the senses, the physical organs of 
which, being diseased, often deceive us, than it is to 
doubt the action or operations of the internal, intu- 
itive power of the mind, forming a part of con- 
scious experience and present knowledge. 



SECTION VII. 
1. Our confidence in the power and accuracy of 
mental reasoning will be increased by our confi- 
dence in mathematical reasoning, knowing the supe- 
riority of the former over the latter. In mathemat- 
ical arguments, or reasoning, if we have any doubt 
as to the process, or conclusion, we have only to 
turn back to the premises, and build the argument 
again, guarding against any improper step, and 
divesting the same of all obscurity and doubt ; and 
if there is any doubt of a proposition which is as- 
sumed as the result of preceding steps, a review of 
those steps, in the demonstration, or argument, will 
enable us to detect any thing that is wrong, and to 
approve of it when corrected. 2. "When we see that 
all the terms used are clearly defined, and all doubt 
being removed from them, we regard the conclusion 
as inevitably correct. 3. If the true objects of nu- 
merical argumentation or demonstration be quantity 
and its relations, it is certain that an acute atten- 
tion and precision, in regard to the correctness of 
each step in the whole process, will render doubt in 
regard to its correctness impossible. In defining, or 



256 REASONING. 

in determiniDg the correctness of the various steps 
or facts used, or to be involved in any process of 
reasoning, requires the presence and action of the 
judgment. We are guided and progress by the 
power of reason, under the inspection and decisions 
of the judgment, in regard to that which is adapted 
in nature or qualities. 



SECTION VIII. 
1. Demonstrative reasoning is that kind of rea- 
soning which is used to probably a greater extent 
among the masses of intellectual beings than any 
other, progressing from cause to effect, or from 
premises to the conclusion, showing, or proving, 
by clear and certain evidence, the result. It is a 
power demonstrating or connecting the truths of a 
process, rendering or forcing a correct conclusion 
with clearness and certainty. 2. Investigative rea- 
soning is that kind of disquisition which involves 
the idea of vivid, keen, and penetrating mental 
powers and action ; and it is that kind of progress- 
ive mental action which forces its way into hidden 
fields of realities. It searches minutely, bringing to 
light new facts, which may evolve others connecting, 
or adding them into appropriate in cursive chains, 
rendering such dormant treasures the conquest of 
research and imperishable knowledge. 3. False 
investigative reasoning may take place or exist when 
the acknowledged primary facts are untrue, either 
in whole or in part, or in their conditioned combina- 
tion or relation. The inductions, or processes of 
arguments, may be incorrect in some way, and the 



REASONING. 257 

conclusions may not be legitimate or natural results. 
False reasoning may take place as noted in the 
order of the following section. 



SECTION IX. 
1. False reasoning may take place by assuming 
premises or propositions which are incorrect within 
Ithemselves, or which are not naturally adapted to 
the conclusion desired. 2. By assuming a prop- 
osition asserted to be a conclusion of some previous 
process of reasoning, without examining such former 
process, or knowing it to have existed, and to be 
true or correct. 3. By confusing the distinctiveness 
of each step in the connected links or chain of rea- 
soning, thoroughly rendering a change in position 
possible, and without detection. 4. By commencing 
the argument at some point far removed from the 
premises. 5. By petitio principii, or begging the 
question in assuming a principle which amounts to 
the same thing to be proved, or which may vary 
slightly in some almost imperceptible way. 6. By 
assuming a principle, and then wandering off, rea- 
soning on many contingent things, till they can be 
combined together, from which the reasoning com- 
mences, without any connection with the first as- 
sumed principle; or by reasoning in a circle, in 
assuming a principle, and employing it to establish 
some other reality or facts, which fact or facts are 
used to prove the first assumed principle. 

22* 
■ 





258 - REASONING. 



SECTION X. 
1. False reasoning may arise by means of the 
sophistical use of terms and analogies in principles 
assumed, all of which can be corrected by careful 
examination. 2. Reasoning may be rendered more 
efficient and more capable of performing its work 
with increased exactness, by attending to the re- 
peated efforts in pursuing arguments, and guarding 
against all contingencies which should not be con- 
nected with the chain, or process of its immediate 
action. 3. Reasoning may be influenced improp- 
erly by an impure motive. This will so bias the 
efforts of the mind as to cause more than a due pro- 
portion of attention to be bestowed upon those 
things most intimately connected with some conclu- 
sion designed or desired, while real facts, naturally 
adapted to the argument, receive such a slight pro- 
portion of attention as to be finally lost from the 
argument, or have no special influence. 4. Preju- 
dice will affect reasoning so as to distract or destroy 
its accuracy ; for in this way opinions are formed 
before the subject has been investigated or exam- 
ined. Such previously-formed opinions will often 
bias the process of our reasoning when we are un- 
conscious of the fact. Before we are fully aware of 
what is passing in the mind, our reasoning power 
may be in search of facts to establish the truthful- 
ness of those previously-formed opinions, and the 
correct process of argumentation lost sight of, or 
that has been departed from ; but the principal 
ground of departure is that of a willing and ma- 
licious choice; and when we determine to pursue 



REASONING. 259 

a wrong course, though our consciences may revolt 
at it for a long time, yet perseverance will finally 
lead to uncertainty, and a bewildered stupor and 
inactivity, from which a return and recovery is 
almost impossible. Reader, if you would start right, 
and remain or continue in a right course, never pre- 
judge the subject of your inquiries, and never dare 
to act according to or with an improper or vitiated 
motive! Let motive be pure forever. 



Division #;is|l| 



CHAPTER I. 

DREAMING. 

SECTION I. 
1. Dreaming is having thoughts, notions, or ideas 
in or during sleep. They may arise in connection 
with only one subject, or we may experience a series 
of thoughts or moral impressions. Under the above 
heading we shall define that which may be called 
mental dreaming; and, in another place, we will 
define moral dreaming, as there are two kinds 
clearly distinct in nature. 2. It may be regarded 
as wholly involuntary / for we often experience im- 
pressions, or ideas, which arise in the mind, of an 
unpleasant nature, or those which are revolting to 
us, but have no power to divert our notice of them, 
though we experience an effort to effect such a 
change. At times the effort made in resisting un- 
pleasant impressions, and the apprehensions of ap- 
proaching fear, are such that we are aroused from 
slumber; but the mind retains a vivid knowledge 
of what was passing, or had been the object or 
objects of its anxiety and action. 3. We not only 
experience the presence of impressions and ideas or 
thoughts, but they associate, or are combined, to a 
certain degree, and often they succeed each other in 
260 



DREAMING. 261 

regular trains of thought, and we have seemingly 
no control over them. 4. That the mind is im- 
pressed or affected by dreams, or visions, in this 
way, and that it experiences the presence of real 
thoughts, and ideas of real entities and events, is 
beyond the possibility of doubt. A great variety 
of different trains of impressions or ideas occur, and 
some of them are so indelibly impressed on the 
mind as to be remembered for years. 5. Dreaming 
is common to all persons; yet some dream much 
more frequently than others. But very few have 
ever asserted that they have never experienced any 
thing of the kind. Those who think they have 
never dreamed may have dreamed, and the mind be 
unable to recall them in their waking hours. The 
natural inclination of the mental powers to be in 
motion always, and independently of the co-opera- 
tion of the physical system, shows the superiority 
of mind over matter, and strongly argues its imper- 
ishability. 



SECTION II. 
1. Mental dreaming, as a general rule, arises in 
the mind, or is one of those states which take place 
in sleep, immediately following and corresponding 
with those facts, or subjects, which were the objects 
of mental action previous to the slumber in which 
such ideas arise; but the manner in which trains 
of ideas arise is mysterious. Recent occurrences 
and recent mental states may be connected, or have 
some relation to that which is passing through the 
mind, or is impressed upon it in the hours of sleep. 



262 DREAMING. 

The hearing of some sad news, or the witnessing 
of some horrible event, are often followed by dreams, 
in which the different items, as they were ma > 
known, or were witnessed by us, reappear to ' 
mind ; but not often without some change, or the 
absence of some thing, and the addition of others. 
2. They are not always immediately successive to 
preceding events or facts. Under the influence of 
dreams we may be impressed with realities, or have 
ideas revived, which took place years before, and 
even of things which had been forgotten ; and, in 
our waking hours, we can often recall the percep- 
tions which the mind had in dreams of facts or 
events which are to come, of which we have never 
had knowledge before ; yet the real occurrence of 
such things can not be regarded as certainly coming 
to pass, from the fact that we had such dreams ; 
they may or may not occur. 3. Mental states of 
mind, which take place under the influence of 
dreams, are not to be depended upon as true pre- 
ludes of things to come. They are mere circum- 
stantial or casual states, which can not be regarded 
as positive evidence that those things made known 
in dreams will ever occur, or that their opposites 
will come true. They are worthy, perhaps, of 
no more confidence than the notions which arise in 
a flighty mind, under the influence of delirium, 
caused by an intense or high fever ; but impressions 
of moral dreaming, or visions, are worthy of confi- 
dence, and are to be depended upon as being in- 
tended for our instruction in some way. 4. Perhaps 
the principal or most important truth we derive 
from the existence or occurrence of mental dream- 



DREAMING. 263 

ing is, that the mind is active within itself and in- 
dependently of the ftody; and if it can act while 
the body is inactive under the power of sleep, which 
is typical of temporal death, we are left to infer 
that, as it thus acts, and is ever acting, it can act on 
or continue to act when the body is silent in death. 



SECTION III. 
1. Dreaming may, in some degree, be caused by 
physical debilitation. On careful observation it has 
been ascertained that dreams are pleasant or revolt- 
ing in proportion to the strength and health of the 
body. In good health, the occurrences which are 
experienced in the mind, while under the influence 
of slumber, are apt to be of an agreeable or pleas- 
ant character ; and if we are verging to an attack, 
or the influence and power of disease, we are apt to 
rest imperfectly in sleep, and our dreams are oppress- 
ive and generally of a disagreeable character. 2. 
The character of dreams often vary with the laws 
of anatomical departments, or localities, which are 
affected by disease; and they may vary with the 
kind of disease. The different ways in which the 
nervous system is affected has some corresponding 
influence upon the mind, and this may be connected 
to those mental states which occur in sleep. When 
the physical system is reduced Dy dyspepsia, the 
mind is apt to be filled with gloom, so that its ac- 
tion, whether we are awake or sleeping, is of a mel- 
ancholy character. If the nerves are excited by 
fever, the action, whether in dreams or in waking 
hours, will be quick, with an uneasy influence, or 



264 DREAMING 



tiich 



unpleasant sensations. 3. Bodily sensations, which 
have been once experienced in such a way as to 
make a lasting impression upon the mind, may be 
recalled, in part, if an object of similar qualities, or 
properties, be brought in contact with the physica 
nerves, during slumber, that affect them in giving 
rise to the first sensations experienced. If the body 
in slumber becomes chilled with cold, we often 
dream of winter, or of the sufferings of others, or 
of self with cold. If burning with fever, the mind 
is apt to dream of sufferings from a hot sun or room. 
If we experience an acute pain while sleeping, we 
are apt to dream of similar sufferings as endured by 
others or ourselves. 4. When realities or events are 
presented to the mind under the influence of dream- 
ing, they appear directly opposite to what they are, 
in fact, but corresponding with the natural inclina- 
tions or desires of the soul in waking hours. The 
poor man dreams of receiving a vast amount of 
wealth ; he who can not compose, dreams of writing 
poetry or a book : the man who can not express his 
thoughts, dreams of speaking with great fluency; 
but an orator seldom ever dreams of delivering a 
discourse with freedom. The eloquent extempora- 
neous speaker generally dreams of being embarrassed 
in addressing an assembly ; so there is no general 
rule or uniformity in the order or character of 
dreams. 



SECTION IV. 
1. There is no fixed law of conformity or of 
agreement in relation to dreams ; for there is great 



; 



DREAMING. 265 

disagreement and contradiction in dreams. Such 
thoughts are often disconnected and desultory. 
These irregularities are not corrected by reason, 
judgment, and the exercise of the senses, in regard 
to definite truths and settled laws in external things ; 
and those mental powers which have a correcting 
control over the mind, are partially suspended. 2. 
Though the power of the senses is suspended, and 
the principal faculties of the mind appear to be in- 
active, in many respects, yet our conception of reali- 
ties, or events, while under the influence of sleep, 
appears to be vivid and strong. The power of sug- 
gestion and comparison appears to be also in lively 
exercise. ]STo sensations affect the mind through 
the medium of the senses : hence, the mind attends 
to the objects of conception. This may account for 
the tenacity of the mind in recalling that which ap- 
pears to be real in our dreams. 3. Old associations 
and facts that have been forgotten, are often called 
up or revived in dreams, so that they become the 
objects of thought again in our waking hours. It is 
utterly impossible to account for their origin, or re- 
occurring upon any fixed principle or definite law. 
That such things have and do take place is experi- 
mental knowledge, but to assign any certain cause 
is impossible. 4. We are now prepared to go still 
further, and say that we may have facts revealed to 
us in dreams of which we have never had any con- 
clusive knowledge. Students have been known to 
work till late at night at propositions in mathemat- 
ics, and have retired to rest without solving the dif- 
ficulties in regard to them ; but when under the 
power of sleep the whole difficulty, or difficulties, 

2?> 



266 DREAMING. 

have been clearly solved in a dream, and, on wak- 
ing, with joy they have placed all the work down on 
paper correctly, and without any trouble. 



SECTION V. 
1. Our conceptions of the length of time occupied 
in dreaming appears to be of very long duration, 
when, in fact, it can only extend to but a few min- 
utes. A chain of events may pass through the 
mind in one dream which would require many days 
in reviewing them, but on waking we discover that 
it has been the work of a few minutes ; yet our 
dreaming conception of it would appear to have 
continued months. Such conceptions appear to be 
present as real ; and our successive thoughts, ac- 
tions, or that which is noticed or experienced in our 
dreams, appear to employ very much time and de- 
liberation, when, on being suddenly wakened, we 
ascertain that we have been slumbering only a few 
minutes. This is evidence that the mind can and 
does act in sleep, and that such action is, in reality, 
far more rapid than it is in our waking hours : for 
that which is experienced, or passes through the 
mind, at certain times, within ten minutes, would 
require a whole day to review in our waking hours, 
or state. If the action of the mind, without the 
immediate use of the senses, is increased, we may 
infer that its capacity and power of action, when 
freed from the inertness connected with the nature 
of the physical system, will far transcend all com- 
prehension and thought in regard to such action. 
2. Mere mental dreaming is often regarded as true 






DREAMING. 267 

when some feature or fact thus experienced happens 
to come to pass by casual, or even by natural causes. 
When we dream of events taking place, of great 
variety, and for a long continuance of time, it is not 
unlikely for something to occur corresponding to 
some event, or fact, of which we had conceptions in 
a dream. The mere occurrence of such a fact, or 
facts, will recall that part of our dream, the remem- 
brance of which tends to strengthen our confidence 
in the truthfulness of them. These mental states 
may be affected, or may be the result of disease or 
of some kind of physical debilitation ; but that 
which occurs corresponding to something realized in 
dreaming, becomes the object of special mental ac- 
tion, while perhaps a thousand other facts, or events, 
contained in dreams, pass unnoticed in our waking 
hours, not being recalled by facts corresponding to 
them. 3. Dreams vary with different individu- 
als. Some persons never dream of objects they 
have never seen, while the reverse is true with 
others. There is another class who never dream of 
tastes, smells, or sounds, only as the presence of 
these to the slumberer are the occasion, or are, in 
part, the cause of such corresponding dreams ; but 
there are others again whose experience differs. 
Some persons, after the loss of their sight, never 
dream of seeing objects; so that there appears to be 
retained in the mind, while under the influence of 
sleep, at least a partial sense of defects which may 
exist in connection with the senses, in apprehending 
or in knowing realities or facts of the external world. 
4r. Dreaming conceptions are not confined to old 
conceptions. Under the influence of slumber, poets 



268 DREAMING. 

have composed parts of poems, and, in their waking 
hours, have written out the same. The logician has 
unraveled mysterious things, and concluded his ar- 
gument correctly ; the mathematician has concluded 
his demonstration ; and the linguist has seen how to 
translate a difficult passage. 



SECTION VI. 
1. Breams may have existed in the mind, of 
which there is no recollection in our waking hours. 
Persons often talk in sleep without being conscious 
of any thing of the kind in their waking hours. It 
is clearly evident that such conversation is the re- 
sult of dreaming, yet it can not be recalled. This 
may account for the opinion of many persons, who 
think they never dream. They may dream, but not 
be able to recall them in their waking hours. 2. 
The loss of power \ in dreaming over the succession 
of our thoughts, is probably the most striking pecu- 
liarity connected with the phenomena of such men- 
tal influences or states. We may dream of trying 
to rehearse some facts, or chain of facts, connected 
with some general principle or subject, and lose the 
connection, or wander away from the desired course. 
While the chain of facts, or ideas, are passing 
through the mind, it is not unlikely that the general 
subject, or some important truth came up, when the 
thoughts wandered, in the absence of power to con- 
trol them, and that, too, while there is an internal 
conviction or impression that the regular process of 
investigation, or of examination, proceeds undis- 
turbed ; yet we can discover that we have some 



DREAMING. 269 

power at times, and by an effort, to check our 
thoughts to some extent, and to direct them again to 
the desired object, though this power is not apt to 
be of long duration. 3. It is useless to try to define 
the causes of dreams. The best we can do is to 
regard them as varying with the many and myste- 
rious influences connected with the phenomena of 
mind. Each person can best determine the cause 
of such mental influences, or states, by carefully 
attending to his own experience in regard to them. 
All the facts connected with the phenomena of 
dreaming are evidences that mind is ever active 
and imperishable. 

23* 



270 CLAIRVOYANCE. 



CHAPTER II. 

CLAIRVOYANCE. 

SECTION I. 
I. Clairvoyance does not properly belong to this 
work, and should not receive this brief notice, were 
it not for the fact that it has been regarded, by 
many, as being an essential part of the phenomena 
of mind. 2. It is the clear-sightedness of the mind 
in perceiving, or in apprehending facts or events, 
without the aid of the senses, as a medium, in whole 
or in part, in arriving at a knowledge of such facts, 
or events. This is, in reality, closely connected with 
dreaming, though it appears to take place further 
removed from any internal controlling power gov- 
erning it. This ulterior process appears to occur 
when we are under the deepest influence of Sonmus, 
and when the senses are entirely inactive to external 
affecting causes, so far as can be determined. 3. It 
is a power attributed to persons in a mesmeric state, 
of perceiving, or of discriminating objects or reali- 
ties not present with, nor objects of the action of 
the senses. To define such a power and its action, 
or to give bounds to it, we regard as a work more 
properly belonging to beings more perfect in knowl- 
edge, and cogent in thought, than we are, or ever 
expect to be in this world. 4. Such a power does 
not appear to be common or naturally connected 



CLAIRVOYANCE. 271 

with earthly intelligences, in the proper existence 
and relationship which characterizes them. How- 
ever natural it may be to the action of spirit within 
itself, or abstracted from the inertness of bodily 
organs, yet such action is not common to the masses 
of intelligences, or, if so, we are unable to recall 
such action in our waking hours. 



SECTION II. 
1. If such a power does really exist in connection 
with some minds when it is unknown to others, or to 
the great majority of persons, we can not account 
for its existence as an essential element of spirit, or 
any thing superadded to one that is withheld from 
another; therefore, the only rational way we have 
of meeting the subject is, that such differences 
depend upon some peculiarity in the physical or 
nervous constitution, which is connected with the 
mind's developments and action. The nerves are 
connected with the brain, and are so inseparably 
connected with the sensations experienced in and 
by the mind, that mental states may be affected by 
them ; and we know not how far such states may 
vary or correspond to the peculiar sensitiveness, 
condition, or influence of the nervous system. 2. 
Sow far or to what extent the doctrine of clairvoy- 
ance is true, we shall not determine ; but we shall 
claim the privilege to say that too much faith or 
belief in such things is deceptious and dangerous, 
and it adds no essential truths to knowledge. For 
the mind, with confidence, to dwell long in such a 
field, and to become all absorbed in exploring what 



272 CLAIRVOYANCE. 

seems, in its imagination, to be therein contained, is 
to advance midway from a world of reason to that 
of insanity. 3. That a simple state of clairvoyance 
may be experienced by some minds connected with 
a peculiar nervous constitution, or system, is neither 
unnatural, nor a new reality or truth, in the exist- 
ence and bounds of scientific research. Such per- 
sons are so naturally constituted that they can be 
affected by mesmerism, anxiety of mind, fatigue, or 
disease, so as to have some kind of stupor over the 
action of the senses, and, at the same time, they 
experience some kind of perception of things which 
can be the objects of mental action. This is no 
new theory, either in reality or the investigations of 
science. It is as old as this kind of peculiar nerv- 
ous constitutions. It is natural with the nervous 
sensitiveness of some persons, though the perverted 
use that is often made of it, in the necromancy and 
feats performed in the world, is deceptious, tending 
to absurdities and ruin. 4. So far as any person 
has a natural disposition and tendency to such men- 
tal states as may be included under the meaning of 
clairvoyance, it is innocent / but when an inten- 
tional perversion takes place, it becomes wickedly 
absurd or sinful. No one can be so operated on by 
another as to reveal facts of the spirit- world beyond 
the limits of its personal identity, or mental re- 
sources and action. 



SOMNAMBULISM. 273 



CHAPTER III. 

SOMNAMBULISM. 

SECTION I. 
1. This is the act or practice of walking in sleep. 
In dreaming the mind acts, but the somnambulist 
walks abroad, or has power voluntarily to move 
from place to place while under the influence of 
sleep. This singular affection differs from dream- 
ing. Simple dreaming involves only the action of 
the mind, while somnambulism includes the affec- 
tion and action of the physical powers in connection 
with mental inclinations and action. 2. It differs 
from dreaming as to the exercise of the mind. The 
mind may be fixed upon its own impressions, or 
ideas, which are passing under its inspection, but 
there appears to be less power in recalling such an 
exercise in our waking hours than there is to recall 
the substance of dreams. There are but few if any 
somnambulists who can ever recall the fact of walk- 
ing in sleep. As a general thing they never have 
the slightest knowledge, in their waking hours, that 
ever such an occurrence took place, or was the result 
of their own action. 3. The same appears to be 
true in regard to talking in sleep. There is, per- 
haps, not one case out of a thousand where persons 
who are in the habit of talking in sleep, ever have 
the slightest knowledge of such a fact from any 



274 SOMNAMBULISM. 

action of their own minds, though it is highly 
probable they are dreaming, or the mind is acting 
in some way all the time. 4. The first degree of 
somnambulism, with some persons, is an inclination 
to talk in sleep, though others are not known to 
talk. The former often rehearse what is passing in 
the mind, and frequently that which was not in- 
tended to be known. If this propensity increases, 
we may expect them to walk during sleep. A 
friend of mine intentionally lodged in the same 
room with a man who was in the habit of walking 
during sleep, intending to follow him. About mid- 
night the somnambulist arose, W T alked down stairs, 
passed out at the door, took a path across the field, 
crossed a water course on a high log, not touching 
the hand-pole, and without either stooping or paus- 
ing. In this way he could not pass over in his wak- 
ing hours by daylight, yet he passed on without 
any difficulty ; then turning into a dark valley, he 
ascended and seated himself upon drift wood. In 
a few moments he returned, by the same way, to his 
room and bed, and knew nothing of the occurrence 
on the next morning. 



SECTION II. 
1. Somnambulism differs from dreaming, in the 
power which the action of the mind has over the 
muscles and the nervous system, whether such men- 
tal action or volitions can, in any way, be recalled 
in our waking hours or not. Dreams appear to be 
real in the mind of any one, and the same appears 
to be true in regard to that which is passing in the 



SOMNAMBULISM. 275 

mind of the somnambulist. The additional power 
is added in, and by which he can and does put his 
physical powers in motion. A servant in the south, 
during sleep at night, often responds to his master's 
call, on his return home, takes his horse, waters him, 
puts him in the stable, feeds him, and fastens the 
door, returns to bed, and knows nothing of the trans- 
action on the next morning. He has often, under 
the influence of sleep, gone to mill, then returned to 
his bed, and had no knowledge of it in his waking 
hours. 2. Another peculiarity is, that in sleep the 
senses and muscles appear to be powerless and inact- 
ive ; but in somnambulism the latter is active, while 
the former is inactive. This can not be defined 
unless it exists in connection with that peculiar sen- 
sitive class of nerves connected with the muscles, 
and not with the senses, being affected in some way, 
and in such a manner as to invoke or induce an 
effort of the muscular powers under the influence 
of mental volitions. In this way the senses may be 
powerless, while muscular action is a natural result; 
and persons often perform hard labor, or travel a 
long distance, without having experienced percep- 
tions of any thing which they can afterward recall. 

3. The absence of fear is another peculiarity con- 
nected with somnambulism. The somnambulist can 
go where he could not in his waking state without 
fear or loss of life. They have been known to pass 
out of windows and climb up on the tops of houses, 
and, in an erect posture, walk narrow joists or beams 
of timber from twenty to forty feet above the ground. 

4. The strength of the investigative power seems to 
be more vigorous under the influence of somnambu- 



276 SOMNAMBULISM. 

lism than in waking hours. While under its influ- 
ence students have finished tasks which they had 
given up in despair on going to sleep. Some have 
composed poetry which they failed to accomplish 
before ; others have solved propositions which they 
could not do in their waking state. 



SECTION III. 
1. A very singular phenomenon is sometimes wit- 
nessed in the presence of paroxysms, which come on 
in the daytime as well as at night. At times they 
are preluded by a singular sensation or noise in the 
head, but frequently they are xperienced without 
any warning. The mind seems to be abstracted 
from external impressions, yet there is no apparent 
difficulty in conversing about that which is passing 
through the mind at the time of such conversation, 
so that they could narrate correctly events which 
they could give but an imperfect account of when 
freed from such paroxysms. 2. Some persons are 
totally unconscious of any external thing; others 
can hear and answer questions. There have been 
instances given where persons have, while under the 
paroxysm, conversed readily in Latin, which they 
could not do at other times. 3. A contingent fea- 
ture of this affection has been referred to as being 
produced by an attack of somnolency. In recover- 
ing from one attack, persons have lost all literary 
knowledge ; but in recovering from the second at- 
tack, all the lost attainments have been restored, 
and thus alternating for years. 4. It would almost 
appear that, under such paroxysms, the mind or 



SOMNAMBULISM. 277 

spirit has some kind of sight and perception inde- 
pendently of the senses. Philosophers have given 
instances of persons who have had their eyes closed 
while under the paroxysm, and bandaged with many 
thicknesses of black silk; yet they could read and 
answer questions in regard to distinct objects cor- 
rectly, and in regard to some things which they had 
never seen before. We know of no way to explain 
this, unless in proportion as the soul is abstracted 
from the bodily organs, the more perfectly its powers 
are developed, and the more correctly is its action. 
5. Whatever there may be that is strange or novel 
in the preceding part of this chapter, yet it should 
be borne in mind that all these facts go to show that 
mind can act without the body, from which it is 
reasonable to believe in its superiority, and to infer 
its imperishable nature or its eternal duration. 
24 



278 MESMERISM 



CHAPTER IV. 

MESMERISM. 

SECTION I. 
1. By mesmerism we understand animal magnet- 
ism, or the existence of a peculiar kind of sleep, in 
which the mind is active, though the mesmerized 
person appears to be unconscious of external objects. 
The mind is active within itself, or in regard to 
something specially passing within itself, while all 
external things are lost sight of or are precluded. 
2. The act of mesmerizing is that of affecting the 
body in different ways, so as to produce a species or 
kind of sleep, while the mind retains its activity 
and power. This is no new discovery in scientific 
research and knowledge. Long has it been known, 
and it has and does exist, in reality, in the very nat- 
ural constitution of some persons. 3. A constitu- 
tion which is capable of being mesmerized is almost 
the same as those which come under the influence 
of somnambulism. It is natural to some constitu- 
tions, and all such may be mesmerized ; but a dif- 
ferently-constituted person can not be mesmerized. 
The mesmeric susceptibility is connected with a pe- 
culiar condition or nature of the nervous system, 
and never can be imparted to one who has it not ; 
yet the influence or power of disease might effect 
such a change, or condition of the nerves, as to 



MESMERISM. 279 

render a person capable of being mesmerized who 
had no natural disposition to it. This constitutional 
or natural affinity to mesmeric affection, or influ- 
ence, can be affected or produced by external agen- 
cies or causes, which are neither marvelous nor un- 
common ; but there is a mystery in the nature of 
such a constitution, which, like many other things, 
can only be fully comprehended in the future world. 
4. There are hut very few persons, if any, who are in 
the habit of talking or walking in sleep, while in 
health, but what can be mesmerized ; yet this can 
not be done contrary to the will or permission of the 
subject. 5. Some subjects, under the influence of 
mesmerism, are wholly unconscious of external 
things, while others are not, but have not immediate 
power to break the influence. Mesmerizers claim 
that the former class can be operated upon by will, 
in commanding them to do as they please, while the 
latter class can resist only in part. It may be that 
persons, being mesmerized, go into that state with 
the mind almost entirely directed to the operator, 
and when a stupor comes over the power of the 
senses, the mind still having liberty to act, and the 
operator being the object of the mind, he may have 
more controlling power over it than any other per- 
son, and more than would seem natural ; but there 
is far more contained in the assertions of such 
agents than there is in the facts as they are. 



SECTION II. 
1. In this way it has been maintained that the 
truthfulness of phrenology has been established by 



280 MESMERISM. 

the action of the mesmerized person, corresponding 
to the nature of the organ touched by the operator ; 
but this is no proof, if what the mesmerizer claims 
is true, that subjects can be operated upon by will ; 
for he knows what organ he intends touching, and 
what kind of action he expects. This being fixed 
in his mind would be that which he would will : 
hence, the action of the subject would correspond to 
the will of the operator. "With all the obscurity 
and doubt of the correctness of this conclusion, yet 
that spirit can thus operate upon spirit is far more 
reasonable than to believe a mere physical organ of 
the head can possess within itself spiritual rational- 
ity sufficient to act. If spirit can act as spirit, why 
may it not act without involving the inert existence 
and medium of the skull. The truthfulness of phre- 
nology can not be established by mesmerism whil 
mind and matter are dissimilar and divisible. 2 
If the somnambulist becomes lost to every thing bu 
that upon which his mind is intently fixed, and if 
he has power to walk abroad in obedience to any 
internal inclination, may not a person, on being 
mesmerized, become unconscious of every thing in 
regard to the action of the senses, yet be controlled 
by the thoughts of the mind, which still cluster 
around the existence and will of the operator, so as 
to be thus influenced in some way ? But deceptions 
in regard to these things are far more probable than 
conjectures in favor of such mysteries. We men- 
tion them only to induce investigative thought, 
while the student is left to form his own conclusions. 
3. There are persons who, under mesmeric influ- 
ences, are partially sensible of what is passing, but 



3" 

I 



MESMERISM. 281 

are unable to move from any position they may be 
placed in, though they may try to do so. By a 
well-tried effort, some of them have succeeded in 
breaking the influence, as they have testified. 4. 
There is another class which appears to be uncon- 
scious of every thing, yet they will respond to ques- 
tions, or walk, if ordered to do so. This may be 
accounted for upon the same principle that a person 
continues to converse with another in sleep. "When 
some individuals begin to talk in sleep, they will 
answer almost any question asked. In this way 
confidential truths have been revealed. But to 
fully explain such phenomena must be the work 
of each one who thinks upon the subject. 5. 
Though this constitutional or natural tendency to, 
or susceptibility of mesmeric states, can not be 
defined, yet we can but believe, to some extent, in 
its mysterious existence ; but, when properly viewed, 
it contains no more mystery than dreaming or som- 
nambulism. This far we may go in safety; but the 
idea that men may send the spirits of others to 
distant worlds, or have the facts of the spirit-world 
revealed by them, is not only absurd, but tends to 
ruin. Finity has no such power. 
24* 



PHRENOLOGY. 



CHAPTER V. 

PHRENOLOGY. 

SECTION I. 
1. Phrenology proceeds upon the supposition 
that the brain is the organ of thought and passion ; 
that the science of the human mind is inseparably 
connected with this supposed organ; and that the 
different powers of the mind may be determined 
principally by the size and shape of the head, to- 
gether with the undulations of the skull, embracing 
the position and condition of such undulations. As 
to the general features, or outline of phrenology, we 
would file no very special objections ; but when we 
come to define and settle the divisions of the organ, 
we are plunged into darkness and confusion. 2. 
The size and the general appearance of the head, 
together with the expression of the eye and the 
countenance, are important in forming a correct 
judgment in regard to the mind. Doubtless more 
is indicated by physiognomy than is by phrenology. 
The expression of the countenance, as a general 
thing, is more important in deciding upon the 
strength and character of the mind, than all that 
can be gathered from the different sections in crani- 
ology. 3. There are several important points to he 
settled^ and to be acknowledged as true, before the 
philosophy of mind, with its well-tried chain of 



PHRENOLOGY. 283 

truths, can be supplanted by it. We do not regard 
the doctrine of phrenology as being sufficiently in- 
terwoven with mental science to require an exten- 
sive analysis : hence, we shall refer briefly to only a 
few facts in connection with it. 



SECTION II. 
1. The truths which support the doctrine of phre- 
nology must be sufficiently clear and strong to show 
that it is, in fact, a science ; but no two writers have 
entirely agreed, in every respect, in regard to the 
localities of the different organs, as indicated by the 
peculiar shape of the skull, which, according to 
phrenology, is essential to the existence of such a 
theory or doctrine. 2. It must be demonstrated 
without a doubt, that the brain is, and is wholly, the 
organ of the mind, otherwise the cranium might 
deceive us ; and as all the nervous matter in the 
entire system is of the very same properties as that 
of the brain, and is, to some extent, and in some 
way, connected with it, there might be some diffi- 
culty involved in locating the organ of the mind. 
3. Phrenologists should first prove that the brain is 
the organ of the mind, and then they must agree in 
locating the different powers or faculties of the mind 
according to the exterior surface of the skull, and 
especially those locations should be made and be 
defined without doubt, which have so long been the 
objects of doubt and contention among different 
writers. An intelligent world will expect these 
questions of doubt to be settled before they will 
consent to regard such a system, as a whole, con- 



284 PHRENOLOGY. 

sistent with reasoD, or that it is true science. 4. It 
must be clearly shown how the skull bone, which is 
inert within itself, is better adapted to the develop- 
ment of the various influences and powers of an 
immaterial nature, than such a nature would be to 
develop its own powers and action. 5. If we ad- 
here to the exactness of phrenological claims, it 
must be demonstrated, according to general uniform- 
ity, that each undulation on the external surface of 
the skull has a concavity corresponding to it on the 
inner surface of the skull, answering to the different 
lobes of the brain, which lobes have been assumed 
as being the basis respectively from which the ac- 
tion of the various powers of the mind are elimi- 
nated; but this is impossible. 6. There should be a 
clear showing, or proof, that the brain does really 
contain lobes, or protuberances, as has been assumed, 
and just a sufficient number to correspond with the 
different powers and affections of the mind ; but the 
almost imperceptible waves of the brain can not be 
called lobes, as is set forth in the doctrine of phre- 
nology. 



SECTION III. 
1. Should such lobes exist as organs of the differ- 
ent powers of the mind, it would appear that they 
would have to exist in immediate contact with the 
skull, so that the external surface would indicate the 
size and strength of such organs thus manifested ; 
therefore, no vacuum, or space, could exist between 
the brain and the skull without confusing the defi- 
nite location and action of the various mental pow- 



PHKENOLOGY. 285 

ers. But there is a vacuum, or space, between the 
brain and skull which severs the connection between 
the two, and renders it impossible to trace the con- 
nection between the external surface of the skull 
and the brain at any time, without taking into the 
account the changes under different circumstances. 
2. Philosophers agree that the train may be re- 
garded as the organ of the mind by reason of the 
wise order in the arrangement of infinite wisdom, 
and not that it is or can be the organ of the mind 
from its peculiar essence, or natural qualities ; for 
in this case the whole nervous system would be the 
organ of the mind, as it is connected with the brain, 
and contains precisely the same essence, or proper- 
ties, when analyzed. 3. The idea that the mind is 
wholly dependent upon the nature and condition of 
the physical organs, in order to be manifested, or 
for the character of its action, is absurd; for we 
have already seen that the mind can act without the 
bodily organs, and when the senses are locked up, 
or their power is suspended by sleep. 4. The doc- 
trine of phrenology, when not sufficiently guarded, 
often misleads the mind. In some instances it has 
given origin to tendencies which have resulted in 
the worst forms of infidelity, by and in which it has 
been assumed that all the sufferings of both body 
and mind are the results of imperfect physical or- 
ganization, and that the fall of man affects only the 
physical powers, by and through which the mind 
acts. If this be true, and it is possible for us to 
have any consciousness of guilt or sin, then that 
which tests this fact must be matter, and when the 
body dies all our consciousness of guilt must perish 



286 PHRENOLOGY. 

with it. This would result in the doctrine or idea 
of annihilation, which is false. 



SECTION IV. 
1. The physical organs, being inert within and of 
themselves, they have no power to comprehend the 
knowledge of suffering, and report the same to the 
mind, in order that it may be known. Matter can 
never originate intuitive mental convictions and 
feelings of our lost estate ; for it is by the existence, 
presence, and self-action of innate mental elements 
that we can have any knowledge of the capability 
of the body to suffer, or that it ever has experienced 
pain. 2. While the reasonableness and truthfulness 
of the outlines of phrenology are acknowledged, yet 
we are unable to admit the more peculiar specific 
doctrines connected with it, and all we can do is to 
receive that which is correct, and reject the incor- 
rect, or that which is false. The same cause will 
not affect every person in the same way. 3. Inju- 
ries received upon the head often affect some power 
of the mind, and an injury received upon a certain 
organ affects one mind very differently from the re- 
sult the same cause would produce upon another 
mind. The same organ in kind may be affected on 
different heads, and the results are not similar; but, 
in most instances, they are very different. The 
same organ in the same head may be affected by a 
blow, at different times, without producing similar 
effects upon the mind ; therefore, it is impossible to 
locate the different organs from the similarity in the 
effects realized. 4. Different portions of the brain 



PHRENOLOGY. 287 

may be diseased without affecting the mind corre- 
sponding to the office, nature, and action of the 
organs thus affected. A lady has been mentioned, 
one half of whose brain was completely paralyzed 
by disease, yet the faculties of her mind were per- 
fect, notwithstanding the destruction of one half of 
the cerebral organs. A man has been mentioned, 
who retained the right use of all his faculties up to 
the moment of his sudden death, and on opening 
his head it was discovered that suppuration had 
destroyed the whole right hemisphere of his brain. 
Though one half of his cerebral organs were de- 
stroyed, yet his mind was not affected. Operators 
testify that they have removed, in a similar way, as 
much as a half pound of matter found in the brain, 
when the mind did not appear to have been affected 
up to the time of death. 



SECTION V. 
1. We learn, from different experiments, that large 
portions of the brain have been often removed with- 
out destroying the exercise of the mental faculties. 
A man has been mentioned, whose head had been 
so injured that a large portion of the right wing of 
the os frontis was removed, suppuration had taken 
place, while at each dressing, for over two months, 
the matter discharged brought with it large quanti- 
ties of the brain ; yet he retained the right use of 
all his faculties to the time of his death. 2. Instan- 
ces have been given, in cases of fracture of the 
skull, when large portions of the brain have been 
removed without the slightest injury to the minds 



288 PHEENOLOGY. 

of the persons thus suffering. These facts are con- 
clusive evidences that different organs in the brain 
can be entirely destroyed without marring the cor. 
rect action of the mind. 3. How can this be ac- 
counted for upon the principles of phrenology f 
There is only one way of escape, so far as can be 
determined at present ; that is, when the organs on 
one side of the head are destroyed, we have to as- 
sume that there are double organs, and those on the 
other side correspond to those lost. But this is only 
assumption, as it can not be based upon any pri- 
mary principle of phrenology. 4. While the gen- 
eral principles of phrenology may be regarded as 
true, yet we are unprepared to adopt it in lieu of 
mental philosophy, as the latter has been long es- 
tablished upon true principles, attested by almost 
any amount of experiments and facts known to be 
true. 



$ifrm0tt Hint]}, 



CHAPTER I. 

REFLECTION. 

SECTION I. 
1. Reflection is the act or operation of the mind 
by which it turns its views, or thoughts, back upon 
itself or its operations. Memory is the power by 
which past thoughts or events are retained, com- 
manded, or recalled ; but reflection is the power by 
which the thoughts are turned back upon them- 
selves, or upon past events or facts. 2. By this 
power our thoughts may be thrown back upon the 
past, or upon that which is absent. In this way the 
field of past events can be entered, and diligent 
search instituted, in regard to facts which are de- 
sired to be used by the mind in forming combina- 
tions, or in tracing relations and associations of 
truths. 3. Reflection is involuntary, when it takes 
place without any willing or intentional effort ; and 
the prominency of some truth or fact, under its ac- 
tion, may, in its relation to other things, give rise to 
repeated action in many different ways, while there 
is an internal desire or inclination to direct the mind 
to some other object, or in some other way. 4. It is 
voluntary when we pause the action of the mental 
powers, and throw back our thoughts in search of 
25 289 



290 REFLECTION. 

some express object, or for some special purpose ; 
and in connection with this is the exercise of the 
judgment, and the presence of reason. 5. It is con- 
nected with the power of reason, but more inti- 
mately is it connected with the power of remember- 
ing past perceptions, and past mental acts or proc- 
esses, so that they can be compared with present 
facts, feelings, and inclinations as experienced by 
the same sentient being. It traces the laws by 
which the processes of mental action are governed, 
regulated, and known. 



SECTION II. 
1. While the mind, by the power of reflection, is 
canvassing and considering past events or realities, 
there is called into action the power of memory, 
comparison, and judgment, which give rise to new 
states of mind, and new trains of thought. 2. In 
connection with these, there arises certain internal 
convictions, and the exercise of an intuitive belief 
in the existence of external and internal realities. 
They are embraced by, or are objects of the under- 
standing, without being connected in any chain of 
reasoning. Here the action of the mind rests upon 
facts or elements which are original, or enter into 
our natural constitution. These primary truths are 
prominent when we are under the influence of care- 
ful reflection. 3. Under the process of reflecting, 
we are confident that we experience an internal con- 
viction and belief that we are real existences, and 
that we possess cogitative minds, with powers supe- 
rior to materiality. 4. While the action of the mind 



REFLECTION. 291 

is paused to give place to mature and deliberate 
reflection, there arises, in connection with the mind's 
intuitions, a conviction of the truthfulness of the 
report of the senses, and the power to believe in the 
reality of external things. 5. The importance of 
reflection is invaluable. It leads to the safest and 
most effectual preventives of evil, and enables us 
to take, in due time, the necessary steps to avoid 
danger and ruin. 



292 CONNECTION OF MIND AND MATTER. 



CHAPTER II. 

CONNECTION AND INFLUENCE OF THE BODY UPON 
THE MIND. 

SECTION I. 
1. The mysterious union of mind with matter can 
never be denned in this life so as to leave no doubt 
in regard to the subject; but the fact that such a 
union exists is knowledge which can not be doubted. 
The soul is the life of the body, and the body with- 
out the soul is inactive and lifeless, or dead. 2. 
Temporal death has power over and terminates the 
life of the body ; but it has no annihilating power 
over any of its essential elements, as we have no 
evidence that any thing of either matter or mind 
can or will ever cease to be. 3. The effect which 
temporal death has upon us, so far as we can under- 
stand, goes no further than to destroy the ties of 
affection which unite the two natures in one, decom- 
posing and scattering the elements of our physical 
nature, while the soul has, in one sense, experienced 
freedom from the inertness of earthly organs. 4. 
Temporal death can have no power over the soul's 
being, or in limiting its power of action in any 
possible way. 5. It can have no destructive power 
over either intuitive or acquired knowledge. True 
knowledge will ever live in the imperishable soul, 
and nourish in immortality. 



CONNECTION OF MIND AND MATTER. 293 

SECTION II, 
1. Intellectual action can be rendered imperfect 
by the disorders, frailties, and imperfections of the 
human body. All these affect the 'developments of 
mind, and give origin or influence to mental states 
contrary to its ordinary principles, and in violation 
to the laws of its natural constitutional organization 
or existence. 2. We can not have conceptions of 
mind within, and of itself, as being capable of ever 
deviating from correctness, in all its processes, at- 
tended with uniform harmony: hence, all its voli- 
tions of uniformity in action are wholly attributed 
to the effect or influence of the physical organs upon 
them. We are not to conclude that, because the 
strong-minded young man becomes forgetful, blind, 
and deaf in old age, his soul or mind is dying, or is 
becoming powerless on its journey to annihilation. 
Speak of the occurrences of early life, and they are 
fresh in his memory. Apply the optic to his eye, 
and he can see ; with the ear-trumpet he can hear. 
All these facts are evidences that the internal power 
is not lost, but is trammeled by increasing bodily in- 
firmities. 3. It is impossible for us to believe that 
an idiot will be lost in the future world, for he is in- 
capable of doing an intentional wrong from knowl- 
edge ; and it is equally impossible that an idiot 
should exist an idiot in heaven, for as such he could 
not answer any wise purpose or design of his Crea- 
tor ; but it is reasonable to believe that when his 
deformed body suffers the paralyzing touch of death 
his soul will be free, and possessed of rational pow- 
ers, in the right use of which he will ever love and 
25* 



294 CONNECTION OF MIND AND MATTEE. 

adore the Author of unending bliss. 4. The mind, 
in some instances, under the influence of bodily in- 
firmities, revolts from its natural uniformity of ac- 
tion, and violates the laws by which its processes 
have been regulated. In seeking for the causes of 
this, we need go no farther back than the diseases 
and deformities of the body. It is impossible to 
describe the variety of ways in which the bodily 
organs are affected by disease, or to trace from a 
cause a corresponding effect upon the mind; but 
that the mind can be, and is affected by such things, 
is too plain to admit of any doubt. 



SECTION III. 
1. The physical system, when advanced in years, 
or is under the infirmities of age, does not affect the 
internal operations of the mind as it does the medi- 
ums by and through which it holds intercourse with 
external things. The internal mental states and 
processes can take place, or be carried on, without 
any special reference to the external world, and con- 
sequently they are not dependent upon the external 
senses. The physical organs may be so diseased 
that the external senses become incapable of proper 
discrimination or action, but the internal elements 
and operations of the mind remain vigorous and 
active, though the earthly house of this tabernacle 
is being dissolved. 2. The influence of disease will 
and does affect the action or operations of the mind, 
whether the individual thus affected be advanced in 
life or be possessed of the vigors of youth. Many 
persons, on recovering from violent attacks of fever, 



CONNECTION OF MIND AND MATTER. 295 

or other diseases, lose their memory so that they can 
not recall past events. Others can not calculate, 
and some individuals can not recognize their nearest 
friends. These influences generally pass away in a 
short time with young persons of vigorous constitu- 
tions, while some older persons never recover en- 
tirely. 3. The mind may be affected or excited by 
affecting influences upon the nervous system. That 
which produces acute pain, as is experienced in am- 
putating a limb, or in piercing the nerve of a tooth, 
will arouse the mind to its utmost capability of ac- 
tion. More soothing effects are produced by the 
application of gases, or other strong stimulants. 
These show the connection of mind with matter, 
and the influence which matter has upon mind. 4. 
Intense excitement of the mind has a very great in- 
fluence upon the body. Sudden fright or imminent 
danger will often shake the whole nervous system, 
and in some instances death has ensued. Cases 
have been mentioned, where persons suddenly ex- 
posed to danger have been so affected that the hair 
of the head has become white in a short time ; oth- 
ers fall sick immediately, and often go deranged, or 
sink into the embrace of death. 



SECTION IV. 
1. Excited imagination and conceptions often ex- 
ist in connection with hypochondria. Instances are 
referred to where persons assert that they have real 
conceptions of fearful-looking beings, and of awful 
calamities just about to take place; others imagine 
that they are sick with some special disease, or that 



296 CONNECTION OF MIND AND MATTER. 

they have become deformed. A man has been 
mentioned, who imagined that his nose had become 
so enlarged that it filled his bedroom, and that 
there was not room for the door to open in order 
to admit any person to render him assistance with- 
out afflicting his nose, and causing insupportable 
pain. He was relieved by a man blowing through 
the keyhole for the purpose of driving away the 
inflammation. On opening the door gradually, he 
pretended to reduce the inflammation by an appli- 
cation of ointment till he advanced to the bed. 
Then he succeeded in persuading him that his nose 
was cured, upon which the invalid rose and walked 
about. 2. Another man has been referred to, who 
imagined that he had two small black dogs in his 
stomach. His physician failing to correct his sup- 
position, proposed vomiting as an effectual cure. 
When the invalid raised to vomit the second time, 
the physician, before laying him back to rest, dis- 
closed two small black dogs, exclaiming, " Here 
they are !" It is stated that the sick man, on seeing 
them, lifted his languid eyes, thanking Heaven that 
he was freed from them. 3. An instance is recorded 
of a man, who imagined himself to be really dead. 
His physician, finding it impossible to change his 
mind, proposed burying him. He was placed in a 
coffin, and sentinels were stationed along the road 
to make unpleasant remarks. As the procession 
moved on, the first sentinel cried out, " Who have 
you got there?" On being answered, he continued, 
"O, happy thing he is gone!" This seemed to have 
some effect upon the invalid. The second cried out, 
"Who have you there?" On being informed, he 



CONNECTION OF MIND AND MATTER. 297 

continued to say, " We are all glad he is dead ; he 
was a great scoundrel ; pity he had not died years 
ago." At that the invalid mutteringly remarked, 
" If I was not dead I would pay you for that." The 
third cried out, " Who is dead ?" On hearing the 
name, he responded, " Good ! I have no doubt but 
that he is gone to destruction ; the devil has his 
own at last." At this the dead man bounded from 
his coffin, and pursued the sentinel through the 
streets. These only show how the mind can be 
affected by its connection with a diseased body. 
The mind within itself is rational. 



298 APPARITION! 



CHAPTER III. 

APPARITIONS. 

SECTION I. 
1. Apparitions are only another source of evi- 
dence, showing the connection and influence which 
physical organs have over mental states. Such ap- 
pearances, or visibilities, are mere appearances, and 
are opposed to realiiy. Persons often speak of see- 
ing angels, or individuals who are absent from them. 
Others suppose they see ghosts or spirits of departed 
friends. That angels can and have been seen, in 
ages past, we do not doubt; and we know of no 
well-grounded reason why spirits may not reveal 
themselves to us in this age of the world ; yet such 
things never were common or frequent events, and 
we have no well-grounded reasons why they should 
appear now. It is much easier for us to be deceived 
in regard to such things than it is to be not deceived ; 
but by repeated efforts the mind may become pos- 
sessed with excited conceptions, and it become com- 
mon for us to speak of seeing spirits, or persons who 
are distant, with the utmost confidence, when there 
is no reality in regard to such things, and we are 
laboring under a delusion. 2. These may be caused 
by the effect and influence of disease upon the eye. 
All that enters into the composition of the eye is 
more or less affected by disease. The transparent 



APPARITIONS. 299 

properties are liable to change, so as to present the 
appearance of objects which do not exist. It can 
be discovered that a change in the appearance of 
the outer divisions of the eye have taken place 
while the person is under the influence of severe 
disease, or after their recovery. 3. Disease often 
affects the nerves and delicate cords by which the 
eyeball is directed, or is moved, so as to cause a 
quick or an irregular motion, presenting objects 
which, at the time can not be accounted for. 



SECTION II. 
1. The effect produced upon the retina, or optic 
nerve, is the greatest cause of deception, giving rise 
to perceptions of objects as real, which do not exist 
at the time the perception is experienced by the 
mind. Violent attacks of fever, or some other dis- 
ease, often produce a morbid sensibility of the 
retina, or optic nerve. This fact can be arrived at 
with safety from that which is experienced by per- 
sons under the influence of disease. The organ of 
the visual sense is far more perfect in health than it 
is when diseased, and it is not a difficult task to 
mark the variations of its power passing under the 
influence of different kinds of disease. 2. If dis- 
ease has power to change the form or condition of 
the eye, or diminish its power in any way, this may 
cause a change in the direction of the rays of light 
upon the optic nerve, and cause appearances as real 
where they do not exist. 3. Internal mental excite- 
ment may have power to change, in some way, the 
retina, or optic nerve, in whole or in part, so as to 



300 APPARITIONS. 

give origin to perceptions of existences which have 
no present or real being. This would suppose self- 
power with nervous constitutions to affect the optic 
nerve, by sudden alarm or excitement, so as to give 
origin to the notion of entities where they do not 
exist; and as such changes belong to the physical 
system, and as such perceptions, through the me- 
dium of the visual sense, are not intentional or vol- 
untary, that which is seen and thought to be real, 
which, in fact, has no existence, is at first received 
with the utmost confidence, and often requires a 
strict exercise of reason in correcting the perceptions 
arising in this way. 



SPECTRAL ILLUSIONS. 301 



CHAPTER IV. 

SPECTRAL ILLUSIONS. 

SECTION I. 
1. Spectral illusions may be regarded as being 
of more importance than is proper or right. Those 
who are accustomed to such illusions have, as a 
general thing, the utmost confidence that the beings 
they see are real, and that they themselves can not 
indulge any doubt in regard to such things as being 
true. A man of our acquaintance, who gives evi- 
dence of being a good man, and truthful in all 
things, has given accounts of frequently seeing 
angels and the spirits of his departed friends, and 
of his conversation to them, with as much solemnity 
and confidence as he has in believing in his own ex- 
istence ; yet he never could succeed in getting any 
answer to his inquiries from them. 2. An instance 
has been recorded of a man who was advanced in 
life, possessed of a good or sound mind, and having 
enjoyed good health, in the latter years of his life 
he had almost daily visitations from spectral forms. 
These forms or figures generally appeared as human 
beings. The forms often varied, but the counte- 
nances appeared to be the same. He could see 
them at different times, and with his eyes either 
opened or closed. By pressure on his eyes, they 
disappeared ; yet, when they were present, their 
26 



302 SPECTRAL ILLUSIONS. 

appearance was pleasant, and their features were 
clear and distinct. Any stimulant or excitement 
increased the number of those visitors. By exam- 
ining this history, we have no difficulty in ac- 
counting for these spectral beings, as any thing 
which excited him produced the presence of those 
existences. His constitution was so easily affected, 
that the optic nerve was influenced by the same, 
and forms appeared which had no existence. 3. 
Irregular and sudden dreams may lead to the same 
kind of deception. It is not unfrequently the case, 
that persons studying intensely on some subject, or 
after the mind becomes weary in pursuing some 
train of thought, suddenly to fall asleep for a mo- 
ment, without being sensible of the fact, the mind 
uninterruptedly perceives its succession of thoughts. 
Some persons, or figures, appear in a dream ; the 
person starts suddenly, with the impression that 
what he saw was real, and, losing sight of the 
intermediate state of slumber, he believes that that 
which has been seen is real. It is frequently the 
case, that when persons thus suddenly dream of 
some alarming appearance, on waking they will re- 
alize, for some time, a view of the same thing, and 
in probably the same place they dreamed it was. 
This may be caused by excited conceptions in con- 
nection with the influence the startled mind has 
in affecting the optic nerve. 4. Some feeble con- 
stitutions, when in solitude, with the busy world 
closed out from the mind, and the existence of ex- 
ternal things seemingly separated from the senses, 
experience such intense mental impressions and 
conceptions that, after a brief space of time, such 



SPECTRAL ILLUSIONS. 303 

conceptions of things, or of forms, have been so 
vivid that, under the action of memory, they are 
called up as real, and they become objects of belief, 
and are finally reported as real occurrences. A 
case is recorded of a man, who had heard of the 
sudden death of an intimate friend, which caused 
great agony of mind. At night that friend ap- 
peared before him. All the particular peculiarities 
of his features and dress were distinctly presented 
to his view, and on advancing toward him, he ap- 
peared to melt away in the air. This may be ac- 
counted for by the visual organ being affected or 
influenced by the excitement of the mind on that 
subject. There are natural causes for all these 
things, if carefully examined, or, at least, such as 
will be satisfactory to the mind; yet it is impossible 
to explain away all the mysteries connected with 
the most simple existence in nature. But the idea 
of specters and phantoms can create more excite- 
ment in the world than the mysteries connected 
with real existences. To say that angels or disem- 
bodied spirits can not, under any circumstances, be 
seen by earthly intelligences, is only to make an 
assertion without either reason, evidence, or facts in 
science to support it; but that which we are con- 
tending for is, that no one should place any confi- 
dence in the real truthfulness of phantoms and spec- 
ters which can be so easily accounted for on natural 
principles, or from that which may be styled natural 
causes. 



304 SPECTRAL ILLUSIONS. 

SECTION II. 

1. Images or persons, which seem to appear to 
individuals influenced out of the ordinary way, 
either physically, or by the effect of excited minds 
upon physical organs, seldom speak or answer any 
questions ; but, in some instances, they are reported 
as having conversed. There is a case recorded, 
where a man, mourning over the loss of his wife, 
who had been the victim of sudden death, realized, 
as he thought, while in deep study, the door of his 
room open. The form of his wife reappeared, and 
informed him that she had entered into rest, and de- 
sired him to prepare for the same happiness in the 
future. The specter could have been the result of a 
change in the visual organs, while the language he 
thought she spoke might have originated in a dream 
of which he was not sensible, the mind being in- 
tensely exercised at the time. 2. There is further 
proof that spectral illusions will arise in connection 
with intense mental excitement. A case of this 
kind has been mentioned, in regard to a man who, 
at one time, thought he was about to be wrecked at 
sea. He maintained that he distinctly saw, during 
the greatest danger, his family in the same perilous 
condition, though they were distant. Men who have 
fallen from buildings say that almost the entire 
prominent scenes and events of their lives rushed 
through their minds ere they reached the ground. 
3. Though the majority of spectral illusions can be 
accounted for in some way, yet no reasonable mind 
will deny but that there are cases recorded, if they 
be true, which no philosophical argument or research 



SPECTKAL ILLUSIONS. 305 

can account for in a clear and satisfactory manner. 
A case has been given, and attested as true, of a 
man who was seated in a worshiping congregation, 
who suddenly shrieked out with great intrepidation, 
rising to his feet, steadily looking toward the stand, 
and exclaimed, "Do you not see the minister clothed 
in a shroud?" In a few minutes the minister, who 
had not yet arrived, came, entered the stand, and 
preached. Before the next Sabbath he was dead, 
and in his grave. If this be true, what rule in met- 
aphysics can solve the mystery % 4. The use of an- 
odynes and opiates is often the occasion of giving 
rise to spectral illusions. Instances have been 
known where persons have taken opium, and, while 
under its influence, without having fallen under the 
influence of sleep, and perfectly conscious of all that 
was passing, the form of some friend, about whose 
safety they had great concern, appeared to their 
visual organ of sense, and, though knowing at the 
time that it was only a mere phantom, yet they 
could not banish it away. We can but conclude 
that spectral illusions have their origin in connec- 
tion with the condition of the physical organs. 



SECTION III. 
1. Nyctalopia, in its various forms, exerts no an 
nihilating power over the mental elements, but ex- 
hibits a peculiar acuteness and power of the visual 
organ, by which the sensibility of the optic nerve 
must be very much increased. This is only another 
evidence that the optic nerve is capable of various 
changes, and that the presence of spectral illusions 
26* 



306 SPECTRAL ILLUSIONS. 

depends upon certain influences affecting the retina, 
or optic nerve. If the eye was perfect in all its 
parts, and free from the power of disease, it would 
be free from the presence of phantoms, or specters. 
2. The brain can be easily affected by erroneous im- 
pressions while the body is under the influence of 
disease. Errors which at one time have been re- 
ceived as real, are apt to return in affliction and 
excite the mind. The disease, in connection with 
these mental emotions, tending toward the brain, 
increases the confusion and sight, and at times the 
hearing becomes influenced or changed in some way 
so as to deceive us. 3. Those who are approaching 
epileptic fits, often are troubled with the appearing 
of phantoms or specters. The evidence of a man 
has been recorded, who says that the prelude to the 
paroxysm with him was, the appearing of a peculiar, 
looking human being, who struck him on the head ; 
then the paroxysm commenced. This specter was, 
no doubt, caused by the effect the approaching at- 
tack had upon the brain and eyes. 4. The influ- 
ence of febrile diseases upon the peculiar sensitive- 
ness of some constitutions, may be regarded as oc- 
casions of the origin of spectral illusions. A case 
has been given, where a man thus affected, while 
under the influence of a violent pain in the head, 
distinctly saw his family in the room, who were, at 
that time, three thousand miles distant. A lady 
has been mentioned, who, under the influence of 
severe illness, saw her father, at different times, 
come into her room, and speak in his natural tone 
of voice, though he had not been there at any time. 
The records of the past contain any number of 



SPECTRAL ILLUSIONS. 307 

cases, varying in some respects ; but they establish 
the fact that diseased physical organs have an influ- 
ence over the mind. 5. A too highly-excited im- 
agination may lead to a belief in existences as 
real when they are not. An excitable mind, when 
aroused, will and can imagine fearful sounds, or the 
footsteps of an enemy approaching. They see some- 
thing in the distance, which appears to draw near; 
and as it appears to come, it enlarges with more 
perfect form, till the beholder is so terrified as to be 
awed or overcome with fear. 6. The sense of sight 
is not the only one of the senses which can be af- 
fected by disease. All the senses can be so influ- 
enced as to lead to deception. The ear can be so 
affected that we can have conceptions of sounds as 
real which never existed. Taste may lead to decep- 
tion. The sense of smelling may deceive us, and 
the same is true of feeling. 7. All these facts show 
that our knowledge, which we receive through the 
medium of the senses, can be rendered uncertain, as 
these organs can be so easily affected by disease ; 
but our internal knowledge of the existence of self 
can not be doubted, as we do not depend upon any 
physical elements in arriving at the certainty of such 
knowledge, or in knowing that we do really exist. 



308 SPIRIT-KAPPING. 



CHAPTER V. 

SPIRIT-RAPPING. 

SECTION I. 
1. Necromancy, though not intimately or closely 
connected with mental science, yet it has been in- 
volved with mental phenomena, for the purpose of 
adding importance to the office of modern teachers, 
or those who would be gifted in enchantment or 
conjuring. It is styled, or called, the art of reveal- 
ing future facts or events. There is a pretended 
medium, or means of communication, with the dead, 
or with minds disembodied. Philosophy knows 
no rule, or way, by or in which finite and disem- 
bodied spirits can convey words or ideas to us, 
only through the medium of the senses. This 
would require that such spiritual agencies should 
be tangible, and if tangible why not visible? 2. 
Spirit-rapping may be called a delusion. That 
some peculiar nervous constitutions may be af- 
fected in a way mysterious to the individuals 
themselves, and to others, is perfectly correct; but 
that such physical constitutions are, or can be, the 
medium of other finite spirits in communicating 
facts to us from the spirit-world, is contrary to the 
laws of both mind and matter, and must be absurd. 
3. Persons who style themselves mediums may be 
sincere in not understanding why the physical or- 
gans have an involuntary action, and often contrary 



SPIRIT-RAPPING. 309 

to their wish. The delusion is not in the fact that 
such action takes place, but it exists in the fact that 
their excited minds refer the cause of such action to 
spirits, when it is natural to their peculiar nervous 
constitutions. The difficulty is that they do not 
understand the peculiar sensitiveness which is natu- 
ral to the frailty of their own physical systems, 
where the cause of motion, by which mediums write 
or convey their messages, exists. That palsied man 
can not tell why he shakes contrary to his will ; yet 
he knows that it is even so. He might attribute 
such action to spirits with as much propriet}' as a 
medium can refer to them — the motion by which his 
hand writes. The mere turning of the mind of a 
nervous person to the thought that they are moved 
by spirits, will startle them, and cause involuntary 
action. If they can keep their own excited spirits 
from rapping out thoughts by accidental marks, or 
their own intentional thoughts, they will not be 
likely to ever be troubled by the spirits of others. 
4. If it is right for finite spirits to communicate 
future events to us after they have left the world, 
why is it done in such an obscure way, and with so 
much doubt or imperfection? It is reasonable to 
suppose that such knowledge is perfect, and that it 
should be conveyed correctly; then why should they 
move a nervous arm to write it out with irregular or 
accidental motions ? If it is right that they should 
send important messages to earth, it has always 
been so ; then why have the spirits of dear departed 
friends been so idle and careless in this respect, dur- 
ing the past ages of the world ? 



310 SPIRIT-RAPPING. 



SECTION II. 

1. That disembodied spirits can reveal facts, or 
ideas to us, must be either true or false. If false, 
further argument would be useless ; but if true, then 
those privileges and communications must be either 
right or wrong. If right, they are not only per- 
mitted, but take place according to the will and 
purposes of Deity. If these things are ordered of 
Heaven, they must be right in his sight, and ar- 
ranged for the good and happiness of this world's 
inhabitants. All means employed by infinite Wis- 
dom for the happiness of this world's inhabitants, are 
adapted to all ages and all circumstances connected 
with our race ; therefore, such messages would not 
have been delayed for the discoveries of modern me- 
diums, and without any special regard to the moral 
character of such agents. 2. If these things be or- 
dered and sent by the divine Being, the object must 
be pure and holy, and all connected influences and 
operations must correspond in purity and holiness. 
Then, none but holy beings can reveal such messages, 
or be mediums for pure spirits. None but good mes- 
sages can be sent, and such as are calculated to do 
good to man, and cause him to glorify God. 3. 
Therefore, according to all our ideas of infinite pu- 
rity, and the holiness of good spirits, it would be ut- 
terly impossible for such spirits to communicate 
to any on earth but pure and holy mediums. 4. 
The character of all such messages must not only 
be pure, but they must correspond with truth as it 
is evidenced in the works of nature; and they must 
agree with the volume of revelation, and in no case 
deviate from its truths. 



SPIRIT-RAPPING. 311 

SECTION III. 
1. But if the tidings thus revealed be impure, or 
contrary to these sources of truth, we have a right 
to suspect that the medium is bad, or is vile in heart; 
and if this be true, the spirit which moves or influ- 
ences such an unholy medium, must be vile or 
wicked within itself. 2. If such a spirit is from 
Satan, or from under his influence, we have a right 
to question its declarations, as Satan would not have 
any truth published to us, as that would thwart his 
own interests and purposes. Then, if such tidings 
be from an evil source, and calculated to lead to de- 
lusion and misery, the less we have of such news the 
better it will be for the world. We have a right to 
doubt the correctness and truthfulness of such things, 
as we have no evidence that the Lord ever intended 
to instruct the world in this way. 3. This view of 
the subject would compel us to believe in, and to 
be much influenced by what has been called demon- 
ology. This would comport with the intimations of 
some of the alchemists of England, who profess to 
have borrowed much of their skill, in turning com- 
mon metals into silver and gold, from Satan. We 
know not what or how much power Satan may 
have over wicked men, in regard to such things, but 
one thing appears to be certain, that tidings calcu- 
lated to do good, and from a pure source, never could 
come from an unholy medium. If spirit-rappings 
be true, we have no evidence that they could be 
either ordered or blessed of Heaven. 4. As these 
things have been improperly connected with mental 
phenomena by many writers, we can only add that 



312 SPIRIT -RAP PING. 

the philosophy of mind knows no principle or action 
of the mind, abstracted from the peculiar sensitive- 
ness of physical organs, which is capable of forming 
a basis for such spiritual revelations. 



CONCEPTIONS BOEDEEING ON INSANITY. 313 



CHAPTER VI. 

EXCITED CONCEPTIONS BORDERING ON 
INSANITY. 



SECTION I. 

1. We understand by excited conceptions those 
conceptions which arise, or take place, in connection 
with an excited nervous system and vivid or highly- 
wrought mental states. An unnatural excitement 
of mind depends very much upon the proper organ- 
ization and health of the physical powers. A de- 
fective organized physical nature often impedes the 
development of mind, in certain respects, and is the 
occasion of the mind acting too powerfully in other 
ways or through other organs more perfect. This 
leads to extraordinary developments of mind in 
certain respects, or in regard to certain degrees 
of strength, while there is almost a total deficiency 
in regard to other qualities or powers. A mind 
blessed with an extraordinary memory is apt to 
be deficient in judgment. Often when strong or 
certain extraordinary gifts or powers are pressed 
a little too hard, or with severe efforts, the phys- 
ical organs, through which such action is made, 
give way, or become paralyzed, so that a state 
of insanity, or of partial insanity, is the result. 2. 
A mind with unusual power of action, connected 
with a frail, nervous system, which is gradually 
sinking by disease, may overpower the strength of 

27 



314 CONCEPTIONS BORDERING ON INSANITY. 

the physical organs, with which its action is con- 
nected, and become bewildered with excited con- 
ceptions till the system becomes paralyzed, and the 
mind either inactive or incapable of rational life. 
3. The strong physical constitution may retain its 
strength, while some organ essential to the right use 
of reason may become diseased or prostrated by 
some extraordinary mental effort, leaving the mind 
to wander amid the wilderness of excited concep- 
tions, and the imaginations of things that exist 
only in phantom. 4. General debility ', caused by 
disease, often produces excited conceptions, or a 
wildness of thought, which disqualifies the mind for 
usefulness ; yet general debility, caused by disease, 
seldom affects or exists in connection with all the 
organs of sense in the same way, or to the same de- 
gree. An important law in regard to disease is, its 
sympathetic tendency to the weakest physical organ. 
Those physical organs connected with the more pow- 
erful influence or action of the mind, are apt to be- 
come fatigued or weakened; then, in a low state of 
health, they are the concentrated objects of disease. 
This tends to affect the mind, producing excited con- 
ceptions, wildness of thought, stupor, or delirium. 



SECTION II. 
1. We can not conceive that the mind, abstractly, 
or within and of itself, is capable of either excited 
conceptions or of delirium y for these affections can 
exist only in its connection with the body, otherwise 
delirium or idiocy might exist on forever, which is 
absurd. 2. Excited conceptions, connected with the 



CONCEPTIONS BORDERING ON INSANITY. 315 

sense of sight, may vary in degrees of strength, in 
different minds, without any perceptible variation 
caused by disease. The ardor of the mind, in con- 
nection with a vigorous imagination, may give rise 
to excited conceptions of things and events as real. 

3. Such conceptions may arise in connection with 
some emotion of spirit or mental excitement. Great 
anxiety of mind in regard to some approaching event, 
or the arrival of a dear friend, who has been long ab- 
sent, may bias the mind. With what fondness the 
eye traces the road till the track is lost in the dis- 
tance! Ever and anon we imagine we see an object 
approaching, and if some one should appear, we 
can imagine the features of our friend, till the short- 
ened distance checks our hope with disappointment. 

4. The excitement of great joy often gives rise to 
excited conceptions, and we see things very differ- 
ently, for a short length of time, from what we do 
ordinarily; and it is frequently the case that we 
have conceptions of things which were not present 
at the time, and we are deceived in regard to mag- 
nitude, qualities, and form. 5. The effect produced 
by grief or despair appears to so affect the mind 
as to almost hang the earth in mourning. Under 
such influences we have conceptions only of scenes 
or facts, like those we have just witnessed; and as 
the thoughts pioneer the road of misfortune, we have 
vivid conceptions of series of calamities, which be- 
come the principal objects of mental action. 



SECTION III. 
1. Though the principal cause of excited concep- 



316 CONCEPTIONS BORDERING ON INSANITY. 

tions of sight may be found in the effect and influ- 
ence which disease exerts upon the visual organ 
and the ~brain, an instance is recorded of a man, 
whose physical organs were so affected, that for 
months, in his waking hours, he saw passing through 
the field of vision the forms of men, women, ani- 
mals, and birds. Under all such exciting influ- 
ences, the mind is only advancing to a midway 
condition between a rational "state and that of insan- 
ity. Too much excitement has a destructive influ- 
ence upon a well-balanced mind, and much more 
destructive upon those not so well guarded. 2. The 
mind is capable of excited conceptions, in connec- 
tion with sound. These take place in connection 
with great mental excitement. Many cases are 
given where persons, having conceptions of human 
forms, have, in connection with them, conceptions 
of sound, as they not only hear them speak, but re- 
hearse that which they say ; yet excited conceptions 
of sound are common with some persons, when there 
is nothing of the kind takes place in relation to the 
sight. "When the mind is abstracted from the world 
at large, and pursuing some train of thought, or is 
in silent meditation, it is apt to be suddenly startled 
by some singular sound, as that of music, the hum 
of a wheel, or that of a voice speaking or calling. 
The peculiar excitement of the moment increases 
the vividness of the excited conception, and that 
which seemed to be heard becomes an object, or 
objects, of belief. 3. Many instances are given in 
history, where men, on the eve of some great event 
or daring expedition, have their minds so intensely 
excited that they suddenly rouse and cry out, " Who 



CONCEPTIONS BORDERING ON INSANITY. 317 

called me?" We know not why excitement may not 
affect the auditory nerve as well as the optic nerve. 
Disease which affects the head can, and often does, 
give rise to excited conceptions of sound. These 
are evidences that internal operations of the mind 
are more to be depended upon as true than the cer- 
tainty of that which is reported to the mind through 
the medium of the senses. 4. It is remarkable how 
acute the hearing of persons becomes under the in- 
fluence of a severe fever. They are often troubled 
with conceptions of what was said ; and when they 
appear to be delirious for an hour or two, yet they 
can recollect, in moments of relief, a part, if not all 
that was said, when it was thought by those who 
spoke that they were not conscious of what was 
passing. Often, in conversing so low in the room 
of sick persons that the parties themselves can 
barely understand each other, the sick can hear and 
understand all that is said. May we not infer from 
this that, though disease and death may affect the 
body, yet the soul remains vigorous in power of 
action evermore? 



SECTION IV. 
1. Excited conceptions^ in connection with the 
sense of touch, are not so common or important as 
those which have been already noticed; yet, under 
the influence of disease, it is not uncommon for 
conceptions to be experienced in regard to the cause, 
location, and character of such afflictions, which are 
deceptious. A certain individual, under a lingering 
disease, became established in the belief that he 

27* 



318 CONCEPTIONS BORDERING ON INSANITY. 

could feel the motions of a snake living in his stom- 
ach. Another man said that there were small 
snakes in his veins, and that the veins would ex- 
pand as they coursed their onward way. It is fre- 
quently the case that afflicted persons have concep- 
tions of others laying their head upon them, or 
touching them, so as to often cause pain or unpleas- 
ant sensations. 2. Similar variations exist in regard 
to the other senses, which can be supplied at the dis- 
cretion of the reader. The cases already referred 
to may readily lead the mind to call up clearer and 
stronger cases, in which there is evidence of influ- 
ences which give rise to excited conceptions, uneasi- 
ness, and wildness of thought. All such instances 
are evidence of the departure of the mind from its 
true balance and correct action. There is great 
danger of delirium or insanity, to some extent, if 
the mind is permitted to take up one idea, or sub- 
ject, and dwell upon it exclusively. If the mind 
does not tire in dwelling on one subject for a long 
period of time, but rather loses all relish for all 
things else quickening in its action, insanity, to some 
extent, is almost certain. Never dwell too long on 
any one subject, if you would preserve a healthy 
mental action and avoid insanity. 3. Excited con- 
ceptions may be caused by the influence of disease 
upon the wTwle nervous system, under which the 
mind becomes unusually excited, immediately fol- 
lowed by indications of a bewildered wildness. It 
can be caused by a highly-aggravated spinal affec- 
tion. The sensitive connection existing between the 
part affected and the brain, often causes an irregular 
mental action, while the countenance and expression 



CONCEPTIONS BORDERING ON INSANITY. 319 

of the eye will indicate an improper change. 4. It 
may be caused by inflammation or other diseases of 
the brain. A fracture of the skull, or a removal of 
a part of the brain, are apt to affect the exercise of 
the mental powers. Any thing like nervous pros- 
tration, or severe attacks of fever, affecting the 
cerebral substance, will affect or influence, to some 
extent, the correct or right use of the mental proc- 
esses ; and when this takes place, there is connected 
with it excited conceptions or wild notions of im- 
agination. 5. The last general cause we shall notice 
is, that which exists in febrile influences upon the 
physical organs. This influence is not only general 
upon the system, but the exciting effect it produces 
upon the nervous system, and the brain in particu- 
lar, causes singular and strange excited irregularities 
in the action of the mental powers. 



320 PARTIAL INSANITY 



CHAPTER VII. 

PARTIAL INSANITY. 

SECTION I. 
1. The mind, under the influence of -partial in- 
sanity, is disqualified for healthy action ; though the 
mind, thus affected, may appear perfectly sane or 
correct on some subjects, yet it is the reverse on 
other topics. Often, when such a mind is employed 
on subjects foreign from those upon which it is 
wild, all appears to be right and reasonable ; but 
when we speak of any thing which has a relevancy 
or connection with that upon which its action is im- 
perfect, there is an immediate change in the excita- 
bility of the mental state or action, and from this 
the chain of thoughts begin to disconnect, and the 
mind wanders, till the old theme is brought up with 
all the vigor of which the mind is capable. There 
is an instance recorded, where a man was charged 
with insanity, when, on being brought before the 
court for examination, he gave no evidence of insan- 
ity, though thoroughly tested. When the case was 
about to be dismissed, an intimate friend proposed 
that he be asked when he was going to judge the 
world. He was instantly excited, and assumed the 
character of the judge of the universe 2. The 
mind may be called partially insane when it gives 
evidence of wildness upon certain topics only peri- 



PARTIAL INSANITY. 321 

odically. There are such persons who, at times, 
and in their deliberate moments, appear to be rea- 
sonable and mild in their feelings or disposition ; 
but, at other times, they can not control the action 
of their mental powers. With care and proper 
treatment, some of this class of persons can be re- 
stored. 3. Another class of individuals appear to 
be sane on all the events or occurrences of their 
early life, but can not converse, in a connected way, 
upon recent facts or events. This change is clearly 
the effect of physical debility by the influence or 
power of disease. If the difficulty existed wholly 
in the mind, past events would be forgotten as read- 
ily as those of recent occurrence, and the imperfect 
action of the mind would apply to the one as well 
as the other. 4. This affection may exist in the 
unhealthy state or defective action of one or more 
of the mental faculties, though the mind may act 
correctly, with the exception of the affected element 
or department. Though such a defect is difficult to 
define, the only way in which we can form any 
thing like a correct idea is, in watching the charac- 
ter of mental action, or the defects in the manifesta- 
tion of mental powers corresponding to the office of 
certain elements, and the change that has taken 
place in regard to such action. 



SECTION II. 
1. The influence of insanity can exist in connec- 
tion with the judgment. When there is no healthy 
action of this power, if the mind loses the correct 
power of perceiving relations, and of rightly dis- 



322 PARTIAL INSANITY. 

criminating differences, it can not confidently decide 
upon the same, or in relation to them; and when 
decisions are thus made, they are as likely to be ab- 
surd as correct, or they are almost certain to be 
wrong in some way. And where the decisions of 
the mind are wrong, or if right, it is so by mere 
accident, and to which the mind does not seem in- 
clined to abide or adhere only for the moment, we 
have clear evidence of partial insanity. The mind 
appears to arrive at conclusions accidentally, and to 
abandon them at pleasure, so that its action is like a 
log floating upon the waves of the sea, and its decis- 
ions can not be depended upon. 2. Partial insanity 
may be connected with the imperfect action of orig- 
inal suggestion. The ideas and convictions which 
arise in connection with this power of the mind, 
must be objects of belief or unwavering confidence. 
"We must believe that we exist, and that we have 
personal identity, and that the objects of belief re- 
main unchanged ; for without this belief we can not 
be sane. The facts which arise by and in connec- 
tion with this faculty, must be realized on ; and if 
this function is alienated, or ceases correct action, 
we, in proportion, cease to be sane. 3. The power 
of association may act so imperfectly that the decis- 
ions of the mind can not be regarded as correct. 
"When the power of associating ideas or facts is de- 
fective, there is evidence of great recklessness in the 
arrangement of facts. The thoughts appear to fly 
in every direction, and words are apt to be used 
without number, and without any special force, un- 
less they be to weary those to whom they are ad- 
dressed. Minds of this character seldom ever retain 






PARTIAL INSANITY. 323 

the objects of conversation for any length of time. 
All that the mind dwells upon seems to be visionary 
and like the morning cloud or early dew. Such 
minds can not be depended upon; for every thing 
appears to be uncertain and confusion. Arguments 
will not be listened to ; reason is of no considera- 
tion ; the erratic motions of the mind, sweeping a 
thousand different things, exhausts the power of 
speech, yet nothing definite is accomplished. 4. 
The power of reason may be defective as to correct 
action. Facts can only be received as abstract 
truths, as there is no power of reason in connecting 
facts together, or of forcing a conclusion from the 
premises. There appears to be no power of tracing 
effects to cause, or of reasoning from cause to effect. 
All chains of thought are disconnected. But the 
worst feature is that w T here the premises are not rec- 
ognized, and conclusions are made without either 
premises or correct argument. It consists in assert- 
ing a thing to be so, and will not be moved from the 
same by any possible fact or timely consideration. 
These minds are far removed from any probable 
correction. 5. There is another class who evidence 
insanity by the celerity of the reasoning power in 
hasty deductions or quick conclusions. There is a 
quick, shrewd cunning, and by either watching the 
movements or appearance, they can suspect the con- 
clusion without waiting to scan the intermediate 
steps. If any special design is indulged in regard 
to them, such as placing them in confinement, they 
are apt to suspect something of the kind from mere 
observation. 



PARTIAL INSANITY 



SECTION III. 
1. The physical organs connected with the senses, 
or the action of the senses, may, under the influence 
of disease, cause the deception in the character of 
sensations experienced, and a state of partial insan- 
ity ensue. This brings us to the general cause of 
insanity, the effect of material organs upon the ac- 
tion of the mind, which are imperfect within them- 
selves, or are paralyzed in some way by disease. 2. 
Partial insanity may exist in connection with the 
power of perception. Perceptions of internal proc- 
esses of the mind can not be connected with insan- 
ity only as it is affected by the physical nature, 
either directly or indirectly, as we can have no con- 
ceptions of mind aside and apart from the body in 
its fallen state, as being any thing but sane within 
and of itself; but perceptions of external things are 
more apt to deceive us, or to become so influenced 
as to bring the mind under partial insanity. This 
reference of the internal mental state to the outward 
cause may be trammeled or improperly influenced. 
All such influences have their effect upon the correct 
action of the mind. If sensation corresponds in any 
way to the external cause, then perception, which is 
an immediate sequence, must agree with the internal 
mental state, and both sensation and perception are 
dependent upon the healthy state and action of the 
physical organs ; otherwise, it would appear evident 
that there could be no deception involving any thing 
like insanity. But, from the true state of the case, 
insanity may exist, in part, in connection with or 
under the influence of disease. 3. Partial insanity 



PARTIAL INSANITY. 325 

often exists in connection with the power exercised 
in accrediting testimony. Such minds never find 
any thing too hard to believe. If that which is nar- 
rated is unreasonably extravagant, it is believed 
with the same degree of confidence that exists in 
believing truth : hence, all that is heard, if real or 
true, and though such information be right, the re- 
verse of that which has just been presented, yet 
both are often regarded as true. In this way things 
which conflict with each other, whether in classes or 
otherwise, are objects of belief. The great difficulty 
appears to exist in the fact that the mind is incapa- 
ble of comparing contraries together, and of discov- 
ering the difference between truth and falsehood. 
4. Another trait of insanity exists in connection 
with a loss of confidence in every thing. The mind 
is disposed to doubt every thing, and the more we 
try to relieve such a mind, by presenting truths or 
facts for its action and consideration, the more dis- 
inclined it is to believe. 'No doubt but that many 
false notions and doctrines are imbibed and taught 
by partially-insane persons ; and such persons should 
be adjudged of guilt or crime in proportion to the 
healthy action of the mental powers. Nevertheless, 
this should never be pleaded in the defense of crimi- 
nals, in order to clear them ; for if they are so insane 
as to be guilty of horrible crimes, molesting the 
peace and happiness of society, they should be cared 
for, and placed, as a merciful act, where they could 
not have the privilege of committing such injuries ; 
and if they commit such offenses without being in- 
sane, they should never be cleared upon the ground 
of insanity, though they may feign insanity, or it 

28 



326 PARTIAL INSANITY. 

may be pleaded for them. 5. Indolent habits have a 
tendency to mental alienation. Such habits increase 
as age advances. The vigor of youth will serve as 
a stimulant, counteracting such influences, till the 
individual is passing into confirmed adult years. 
Then this vivacity begins to diminish, while indo- 
lence increases ; and with the increase of such 
habits of indolence, the bodily energies and organs 
become affected or weakened by the power of dis- 
ease, which follows, though it be barely perceptible. 
The mind ceases to act correctly, and it is plainly 
evident that dotage has set in, and the mental pow- 
ers have been rendered imperfect in action. 






SECTION IV. 
1. Partial insanity may be induced, or it may 
have its origin in connection with too great physical 
efforts. The physical constitution is capable of per- 
forming a certain amount of service, under which it 
will preserve the greatest amount of health and ac- 
tivity ; and to pass beyond that is abuse, and tends 
to destroy the health of the body and the correct 
activity of the mind. 2. It sometimes results from 
a too high-wrought zeal of soul, or too great a degree 
of mental excitement. In proportion as the mind 
becomes excited beyond the bounds of propriety, is 
there danger of the physical organs being overpow- 
ered and paralyzed, so that mental action, in some 
way, will be defective. A certain young man, with 
a well-educated mind, stepped into a shop to try on 
his wedding coat, and while there, a messenger 
came in haste to tell him that his intended was then 



PARTIAL INSANITY. 327 

on the floor being married to another man. The ex- 
citement in regard to such an unexpected occurrence 
overpowered him, and in fifteen minutes he was said 
to be mentally deranged, from which he never recov- 
ered, though he lived some forty years after the 
event of his derangement. 3. Any unnatural ex- 
citement will, at times, affect the mind unfavorably 
in some way. All fits of anger should be avoided 
as deadly poison. Revenge should be expelled 
from every heart, and should be regarded as one of 
the worst foes to our race in the effect which it pro- 
duces upon the development and regularity of men- 
tal action. Perhaps the first effect produced by 
such influences will be fits of stupor and peevishness, 
then self-chagrin, with loathful melancholy. These 
will be followed b}^ a decline of health, or the inac- 
tivity of some organ upon which the mind is de- 
pendent, and influenced in its action. 4. Repeated 
mental excitement affects mental action in some way 
when it does not amount to insanity. Public speak- 
ers, who draw heavily upon their powers repeatedly 
and under great excitement, suffer, at some periods, 
uninvoked mental influences, which border on in- 
sanity, and give them much trouble. It is often a 
source of trouble to ministers who speak often and 
under great excitement. Such heavy draws upon the 
nervous system, and especially the brain, which is re- 
garded as the organ of the mind, have a tendency to 
affect, in some way, the action of the mind. Though 
their minds may remain clear, firm, and decisive in 
action for many years, yet, at some unexpected hour, 
they may change in regard to their views on many 
subjects. Such persons are not to be regarded as 



328 PARTIAL INSANITY. 

having intentionally and maliciously changed in 
their views, nor are they to be held so strictly ac- 
countable as earlier years would require. Though 
unwilling to acknowledge it, yet the truth is the 
nerves and cerebral mass have been so heated and 
taxed with repeated excitement and efforts, that the 
mind becomes flighty, erratic, or changed in regard 
to many things. These changes should be regarded 
as a misfortune and as a result of partially-para- 
lyzed organs more than intentional crime. The pu- 
rity or impurity of motive should be the object of 
applause or censure more than that which is con- 
nected with the judgment, which, under the circum- 
stances, is defective. 



TOTAL INSANITY. 329 



CHAPTER VIII. 

TOTAL INSANITY. 

SECTION I. 
1. We understand by insanity a deranged mind 
or intellect; that the mind is without reason or is 
delirious. We now come to that state of delirium 
which is a total disorganization of mind, or of cor- 
rect mental action. The power of reasoning is 
wholly in ruins. All the mental states are total 
confusion, and all mental acts are conflicting wild- 
ness. This kind of insanity presents the mind un- 
natural and in ruins. Perhaps any rational mind 
would prefer death rather than to be plunged into a 
state of total insanity. 2. Insanity destroys the 
healthy action of the mind and the power it has 
over its own mental states, of connecting and of di- 
recting the chains of its thoughts, fixing the atten- 
tion to internal realities, or upon those of the ex- 
ternal world. The continuation it has of attending 
to one, or a class of objects, ceasing to think of 
them, or of changing to certain relations and analo- 
gies, running them out in a thousand directions, till 
millions of facts are brought into the account ; but 
all these operations are destroyed by delirium. 3. 
The power of mental action may cease in regard to 
all subjects only in a wild and utterly-confused 
manner. There may be an indistinct apprehending 
28* 



330 TOTAL INSANITY. 

of things, but without any rational conception of 
order, classification, or of law. 4. The mind may 
be influenced by only one impression, without any 
power of varying from it, or of dismissing it from 
the most intense excitement. There is an instance 
recorded of a man who became insane, yet he al- 
ways moved as though he was in great haste. The 
only answer he ever gave to any inquiry was, " I 
am going home," though it could not be discovered 
that any thing had the slightest degree of his atten- 
tion. The melancholy case of a young minister has 
been recorded, who, by a fall, was deranged, while 
on his way to be married. Never afterward was he 
known to pay attention to any thing; and never was 
he known to speak of any thing but his expected 
marriage. All other thoughts seemed to have been 
forever banished ; and that which he did say ap- 
peared to be abstracted from every thing else. 5. 
The mind may be absorbed in a certain chain of 
impressions which are limited, having no connection 
with other things, by mental action, and over which 
the mind has no control in any way. Such impres- 
sions appear to be believed as having a real exist- 
ence, whether they be true or not. If false, there is 
no healthy action of the mental powers by which 
any correction can take place. 



SECTION II. 
1. Mania may be regarded as varying in degree 
of mental range or action from certain limited ab- 
stract impressions to a wild, amplified view of im- 
aginary realities. Though such a mind may glance 






TOTAL INSANITY. 331 

at real truths, yet there can be no exercise of reason 
in relation to them. Under this kind of mania per- 
sons are most apt to suppose themselves as possess- 
ing great power and authority to control ; and when 
they think of their privilege and authority, they be- 
come instantly excited in exercising their great 
power. They are apt to fancy themselves to be 
kings with great power, and that they are sur- 
rounded with splendor and glory, which error the 
mind has no power to correct. 2. The hallucina- 
tions of a maniac can not be corrected, as the dis- 
ordered action of the principal mental faculties is so 
extensive that there is no way or means of correct- 
ing that which is wrong. Though the physical or- 
gans connected with the power of the senses may 
appear perfect in action, yet there is no way to 
restore the power of reason by reason or arguments. 
The maniac will continue to fancy himself a king or 
ruler of this world, having a right to command and 
to force obedience to his authority. Though such 
persons may be of the lowest degree of obscurity, 
still they appear to have conceptions of great honor 
and glory, and that all the world contributes to 
their glory. The presentations of any kind of ad- 
verse circumstances which may surround them, have 
no power to gain their attention so as to produce 
any salutary effect upon their mental states. 3. A 
common characteristic of maniacs is evidenced in 
the fact that some impression or idea has taken pos- 
session of the mind, and upon the oneness of the 
theme the mind acts, without being corrected by 
truths, which would produce an equilibrium of the 
intensity, of mental action, and relieve wrong im- 



TOTAL INSANITY. 

pressions. Whenever the mind is permitted to act 
upon some one idea, excluding all other facts which 
would be examined in connection with it, such ac- 
tion will become intense, and the longer we dwell 
upon one thought the more excited the concentrated 
action of the mind will become, and the tendency 
of the mind to lose all power of reason or control 
in relation to the existence of real facts will be 
increased. 4. In total insanity the mind is incapa- 
ble of correct reasoning on either correct or false 
premises. The connection of thoughts or facts in 
argumentation are broken and so confused that no 
correct steps can be taken in pursuing any subject; 
all is confusion and uncertainty. It is incapable of 
assuming even false data, and of reasoning upon it. 
If it is capable of assuming data in any degree, 
that which is assumed is more likely to be false 
than true ; and if false, the mind is incapable of 
making any corresponding deductions ; and if that 
which is assumed is true within itself, there is no 
power to connect the steps or truths in order to ar- 
rive at any thing like correct deductions. The 
powers of such a mind may be said to be in ruins. 



SECTION III. 
1. In connection with some degrees of insanity 
there is a remarkable activity of mental action. 
This peculiar vividness of mental action may be 
accounted for, in part, from the fact that the mind 
is withdrawn from all subjects except that which is 
embraced in its present notice, irrespective of all 
other truths which should be examined in connec- 



TOTAL INSANITY. 333 

tion with it ; therefore, it seizes rapidly upon parts 
of connected events, or facts, without any apparent 
perception of relations in return, or of those which 
arise in the order of time. The memory may ap- 
pear to be strong and more active than in health, in 
regard to some things, yet those things called up 
are only parts of facts, and they are in disorder and 
confusion. The mind has no power to use them ; 
the vigorous efforts to connect them are instantly 
broken, while all the thoughts are suspended, and 
some other impression appears to affect the mind ; 
but ere it is brought forward the mental effort is in 
ruins. In some instances, the memory appears to 
call up facts, events, and associations which had 
been forgotten in the healthy action of the mind. 
This is in accordance with the statements of persons 
who have recovered from short or brief attacks of 
insanity. Many things which they had long for- 
gotten became the objects of recollection. 2. There 
is great readiness and vividness of thought pos- 
sessed by some minds as they are verging on to 
total insanity. Such maniacs give evidence of 
great acuteness and ingenuity in a peculiar way. 
They may have some indications of remaining 
power to reason, from the rapidity of the mind in 
sketching isolated facts, and, in selecting partial 
relations, mingled with other things which may be 
true or they may be false. But, without doubt, it is 
utterly impossible for an insane person to argue cor- 
rectly on any subject. If they arrive at the truth, it 
is wholly accidental. 3. It appears that the greatest 
peculiarity connected with either partial or total 
insanity is, that a certain idea or impression be- 



334 TOTAL INSANITY 






comes the object of undivided mental action; all 
other existences or influences appear to be excluded, 
and that which is the object of consideration may 
be true or it may be wholly visionary. If true, the 
deduction, if any is attempted, is always wrong, 
unless it should be true accidentally; and those 
things which become the objects of belief, with 
them are apt to be entirely absurd. 4. Another 
peculiarity connected with maniacs is, the indispo- 
sition to change their belief, which arises in con- 
nection with certain impressions, whether such im- 
pressions be true or false. The subject which 
appears to have control of the mental powers, has 
been known to continue with some maniacs for a 
number of years. The hallucination of others has 
been known to change from one object to another in 
the space of a few years. The former may argue 
an unchanging influence of disease upon the phys- 
ical organs, through which the mind' acts; and the 
latter may be accounted for upon the ground that 
the power of disease upon the physical organs, 
through which mind is manifested in action, has 
changed to some other organ, or that the nature of 
the disease has changed in some way. These facts 
only lead to the confirmation of the opinion that 
mind is never insane only in connection with a de- 
formed or a diseased physical system in some way. 



SECTION iy s 
1. Mental hallucinations may suspend or dismiss 
the impressions which have been of abiding experi- 
ence, and, after a long interval, they may be sud- 



TOTAL INSANITY. 335 

denly revived, which can not be accounted for 
unless it is attributable to some change in the phys- 
ical constitution, either in regard to increased 
degrees of maturity, or in the diminishing power 
of disease, so that the mind can be more vigorously 
exerted. Instances are given of persons who were 
employed in doing a certain piece of work, when 
they were suddenly struck with insanity; and, after 
the lapse of years, on being restored, the first thing 
of their inquiries was, in regard to the work in 
which they were employed when they went into 
insanity, while all the time and events which had 
intervened were entirely lost. It has been stated 
that persons who are addicted to periodical parox- 
ysms of delirium, have been known to resume the 
conversation on their recovery precisely at the place 
where they left off when the paroxysm came on, 
without any knowledge of what transpired in the 
interim; and it has been stated that some of these 
persons, when the paroxysm reappeared, commenced 
with that part or subject of their hallucination pre- 
cisely where they left off when reason returned; 
but, as a general thing, there is not such a uniform- 
ity in connection with insanity. It is more gener- 
ally characterized by a fearful erratic wildness. 2. 
The extremes and modulations which characterize 
the feelings, and the deportment or acts, of mani- 
acs, may be accounted for, in part, as corresponding 
to the different temperaments connected with each 
constitution; and they may arise, in part, from the 
uncultivated viciousness of the one, and the guarded 
mildness of the other. They may vary again with 
the mind that had been under religious influence, 



336 TOTAL INSANITY. 

contrasted with the mind which had always been 
vicious and revengeful. When insanity becomes 
the lot of such persons, it is natural to expect that 
they will be influenced by these things in some way. 
3. Insanity, as it exists in the case of the maniac, 
is apt to be of a restless and turbulent character. 
Great excitement generally prevails over, and is con- 
nected with the entire mental powers. There appears 
to be a constant disposition to keep moving or to be 
traveling from place to place. This is not the kind 
of derangement, under the influence of which the 
person loathes life, and seeks death ; for persons un- 
der the influence of this kind of derangement are 
always suspecting danger, and are flying from it with 
feelings of appalling frenzy or dread. 4. The general 
character of mental derangement is that which has 
connected with it a fearful apprehension of danger 
or death; and such persons are always trying to 
escape from harm. Such persons are generally 
harmless, and have no disposition to inflict injuries 
upon their fellow-beings, though the Gare of such is 
attended with great trouble. 5. There is another 
class of insane persons, who are malicious in feel- 
ings, and are always seeking revenge. It is not 
unfrequently the case that they imagine that they 
are expressly ordered to take the life of some fellow- 
being; and, as a general thing, those who are se- 
lected by them to be tortured, or put to death, are 
the nearest and dearest friends. 



INSANITY — MELANCHOLIA. 337 



CHAPTER IX. 

INSANITY— MELANCHOLIA. 

SECTION I. 
1. That kind of mental depression called melan- 
cholia may be regarded as a result of some kind of 
disease upon the physical constitution, or it may 
have its origin with, or in connection with, repeated 
and powerful mental exertion, prostrating the power, 
in part, of the organs through which mind acts, or 
is manifested. There is a difference between real 
mania and that of melancholia. The former is con- 
nected with the presence of hallucination, under the 
influence of which the individual appears to be car- 
ried away with his excited conceptions of his condi- 
tion in life, and does not appear to be under any 
sense of want, or that such a state of things could 
be possible. The latter condition is connected with 
those who are depressed in feeling, which may arise 
from the influence of lingering disease, or it may 
arise with trouble of mind, which prostrates the bod- 
ily powers, rendering them subject to disease. This 
gloomy or melancholy state of mind may increase 
till maniacal excitement takes place ; but melan- 
cholia generally continues in a state of mental de- 
pression. Such a state may arise from different 
causes. The same, or similar causes, may produce 
mania with one person, and that of melancholia 

29 



338 INSANITY MELANCHOLIA. 

with another. These dissimilaritous results appear 
to arise from constitutional differences. 2. A very 
peculiar difference between melancholia and mania 
is, that a person under the influence of the former 
has power to reason more accurately, and the mind 
evinces stronger features of the action of the power 
of reason than in the latter state; yet, the impres- 
sions of such a mind can be changed with far greater 
difficulty than those of the maniac. The impres- 
sions of the mind, under a melancholy influence, can 
be acted upon with greater deliberation, and gener- 
ally with a greater degree of unwavering intention, 
than those of the maniac. 3. Melancholia differs 
in a peculiar manner from mania, in the tendency 
of minds, under such an influence, to commit sui- 
cide. Real maniacal insanity seldom ever gives 
rise to any feeling or inclination which would lead 
to such an act or horrible result. It is very common, 
when suicide is committed, to say that the person 
was totally insane, or was devoid of all reason ; but 
there is no instance recorded of totally-deranged 
persons, or one devoid of all reason, ever being- 
guilty of suicide. Such persons are devoid of all 
such feelings or inclinations ; for, under such a state 
of mind, they have run back to the mental ineffi- 
ciency of children, while all their intentions and 
feelings, under such influences, are harmless. 4. A 
raving maniac has never been known to commit 
suicide. All their feelings and manifested inclina- 
tions are averse to any thing of the kind. When 
they possess any traits of reason, or conscientious 
thought, they evince the utmost degree of excite- 
ment and horror in regard to any thing like danger 



INSANITY*— MELANCHOLIA. 339 

or death ; and they are ever flying from their own 
apprehensions of danger in seeking for safety. 



SECTION II. 
Litis depression or melancholia which leads to 
suicide, and that, too, before reason has entirely 
banished, or has left the mind. We are forced to 
the gloomy acknowledgment that all persons who 
commit this horrible act have a sufficient amount of 
reason remaining to know what they are about to do 
when they use the weapons of death ; otherwise, the 
act could not and would not be perpetrated. 2. All 
persons who commit suicide do so of their own indi- 
vidual and voluntary choice. It is impossible for 
any who are totally deranged to have the control 
of their mental states, or thoughts, long enough to 
carry such an intention into effect. By the most 
accurate examination, no feeling or tendency to sui- 
cide can be discovered to exist in the minds of per- 
sons who are devoid of reason. They abhor every 
thing of the kind, and all their inclinations lead 
them to act in flying in haste from every thing like 
danger or death. 3. He who takes his own life has 
the right use of reason, to a sufficient extent, to know 
what poisonous drug, or weapon of death, will 
effect the work; also, the amount necessary to be 
taken, or the way for, or manner of, applying the 
deadly weapon, require some degree of rationality 
and judgment. All such facts show that the person 
is not totally insane. 4. Another proof that such 
persons are not totally insane is manifested in their 
conduct. With what tenacity they keep such inten- 



340 INSANITY MELANCHOLIA. 

tions or conclusions from being known to others! 
See their shrewd, artful cunning and management 
in avoiding detection in the obtaining of that which 
will take life, often securing it under false pretense ! 
How carefully they select a time and place suitable 
to avoid all detection, so their design and plans may 
be carried into effect! All these facts show that 
such persons are not totally deranged. 5. We are 
compelled to the conclusion, that all persons who 
deliberately commit suicide have a sufficient amount 
of reason to know what they are going to do, and 
how they are going to effect the work; also, what 
the result will be, otherwise they would not have 
presence and control of mind to determine upon 
such a course: and if they had, the mind would 
lose sight of such an arrangement before they could 
arrive at the final result. It is perfectly contrary 
to all facts, as well as to the nature and effect of 
total insanity upon the mind. To say that persons 
destroy their lives because they are totally deranged, 
and have no knowledge as to what they are doing, 
is contrary to all the facts in such cases. If a per- 
son must be totally devoid of all reason, in order to 
commit suicide, then he would have no inclination 
to do so ; for a child, before it has the right exercise 
of reason, never manifests any inclination to destroy 
its own existence. The same fact is true in relation 
to idiots. If persons could commit suicide who 
were totally ignorant of what they were doing, then 
they would be innocent; but if they know what 
they are doing, in laying violent hands on their own 
lives, they are guilty of sin, and will be held ac- 
countable for such offenses. 



INSANITY — MELANCHOLIA. 341 

SECTION III. 
1. The hallucination which takes place under 
the influence of melancholia, or depression, becomes 
the only object of mental action. All other impres- 
sions, or facts, naturally connected, which would cor- 
rect any excited perception in regard to supposed 
realities, can not become the object of attention or 
of mental action. All mental power to change the 
action of the mind to many facts, or of examining 
them in connection with erroneous impressions, ap- 
pears to be lost. There is also a loss of power in 
correcting internal mental states by comparing them 
with external truths. The mind becomes bewildered 
and overwhelmed with hopeless misery, and, being 
unable to contemplate any future relief, the whole 
soul appears to be plunged into a cloud of aug- 
mented gloom. Many persons, under such circum- 
stances are apt to begin to imagine that all their 
friends have forsaken them, and then they begin to 
lose confidence in every person. The very appear- 
ance of nature is gloomy and mournful. They begin 
to feel that life is a burden, and commence forming 
conclusions to leave the world. When such resolu- 
tions are once formed, then the mind acts upon them 
exclusively, by connecting with such purposes the 
most effectual way to accomplish the dreadful act; 
which act becomes more harmless, in their opinion, 
as the mind, under great excitement, dwells upon it. 
2. Such purposes can be and have been abandoned 
when the mind has been suddenly arrested by some 
new and alarming object of thought. A man has 
been mentioned, who left home at night for the 
29* 



34:2 INSANITY — ■ MELANCHOLIA 






purpose of drowning himself; but, on being suddenly 
attacked by robbers, he fled for refuge, where he 
soon realized that all intimation to suicide was gone. 
Other cases have been referred to, which resulted in 
a change of purpose after the individuals had determ- 
ined upon their own destruction ; when, on going 
to the place selected, their attention has been sud- 
denly arrested by some accident, calamity, or dan- 
ger, which have changed their thoughts from the 
one object to the other facts, causing all their incli- 
nations to suicide to be dissipated. 3. There is an 
impression of insanity, connected with the idea of 
suicide, which the mind appears to possess while 
there is the least manifestation of reason remaining; 
and it is certainly true, that when the mind is totally 
lost to all reason, it is incapable of determining upon 
suicide, or of remaining in the same state long 
enough to effect such a result, if it could form such 
a determination. This sense, or impression of crim- 
inality, does not correct the mind so as to deter from 
the act of suicide. It is a common occurrence for 
another idea to arise in connection with this, which 
is, that such persons conclude that they justly de- 
serve to die, and that in taking their existence away 
they are only dying according to justice, and in this 
way the crime will only be slightly imputed to 
them. 4. Another hallucination often arises in 
connection with the impression of the criminality 
of suicide. Persons have been known, in the his- 
tory of the past, to commit murder for the sole pur- 
pose of rendering their lives up to the requirements 
of the just law of the land, and thereby die by the 
requirements of justice. This they seem to have 



INSANITY MELANCHOLIA. 343 

supposed frees them from the sin of suicide. Many 
persons have avowed their intention of murdering 
some one, without having the first improper feeling 
toward them ; and often such selections were made 
of some one whom they loved more than any other. 
They have confessed, on some occasions, that they 
only wished to commit murder in order that they 
themselves might die by the just sentence of the 
law; and they have been known to go still farther, 
by selecting a child, which they believed would be 
happy after death, and console themselves that it 
would be no special injury to the child to take its 
life, and then they could themselves die by the 
hand of justice. The right exercise of reason is 
lost with such persons, and it would appear that 
their long-cherished desire to die had always been 
checked by their connection with the exceeding sin- 
fulness of suicide: hence, the resolve on the death 
of some innocent person was favorably entertained 
from the thought that such persons would be happy 
after death, and it would give themselves the oppor- 
tunity of dying according to justice. 



344 INSANITY. 



CHAPTER X. 

INSANITY. 

SECTION I. 
1. There are degrees of insanity. The mind 
which borders on total insanity, or has passed into 
that state which is called total insanity, clearly indi- 
cates its extreme alienation. We have no hesitancy 
in deciding upon such cases with confidence, or with 
full assurance that they are entirely deranged. 2. 
No one should hastily decide upon slight mental 
alienation without the clearest proof that such is 
true; for in this way persons have been declared 
deranged when they were only bordering upon in- 
sanity; and such indications seldom ever become 
the objects of thought or remark, only when the 
individual was under some mental excitement. 3. 
The principal cause of insanity, doubtless, has its 
origin in connection with imperfect organized phys- 
ical organs, or with the power and influence of dis- 
ease on those physical organs, upon which the mind 
is dependent in its action, both as it relates to its 
intercourse with external facts, or in revealing its 
internal states or thoughts to other intelligences or 
beings. It is utterly impossible for us to have con- 
ceptions of minds that are insane when they are 
separated from the body ; and to believe that an 
all-wise Being would create a spirit to exist in a 



INSANITY. 345 

state of insanity in the future world, is contrary to 
all facts, and is absurd. Insanity is either directly 
or indirectly the effect of sin. Its influence upon 
the physical organs, connected with the manifesta- 
tions or the action of the mind, renders them imper- 
fect in some way, and often to such a degree as to 
produce mental alienation ; but to clearly define 
such a connection or process is impossible. 4. Am- 
bition, as it exists in the minds of some persons, 
may give origin to insanity. Such minds are very 
excitable, and are capable of great efforts in trying 
to attain some desirable object or eminence in this 
world's fame. These efforts can not be strictly said 
to destroy or paralyze any of the mental faculties, 
as they exist in essence abstracted from the body ; 
but such efforts may be too powerful for the physical 
organs, and such repeated mental efforts may, and 
often do, paralyze the physical organs, or produce 
disease, which so paralyzes them as to impair the 
correct action of the mind in some way. 



SECTION II. 
1. In like manner will the states and action of the 
mind affect the condition and health of the body 
when it suffers from disappointed hope or affections, 
or from a fearful sense in regard to the soul's safety 
in the future world. All intense and fearful mental 
excitement will affect the strength and health of the 
bodily powers in some way ; and often, on the sud- 
den reception of an overwhelming mental shock, 
some individuals fall sick, and, in some cases, the 
mind is ever afterward deranged. 2. With a cer- 



34:6 INSANITY. 

tain class of persons there appears to be a constitu- 
tional tendency to insanity ; but we can not say that 
such a tendency exists solely or only in the nature 
or essence of the elements of mind, aside and apart 
from any connection it may have with physical or- 
gans ; for if we do, we assert that which we can 
never prove, and we will be forced to acknowledge 
that the soul may or may not be sane in the future 
w r orld ; and even if it should enter that immortal 
state perfectly sane, those elements of its being 
may, somewhere in the unbounded future, become 
deranged, if such immortal elements contain any 
thing like insanity within and of their own essence 
and being. But it is utterly impossible for us to 
have any conception of mind of and within itself as 
possessing any natural tendency to insanity ; there- 
fore, what we understand by such tendencies must 
exist in the physical constitution, as evidence will 
abundantly show. 3. Under the influence of high 
fevers, some minds often hecome insane, and remain 
so till the fever subsides. We dare not say that the 
mind only is sick, or that it is abstractly, in whole 
or in part, the object of fever influence; for the 
fever preys only upon the physical organs or consti- 
tution. Then the delirium did not arise from the 
debility of the mind, but from the debility which 
affected the body. When this excitement leaves the 
body the mind is right again ; but we have no evi- 
dence that if the mind could be excited without 
affecting the physical powers, any thing like delir- 
ium could or would take place. 4. A sane man 
may be rendered insane by a slight injury upon his 
skull. It was not the mind that was bruised or in- 



INSANITY. 347 

jured by contact with some dense object, but it was 
the physical nature, or organs through which mind 
is manifested or acts, thereby rendering such action 
confused or imperfect. But if this injury could be 
properly healed, the mind is often restored to reason. 
It would be worse than heterodoxical to say that, in 
applying remedies to heal the fracture or injury of 
the skull, such remedies were applied only to the 
mind. The truth is, we can have no conceptions, 
founded upon facts, of mental debility, or paralysis, 
only as it is affected by defects in the physical con- 
stitution, or the effect of disease upon it. 



SECTION III. 
1. A hereditary predisposition to insanity may 
have its origin with the way in and by which the 
mind is influenced in connection with the constitu- 
tion or condition of the physical existence. Rea- 
sons can be assigned favoring this position, when it 
is impossible to give reasons in favor of the hered- 
itary mental alienation, aside and apart from any 
influence derived from the physical constitution 
favoring such a result. If the mind can, wholly of 
itself, continue for years perfectly sane, and then, 
entirely independent of any influence from the 
physical powers, change to a state of insanity, we 
might readily conclude that it may change to insan- 
ity at any period in the infinity of its future being ; 
but we can not believe that any mind, abstractly, 
can, by a hereditary disposition, or in any other 
way, become insane, only in connection with the 
body, and in being influenced by it favorably to 



348 INSANITY. 

such a result in some way. We have positive proof 
that bodily deformities, injuries, and diseases can 
and do produce insanity; but we have no proof that 
the mind, wholly within and of itself, ever has, or 
ever can become insane. 2. This tendency to in- 
sanity may, in part, be attributed to an intense and 
vigorous action of the mind, which becomes a habit 
incapable of being suspended till the physical or- 
gans are overpowered in some way. A paral^ 
ysis of some of them, produced in this way, or that 
of an intense nervous excitability, may render the 
action of mind ever afterward imperfect. This 
character of intense mental habit may be of hered- 
itary origin, as well as the weakness or defects of 
the physical organs, connected with mental action. 
3. This sad state of mental alienation may com- 
mence by permitting the mind too vigorously to 
dwell on one and the same topic, or in allowing the 
mind to be wrought into ecstasies of excitement 
upon continued scenes of imagination. This gives 
rise to excited mental feelings and emotions, which 
overwhelm all connected objects, and entirely sup- 
presses all real facts and relations connected with 
the primary truths of that which is supposed to 
exist, and which would correct such extravagances, 
if they could be objects of the judgment and the 
understanding. 4. The impressions made upon the 
mind, by sudden and unexpected events or occur- 
rences, are often the cause of excited conceptions, 
and a wild extravagance of the imaginary powers. 
In this kind of hasty mental action, the true princi- 
ples which are connected, or which lie at the foun- 
dation, are lost sight of, and no connection takes 



INSANITY. 349 

place by the mind deliberately contemplating such 
events in their true relations. On such occurrences 
the well-balanced mind is thrown upon the correct 
exercise of the understanding and the judgment; 
but the mind tending to alienation, is like a ship 
loosed from its moorings, yielding to the sport of 
wrecking tempests. 



SECTION IV. 

1. Too intense Tidbits of mental application often 
alienates the mind from correct action. In this way 
the energies of the body and mind become wearied 
and exhausted, and repeated efforts tend to a con- 
tinued erratic theorizing, or to speculative imagina- 
tions or thoughts. Whenever false impressions 
become the prominent objects of mental action, the 
mind is but little removed from the lower degrees 
of insanity. 2. It has been asserted, from actual 
observation, that the mind is seldom ever alienated, 
though it be severely disciplined in regard to plain 
facts, with which God, in his infinite wisdom, has 
filled the vast universe. The contemplation and ex- 
amination of such truths, with proper care, is calcu- 
lated to produce a healthy mental action, in which 
happiness is much increased. It is stated, by good 
authority, that, by inquiring into the causes of in- 
sanity among any number of persons who have 
been of studious habits, there is a lower proportion 
of philosophers, physicians, mathematicians, and 
chemists, who have become insane, than of almost 
any other classes devoted to scientific research. 3. 
It is also stated, that the highest numbers include 

30 



350 INSANITY 






those who have loved the works of fiction, imagina- 
tion, or taste, among whom may be classed poets, 
sculptors, painters, musicians, and artists ; but this 
chain can be lengthened to embrace a still higher 
number of those who are always looking for that 
which is enigmatical or appalling, such as look for 
the speedy destruction of the world, the appearing 
of ghosts, or will, with breathless intensity, bow low 
to the incursion and dictates of spirit-rappings. 4. 
The punishment of the insane should not be in- 
flicted without the utmost caution, and then only in 
regard to the partially insane. Correction is of no 
use where reason is gone, and where it is not entirely 
absent, severity only tends, in most cases, to drive 
those thus affected further from reason by enraging 
the mind, or by depressing the spirit. The maniac 
should be kept as quiet as possible, and should al- 
ways be dealt with in a kind and affectionate man- 
ner. The melancholists should have their attention 
wholly diverted from their special topics of grief, 
and they should be exhilarated with cheerful music 
or society, so as to keep them from dwelling on their 
calamities. Never do any thing to excite those who 
are addicted to madness, and always avoid every 
thing that would discourage those who labor under 
depression of feelings. 



IDIOCY. 351 



CHAPTER XL 

IDIOCY. 

SECTION I. 

1. The term idiocy conveys to the mind the idea of 
a natural defect of the understanding. The degrees 
which have been acknowledged to exist in idiocy 
are not well defined, as any thing like partial idiocy 
is only another department of partial insanity ; yet 
there are some distinctions by which a difference 
may be discriminated. 2. Fatuity includes that 
kind of mental weakness which differs from the tur- 
bulence and fierceness of the maniac, on the one 
hand, and that of a desponding state of insanity on 
the other. In the latter case or state, a part of 
the faculties may retain power of healthy action ; 
but, under fatuitous influences, the mind appears to 
suffer a general suspension of healthy action in all 
its departments. 3. Cretinism, as it was anciently 
understood among the valleys of the Alps, con- 
tained an amplitude of signification, which will not 
philosophically apply to a correct idea of idiocy. 
The cretins were classified so as to convey an idea 
of the strength and action of the mind. The intel- 
lectual action of the first class was not far removed 
from animal life, having no language to convey 
thoughts, or judgment in seeking happiness, or in 
avoiding danger. 4. There is another class, which 



352 idiocy. 

evinces some signs of intellectual action, with occa- 
sional traces of rationality; but the whole mental 
powers are so inactive that, in looking on such a 
countenance, we appear to have conceptions of the 
presence of a form, while the mind or soul appears 
to have taken its departure. Insanity appears to 
involve a part of the mental powers, while other 
powers are capable of action ; yet they are, in most 
cases, unable to arrive at any correct conclusion. 
But idiocy involves the idea of inactivity of the 
mental faculties as a whole. 5. When a rational 
mind becomes wholly inactive, we can not, with 
strict propriety, call such a state that of idiocy ; for 
it properly belongs to total insanity. Neither can 
we properly say that a mind is under the partial 
influence of idiocy, when all the mental powers are 
rendered almost inactive and without reason ; for 
such a state would more properly belong to partial 
insanity. 



SECTION II. 
1. An idiot is one who has ever been under the 
influence of mental imbecility, so that the mind can 
not be said to have been, at any time, sound or 
rational. The mind of such a person has always 
been in ruins. ^STever has there been power in such 
a mind to move with vigorous action. It is not 
reasonable to suppose that this inefficiency is natu- 
rally connected with the mental functions as an 
essential defect; for such a supposition would be 
unsupported by clear evidence ; but it is more rea- 
sonable for us to suppose that the natural defect in 



idiocy. 353 

its influence is connected with the mind, while the 
true cause is to be sought for. and to be found, in 
other considerations. 2. "We have already seen that 
insanity is principally caused by the effect of dis- 
ease and deformity upon or in the physical system. 
It is reasonable to believe that natural imperfections, 
or deformity of the physical nature, hinders or im- 
pedes the action and proper development of the 
mind, so that idiocy is the inevitable result. All 
injuries or debilities arising from the results of acci- 
dent, or the power of disease, may be remedied 
with the same hope of relief; but not so with nat- 
ural deformity, connected with the internal physical 
organs, upon or by which the mind is dependent 
for action, or is to be manifested. These internal 
imperfections may exist when we have no power 
to apprehend the nature of the influence which af- 
fects the physical organs. Such natural defects, 
preventing mental action, can never be remedied in 
this world: hence, an idiot must remain an idiot 
during life. 3. Idiocy is incuraole in this life, from 
the fact that the cause, which is principally deform- 
ity, can not be removed from such persons by reme- 
dies which remove the power and influence of dis- 
ease. We can have no conception that the essence 
called mind can be naturally deformed, or that it 
can be, within and of itself, under the influence and 
power of idiocy; for such a conclusion would be 
without proof; therefore, all our ideas of idiocy have 
their origin in connection with the deformities and 
imperfections which we believe to exist in the phys- 
ical nature. 4. We know that our material natures 
can, and that they do exert an almost unbounded 
SO* 



354: idiocy. 

control over the power and manner of mental devel- 
opments. Delirium is often the result of fever and 
other diseases, which prey only upon the physical 
powers, and can, in no case, be said to affect the 
mind only as the mind is affected by its connection 
with a diseased body. Insanity is often the result 
of a blow received upon a portion or part of the 
nervous system. The mind was not affected only 
by being connected with those deranged physical 
entities; and just as soon as these are restored the 
mind is sound again. This shows the influence of 
bodily organs over mental action. 



SECTION III. 
1. If the quick and intense excitement and action 
of the mind can cause derangement or delirium, the 
cause of such delirium is not wholly in the mind; 
for, if so, a state of complete alienation would prob- 
ably take place instantaneously, or as quickly as the 
whole powers of the mind felt the influence ; but 
the work of alienation often progresses by degrees, 
which shows that the excitement of the mind has 
influenced or affected the bodily organs, so that they 
perform their office but imperfectly, or they have, in 
part, or in some way, become paralyzed, and thereby 
the development of the mind is confused or im- 
peded. There never has been one philosophical 
argument advanced, which will demonstrate the as- 
sumed fact that mind naturally, within and of itself, 
aside and apart from any bodily influence, can be 
either under the influence and power of idiocy or 
that of insanity; but, on the other hand, we know 



idiocy. 355 

that facts can and do clearly prove that insanity 
can, and often does, result from physical influences 
upon the mind : hence, it is rational to infer that no 
person is, by the nature of mental essence, an idiot, 
but that all idiots are such by reason of natural de- 
fects and deformities existing in the physical organs, 
by means of which mind is more or less connected 
in its power of motion or action. 2. If the mind is 
naturally capable of becoming insane, or of coming 
under the power of idiocy, without any possible aid 
from the physical nature, or connection with it, then 
it is capable of destruction and even annihilation ; 
for if mind is imperishable, then its being is incapa- 
ble of any destruction or annihilation from temporal 
disease or death ; then it would follow that any 
obstruction to the right development of its powers 
exists either in the nature of the mind within itself, 
or that such obstructions were caused by defects or 
the effect of disease in the physical nature. We 
can have no conceptions of the mind, or the spir- 
itual existent naturally defective in faculties, or 
without the right use of them ; for if any such de- 
fects belong to and exist wholly in the mind, then 
such a mind must suffer such defects forever, as we 
have no promise of any new creations in the future 
appearing and existence of mental powers, where 
deficiencies have or do now exist. To suppose the 
existence of a mind naturally imperfect in its imma- 
terial nature, or as to the existence of some or all 
of its faculties, and that it can and will maintain 
such an imperfect existence in the spirit-world, is to 
suppose an absurdity, and reflect dishonor upon 
the wisdom and goodness of its Creator. If our 



356 idiocy. 

immaterial nature is capable of being, in whole or 
in part, destitute of mental elements, then we can 
only conclude that they must exist forever in the 
same unaltered condition of partial or total insan- 
ity, or that of idiocy. Then it will follow, as an ir- 
resistible conclusion, that if the soul can be or always 
has been totally insane, or idiotic, it has violated no 
law or rule of right, and must be sane in heaven. 
An idiot in heaven can never fulfill the design of a 
gracious Creator, in glorifying and in praising the 
Author of all good ; therefore, such a being will not 
exist any where on the plains of infinite life. The 
idiot will be saved, but he will leave his idiocy with 
the deformity of his body in the grave, while his 
rational and exalted spirit will ever move the harp 
of eternity. 3. We are convinced that the cause of 
idiocy exists not in the essence of mind, but in the 
deformity and diseased condition of the physical 
organization. There is no evidence, neither can we 
believe that an all-wise Being ever created an insane 
mind, or one that was in mind abstractly an idiot. 
Neither can we believe that the mind can, of itself, 
cause its own idiocy, unaided by material influences ; 
therefore, if any mind is, at any time, insane, or in 
a state of idiocy, it is so by reason of its connection 
with defective physical organs. 4. If the mind 
was naturally capable of losing the right exercist of 
its faculties or their existence, in whole or in part, 
then it would have self-power to destroy itself at 
any future period ; but such a position is contrary 
to all facts, and is absurd. We can form no idea, 
founded on reason, that the mind, within itself, or 
separated from the bodily influences, ever has been 



idiocy. 357 

or ever can be either insane or idiotic. There will 
be no insanity or idiocy beyond the vale of tem- 
poral death. 



SECTION IV. 

1. We have evidence of the destructive influence 
of the physical organs over the power of memory 
in the aged. An active and retentive memory often 
loses its power of action as a person or individual 
advances in age. If we say this loss of power is 
wholly in the mind, then it would follow that the 
mind is capable of losing its faculties, and it would 
be reasonable to suppose that they were entirely 
destroyed, under the power of temporal death, or 
the destruction of the body. But this is absurd; 
for when aged persons are unable to recollect the 
occurrences of one hour past, or even forget that 
which only took place a few moments previous, yet, 
if their attention is directed to what took place in 
the early part of their lives, they can often narrate 
that which transpired, and connect facts and events 
together, without any hesitancy. This is conclusive 
proof that the power of memory is not lost, nor is it 
ceasing to be; but its action, in advanced life, is 
trammeled only so far as it is connected with phys- 
ical organs which are becoming paralyzed by age, 
disease, and their tendency to decay or death. 2. 
That the physical nature curtails the power of hear- 
ing, is clearly demonstrated in the example of those 
who are far advanced in age. Such persons often 
become deaf; and if this defect was abstractly in 
the mind, then we could conclude that the mind, in 



358 idiocy. 

this respect, was becoming annihilated : but when 
the ear-trumpet is applied the hearing is restored : 
hence, the power is not gone nor destroyed, but is 
ever living in the nature and essence of the im- 
perishable mind. Then the defect is not of the 
mind ; but it belongs to and exists in the bodily 
powers, which are affected by the paralyzing touch 
of age or disease. 3. The same evidence is true 
in regard to the organ of sight. The eye becomes 
affected as persons advance in old age, so that 
they dimly see objects which pass through the 
field of vision ; but when an optic is applied, the 
sight is restored. The power is still there, and the 
whole difficulty must exist in the physical organs. 
All these facts, and many others, prove that the 
physical powers can and do often trammel the right 
action of the mind. Having referred to facts which 
are conclusive in establishing the destructive power, 
in part, which matter has over the development and 
right action of the mind, it is only reasonable to 
go still farther, and say that the power of disease, 
and the existence of deformity in the physical or- 
gans, may and can give origin to, or cause the exist- 
ence of idiocy. 4. Then we are forced to the con- 
clusion that the cause of idiocy is wholly connected 
with the bodily powers ; for if we believe in the im- 
mortality of the soul, we must believe that all idiots 
are saved in the future, from the fact that they have 
never had power to willfully transgress any law or 
rule of right. If the soul or mind, disconnected 
with the body, is capable of being idiotic, in whole 
or in part, in this life, it must exist as such forever ; 
and if all the inhabitants of the good world are 



idiocy. 359 

there for the purpose of rendering perpetual praise 
and glory to the great Author of all, then an idiot 
can have no place there, for he is naturally incapa- 
ble of filling this design in perfection and holiness. 
It is consistent with all our ideas of infinite wis- 
dom and purity, to believe that idiocy can exist 
only in connection with the deformities and infirm- 
ities of the bodily powers, all of which may be re- 
garded as a curse, and only the result of sin. If sin, 
either directly or indirectly, can cause idiocy, then 
it follows that the remedial plan, in destroying such 
a power and influence, will reveal rationality as 
inherent in the very nature of those elements of 
mind which were locked up during the existence 
of the body ; therefore, we are led to believe, that 
when the soul of an idiot is released from his sin- 
diseased body, it will be possessed of rational pow- 
ers and knowledge, in the enjoyment of which it 
will flourish in immortality. 



Qthhfon Ctntj( 



CHAPTER I. 

INTERNAL ORIGIN OF KNOWLEDGE. 

SECTION I. 
1. The soul has knowledge in itself, and its power 
to know and to retain knowledge is wisely arranged 
by its great Author. It has internally perception, 
thinking, reasoning, believing, doubting, knowing, 
with various mental operations, or acts, which are 
experienced, and we are conscious of their real 
existence, in connection with which we receive dis- 
tinct ideas of them, or in relation to them, without 
traveling beyond the internal being and action of 
mind, and unaided by the power of the senses as a 
medium of knowledge in regard to external things. 
The mind can and does possess ideas wholly within 
itself, and it receives them with confidence by at- 
tending to its own operations or action. 2. The 
mind has power of knowledge within itself which 
power is connected with the existence and action 
of intuitive mental elements. The mind is not ca- 
pable of receiving or of possessing knowledge of 
external things unless it has knowledge of a purely 
internal origin ; for all knowledge of external facts 
are unknown to us only as we have internal power 
to receive them as such. And if those elements of 
360 



INTERNAL ORIGIN OF KNOWLEDGE. 361 

mind, connected with the origin of intuitions, have 
internal power to receive external existences as 
facts, they have power within themselves to know 
thoughts of internal origin, and to have ideas of 
interior operations or mental action. 3. The pri- 
mary power of knowledge is not material, but is 
mental, and has its origin in connection with the 
existence and action of the internal mental elements. 
Connected with these is the self-power of knowing 
existing truths, and with them is the origin of all 
our knowledge. 4. Knowledge received through the 
medium of the senses from the external world, and 
in regard to external things, may be regarded as of 
a secondary order, or of an ulterior nature, when 
compared with knowledge of internal origin. 5. 
The internal action of the mind or soul, by which 
items of knowledge are apprehended, is so con- 
nected with such an immaterial essence, or being, 
that the rational force and vigor are derived from 
it; yet the soul employs material elements or organs 
to aid in the acquisition and in the perfecting of 
knowledge in regard to the external universe of 
materialities. The soul is aided by material eyes to 
aid in seeing material existences; also, with other 
material organs of sense, or those which are in some 
way connected with the origin of sensation. Aided 
by these, the mind becomes acquainted with the ex- 
istence and nature of material existences; yet the 
soul has knowledge within itself, which has not and 
can not be imparted to it by physical entities, or by 
the senses. Though all the senses were to fall under 
the power of sleep, yet the soul would exist even on 
forever, and would possess reason and knowledge. 

31 



y 

1 

; 



362 INTERNAL ORIGIN OF KNOWLEDGE. 
SECTION II. 

1 . Knowledge is of internal origin, though it may 
be said to begin in the senses ; yet only so far as 
sensations through the medium of the senses, being 
caused by external things, are necessarily followed 
by new mental states. But knowledge does not 
and can not begin with the senses, unless sensa 
tion within itself can be called knowledge ere i 
makes its report to the mind ; otherwise, we can 
have no knowledge of external things, till sensation 
is followed by the perception of the cause or causes 
of such sensation or sensations, and the mind de- 
cides upon them. Sensation, which is followed by 
new mental states, may be said to have its origin in 
connection with the senses ; but we can not say that 
knowledge begins with the senses, only as we have 
knowledge of the origin of sensation ere its report 
is decided upon by the mind in determining the 
cause of such sensations. 2. The source or origin 
of knowledge, according to the general acceptation 
of the term, is in the mind. In taking this position 
we must retain in the mind the difference between 
knowledge as it exists in connection with mental 
states, and the influences which may lead to or cause 
the existence of such mental states. 3. Ideas of 
internal origin may be readily and clearly defined ; 
yet it will not be necessary to dwell long here. The 
origin of the idea expressed by the terms thinking, 
willing, and believing can not be traced to the power 
or action of the senses ; for they are not the objects 
of the test or action of any of the senses. Neither 
can we say that the ideas of cause and effect, right 



INTERNAL ORIGIN OF KNOWLEDGE. 363 

and wrong, space or infinity, order, truth, and power 
can have their origin in the senses. The internal 
operations of the mind can exist and be known to 
us as primary sources of knowledge. 4. Internal 
ideas or notions may arise in connectien with the 
power of intuition^ and may be embraced in the 
understanding, where such ideas or notions may be 
inspected by the mind, and decided upon by the 
judgment. 5. The primary origin of knowledge 
can not be said, philosophically, to commence with 
any ulterior faculty or medium of mental action, but 
such origin of knowledge must be connected with 
the power of intuition. Intuitions appear to be 
spontaneous, and such intuitions, when they are 
brought under the power and action of reason and 
the judgment, may be known as ideas or notions. 
Here appears to be the beginning, under the inspec- 
tion of the mind, of the knowledge of the existence 
of such notions or ideas, or the beginning of the 
knowledge of what such ideas or notions reveal. 6. 
This may be extended by noticing complex ideas of 
internal origin. Such ideas are composed of ele- 
mentary facts, and these parts are simple or individ- 
ual entities. Consciousness, original and relative 
suggestion, are regarded as contributing to the 
origin of simple ideas, which are combined by 
reason and the judgment. The process of combin- 
ing these ideas may be carried on without reference 
to external things, and may be entirely an internal 
action or mental operation. 



364 LIMITATION OF MIND 



CHAPTER II. 

THE DOCTRINE OF PSYCHOLOGY AND ANTHROPOL- 
OGY CONTRASTED IN THE EXAMINATION 
OF THAT WHICH RESEMBLES MIND 
IN BRUTES. 



SECTION I. 

1. We do not introduce all the contents of this 
chapter as properly belonging to the analysis of 
mind, yet it contains many things which should be 
studied in connection with the examination of the 
elements of mind. That mind or spirit exists can 
not be doubted; and almost the next inquiry con- 
nected with this conclusion is in regard to the extent 
of mental or spiritual existence. Can any order or 
form of physical existence below that of man pos- 
sess, or have connected with it, any thing which in 
nature is similar, in any respect, to the human soul 
or mind ? If human beings are only possessed with 
spirit or mind, then all inferior orders of beings are 
wholly inert, or without sensitive animation. 2. Tlie 
mysterious connection of mind and matter is beyond 
the power and limits of philosophical investigation ; 
yet it is not improper for us to detect any power or 
influence existing in matter, or that is superadded 
to it, which naturally differs from perfect material 
entities. We can more readily discriminate and 
decide upon that which differs from matter by com- 
mencing with the lowest orders of material existen- 
ces, and travel up to the real existence of man. 3. 



LIMITATION OF MIND. 

In fixing the attention upon inert and inanimate 
matter, we can not discover any property, essence, 
or influence which resembles mind or spirit; but 
some combinations of crude matter may differ from 
other masses or portions of inert existences. A por- 
tion of clay may lie in the earth for thousands of 
years, without any increase or diminution, or any 
other change, so far as we can determine from any 
evidence within our power; but there are evidences 
which indicate and even establish the fact that other 
combinations increase in size, or grow with seem- 
ingly no cessation or interruption. Petrifactions 
are conclusive of the beginning and advancement 
of the work of change. The formation and growth 
of rock can not be doubted. This process of ad- 
vancement or growth, which characterizes the vari- 
ous degrees or conditions of such inert existences, 
has been called inanimate life in contradistinction 
to those existences which contain no real or contin- 
gent evidences of change. If the advancement or 
change indicated in maturing petrifications, crystal- 
lization, and enlargement of rocks can be called life, 
it is certainly the lowest order of life of which the 
mind can have any conception, while the student is 
left to controvert at pleasure the propriety or impro- 
priety of using the term life in this way. We will 
simply say that no geologist, lapidarian, or min- 
eralogist will dissent from the fact that such life, or 
change is very different from, and is of a lower de- 
gree or order than the life of timber or of vegeta- 
tion. The latter is periodical, and depends upon 
the change and condition of the seasons, while the 
former appears to be continuous and of an inherent 

31* 



366 LIMITATION OF MIND. 

nature, independent of the influence of the vernal 
sun, summer solstice, or tropical shadow; but in 
connection with this process or change, there is no 
evidence of mind or spirit, in any possible way, or 
in the slightest degree. 4. That hind of inanimate 
life, an idea of which is presented to the mind in 
the growth of timber or vegetation, is of a higher 
order than that to which our attention has just been 
called. The growth of vegetation depends upon 
certain influences immediately connected, such as 
the warming and invigorating power of the sun, and 
the reviving effect and motion of the atmosphere ; 
but a sufficient cause can destroy the emerald, hues 
of the summer forest, which shows that this kind of 
life is more easily disturbed and destroyed than that 
of a still lower order; yet there is not connected 
with vegetable life any thing which indicates the 
presence of mental or spiritual influences in the 
slightest degree. 



SECTION II. 

1. Animated existences, or animal life, is very 
different from that of inanimate realities. Animals 
or brutes are classed in a higher order or scale of 
beings than those orders of which we have just 
been speaking. The evidences of this fact are 
plain and of universal acknowledgment, and we 
are forced to the conclusion that beasts, birds, 
and fish possess something more than is or can 
be contained wholly or only in material elements 
or existences. 2. Brutes exist either wholly or 
only of material elements, or that influence or 



EXTENT OF MENTAL INTIMATIONS. 367 

power which is connected with or is possessed 
by such elements differing from them, must be 
superadded or is superior to any essence or ele- 
ments of matter; and if there is, in the existence 
of brutes, any thing which is different from the es- 
sential elements and qualities of matter, andv supe- 
rior to them, we must look elsewhere for such influ- 
ences or qualities than in those things which are 
essential to the existence of matter. 3. Insensibil- 
ity and inertness are essential to the existence of 
matter, and without these matter would cease to be 
matter; but brutes could not exist and be wholly 
pervaded and possessed of these. 4. Brutes possess 
animation, or life, differing very much from any 
thing belonging to inanimate existences. The life 
of the zoological world is of a different nature, and 
under different laws from any existence of an inani- 
mate order. We will now proceed to notice some 
of the leading differences in which all beings hav- 
ing animate existence or life, and the power of self- 
action or motion, is superior to all insensible and 
inert existences. 



SECTION III. 
1. Brutes differ from inert existences in being 
possessed of life with sensitiveness, or are capable 
of experiencing sensations ; and they can not expe- 
rience sensations without having internal power to 
realize such influences ; and if they are capable of 
realizing or experiencing sensations, that internal 
power by which such sensations are tested is differ- 
ent from crude matter, and is superior to it. If we 



368 EXTENT OF MENTAL INTIMATIONS. 

have no evidence that matter can or will ever be 
annihilated, it would be absurd to conclude that a 
superior influence or nature possessed by brutes, or 
if it be superadded to them, can or will ever be 
annihilated. 2. Brutes have power of self-action, 
w T hich is perfectly opposed to the nature of matter, 
and contradictory to all laws governing material 
elements or existences. If a brute is wholly a ma- 
terial existent, motion would be utterly impossible, 
as inertness is essential to the existence of matter; 
therefore, that power in brutes which moves, or 
causes motion, is different in nature, and is superior 
to matter. 3. To a certain extent brutes see, feel, 
taste, smell, and hear. Some of these powers are 
more acute than they are in connection with the 
human body, yet they are not connected with a 
mind that can reason or that is capable of moral in- 
fluences ; but these are so exercised by brutes as to 
give clear proof that they are not wholly and only 
material entities. In connection with their physical 
natures there is something more, or another nature 
which is distinct from matter, and must be superior 
to it. 4. This internal and superior natural and 
motive power possessed by brutes has been called 
instinct; but what is instinct with the lowest degree 
of meaning that can be properly attached to it? It 
is a certain internal influence, disposition, or power 
by which, independent of all instruction or experi- 
ence, animals are correctly directed to do spontane- 
ously whatever is necessary for the preservation 
of life, or the securing of pleasure : hence, it is 
utterly impossible to define the power of instinct to 
be in nature and reality only matter. We will now 



EXTENT OF MENTAL INTIMATIONS. 3(39 

proceed to notice the powers and action of that 
which is called instinct in brutes, which resembles 
mind, and appears to establish the fact that brutes 
are possessed with that which may be called spirit, 
as well as that part of their existence which is called 
physical. 



SECTION IV. 
1. Volition, to some extent, is evidenced in the 
freedom of animal action. This can be noticed in 
the manner of their movements or acts. If they are 
escaping from clanger, there is care manifested in 
selecting the safest and quickest way of escape. 
This is clearly tested from the fact that they never 
choose the direction of danger or of their foe. 
Whether this power of voluntary preference should 
be called volition or not, we are certain that it is not 
matter, and that it is superior to it. 2. Brutes ap- 
pear to have power to detect approaching danger 
and a knowledge of the way to escape. This appears 
to be connected with the nature of their existence ; 
but it also admits of degrees of maturity ; for the 
young of all sagacious animals appear at first to 
have but little alarm at danger, though this is soon 
remedied by a more matured degree of care. All 
of these things are unknown to the nature and exist- 
ence of matter. 3. Brutes appear to have naturally 
a knowledge of courses, and have but little confusion 
in determining and in pursuing the proper direction 
to any place where they have ever been, and often 
are seen moving from one section of the globe to a 
more plentiful region, though they may have never 



370 EXTENT OF MENTAL INTIMATIONS. 

passed that way before. Bears, in times of great 
scarcity, have traveled from their native woods 
through cultivated parts of the country for hundreds 
of miles, on a direct course to a new wilderness 
abounding with supplies. And with what exact- 
ness and certainty do the different kinds of birds 
direct their course in the heavens, alternating with 
the seasons in going from one climate to another! 
No philosopher can say that all these evidences of 
mind, in some way, and degree, are wholly the re- 
sult of material entities and of material laws. Such 
implications would almost astonish the insensible 
earth. 4. The horse and dog know their masters 
by sight, and they know them by the sound of the 
•mice. They are capable of being so trained that 
they will act or move in different ways by certain 
motions or sounds of the voice. This is positive 
proof that they are more capable of improvement or 
cultivation than mere inert matter. ISTo one can 
doubt such a conclusion. 5. The power of judg- 
ment and comparison appear to be evidenced, to 
some degree, in the acts of some animals. Some 
horses have been known to move with much more 
care if some female or timid person is driving them, 
and especially if the harness should begin to give 
way in some dangerous place. A fox was once ob- 
served to run down into water, and gradually sink 
under, holding a lock of wool in his mouth above 
the water. On drawing his head under the water, 
the wool floated off, which was found to be full of 
fleas. Another instance is given of a fox that was 
observed in a field, playing round a group of pigs 
as though the large swine were objects of terror. 



EXTENT OF MENTAL INTIMATIONS. 371 

The fox suddenly caught up a piece of wood about 
the size of a pig, and running toward the fence, 
jumped through a large crack; then he dropped 
the wood, and returned to the swine, seized a pig, 
and ran through the fence with it at the very same 
place. No doubt but that he compared the pig 
with the size of the wood, in order to judge of the 
chance to escape with his prey. All these traits of 
mind or spirit can not be the result of insensible 
matter. The foregoing facts are evidences of a 
spiritual nature ; and if brutes have a spiritual na- 
ture, we will have to call it an immaterial nature; 
and if immaterial, we have no evidence to believe 
but that it is indestructible ; for if we have no evi- 
dence that material elements will ever be annihi- 
lated, we have still less reason to doubt the imper- 
ishability of spiritual existences. 



SECTION V. 
1. "We have, from the preceding arguments, ar- 
rived at the fact, that brutes have some kind of a 
spiritual existence or nature, as well as a material 
one. This is clearly set forth in the great and mul- 
tiplied differences existing between inert elements, 
whether separate or compounded, and the condition, 
action, and conduct of brutes as they are. This is 
also established upon the degrees of difference among 
brutes themselves. Some are by nature but little 
removed from mere self-moving matter, while others 
are naturally sagacious, and are capable of improve- 
ment by careful training. 2. Whatever may be the 
character of brute intelligence, and notwithstanding 



372 EXTENT OF MENTAL INTIMATIONS. 

the high degree to which it may be elevated by care- 
ful training, yet they are very far removed from real 
rationality, and the power and action of any thing 
like conscience. 3. That natural inclination or 
influence which is present with brutes in aiding 
them to search out that which is naturally adapted 
to the appetite, or the demands of their constitu- 
tional existence, has been called instinct ; but that 
power which is susceptible of being cultivated, and 
of choosing ways and means adapted to certain re- 
sults, has been called instinctive intelligence; yet 
the student is not to conclude from such facts that 
brutes are reasonable, moral, and intellectual beings, 
for they are far from such an exalted position. With 
all the manifestations of their nature and being, they 
only serve to draw that contrast by which intellect- 
ual man stands pre-eminent above all, towering in 
thought amid the imperishable realities and glories 
of infinite duration. 4. Instinctive intelligence is 
manifested in the conduct or operations of bees. 
How appropriately they arrange the house of the 
governing bee! and whenever this bee is there all is 
harmony. If this bee leaves the hive, all of the 
others will follow ; and if this bee dies, the fact is 
soon known throughout the hive. The work is sus- 
pended, gloom spreads over them, and they appear 
to die in despair ; but there appears to be wisdom 
and skill displayed in the manner and form of their 
work. The very form of their cells evidences wis- 
dom. Mathematicians are indebted to them for a 
form after that of the cells of the honeycomb, 
which will hold more than any other upon a base 
of the same dimensions. Similar intimations of a 



EXTENT OF MENTAL INTIMATIONS. 373 

high order of instinctive power is evidenced in the 
mysterious ways in which wild animals procure or 
take their prey. These traits are not matter. 



SECTION VI. 
1. There is a great dissimilarity existing between 
the powers of man and that of the brute. The 
former is naturally constituted with superior powers, 
and has control of them in the examination of any 
subject. He can combine or abstract at pleasure. 
His cogitations can be continued or suspended, va- 
ried or changed by a voluntary act. The brute 
may be said to have perceptions of external things, 
and may move in the direction of some object of 
sight ; yet there is no power to combine facts or to 
reason in regard to them. 2. There is an intuitive 
inclination in man to look for a cause when an effect 
is produced, and involuntarily we begin to progress 
in thought or argumentation from the effect back to 
its corresponding cause ; but there appears to be no 
power connected with the manifestations of instinct- 
ive intelligence to look at any thing in this way — 
no contingencies are seemingly involved. 3. The 
human mind, from the nature of its structure, 
and its power of action, is really scientific in its 
research. It is from its organization naturally di- 
rected to the apprehending and comprehension 
of primary truths, following them out either singly 
or in a combined relationship to their various 
results. In this process the mind must be capable 
of making science explain enigmatical scientific 
propositions and combinations of supposed facts. 

32 



374 EXTENT OF MENTAL INTIMATIONS. 

The brute appears to act from what he sees, hears, 
and feels, without any reference to the cause, or as 
to why such cause or causes exist. He appears to 
be governed by a simple perception of objects, with- 
out any explanation in regard to them. 4. The 
human mind is capable of progressive improvement, 
and its rising efforts and conquests in scientific 
knowledge appear to be bounded only by the fee- 
bleness or paralyzing weakness of physical organs. 
The brute intelligence appears to be susceptible of 
improvement, in some instances, to a very limited 
extent, and none of them can pass beyond certain 
limits or bounds. They may be said to remain in 
their generations in the same limitations of instinct- 
ive action ; but the imperishable mind of man, lim- 
itless in research, sends out its exploring thoughts, 
like a burning sun radiates its million beams of 
light, filling the universe with the brilliancy of 
effulgent da}^. Man is possessed of a conscience, 
and feels himself to be a moral agent, and accounta- 
ble to God ; but the brute is without any innate moral 
principle, and can not possess moral feelings, or in- 
ternally, from desire, perform a moral action. 



SECTION VII. 
1. The human mind can not become familiar 
with scientific research, and arrive at true knowl- 
edge, without the presence and action of self-con- 
sciousness, reason, original suggestion, the under- 
standing, and the judgment. These appear to be 
absent in the manifestations of brute intelligence ; or, 
if there be any resemblance of them, in connection 



EXTENT OF MENTAL INTIMATIONS. 375 

with the existence and acts of brutes, it is so faint 
that it is not worthy a passing notice at present. 
The absence of reason only would destroy all power 
of arriving at scientific knowledge, and many other 
faculties would be rendered useless if not destroyed. 
Eeason appears to be absent in brute instinct : 
hence a distinguishing difference between man and 
the brute. 2. The brute does not appear to possess 
the power of reason, self -consciousness, understand- 
ing, judgment, classification, nor generalization. 
These are essential to a rational and an intellectual 
mind ; but the entire absence of them in brute in- 
telligence is evident, and enters into the cause of 
such a great difference between the contrasted exist- 
ences. 3. Man is a moral agent, and is subject to 
moral feelings, his conscience constituting the great 
court of appeal ; and, in connection with it, the 
moral sensibilities, emotions, and feelings appear to 
harmonize. Here intuitive convictions arise in re- 
gard to right and wrong / but the brute, oeing to- 
tally destitute of all these, must hold a lower posi- 
tion in the scale of beings, having claim to a spiritual 
existence. 4. We have proceeded far enough in 
contrasting the mental powers of man with the in- 
stinctive intelligence of the brute. It is sufficient 
for us to know that the human mind is very differ- 
ent, and that it is almost infinitely superior to any 
thing possessed in brute instinct or existence ; but, 
on the other hand, it is illogical and absurd to deny 
lthe brute that which he does possess, and that which 
he possesses to our certain knowledge. 5. That 
which appears to have been overlooked by writers is 
that the brute has, as far as we can determine, a 



376 EXTENT OF MENTAL INTIMATIONS. 

spirit as well as a body, and that the spirit in its 
manifestations is far more intellectual than mere 
inert matter could be in its most refined nature. 



SECTION VIII. 
1. The brute, to a limited extent, is capable of 
being taught, which is utterly impossible, if there 
was no principle of any kind capable of being 
taught differing from any thing that can be found in 
matter. The fact that they can be taught to any 
degree, or that they naturally know any thing, or 
have self-power to move, is conclusive proof that 
they have a nature differing from matter, and supe- 
rior to it. 2. The dog can be taught to go errands 
for his master, and to look for game in any direc- 
tion, by the motion of the hand. If he is com- 
manded to watch at any certain place, he will re- 
main there till released by his master. The sound 
of two words will change alternately the course of 
a horse. 3. Animals have been learned to dance at 
the sound of music. This has been thought to arise 
from the fact that they were trained upon hot plates 
of iron in the first place, and that ever afterward, 
on hearing music similar to that played while they 
were dancing on the hot iron, they would begin to 
dance; "and that the associations which had been 
established between the sound of music and the 
mere animal sensibilities reproduced dancing." If 
this is true, and proves any thing, it proves too 
much; for then the brute must have power to dis- 
tinguish such associations of music from other asso- 
ciations of music, or of sounds, in order to know 



EXTENT OF MENTAL INTIMATIONS. 377 

when to dance; and. in the next place, it proves 
that the brute has power of memory in calling up 
the associations connected with music and circum- 
stances long since past ; therefore, we know that the 
principle of their nature which can be thus affected, 
can not be inert matter, and all we contend for is 
true, that brutes have a spiritual nature which must 
be superior to matter. 4. That memory in the human 
mind is distinctly different from "brute memory is 
very clear and conclusive ; but the idea that no such 
thing exists in connection with brutes as memory is 
absurd. It will not do to define it to be nothing 
more than mere animal sensibilities affected in a 
certain way. To say that, when a brute has been 
affected in a given manner, the same sensations are 
reproduced in him when under similar circum- 
stances, and the same actions are repeated, is ac- 
knowledging, in substance, the very fact which is 
intended to be refuted by transferring the power of 
memory from any thing like spirit or mind in brutes 
to mere sensations or sensibilities which can not 
be within and of themselves inert matter ; and if 
we have to acknowledge some spiritual power con- 
nected with brutes — and to this issue we are driven 
whether we desire it or not — then we can have no dif- 
ficulty in believing that this superadded or superior 
spiritual nature can exercise, to a limited extent, the 
power of memory, and just such a memory as the 
wise Author of their being saw best adapted to them 

as brutes. 

32* 



378 EXTENT OF MENTAL INTIMATIONS. 

SECTION IX. 
1. A horse can recollect the road in returning to 
his home from a distant country. We have an ac- 
count of a horse, owned by an itinerant minister in 
this country. In one part of his circuit he always 
turned off from the highway, along a path at a cer- 
tain tree. After the lapse of seven years, he was 
returning along the same highway ; when he came 
to the same tree, the horse turned off with an enliv- 
ened speed, and it was with difficulty that he could 
be turned back to the road. Such facts are common 
to those who travel with horses. To account for 
such evidences of memory and knowledge in any 
other way than that of real memory, and real knowl- 
edge, in a limited extent, existing in connection 
with the existence of brutes, is impossible. 2. We 
are compelled to believe that in brutes there is an act- 
ive, living principle which in itself is not and can 
not be matter. However revolting this may be to 
unthinking minds, let them meet the case with argu- 
ments and facts, and we will submit the whole mat- 
ter at once. 3. Then, is there any thing more upon 
which we can ground a belief that brutes have spir- 
its ? We will say, first, that we have no evidence, 
from any source, which clearly shows that they have 
no spiritual nature, but there appears to be some 
additional evidence proving that they have. 
■ 

SECTION X. 

1. The term ruach, as it is used in the Hebrew 
Bible, when applied to human beings, means the 



EXTENT OF MENTAL INTIMATIONS. 379 

soul; but the same term is used in Scripture in 
regard to beasts, and means, without doubt, the 
spirit, or soul. But there are other terms which 
define the great difference which exists between 
the human soul and the soul of the beast. It is 
clear that, from the meaning of the term, men have 
souls, and that beasts have souls. The difference 
appears to be also defined, that the human soul was 
made for God, and it was intended that he should 
be its portion ; that it should return to him and enjoy 
endless happiness ; but that the soul of the beast 
was adapted to this lower world, and is to derive its 
happiness from it. 2. If the brute has a spirit, or 
soul, will not that spirit, or soul, exist forever? We 
may base an argument on this position upon the 
fact of the indestructibility of matter, or that we 
have no proof that any property of matter can or 
will ever cease to be. We have seen that all matter 
is under the influence of change only by reason of, 
or in connection with, the existence and effect of 
sin. When the world was made it was holy, and 
we can but believe that it was designed to continue 
so forever. If this be true, then it follows that 
when the effect of sin is wholly removed, all mate- 
rial elements will still exist, and never to be annihi- 
lated. If this be true, it is reasonable to infer that 
the spirit of brutes, which we have seen differs from, 
and to be superior to matter, will exist forever, and 
that, in connection with their bodies, immortalized 
in the restoration of all things. 3. Does it not ap- 
pear reasonable, that if beasts existed before the 
fall of man, they were pure in nature and free from 
servitude; and that they were designed to be happy 



380 EXTENT OF MENTAL INTIMATIONS 






forever? If their sufferings and death were brought 
upon them by man, and are the results of sin, what 
can be their condition and state, when sin and its 
effects are wholly removed, but that of happiness 
and life? If the brute suffers innocently it is only 
reasonable to suppose that they will be restored. 4. 
It is impossible for us to conceive that an all-wise 
Being would create beasts for the purpose of anni- 
hilating them at some future time. If they had 
been created suffering and dying before the fall, 
then we might have room to doubt; but as they 
were originally pure and huppy, it is reasonable to 
suppose that such will be their condition in the final 
restoration. 



INTUITIONS. 381 



CHAPTER III. 

INTUITIONS. 

SECTION I. 
1. By mental intuition is understood a natural 
internal power which acts in perceiving realities. 
It is the act by which the mind perceives the agree- 
ment or disagreement of two or more ideas, or real 
facts or truths, the moment they are presented. It 
is the power of perceiving facts immediately, with- 
out the intervention of reason, arguments, or testi- 
mony. It presents truths to the mind on bare in- 
spection, and this simple inspection is knowledge. 
2. This intuitive power has its origin in connection 
with the primary elements of the mind. Here phi- 
losophical inquiries must pause, as we can go no 
further back than original elements. 3. Several of 
the primary elements of mind may be regarded as 
intuition faculties ; but there are no powers of our 
being more closely connected with the origin of 
intuitions than consciousness and conscience. 4. 
In the reciprocal relations of intuitions it is impos- 
sible for them to be opposed to each other. They 
appear to arise as perfect spontaneities of empirical 
order. They are simple in their origin, being free 
from all contingent influences which may follow ; 
and it is impossible for the intuition faculties to be 
opposed to each other, or to the different intuitions 
which arise in connection with each one or all of 



382 INTUITIONS. 

them, as there can be nothing in the philosophy of 
mind anterior to those primary elements which lie 
at the foundation of mind. 






SECTION II. 
1. Ideas arise in the mind in connection with the 
existence, nature, and power of original elements. 
When intuitions arise they are immediately followed 
by the action of the judgment, in discriminating 
difference and resemblance, which presupposes the 
presence of consciousness, and afterward they are 
embraced by the understanding and reason. Thus, 
ideas may be said to commence with the notice the 
mind takes of intuitions in conditioning them, and 
in amplifying or changing them from the concrete 
to ideas known to exist either as entities combined 
or abstracted. 2. Simple ideas arise without nat- 
ural classification. It requires a special action of 
mind in evolving them as objects of reason, and in 
combining or in eliminating from the original, sim- 
ple concrete. 3. General ideas, or notions, may 
arise in connection with simple or even eliminated 
ones. "We may, in the first instance, have the per 
ception of a tree without any general idea of more 
at first than a specific tree ; but the perception of a 
second tree is succeeded by the suggestion of a third 
or more, till the judgment, discriminating, causes 
the mind to be led in contemplating an extended 
number of trees. The same process will hold good 
in regard to other objects. 



INTUITIONS. 383 

SECTION III. 

1. Spontaneous action, or developments of the in- 
telligence, are those which exist in the mind ante- 
rior to attention and a full apprehension of them ; 
but a correct and distinct apprehension of objects 
depends upon attention; for, till the mind gives at- 
tention to them, they can not be properly appre- 
hended, and be inspected or considered, in which 
they become the objects of reason and judgment. 
But there are states, or intuitive motions or affirma- 
tions of mind, which exist anterior to any act of 
attention. Such internal motions, states, or affirma- 
tions, which become objects of the motion and di- 
rection of attention, are spontaneous eliminations 
or developments of intuitive power. 2. When 
spontaneous developments are sufficiently appre- 
hended to secure attention, then the full apprehen- 
sion of them, in connection with which they are 
conditioned and decided upon, is voluntary as well 
as the exercise of those other powers in receiving 
them as knowledge ; but the manifestations or de- 
velopment of spontaneities previous to the voluntary 
action of the power of apprehension, attention, and 
judgment, must be regarded as involuntary. We 
can only be said to have merely a consciousness of 
them, and also, from the act of apprehending them, 
that something must have had an anterior existence. 
3. In connection with the action of these internal 
spontaneous affirmations is the intuitive conviction 
of self, and by reason of such action is the mind 
revealed to itself, and its real existence becomes 
knowledge. 4. Though a knowledge of self is re- 



384: INTUITIONS. 

vealed by reason of these spontaneities, acting out 
or from natural intuitive power, yet the character 
of self must begin with apprehension, attention, re- 
flection, and consideration. Under the inspection 
and decisions of the mind the process is continued, 
and our knowledge matured, after our existence has 
been first affirmed by natural or spontaneous intui- 
tions. 



SECTION IV. 
1. Instinct is that power or disposition of mind 
by which, wholly unaided by instruction or experi- 
ence, ~brutes are spontaneously and unerringly di- 
rected in self-preservation ; therefore, instinct is not 
material in nature or existence, but it is spiritual, 
and belongs to mind. 2. It has been admitted that 
the human mind is capable, and that it does possess 
instinctive power. This power or disposition of the 
mind arises in connection with intuitive affirmations 
of the mind, and is spontaneous without instruction, 
experience, deliberation, or reasoning. 3. If this 
be the true origin of instinctive manifestations, how 
can we so distinguish between its essential nature 
and action and that of mind so as to determine that 
it is not of mind ? If we admit the existence of in- 
stinct, we are compelled to acknowledge that, wher- 
ever it exists, and in connection with the origin of 
all such existences, there is mind, or a soul ; but 
the order or character of such a mind, or soul, must 
be determined by the facts existing in connection 
with it. 



COMMON SENSE. 385 



CHAPTER IV. 

COMMON SENSE. 
SECTION I. 

1. Common sense may be regarded as the process 
or power of practical judgment. In character it is 
regarded as that which is sound and safe, and it is 
efficient in directing us in proper deportment and to 
correct action. 2. It may be defined as the imme- 
diate or instantaneous decision of correct reason. 
It is universally appealed to as a correct guide in 
detecting falsehood, and in testing that which is 
true, and so presenting the same, confirming our 
confidence, while the objects of its power and action 
are received w r ith the utmost degree of certainty. 

3. The mental process which results in that to which 
the name of common sense is applied, appears to be 
controlled and modulated by certain facts, or classes 
of facts, common to the notice and experience of all 
minds ; and there is a peculiar similarity in the way 
all minds are affected and influenced, or are condi- 
tioned by such classes of facts. The sameness as to 
a general medium in which many minds are thus 
affected and guided, forms a concentrated equilib- 
rium of practical judgment, which is common to 
all minds in apprehending such truths or facts, and 
the influence they thus receive in common. This 
process gives rise to what is called common sense. 

4. Mental affirmations, which arise in connection 

33 



386 COMMON SENSE. 

with the same order or classes of truths common to 
all minds, being a result of unaffected reason, forms 
the peculiar condition and sound mental action, in- 
specting and presenting to us those events or facts 
which we immediately depend on and receive as 
true. Such a mental process, under circumstances 
common to all minds, forms the basis of certain ac- 
tion, and in connection with it is our belief of real 
facts or events ; therefore, common sense becomes 
something like a similar and medium court of ap- 
peals common to all minds, and by which much 
uniformity of action among all classes is preserved, 
and that of correct sentiment and feeling. It is the 
instantaneous decision of reason in connection with 
real mental affirmations. 



SECTION II. 
1. The vivid and correct exercise of this mental 
power, which is not really a faculty, is of the utmost 
importance in constituting a well-regulated mind. 
Some minds are capable of being called great and 
overwhelming in that which might be called uncom- 
mon sense, while they are almost entirely destitute 
of common sense. The former is attended with 
strong, hasty, and ill-timed efforts or action, while 
the latter is characterized with prudence and suc- 
cessful efforts with increasing influence. 2. The 
mental action or power called common sense is man- 
ifested by no appeal to casualities or assumption, 
but it commences with the real affirmatio?is of the 
mind. The origin of its action is not with external 
objects, but it commences wholly within the mind, 



COMMON SENSE. 387 

in connection with truths apprehended, and the im- 
mediate action of reason. 3. Common sense is not 
only dependent upon the power and correct action 
of reason in connecting facts necessary to final re- 
sults, but it is more dependent upon a well-balanced 
judgment. Real mental affirmations can not be 
connected with the true facts and principles of com- 
mon sense till they are, by a proper discrimination, 
classified, combined, or abstracted, which is the 
work of the judgment. In this way all the facts 
connected with any subject, or class of objects, are 
carefully considered, and contribute their proper 
weight, while the mind is deciding upon any sub- 
ject or course of action. The mass of mankind, in 
different ages of the world, have been appealed to, 
and have heard almost every variety of contradict- 
ory views and doctrines ; yet they were not and are 
not compelled to adopt any extreme by falling back 
upon that uniformity which is found in the general 
medium called common sense. 4. The reality of 
common sense involves a general understanding of 
facts, notions, and feelings evident in themselves, 
which are the objects of the judgment, giving 
strength to belief and direction to our action. In 
the very nature of this power there appears to be a 
healthy action of the various faculties concentrating 
in a common consent to, and a correct understand- 
ing of that which is true of the thousands of facts 
and events which are present. This process appears 
to be common to all minds, and. forms a medium in 
the judgment and for the action of the masses. 
Then it is peculiar to the office of common sense to 
direct in solving questions from our experience in, 



388 COMMON SENSE. 

and knowledge of past and present truths ; and it 
is, in reality, a combination of solutions to questions 
forming a basis or power in judging and acting cor- 
rectly. 



SECTION III. 
1. If common sense he affirmations common to all 
minds, and that these are immediately connected 
with the exercise of reason and judgment, then it 
can not be absent in any mind, or such a mind must 
act almost by accident, and always appear to be un- 
settled and unhappy in the midst of contentions, or 
when surrounded by storms. 2. Common sense 
directs in correct investigations, and is a guide to 
truth. Its aid in the detection of error is of the 
utmost importance. An appeal may be made to 
this power with full assurance, and with confidence 
of certain success. We can not have confidence in 
the correctness in any process or conclusions which 
are perfectly contradictory to it, as the lapse of time 
and the bestowment of more thought almost inva- 
riably reveals some error or absurdity. This power 
must have its place, and exercise its influence in the 
mind, or we are soon wild with extravagance and 
endless delusions. To think of ever or of really 
feasting the immortal mind in extended fields of 
mere assumptions and conjecture, is only to be 
always deluded, and rendered unfit for that which 
is, good or honorable within the range of that re- 
quirement which will not tolerate impurity. 3. This 
power, so indispensably connected with a well-reg- 
ulated mind, may he cultivated and rendered more 



COMMON SENSE. 389 

efficient in directing to proper conclusions. This 
may be done by carefully attending to the process 
or reasoning, and the true and correct discrimina- 
ting power of the judgment. Repeated efforts should 
be made, under deliberate reflection, to compare and 
properly weigh all the facts present, which form an 
aggregate union or equilibrium force of agreement, 
which may be regarded as a safe basis or ground of 
confidence or belief, in regulating our decisions and 
action. Common sense is an invaluable treasure of 
the soul, and wherever it exists the mind is capaci- 
tated for undisturbed happiness and great useful- 
ness in the world. 

33* 



^iUum <tzltbnt\ 



CHAPTER I. 

VOLITION. 

SECTION I. 
1. Volition has been regarded as the power of 
willing or of determining. Under the just and 
equitable laws by which the Creator governs the 
work of his hands, volition is essential to the exist- 
ence of sentient beings of high moral destiny. This 
power is very closely connected with the existence 
and nature of the entire faculties of the mind, or 
soul. 2. It is also defined to be the act of willing 
and the act of determining choice, or of forming 
purposes to be carried out by the action of the whole 
mind. We shall see that this subject is of the high- 
est importance, and that it has been trammeled 
under the power and influence of prejudice and 
imperfect reasoning for ages, and that, without a 
clear and correct knowledge of it, the writer and 
speaker will always be embarrassed in presenting 
and in enforcing some of the most important truths 
connected with our happiness in this life, and our 
felicity in a peaceful immortality. 3. A president 
of one of our western colleges, favorably and exten- 
sively known, defined volition, in a baccalaureate 
address, in substance as follows : " Volition in man 
390 



VOLITION. 391 

is that power which moves his body. That it has, 
in whole or in part, any power or influence over the 
mind, is a doctrine we think long since lost in obliv- 
ion." How are students to gain correct ideas of 
mental powers from such instruction ? It would be 
far better for them to trust their own cogitations 
and the books, without any other means of instruc- 
tion upon the subject. If volition has power to 
move matter, and has no power or influence over 
the mind, then it is neither matter nor immaterial in 
its nature. If matter it would be inert, and if it 
was of mind it would act with the mental powers, 
and have power and influence, otherwise it would 
not have the power to move the body. 4. Volition 
is, in nature, freedom within itself. It has power 
of and within itself to act or refuse to act. This is 
implied in the use of the very term, its meaning, 
and the nature of the power it is intended to repre- 
sent. 



SECTION II. 
1. There is or there is not such a power as voli- 
tion. If there is no such power, then all arguments 
about it are unmeaning ; but the existence of such 
a faculty or power has been acknowledged by gen- 
eral consent; therefore, if there is such a mental 
power, it is characterized by its nature, office, and 
its relation to other faculties or powers. So far as 
it can be defined, its existence is real, and its nat- 
ural power to act within and of itself is untram- 
meled. 2. The doctrine that volition is only and 
simply the "aet" of the will, or that the "will is the 



392 VOLITION. 

mental power or susceptibility by which we put 
forth volitions," and admit such volitions to be sim- 
ple action, can. not be clearly sustained; for action is 
only action i and if we say the will has power to act, 
then volition would be lost in the same action, unless 
we were to say it was a secondary or double action 
in one. But this would be absurd; therefore, we 
claim that there is a more extensive and deeper 
meaning to be attributed to volition than simple 
will-act or will-action. 3. If volition be only sim- 
ple action, such action may be applied to the ac- 
tion of water, or of the atmosphere, with as much 
propriety as it can be to the action of the will, if its 
reality is wholly dependent upon the action of the 
will ; therefore, we must understand volition to have 
a far more important meaning than that which has 
been given to it by the preceding statement. 4. 
Volition can not be any thing more or less than 
an internal power existing naturally of self-freedom 
in action. No power of the mind restrains its ac- 
tion, in any way, by an authoritative or mandatory 
power, or by an unalterable necessity. It is a power 
truly volitive in its essential nature. Its action; 
naturally within itself, is unembarrassed, forming a 
basis or reason why sentient beings can have an 
existence ; for this power renders us capable, freely 
of and within ourselves, to render praise to, and to 
glorify the Creator; and this design could not be 
complied with, or be fulfilled by us, unless we were 
constituted with liberty to either render such hom- 
age or to refuse. And of necessity this universal 
liberty must be given, or the great object of man's 
creation would have been destroyed by law; and. 



VOLITION. 393 

therefore, his existence would have been impossible ; 
and as he is not compelled by law to glorify God, 
neither is he legally compelled to decline or refuse 
such homage. 






SECTION III. 
1. Volitions differ from volition only in the plu- 
rality of their various actions, or the almost simulta- 
neous eliminations of spontaneous motion, corre- 
sponding to various qualities of objects, or to those 
entities closely combined. 2. It is impossible to 
give a true definition of the nature of volition or of 
volitions. It is not proper to say they are simple 
states of mind, or that they are either mental de- 
terminations or conclusions ; for they are still more 
important, and lie back of all these. The moment 
we appeal to conscience and our experience, we are 
satisfied as to the existence of the power and action 
of volition, though the nature of either or both can 
not be defined. Consciousness appears to be the 
test power in relation to a knowledge of many influ- 
ences and principles of internal origin ; therefore, 
when we follow a subject, or fact, till the analysis, 
by means of reasoning, is lost, or can go no farther, 
then, if we can have a belief in realities, grounded 
upon the approval of consciousness, and relatively 
strengthened by experience, we are safe in our be- 
lief in such existences, and should not yield to doubt 
without being influenced by a new class of intuitions 
and convictions. 3. Volition may exist in reference 
to some object or objects, and also without any object. 
The belief that it can not exist without some object, 



394 VOLITION. 

is contrary to all our conceptions of its nature and 
office. If it only exists with an object, then its ex- 
istence is either an accident, as an object may or 
may not exist, or the object is the cause of its exist- 
ence ; therefore, such an existent has its origin 
wholly in or in connection with the object which 
may be inert; but this is absurd. We can form no 
correct idea of it only by the aid of consciousness : 
hence, the origin of our knowledge of it commences 
with consciousness. If the existence and action of 
intuitions are spontaneous, we can only conclude 
that volition may and does exist and act without 
any object ; for its very nature is freedom and self- 
authoritative action ; yet it has power also to act in 
relation to objects. 4. If volition can not exist only 
in relation to or with an object, then it follows that. 
if there is no object present, volition is non-ex- 
istence. It is dependent upon the presence of an 
object for its real being ; therefore, volition may 
have its origin in, or in connection with, external 
material entities. This position is false, though it is 
a correct conclusion drawn from the statements of 
some writers. The existence of volition is not de- 
pendent upon either the existence and presence of 
an object, or any ulterior action of the will; it is a 
power of the mind, and has, from its nature and 
action, an internal origin, and is not a casual entity, 
wholly dependent upon certain contingencies or ab- 
stract action for its being. It has its origin in con- 
nection with the existence and action of intuition 
faculties and intuitions. 5. It is utterly impossible 
for volition to consist only and wholly in the action 
of any faculty or faculties of mind ; for then its 



VOLITION. 395 

existence would be an accident, as such faculty or 
faculties may or may not act ; and if such action 
was not put forth, then volition could not be called 
up from nonentity, which would be natural to it; 
and if it could be thus called up, then each appear- 
ing of it would be a new creation, which is absurd, 
as no element of the mind has power to create an- 
other element or faculty. The definition of volition, 
as it has been given by a majority of writers, is 
based upon assumptions, without one clear and con- 
clusive argument or fact given in favor of such a 
definition ; for if volition is, in nature, only action, 
then the very idea of action implies something capa- 
ble of acting ; otherwise, action could not exist and 
volition would not and could never have an ex- 
istence. 



SECTION IV. 
1. Volition can and does exist of and within its own 
essential nature; and such real existence is inde- 
pendent of all contingent entities. It exists either 
with reference or without any reference to what we 
believe to be in our power. The latter consideration, 
which may be the object of belief, can neither cre- 
ate nor annihilate the abstract existence of volition 
as belonging to and existing in the mind ; and the 
action of belief has nothing to do in originating 
this internal power. 2. The exercise or action of 
volition can exist either in reference to or without 
any reference to what we believe to be in our power ; 
for the very nature of this internal power is self-lib- 
erty of motion or action ; and though such action 



396 VOLITION. 

may be restricted or varied by opposing causes, yet 
these are not necessitated laws authoritatively im- 
posed upon it by its Author. In nature it is still 
real, and possessed of spontaneous action. 3. Voli- 
tion is one thing, and volitive action is another. 
The former is an abiding power, and the latter may 
or may not exist. The former may exist without 
the latter, but the latter can not exist without the 
former. No man believes that he can fly, yet he 
has power to desire to do so; and he is capable of 
volitive action in regard to it, though he may not 
make the effort, and he may, as many have done in 
the past, make the effort, however unreasonable it 
may be. Volition, in relation to any impracticable 
thing, or results, is no more than the free motion of 
the volitive power toward or in relation to them. 
We are not to understand, therefore, that volition 
implies that the act desired is actually performed in 
order to constitute volitive action ; for, in that case, 
it would appear that the action must first be com- 
pleted, in order to know that we have had volition 
or volitive action. 






SECTION V. 
1. Volition and desire are not one and the same. 
The former may exist in nature independent of the 
latter, and it may act in reference to an object, or 
refuse to act. It can also act from its liberty in 
relation to inaccessible objects, or those we do not 
expect to obtain ; yet such action is soon suspended 
on the clear appr3hending of intervening impossi- 
bilities; but desire, in many instances, seems to be 



VOLITION. 397 

undying in its nature. When we have fondly cher- 
ished our desires for some object which we think 
might reasonably be ours, though there is not the 
slightest possibility of realizing the object, yet we 
can not totally suppress our desires. 2. The power 
of volition exists in the mind, and it can so exist at 
times, and under certain circumstances, without ac- 
tion ; but we generally understand by the term voli- 
tion this power acting or in action. The desires 
have no authoritative power over volition in con- 
trolling it ; yet our desires have their influence in 
inducing volitive action in the direction of them. 

3. Desire is no more than an emotion or excitement 
of the mind, directed to the attainment of some ob- 
ject, or a mental passion existing by the love of 
some object, which may be either good or bad ; but 
volition inclines or influences the mind to act in 
reference to objects, whether they be desired or not. 

4. A difference between desire and volition can be 
tested by consciousness. We can experience an 
internal discovery and decision of the two exist- 
ences with a conviction of the reality of that which 
is peculiar to the nature or character of each as 
clearly distinct. If from consciousness and experi- 
ence we can have knowledge of such powers, with 
their dissimilar characteristics, then it is impossible 
for us to ever have conceptions of them as one and 
the same. These differences have already been dis- 
cussed to a sufficient length. We know that we 
often have volitions, and act entirely contrary to our 
desires. Persons may desire to participate in some 
luxury, pleasure, or gain of earth, fraught, to some 
extent, with evil, while the strength of such de- 

84 



398 VOLITION. 

sires are overruled by the volitive power, in determ- 
ining and in pursuing a high and holy Christian 
course. 



SECTION VI. 

1. Volition differs from desire in its power of 
sudden change, and its controlling power over it 01 
in counteracting it, while the latter can not readil; 
change, and can only affect the action of the formei 
by a mild influence, inducing action. Volitions cai 
be changed with the rapidity of thought, till such 
changes may number thousands in a few hours. So 
rapid is this process, that we have only to appeal to 
the action of this power as it is experienced in each 
mind, as proof or knowledge of the fact; but desire, 
though it may be attended with joy or heaviness of 
spirit, yet it can not be easily changed under certain 
circumstances. The traveler from home may desire 
to return, but he voluntarily conquers its power by 
pursuing his lonely journey, while his eyes give vent 
to his feelings in a flood of tears. That man who 
has been exposed to the storms of maritime life 
can not change his desires to see his loved friends 
at home, having been long absent from them. No 
person who is rocked on ocean waves, in returning 
from some transmarine country, can cease to cherish 
a thrilling desire to see his home and dearest friends 
in his native land. 2. If the power of volition 
necessarily acted in conformity with our highest or 
strongest desire, we would be destitute of any rule 
of morality, which would be capable of restraining 
from any evil a depraved nature could wish ; but 



VOLITION. 399 

conscience furnishes correction to evil desires by 
dictating that which is right and that which should 
be done. In this way conscience furnishes motive 
to volition, but in no case can it command or control 
it ; and if the presence of correct motive is wholly 
dependent upon conscience and consciousness as 
that which is proper for volitive action, and that 
neither conscience nor consciousness has, by nature, 
power to authoritatively govern the volitive power, 
then it is absolutely certain that motive furnished 
by them can not peremptorily govern or control voli- 
tion, or the will, under any circumstances; there- 
fore, motive may and can invoke volitive action, but 
never can command its action : hence, such an idea 
is not only without proof, but it is clearly absurd 
within itself. 3. There is a vast difference in the 
condition or character of motive furnished by the 
elements of mind, which lie at the foundation of 
moral action, and that which is furnished by our 
propensities or passions. The former is presented 
in counter-distinction to impure influences, while 
the latter corresponds with the corruption of our 
fallen and depraved natures ; and to pursue it or to 
be led by it is delusion and hopeless despair. 4. 
Intellectual and moral beings are capable of being 
led by pure motive, and such motive is furnished 
by those mental powers which lie at the foundation 
of moral action. Without the development of 
these powers of moral action, man would be like 
the brute, led by desires which correspond to and 
act in conformity with mere animal nature; but, 
possessed of moral susceptibilities, we have light 
to act correctly, and if we refuse, guilt is the result. 



400 VOLITION. 

And when we voluntarily act in reference to any 
object, we have an immediate, internal conviction 
as to whether it be right or wrong. 



VOLITION. 401 



CHAPTER II. 

VOLITION, CONTINUED. 

SECTION I. 

1. The volitive power is manifested with various 
degrees of strength. Like other mental powers, it 
may be strongly or vigorously developed in some 
minds, while others appear to possess not so much 
of strength or degrees of power ; and this power, in 
the same mind, may be more vivid or energetic at 
some times, and under some circumstances., than 
others. This waning, so far as it is manifested in 
the latter case, may arise from a confused or wearied 
state of mind, or a diseased physical nature may 
trammel its action; but the former difficulty may 
exist in the natural condition of the mental consti- 
tution. 2. The same degrees of difference may be 
applied to the force of the action of the volitive 
power. Action may be either weak or strong, and 
the force of such action must, necessarily, depend 
upon the original power to act; for without such 
power action would be wholly an accident, if it 
could possibly have an existence. The different 
degrees of force connected with it are similar, in 
particular respects, to those connected with the ac- 
tion of other powers of the mind. A knowledge of 
these differences or degrees can be readily appre- 
hended or determined by an appeal to conscious- 
ness, in which we feel satisfied that what we realize 

34* 



402 VOLITION 



is true, and our belief is unshaken ; yet these de- 
grees may be varied by other causes than those im 
mediately connected with the immaterial nature — 
the incursive defects or diseases of the body may 
have either a direct or remote influence. 3. The 
action of the volitive power becomes vivid and 
strong in proportion to the strength of our feelings 
and desires in relation to or for any object. Though 
volitive action may take place in regard to any ob- 
ject of our wish or desires, yet it is not naturally 
dependent upon them for such action. "We have 
seen, from its nature, that it has power to act either 
with or without such desires, and also with or with- 
out any special object. 4. Volition differs from 
feeling. The former is the power of free or liberty- 
action, and its leading characteristic is motion or 
action, and not emotion or feeling: hence, volitive 
action is not necessitated by preference, feeling, or 
desire ; it has power to act either in connection with 
them or wholly without them. We should be very 
careful always to distinguish between those powers 
which lie at the foundation of mental action, and 
those which lie at the foundation of moral action. 
The nature of volition is clearly different from the 
moral sensibilities. 









SECTION II. 
1. Yolition relates to self-action, both as it relates 
to body and mind. The body may move volunta- 
rily or involuntarily, yet it can be made to move or 
be set in motion by volitive power. We may de- 
termine to put forth action of the bodily powers 




VOLITION. 403 

instantaneously, or that it shall be done at a certain 
epoch in the future. The mind can act either with 
or without any physical motion. In this way the 
mind can act in arranging any process of future or 
contemplated events or facts. It is difficult to ex- 
press the liberty and limitlessness of the volitive 
power. It is peculiar in nature to itself, and can 
not be arbitrarily trammeled by preference, desires, 
or motive. In its essential nature and existence it 
is free from all of them ; yet its action may, in a 
contingent way, be influenced by them. 2. We 
have seen, by the preceding argument, that volition, 
in its nature, embraces more than mere action, being 
a power capable of action, and at liberty to act in 
any way independently of other powers of the 
mind. It may and can be influenced in acting by 
other internal powers, but such action can not be 
compelled by contingent or external causes. We 
have demonstrated that mere action can not exist if 
there is nothing capable of acting : hence, the 
very term volition implies the action not of non- 
existence, but of something capable of motion or 
action. We have seen that volition is not desire, 
and that the essential existence of the former is not 
dependent upon the latter; neither can the latter 
authoritatively originate the former. It may exert 
an influence upon it, but can never compel volitive 
action. 3. Volition differs from choice. If our 
liberty consists wholly and only in our power of 
acting according to choice, then choice must inva- 
riably precede action, and be the cause of such ac- 
tion ; therefore, we can not commit crime till we 
first choose to do so, neither can we do a righteous 



404 VOLITION. 

act till we choose so to do ; but when a variety of 
objects are presented to us at the same time, we can 
have no voluntary mental action of any kind in 
comparing the properties or preferable qualities of 
them, in order to choose which we prefer, till we 
first choose to know that we can apprehend differ- 
ences in them, and that we can choose to originate 
mental action in apprehending their existence at 
all. This is absurd. Choice can never give origin 
to the volitive power. It may have a contingent or 
persuasive influence upon its action, but it can do 
no more. 4. Volitive liberty is, within itself, the 
power of acting or not acting, and that either with 
or without choice. Choice has no creative power 
by which volition is a mandatory result. Man's 
free agency consists not in the power to originate 
volition, but in the liberty of which such a power is 
naturally constituted. If this liberty is destroyed 
by necessity, then our existence has never taken 
place, as we would have no self-power to volunta- 
rily glorify the Author of our being; and we can 
have no conception that such an infinitely-wise and 
holy Being could ever have been employed in crea- 
ting intellectual and inert blanks to adorn the per- 
fection of limitless creation : therefore, liberty is 
essential to our existence. 



SECTION III. 

1. Yolition is anterior to choice; for choice, in its 

very nature, implies the possibility of a different or 

opposite selection to that which is made. Then if a 

different selection could have been made, the power 



VOLITION. 405 

and liberty of such selecting must necessarily exist 
anterior to choice, and the selection made; there- 
fore, choice can not exist till we have volitive ac- 
tion, at least, in connection with apprehending the 
presence of objects of choice. 2. There is an ante- 
cedent volitive power, in which there is always an 
alternative to that which the mind decides on, with 
the consciousness that we can choose either. This 
is a liberty we can not doubt. If many objects are 
presented to the mind, we are in possession of the 
same liberty to choose or not to choose any one or 
class of them ; and to deny this is to disorganize 
the rational mind, raftering in darkness the can- 
opy of its being and future hope with immovable 
confines and eternal clouds. If choice can not pre- 
cede volitive action, it is cleartthat it can not pre- 
cede the existence of the volitive power. 3. Then 
it follows that our choice, or act of choosing, is free, 
being opposed to any thing like an unchanging ne- 
cessity. Volitions can exist as opposed to the laws 
over matter and natural causation, and even the 
laws of instinct. Thus, the mind has volitive power 
to choose, in which alternatives are disposed of 
without respect to any natural relationship, ele- 
ments, or of cause and effect. The mind of man 
is free to act in accordance with the course of nat- 
ural laws and tendencies, or contrary to them ; 
and this same liberty exists in relation to imma- 
terial elements and laws. Mind is free in its 
natural existence, or liberty of action, amid all 
relations and laws of realities around him. 4. 
Volition is possessed either of self-freedom, or it is 
under the law of fatal necessity. If it is governed 



406 VOLITION. 

by choice, and choice is an effect of our constitu- 
tional organization, then the whole mind is under 
the law of necessity, whether it be regarded in a 
primary or a secondary point of light. It has been 
asserted that we are free, or are at liberty to act ac- 
cording to choice ; but we have seen that volition is 
anterior to choice, and that choice is dependent on 
it for existence. Sentient beings have self-power to 
act as opposed to natural tendencies and physical 
laws. The wheels of an extensive manufactory 
tend to rest, but they can all be thrown into motion 
by the great water-wheel, which yields to the weight 
of water, according to the law of gravitation. Tiie 
force of this law is the cause or necessity of action. 
If man acts only under the law of necessity, then it 
is the law which is Accountable for either good or 
bad deeds, as it is wholly the cause of every act of 
every order or kind. The idea and the possibility 
of choice, without the possibility of a different or a 
contrary choice, is utterly impossible ; and this lib- 
erty to choose is anterior to choice, and is only found 
in connection with intuitive power. 



SECTION IV. 
1. Another false proposition is, that "motives are 
causes, of which volitions are effects." It is again 
asserted that " every volition has a motive, and if 
the motive be single, which operates upon the will, 
such motive will determine it ; but if there are sev- 
eral operating upon it at the same time, the strong- 
est one will determine the will-action." It would 
appear that no proposition, or propositions, could be 



VOLITION. 407 

much more unreasonable or absurd. 2. Motive 
may be regarded as that which has power to invoke 
will-action; and when we speak of it, in connection 
with volition, we do not say motive is action, but it 
is that which invokes action of the volitive power; 
otherwise, motive and volitive action would be one 
and the same. If motive is not volition, then it can 
only influence the mind to action in a secondary 
way; for it is clear that, as it is not volition, it can 
not act either as or for volition, but it is rather a 
contingent object or influence inducing volitions. 
Then, in all cases, volitive power must exist anterior 
to motive, and motive can not and does not have 
any authoritative power over it. All that it can do 
is to invoke volitive action, which may be granted 
or refused at the pleasure of the will. 3. The origin 
and arrangement of motive, or motives, presupposes 
and proves the pre-existence and action of the voli- 
tive power. If we can pre arrange motives to pro- 
duce in the mind certain volitions, then the determ- 
ining to make such pre-arrangements is a volition, 
which volition must exist previous to motive, as its 
being is a prelude to the origin and arrangement of 
motive. Motive can exist, in the order of time, 
after volition; but motive, in the human mind, can 
never precede and give origin to the power of voli- 
tion. 4. Yolitions are spo7itaneous, and can exist 
independent of motive, and, in many instances, 
without being influenced by it in the slightest de- 
gree. Like intuitions, they can exist and become 
connected with the action of other powers of the 
mind ; so there is nothing like chance or irrational- 
ity in regard to them while connected with sentient 



408 VOLITION. 

beings. "We know, from the preceding argument, 
that motive can only have a secondary or an ulterior 
influence upon volition. The same principle applies 
to mind in general. The relation of cause and ef- 
fect, when referred to the acts of the divine Being, 
destroys all law of motive-control. Such a law, then, 
could not exist unless by Divine volition. Then, if 
he could act once without motive-influence, he could 
continue doing so forever: hence, motive can not 
authoritatively control either mind or volition. 



VOLITION. 409 



CHAPTER III. 

VOLITION, CONTINUED. 

SECTION I. 
1. Motive can not control the Divine mind. Dr. 
Edwards, in trying to sustain the doctrine of mo- 
tive, gives us to understand that the "energy of 
motives exists in the nature of things anterior to the 
will of God." Mr. Upham says that "the supreme 
Being is inevitably governed, in all his doings, by 
what, in the range of events, is wisest and best." 
Thus, he is inevitably subordinate to that which is 
superior in control, and which governs him ; there- 
fore, motive is superior to every thing, and it gov- 
erns all beings in the vast universe. If the above 
propositions be true, the sovereign Ruler of the uni- 
verse, or of universal being, is the energy of motives. 
This conclusion, if true, or if we could believe it to 
be true, would compel us to adopt Atheism as an in- 
evitable result ; but we have seen already the ab- 
surdity of all such statements, in the fact that voli- 
tion in mind any where is anterior to motive, and 
that motive never can originate volitive power, nor 
authoritatively control any of its acts. 2. Such a 
high motive-law leads to materialism; for the mind 
could not move only as it was influenced by motive, 
and in the same direction, and to the same degree, 
with motive-influence. Then, if the volitions of the 
mind should be operated upon by two or more mo- 

35 



410 VOLITION. 

tives of the same or equal importance in every way, 
the mind must cease to act, and remain at rest for- 
ever; therefore, mind would become inert, and if so 
it would become insensible, as sensation would im- 
ply action, and action could not take place. Deity 
in wisdom placed fixed laws over the material uni- 
verse, but he has placed self-moving and imperisha- 
ble minds under very different laws; and it only 
requires plain, common perception in order to dis- 
cern the difference. 3. It is utterly impossible to 
establish a conclusion that motive governs volition, 
without reasoning in a circle. If we ask certain 
philosophers what controls and determines the voli- 
tions, they answer that it is the strongest motive. 
But what constitutes the strongest motive? They 
say, that which determines the volitions. And they 
can not, neither dare they travel beyond this circle ; 
otherwise, this high law of motive is broken or sev- 
ered forever. 



SECTION II. 
1. That volitions are authoritatively controlled 
and determined by either motive or choice is di- 
rectly opposed to the consciousness of mankind. Of 
nothing are we more competent to judge, or are we 
more thoroughly prepared to decide, than that the 
volitive power lies back of both motive and choice ; 
and nothing do we know with more absolute cer- 
tainty than in regard to the action of the volitive 
power, as to whether it is necessitated or free. 
Evidence, reported to the mind through the medium 
of the senses, may deceive us, from the fact that the 



n 



VOLITION. 411 

physical organs connected with the senses may be 
affected or even paralyzed by disease ; but an appeal 
to consciousness is an end to all controversy or doubt. 
Its evidence can not be increased within itself, and 
its testimony is direct without the frailty of inter- 
vening material nerves, tending to paralysis and de- 
cay. If it be unreasonable to doubt evidence or 
testimony from external objects, it is infinitely more 
unreasonable and absurd to doubt our consciousness 
or its evidence. Its voice is without contingencies, 
or the possibility of deception, and to doubt its un- 
erring truthfulness is to be coerced into universal 
doubt and skepticism. 2. In the unerring truthful- 
ness of consciousness, we feel and know that our ac- 
tion in choice, and even in the selection of correct 
motive from evil, is not arbitrary ', hxitfree;-- and we 
can no more doubt it than we can the consciousness 
of self as a reality. In calling up our past acts 
which were evil, we feel that we were free at the 
time to have acted differently: hence the responsi- 
bility and accountability, a sense of which we could 
ot feel if our acts were necessitated. If we intend 
to do wrong, at a certain time in the future, we feel 
that it is positively in our power to avoid such an 
act, and consequently we feel and know we shall 
incur guilt, a sense of which we could not have if 
our volitions were controlled and determined by 
either choice or motives. 3. The untrammeled lib- 
herty of our volitions is clearly established, from the 
fact that the existence of consciousness in man pre- 
vents him from being effectually reasoned out of a 
sense of his accountability. They who have faith- 
fully tried to extinguish this internal light, have 



412 VOLITION. 

found it to be like smuggling subterraneous fires, 
the accumulation of which suddenly rends every 
obstruction with the throes of an earthquake. The 
reason is plain. We are more absolutely conscious 
of the liberty of our volitions in acting right or 
wrong, than we can be of any law of motives or 
even as to whether they can have any existence at 
all. We can have no sense of remorse for any act, 
however bad, without consciousness. While we feel 
that our evil acts are freely our own, we experience 
condemnation ; but if our acts are not wholly volun- 
tary, it is impossible to feel that we have done wrong. 



SUCTION III. 
1. We are more vividly conscious of the sensa- 
tions or feelings we experience in choosing, and in 
voluntarily choosing motive, than we can be even 
of the real objects of choice, or of that which gives 
rise to motives. When many motives influence the 
mind, such influence implies a previous voluntary 
action, which must take place in apprehending the 
presence or existence of such motives. The strong- 
est among many motives can not be determined till 
a previous voluntary action takes place: first, in 
apprehending them ; and, secondly, in comparing 
them, in order to determine upon the preferable or 
strongest one ; otherwise, the strongest one could 
never be known to the mind, as such motive or mo- 
tives have not self-power to make themselves known 
to the mind. 2. There is a difference between re- 
solving to act according to the strongest motive, 
after it is voluntarily discovered, and in acting 



VOLITION. 413 

from fatal necessity. In the very act of yielding to 
the strongest motive, after we have voluntarily de- 
termined it, we distinctly feel, in the resolving to 
conform to it, that, at the same time, we are entirely 
able and free to resolve on a different course. While 
standing on the projecting rocks of Niagara Palls, I 
may determine not to throw myself over, and, at 
the same moment, feel that I am able and can leap 
over and fall into the abyss below. From an inter- 
nal conscientious sense, I know that I am perfectly 
free to either result, and to doubt it is utterly impos- 
sible. In all cases we have a distinct consciousness 
of a power to act either in accordance with motives 
or in direct opposition. 3. If motives control and 
determine the volitive power, we are unable to find 
any well-founded and sound arguments establishing 
such a result ; but when the mind falls back upon 
the spontaneous affirmations arising in the depths 
of its inner being, we feel and know that we are 
free from any law of fatal necessity. 4. The strong- 
est motive affecting the mind is embraced in the 
law of self-preservation; yet we feel and know that 
it depends upon ourselves whether we may adhere 
to such a law or not. It is, with us, to become obe- 
dient to the rules or laws of health, or to be inten- 
tionally reckless of them, or we are at liberty to 
destroy life by violence ; but if we were compelled 
to this by motive, the act would be perfectly harm- 
less, as we have seen, according to the law of neces- 
sity, maintained by others, in which they hold that 
motive governs the entire universe ; but this is ab- 
surd. 

35* 



414 VOLITION. 

SECTION IY. 
1. The law of motive-necessity is contrary to the 
conscious feeling and acts of mankind in general. 
All claim to refer, in some way, to right and wrong, 
reward and punishment, merit and demerit. There 
is a universal feeling prompting to reward him who 
does right, and to punish the transgressor. This 
universal conformity of belief, conduct, and actions, 
which are regulated according to an internal con- 
scious feeling of liberty, in which we know that 
they can be correct or the reverse, according to the 
freedom of the volitive power, forever destroys any 
necessitated restrictions upon our spontaneous voli- 
tions. 2. Yolitions are spontaneous and free, from 
the fact that there is a universal conviction experi- 
enced in the human mind that our former course of 
conduct or acts might have been different from what 
they have been or are. ~No further proof is neces- 
sary, further than to attend to our feelings when we 
recall to mind the imperfections of our past acts. 
With deep regret we feel that they might have been 
right, or very different from what they are. This 
conscious regret is evidence that we could have 
acted differently ; for if the acts of our past lives, 
however wrong, were necessitated, it would be ut- 
terly impossible for us to experience any regret in 
regard to them ; but having such regret, or remorse 
of feelings, is positive proof that our acts are volun- 
tary. If others commit crime, it is impossible for 
us to feel guilty of their offenses ; and so it is with 
us. If motive controls us into crime, we are inno- 
cent, and can not feel remorse; for the crime or guilt 



YOLITION. 415 

is wholly in the motive which controlled us, and was 
the cause of that which was wrong. 3. The remem- 
brance of past acts is attended with a conviction or 
consciousness the most positive, that, in the same 
condition, or under identically the same circum- 
stances, our volition and acts might have been pre- 
cisely the reverse of what they were. In the recall- 
ing of any act, the consciousness of our power to 
have voluntarily determined and acted differently 
will be distinctly recalled in connection with the 
act, and the one is as clearly vivid as the other. If 
we are certain that we have ever had action of the 
volitive power, we are equally as conscious and cer- 
tain that we were free, and at liberty to have willed 
and acted to the reverse of such action. 4. In de- 
ciding upon the acts of others, we have a conscious 
sense of that which is right or wrong. These con- 
victions arise from a consciousness of mental lib- 
erty. We have an unerring conviction that all 
offenders might act differently if they would: hence 
their condemnation; for if we could feel and believe 
that their acts were necessitated, it would be impos- 
sible to censure them for any act. Therefore, the fact 
that we feel justified in condemning that which is 
wrong in others, is conclusive proof that we have 
an intuitive and spontaneous conviction that voli- 
tions are controlled or determined by no other fac- 
ulty or power of the entire mind. 



SECTION V. 
1. This conscious sense of liberty is evidenced in 
regard to acts of present time. If a variety of ob- 



416 VOLITION. 

jects are presented to the rnind, we know that we 
have power to collect any one of them, or any class ; 
and by this act of volition the object or motive is 
distinguished and selected, in connection with which 
we can act, continue to act, or refuse to act at any 
time. We are just as conscious that we naturally 
possess this liberty-power as we can be that there 
are any real entities in the universe. 2. The doc- 
trine that "motive produces volition, and that volition 
produces the act, and all the circumstances, taken 
together, constitutes the motive," is only favored 
with words and confusion of thought. It is a speci- 
men of that continuous, argumentative circle which 
is adopted by all who vindicate the laws of fatality. 
Yolition is antecedent to choice, and choice is ante- 
rior to motive. 3. Volition may be regarded as 
spontaneous liberty-power of action in any way, 
though this power may not be exerted in action. 4. 
It is the jpower of motion in determining an action 
within itself, and in relation to other things, though 
the action of the mind toward or in reference to 
such objects may not be completed. 5. It is the 
power of action, of determining action, and of en- 
forcing action under the full meaning of the will. 
6. The ground of our accountability exists in the 
possession of a liberty-power to do right, and to re- 
frain from evil or wrong. No where can we find the 
ground of accountability beyond the fact and nature 
of voluntariness. We are satisfied that man is ac- 
countable for ail his voluntary acts, and we are 
equally as well satisfied that he is not accountable 
for any thing beyond this ; therefore, if our volitions 
are controlled and coerced by any law or influence 



VOLITION. 417 

in the range of thought, then free will and all ac- 
countability ceases together, and our ideas of obli- 
gation, right and wrong tend to fatal deception. 7. 
Man naturally possesses volition, and he is capable 
of volitive action, or of putting forth volitions. If 
he is not capable of voluntary action, then it is need- 
less to exhort him to action in order to do right ; for 
he has no power to act. If we could ascertain, by 
some process, what the sovereign motive-power was, 
then it would be reasonable to appeal to that; for 
man is passive, while the motive power is the whole 
action and cause of action. Indeed, it would be 
useless to let man know any thing about duty, as 
motive -must do all and is accountable for all ; there- 
fore, if he should not act he is clear, and the whole 
blame is with the motive-power, which governs him. 
But we have pursued this topic far enough. The 
human mind exists in perpetual or unending freedom. 
By its self-power of action, under its present rela- 
tions to its Author, it either rises to happiness and 
heaven, or forces its way into gloomy despair. 



SECTION VI. 
1. Mr. Stewart says that M will properly expresses 
that power of the mind of which volition is the 
act." If volition is only the act of the will, why 
call it volition? for the act of the will is the act of 
the will, and it is no more or less. If will has real 
action, it would be foolish presumption to say that 
volition was the same action, and only the same, in 
essence and action ; yet this would be the case if 
volition is the action of the will; but this is false. 



418 VOLITION. 

Then, if volition be only the action of the will, and 
is dependent upon such action for its origin, and 
can not be the action of the will, as the will is 
acknowledged to have its own action, it must be 
an accidental and superadded action, which may 
have a casual being, and then sink into annihila- 
tion ; but this is absurd. 2. Then we must come to 
a more rational conclusion that volition can not exist 
only as action, unless there is something capable of 
moving or acting. The very idea of action implies 
a power capable of acting ; therefore, volition is a 
power of the mind capable of motion or action. 3. 
Mr. Upham says the will is " the mental power, or 
susceptibility, by which we put forth volitions." 
This amounts to about the same thing as that given 
by Mr. Stewart. But it would stand thus : that vo- 
lition, or the act of the will, is that which puts forth 
the act of the will. Who can understand such 
logic? Here comes again the same old hackneyed 
argumentative circle, the last resort of every philos- 
opher who attempts to chain or fatalize the free and 
imperishable human mind ! 4. Volition and the 
will are not distinct powers of the mind, neither are 
they co-ordinate branches of any mental power. 
One can not give rise to the other, nor are they de- 
pendent upon each other for existence. The two 
terms refer the mind to the different conditions and 
degrees of strength naturally connected with and 
contained in the one intellectual power. 5. The 
term volition refers the mind to the natural liberty- 
power, essentially free to act in any way or manner 
corresponding to the nature of such freedom. 6. 
The term will refers the mind to the same mental 



VOLITION. 419 

power of action, embracing not only its primary 
spontaneity, but involves an idea of its higher de- 
grees of strength, and authoritative and mandatory 
power, not only in giving origin to action, but in 
continuing, contracting, and in compelling action. 
All the difference that need be referred to in this 
place, in the meaning of the two terms, is embraced 
in the nature of the condition of the one power in 
its varied manifestations. We now enter upon the 
analysis of the will in its more extensive manifesta- 
tions, and will define, in brief form, its relation to 
other faculties of the mind. 



gifrision Ifeilli^ 



CHAPTER I. 

THE WILL. 
SECTION I. 

1. The will is that faculty of the mind by which 
we determine either to do or forbear an action. It 
is an inherent power or faculty which we exercise in 
deciding among two or more objects, as to which we 
shall choose or pursue. Its very nature precludes 
the necessity of an extensive analysis ; therefore, we 
do not feel called upon to amplify by following the 
example of previous writers, taxing the time and 
toils of the student in examining a general variety 
of subjects, having only a very remote and common 
relevancy to the important doctrine of the will ; 
yet we desire to involve in the argument more facts 
intimately connected with the doctrine of the will 
than can be found in any one work now extant. 2. 
The will, in its very nature, is the liberty-power of 
the mind. The peculiar condition of its essential 
being is the nature, which is self-freedom and self- 
power of action. 3. It is not only free in its very 
nature, but it has determining power, deciding in 
the mind that something shall be done or forborne ; 
and it possesses mandatory power, leading to such 
mental action as will be effectual, or will secure cer- 
420 



THE WILL. 421 

tain results. 4. The mind is controlled by the will 
in a sense superior to the nature, office, or capability 
of any other faculty or power of the mind. This 
will more fully appear when the nature, office, and 
power of the will are examined in connection with 
other faculties which are closely connected with it. 



SECTION II. 
1. The will is closely connected with the judg- 
ment, and can be and is often influenced by it ; yet, 
while the latter can discriminate and decide upon 
realities or facts, it requires the presence of the will 
in determining or in compelling action. The judg- 
ment can only act in relation to truths ; and when it 
decides, such decision is knowledge ; but the mind 
is wholly free to act or to forbear action. But when 
we will to secure that which is the object of decis- 
ion, the powers of the mind are directed to the 
work necessary to be accomplished. 2. The under- 
standing can not control the will. It has power 
to contain or embrace all that is necessary to be 
brought under the inspection of the mind, and, in 
this way, it can go no further than to invoke volitive 
action. 3. Reason may connect the different steps, 
or a chain of facts, from the premises to the result, 
but it has no authority over the will in causing ac- 
tion. Its power is under the control of the will, by 
which its action can be continued or suspended at 
pleasure. Its process may aid in inducing volitive 
action, but never can command such action. 4. We 
understand by the term will a commanding power, 
or a power which can direct. The understanding 



422 THE WILL. 

appears to contain or embrace all that is necessary 
to be furnished for immediate mental action; the 
judgment determines which is preferable, while it 
is the province of the will to decide on which to 
pursue, and to act in relation to that which is the 
object of such decision. 



SECTION III. 
1. We object to the order of the " classification 
of the mental powers," according to the arrange- 
ment of some writers, upon the nature of the will. 
A fine specimen of seemingly-unintentional, though 
intentional, design may be detected in the assump- 
tion, that " a knowledge of the will implies a pre- 
liminary knowledge of the intellect;" and that such 
" knowledge implies a preliminary knowledge of 
the sensibilities." This arrangement will claim that 
we have knowledge of the existence and action of 
several faculties as anterior to our knowledge of the 
will, thereby fixing a previous basis containing 
laws governing the will. The absurdity of this 
arrangement will be clearly defined hereafter. 2. 
To define the relation of the will to other faculties, 
or to all of them combined, in order to find some 
one or a combined influence as a law or laws of the 
will, by which it may be and is governed, is wholly 
unnecessary, as the very nature and relation of the 
will to all the other powers of the mind will forever 
preclude any idea of the correctness of such con- 
fused positions and argumentation. 3. Feeling, 
thinking, and willing are three faculties distinct 
from each other. They have been known as the 



THE WILL. 423 

sensibility, intellect, and the will. All sensitive 
states and feelings are referred to the first; all in- 
tellectual operations are referred to the second ; all 
mental determinations are referred to the third. 
These three powers of the mind are clearly distinct, 
and all that is embraced under each one. The will 
is distinct from all other powers. It is improper to 
call an act of the will either a thought or feeling. 
It is a determination or act peculiar to itself or its 
nature. 4. " Laws of the will " constitute a heading 
for lengthy arguments, according to some writers. 
The term law implies not only the power to rule, 
but a power which does control or direct. If phi- 
losophers, in using u laws of the will," intend to 
convey the idea that the will is governed by any 
law, or laws, beyond its own nature and being, it 
will be necessary for us to call on them for more 
light. 



SECTION IV. 
1. No material element, or elements, anterior to 
the existence of will in the human mind, can, of or 
within themselves, contain any law or laws possess- 
ing action; and if inertness would be essential to 
the nature of such existences, they could have no 
power over the will. 2. If they intend, by the 
" laws of the will," to say that the laws which Deity 
has fixed over the material universe have power to 
control the will, then mind is matter, and the will 
within itself is inert ; but this is false. 3. It can 
not be possible that they refer to the existence and 
controlling power of the divine Being ; for they 



424 THE WILL. 

could not call such an existence the "laws of the 
will," and if they do, it would follow that he is the 
action of our wills, and we are both passive and not 
accountable. 4. It can not be that they refer to any 
other faculty of the same finite mind ; for it would 
be just as improper for any faculty to have volitive 
power to act in the place of and for the will, as it 
would be for the will to act for itself. The will has 
power of action, and does act, in its own capacity, 
without calling any other faculty or faculties to act 
for it. 



NATURE OF THE WILL. 125 



CHAPTER II. 

NATURE OF THE WILL. 

SECTION I. 

1. "We have already seen that "laws of the will" 
as contained in some works on mental philosophy, can 
not exist, or, if it is possible for such to be real exist- 
ences, the human mind is incapable of having any 
satisfactory knowledge of them. 2. The will is gov- 
erned by its own law, and from its nature it is im- 
possible that any other faculty or faculties should 
control it ; and if the other powers of the mind have 
no authoritative power to control it, then it is absurd 
to say that any object selected by the mind can con- 
tain power to govern the will. 3. " Contingent ac- 
tion of the will" implies the continued being and 
power of action as possessed by other faculties of 
the mind, and that volitive action is accidental. If 
the action of the will is wholly accidental, then 
there is no abiding or real principle capable of 
being called the will. Then, if the will is contin- 
gent, or only exists in action, it follows that, when 
such action is suspended, the will is annihilated ; 
but contingent volitive action, as taught by many, 
is false, and is resorted to only for the purpose of 
destroying the liberty-power of the will. 4. If the 
mind has power to act within and of itself, the con- 
dition of such power is freedom, or liberty ; other- 
wise, no action could take place without an imping- 
36* 



426 NATURE OF THE WILL. 

ing cause. And if action is compelled, in any way, 
or by any power, beyond the identity of self, then 
action is caused by such an influence or power. 
Then that which causes mental action is that which 
acts while the mind is passive or wholly inactive ; 
but if the mind has self-power to act, it is reasonable 
to suppose that it possesses some faculty capable of 
acting, or of determining action. It is just as rea- 
sonable to suppose that the will possesses such voli- 
tive power as to refer such power to any other fac- 
ulty or influence. 



SECTION II. 
1. The doctrine that the "will has its laws prelim- 
inary to that of its freedom" as taught by Mr. Up- 
ham, and others, is clearly incorrect. Under this 
proposition, it is assumed that "the will is subject 
to laws." An argument to prove this is drawn from 
the fact that all things in the universe are subject to 
law, and that the mind of man can not be regarded 
as an exception. This general blending is very ob- 
jectionable. Why was there not a distinction made 
between the laws governing the inert part of the 
universe, and the laws governing the intellectual 
and immortal soul? If an uplifted rock is ponder- 
ous, and will naturally gravitate to the earth, is that 
conclusive proof that the soul is ponderous, and that 
it must naturally and always obey the same law of 
gravitation? If so we are undone forever. 2. The 
decision having been made, by Mr. Upham, and 
others, that " the will is subject to laws" then they 
make this deduction : " the freedom of the will^ 



NATURE OF THE WILL. 427 

whatever may he its nature, must accommodate itself 
to this preliminary fact" Here we have at least 
the will fatalized under the infinite law of necessity. 
But for this desired result, the "immortal" work of 
Mr. Edwards, Upham, and others, would probably 
not have been so amplified in the order of careful 
argumentation. While it is our happy privilege to 
profit by all that has gone before, we would humbly 
beg leave to give reasons for our belief and views 
of the doctrine of the will. 3. The argument seems 
to stand thus: The will is subject to and is governed 
by laws, and that the freedom of the will is the 
" liberty of acting " under and according to the na- 
ture and requirements of such laws. These laws 
are regarded as being infinite, and all they require 
is of infinite necessity. This system of philosophy 
teaches and enforces the doctrine of free will, which 
is our "freedom or liberty" to act according to neces- 
sity. This view of free will is absurd, as correct 
arguments will show. 4. We have already seen 
that the will is not subject to such laws ; and it will 
be remembered that " laws of the will " have been 
assumed, without any attempt to define them, or 
any one of them. The first position assumed was, 
that a knowledge of the will implied a previous 
knowledge of other powers of the mind. If that be 
true, it does not follow that those previously -known 
powers were laws governing the will ; for the very 
nature of those powers, as specified by them, w r ould 
forever refute such a position. The next general 
position is, that " the will has its laws preliminary 
to that of its freedom." Here "laws" are assumed 
without telling us what they are. We will now pro- 



428 NATURE OF THE WILL. 

ceed to notice those things which have been specif- 
ically mentioned and pointed out by them as gov- 
erning the will. 



SECTION III. 
1. The will may he influenced by desire, but it 
can never be controlled by desire, or desires, only in 
a subordinate way. The doctrine that the will is 
authoritatively controlled by desire, is too absurd to 
require any thing more than a passing notice. De- 
sire is no more than a mere emotion or excitement 
of the mind, directed to the attainment of an ob- 
ject. It is an inclination or wish for something to 
be enjoyed. That which we wish for or desire may 
become the object of the determining power of the 
will, or we may determine to pay no attention to the 
object of our desires, though the strength of such 
desires may remain unchanged. In traveling from 
home and friends, we may often desire to return; 
yet we have volitive power to continue our onward 
course to some far-off and perhaps uninteresting part 
of the world. 2. Desire, being only an emotion, 
can never, within and of itself, exercise any manda- 
tory influence and power over the will. 3. Desires 
may arise voluntarily and involuntarily. We have 
volitive power to turn our attention to an object, or 
class of objects, till such object, or something con- 
nected with the class of objects, becomes the object 
of desire; and, in connection with some peculiar 
condition or fitness in some object, which claims our 
voluntary attention, may arise a desire to have the 
same ii> ou^ possession. In this way desire may be 



NATURE OF THE WILL. 429 

successive to volition, if not a result of volitive ac- 
tion. Desires may be involuntary, though the will 
has power to cross or counteract the strength of such 
desires; and, by repeated efforts, it has power to 
diminish and to destroy them. 4. Desire can invoke 
volitive action, but can never command such action, 
and control its determinations. Our desires can 
exert an invoked subordinate influence upon the 
will, and, in this way, induce volitive action; but 
they can do no more. 



SECTION IV. 
1. Another position assumed by many writers, to 
enslave the will, is, that it is directed and positively 
controlled by choice. The liberty of the will con- 
sists in the power of acting according to choice ; 
therefore, choice controls the will, and our liberty is 
wholly embraced in obeying choice, our sovereign 
ruler. If choice has mandatory control of the will, 
it would follow that, when choice is exercised by 
any inert object, and as the power of choice could 
not act without such an object, the object would 
cause the exercise of choice; therefore, the inert ob- 
ject governs choice, and choice controls the will: 
hence, an inert object may be the sovereign ruler 
of the soul, with power to determine its fate forever; 
but this is false. 2. The very nature of choice im- 
plies the possibility of a different selection to that 
which is made. We intuitively feel that there is 
always an alternative to that which we choose or 
decide on; and as we compare different objects to- 
gether, we have an abiding consciousness that we 



430 NATURE OF THE WILL. 

are at liberty to choose any one under our inspec- 
tion. We know that we have volitive power to 
choose or not to choose, and it is utterly impossible 
for us to complete the act of choosing unless we de- 
termine to do so. When two or more objects are 
presented to the mind, we feel that we have power 
to choose any one of them, or to refuse making any 
choice. If choice can not be controlled in any way 
by the will, and is the result of some anterior con- 
stitutional determination, then it would follow that 
choice is inevitable, and that it can only take place 
as effect follows its cause. Then, choice could never 
take place only in an involuntary way. 3. We 
know that choice does exist ; then its origin must be 
caused by the laws of natural necessity, or the mind 
has natural and volitive power to decide between 
alternatives. Choice can never be free if it be pro- 
duced by the laws of necessity. Our freedom to 
act according to such necessity is bondage, but 
choice can be voluntary. When we have made 
choice, we feel and know that we were at perfect 
liberty to have abstained from such choice, or to 
have made a different one. If choice is produced 
by laws of natural necessity, it can never be free; 
but choice, in its very nature, implies liberty or free- 
dom, and without, this it ceases to be choice ; there- 
fore, volitive action is essential to the existence of 
choice. 4. The position of some writers is, that 
choice controls the will, and that choice is the effect 
of the laws of natural necessity. Then, for the 
effect of a natural cause to govern the manner, 
qualities, or condition of itself is impossible: hence 
the perfect impossibility of such an effect causing 



NATURE OP THE WILL. 431 

volitive action, for that would be an effect causing 
an effect. Choice may and does have a subordinate 
influence upon the will, but has no mandatory power 
over it. The will can control, determine, or confirm 
our choice, and it has power to act contrary to our 
choice. It is very common for us to feel and say, 
in regard to some act of ours, that it was not our 
choice. 



SECTION V. 
1. Another assumption is, that the will is governed 
by motive. Mr. Upham says that " the will acts in 
view of the strongest motive, and necessarily so 
actsP If such action is necessitated, of course it 
could not be otherwise; therefore, the will is gov- 
erned by motive, which is clearly and forever incor- 
rect, as arguments will show. 2. Motive is that 
which incites to action, having only subordinate in- 
fluence upon the will in inducing volitive action. 
The very nature of motive implies no mandatory 
power over its own origin and action ; and if it pos- 
sesses no self-power of government, it would be im- 
possible for it to govern the will or any other faculty 
in a positive way. The highest power of motive 
consists only in action toward an object, and this is 
granting more than its nature strictly demands. It 
is acknowledged, on all hands, that the will, in its 
lowest signification, has power to act. As the latter. 
in its very nature, lias higher claims to liberty than 
the former, why should it be regarded as subordi- 
nate to motive? 3. The only way for motive to 
govern the will is, that its action be anterior, in the 



432 NATURE OF THE WILL. 

order of time, to the origin of the action of the will. 
It is utterly impossible to j:>rove that the action of 
motive in the mind is anterior to the origin of the 
action of the will ; and if it could be done, it would 
be no evidence that motive-action could control the 
action of the will; and the very nature of the 
former, compared with that of the latter, precludes 
the possibility of such a conclusion. 4. If motive 
has power to act, and such action can only be in- 
duced by the presence of an object, then the object 
controls the motive, and the motive controls the 
will. Then it would follow, that when the object 
was inert it would control the mind. We are not 
prepared for such a conclusion. Motive may have 
power to induce volitive action, but it has no author- 
itative power over such action. 



SECTION VI. 
1. It has been maintained, by many writers, that 
motive governs mind in general ; that it governs 
volitions in the human mind ; and that, in the same 
way, it applies to the Divine mind. Mr. Upham 
says, "Our condition, in this respect, seems to be 
essentially the same with that of the supreme Being 
himself. He is inevitably governed, in all his do- 
ings, by what, in the great range of events, is wisest 
and best ;" therefore, the divine Being is u inevita- 
bly " governed by a superior. We understand Dr. 
Edwards, and others, to teach that the "energy of 
motives " existed, in the nature of things, anterior to 
the will of God. In this way, many writers take 
the ground that motive governs the will of man, 



NATURE OF THE WILL. 433 

and that motive governs the will of Deity, being 
anterior to it: hence, we are driven to the conclu- 
sion that motive governs all beings, and that it must 
be, of necessity, the supreme ruler of the universe, 
with power to fatalize all things. Notwithstanding 
the opinions of such writers, we can not and never 
will acknowledge motive as the great ruler of the 
universe. 2. Motive, in the Divine mind, is subor- 
dinate to volitions. If "motive" or any "certain 
fixed and irresistible influences" control the acts of 
Deity, such controlling power could not have been 
originated and arranged by the supreme Being; for, 
in that case, he must have willed the existence and 
arrangement of such pre-existing and controlling 
power. Then it follows, that such a controlling 
power must either be anterior to any act of Deity, 
and thereby superior to him, or such an assumed 
controlling power could not have existed till the 
Divine volition willed it into real being; and if it 
could only exist by the will of Deity, he had power 
to act independent of such supposed influence. If 
he had power to act once independently of this mo- 
tive, or natural irresistible influence, he had and has 
power to act on independently of such supposed in- 
fluences forever: so, farewell to the eternal sover- 
eignty of motive! Sleep peaceably on forever ! 3. 
We have already seen that motive has no ^ower to 
control the volitive power in the human mind. It 
may have subordinate influence in inducing volitive 
action, but nothing more; for, in order to control 
the will, it must be proved, without a doubt, that 
motive exists anterior to the action of the will, and 
that it has volitive power to act in causing the will 
37 



434 NATURE OF THE WILL. 

to act. Without this liberty-power of action, it can 
not move the will and determine such motion ; but, 
from its very nature, it can not have such volitive 
power of action; and if it could, it would be just as 
fatal to the law of necessity as to refer such power 
to the will, where it belongs. From the very nature 
of things, there is no possible way to control the 
will by any law of motive. 4. Another position as- 
sumed and strongly argued by Mr. Edwards, is, that 
" the will always is as the greatest apparent good ;" 
but he explains this by admitting that the " will is 
determined by the greatest apparent good." Both 
methods amount to the same meaning. To blend 
the will with the intellect is absurd ; for we can not 
say that it is a thought ; and it is equally as incor- 
rect to blend it with the sensibilities, for it is not a 
feeling. If any other faculty, power, or influence 
of the mind has authority to control the will, such 
faculty, power, or influence must have not only lib- 
erty of self-action, but volitive power to cause the 
will to act ; otherwise, the will can not be controlled 
in this way. And if the will can only be governed 
by such volitive power, why not refer such power to 
the will itself, where it naturally belongs, and not 
labor against all plain reasoning to give the power of 
the will to some other power, where.it does not natu- 
rally belong? And if motive can induce volitive 
action, under the law of necessity, then it would 
follow that when an inert existence was the object 
of motive; that as the object controlled the motive 
which controlled the will, so would such an object 
control the will : hence, we would be compelled to 
serve material elements and laws in common with 



NATURE OF THE WILL. 435 

every thing else possessed with power to influence 
motive; but this is false. 5. That the will is un- 
trammeled is in perfect accordance with the con- 
sciousness of mankind. Of nothing are we more 
positively certain than in regard to our acts, whether 
they be voluntary or of necessity. Knowledge re- 
ceived through the senses, connected with diseased 
and perishing physical organs, may deceive us ; but 
consciousness, possessed of its own evidence, is 
knowledge, without demanding an increase of testi- 
mony from the senses. It is of and within its own 
existence and nature the end of all controversy or 
doubt. To doubt its power is to doubt the reality 
of all things. Our consciousness of self-action, as 
to whether such action is of infinite necessity, or is 
free, equals our consciousness of existence itself; 
and we can no more doubt this than we can doubt 
the existence of self and that of every thing else. 
When we contemplate future action in regard to 
many objects, we feel and know that we have natu- 
ral volitive power, or ability, to choose any one, or 
to determine on any course we please in relation to 
one or all of them ; and we are perfectly confident 
that we have power to refuse action contrary to 
either motive or the power of choice. When we 
reflect upon a wrong act in the past, we feel an 
internal conviction that we were free to have done 
differently : hence our deep regret or sense of sin ; 
for without this conscious liberty, we could never 
regret the imperfections of the past, or feel that we 
had ever sinned or done wrong. As long as we feel 
that we are accountable for our acts, we feel a con- 
sciousness of liberty in acting. If a consciousness 



436 NATURE OF THE WILL. 

of liberty could be removed from the mind, just as 
long as such a sense was gone, we would be incapa- 
ble of any regret or remorse. However much we 
may dread the results, yet if we do not feel an intu- 
itive liberty, we never can experience any thing 
like regret or remorse in regard to any past act. 
Just as long as we could feel that we had no con- 
scious liberty, we would be compelled to feel our 
acts were not our own. 



LIBERTY OF THE WILL. 437 



CHAPTER III. 

LIBERTY OF THE WILL. 

SECTION I. 
1. The expression "free will" is, to some extent, 
objectionable, as it would seem to imply the oppo- 
site, or that there could be such a thing as the will 
enslaved under a law of infinite necessity, which we 
have seen to be incorrect. Will, in its very essence, 
or nature, is a free principle. Liberty is its essen- 
tial condition or law. Free will is as incorrect as 
hound will. Liberty is essential to its nature, and 
it is not will if it be not free ; and if it be bound, 
it ceases to be will. Yolitive power of action is 
essential to the being of the soul, and to all rational, 
intellectual, and accountable beings. Action and 
self-action are essential differences between matter 
and spirit. Spirit has self-power of choice; matter 
has not. Ratiocination is essential to intellect, and 
it can not take place without action. Connected 
with these, volition is forever inseparable ; therefore, 
mind can not exist without self-liberty of action. 2. 
The will, in its acts and determinations, is subject to 
the law of self-liberty in opposition to the law of 
necessity. We have seen alread} r that the will can 
not fall under the law of infinite necessity ; there- 
fore, it must fall under that of liberty, as opposed to 
necessity. If we know that we are under the law 
of necessity, then we have the same power of know- 
37* 



438 LIBERTY OF THE WILL. 

ing that we are not accountable. To suppose and 
believe that our actions are necessary, and that we 
are accountable for such actions, is to suppose and 
believe an absurdity ; for we never can experience 
remorse for any act, or acts, which are not wholly 
voluntary, either by intention or permission. 3. 
The doctrine of liberty is clearly established by con- 
sciousness, in which there is a universal conviction 
that our past acts, even under the same circum- 
stances, might have been very different. Such a 
conviction could not exist only in spontaneous origin 
or liberty. 4. In connection with the presence of 
many objects of choice, we have a positive con- 
sciousness that two or more acts of the will may be 
put forth, or that we may will to refuse them all, 
and that contrary to motive, desire, or choice. This 
truth can be tested by any one, at this moment, in 
regard to the very next act of the mind. The con- 
sciousness of liberty we now have, can no more be 
doubted than we can doubt our own existence. 



SECTION II. 
1. We objected wholly to "laws of the will," as 
used by different writers. The will knows no law 
only that of liberty, which liberty may be regarded 
as absolute, being entirely and forever opposed to 
any law or laws of necessity. 2. I may determine 
to go to London, and while this determination re- 
mains unchanged, all the other powers of the mind 
must be subject to the controlling power of the will. 
This determination may be continued or suspended 
only by the power of the will. The absence of voli- 



LIBERTY OF THE WILL. 

tive action does not imply that, during such inactiv- 
ity, the other powers of the mind are unemployed ; 
but the office of the will is to preside over the men- 
tal operations. 3. The effort to sustain the law of 
necessity has involved reasoning in a circle. Ne- 
cessitarians have assumed that "the action of the 
will is always in the direction of the strongest mo- 
tive." In denning the strongest motive, they say it 
is the motive in the direction of which the will does 
act. They have no way to define the strongest mo- 
tive at first sight, but wait till the will acts, and 
then assume that the motive, in the direction of its 
action, is the strongest. They have to assume that 
motive determines the will, without accounting for 
its authority. If we ask them what determines the 
will, they will answer, The strongest motive. Then, 
what is the strongest motive ? That which determ- 
ines the will. Here is the same old circle; but this 
generation seeketh after evidence. 4. Mr. Edwards 
says " that every act of will whatsoever, is excited 
by some motive." Then, motive causes the action of 
the will; therefore, all volitions are effects of mo- 
tives. If an effect can not be greater than its cause, 
we are forced to the conclusion that no action can 
exist, or take place, either in the mind or body, un- 
less it be caused by motive. Then, motive is the 
only being having right to command and to control 
our entire existence ; but we have already seen that 
this is false. 



440 LIBERTY OF THE WILL. 

SECTION III. 
I* The spirit of dependence can not exist under 
the law of necessity. The conviction that we are 
lost without an interest in the merit of Christ, is 
common to all ; but to properly feel our dependence 
implies a voluntary act, in which we humbly and 
confidently rest all our hope upon Divine assistance. 
The soul is dependent with a voluntary trust in God. 
2. But the doctrine of necessity can not naturally 
tend to mellow the exercise of the heart, and enkin- 
dle, with holy awe, the spirit of fervent love to the 
great Donor of all good. Under the law of neces- 
sity, we may feel conviction ; but we can not depend 
in Divine grace with humble gratitude ; for a con- 
victed mind, which believes in infinite necessity, 
can only realize the presence of infinite law, ever 
hearing the deep tones of the breaking thunder. 3. 
It appears that the learned Dr. Chalmers said, "If 
man is not a necessary agent, God is a degraded sov- 
ereign" Dreadful sentiment! If the doctrine of 
liberty be true, Deity does not preside over the myr- 
iads of earth's population for the purpose of execu- 
ting the laws of stern and infinite fate; for such laws 
could need no additional power to enforce their 
claims, as such claims have been executed and en- 
forced from all eternity. From the very necessity 
in their natural existence, no new claim or arrange- 
ment can ever take place, or ever has legally taken 
place, since the real existence of the laws of fate in 
eternity back ; but such laws must either be self- 
existent and eternal, or there must have been a point 
somewhere in the range of duration when such laws 



LIBERTY OF THE WILL. Ml 

took place, or became real. Necessitarians can not 
admit that they were created by Deity; for then he 
would have willed their existence. Then they must 
have had an existence anterior to any volitions in 
the Divine mind : hence, the existence and claims 
of the laws of fate were all arranged before they 
came to the knowledge of the divine Being ; and, 
of course, he is subordinate to their control. Such a 
conclusion is worse than Atheism. O, how grateful 
the thought that the Lord still governs all things, 
and that he will freely, and with omnipotent power, 
rule forever! 4. A design in the creation of man 
was, that he might voluntarily serve God ; and with- 
out such power, he could never glorify his Creator. 
Doubtless, without natural liberty to glorify God, 
the design of our being would have been destroyed, 
and this would have prevented our existence at all. 
Man must exist free to serve his Creator, or his serv- 
ice would not be acceptable to God ; and without 
such liberty he could not serve him. And if it is 
necessary for him to have natural liberty, in order 
to glorify his Creator, then he is free to pervert the 
exercise or action of such liberty-power, and volun- 
tarily fall from the favor of God, as in the case of 
our federal head. The mind is free, and, under this 
power, we may aim at the sun, step the silent paths 
of innumerable worlds, shout to their eternal flight ; 
but, higher and infinitely better still, we, through 
the assistance of grace, may will the approach of 
heaven, the possession of its joys, and the full glory 
of endless day. 



44:2 POWEE, OF THE WILL. 



CHAPTER IV. 

POWER OF THE WILL. 

SECTION I. 
1. It is difficult to define the difference between 
the liberty and the power of the will. Some have 
thought that power was capable of degrees, while 
liberty remains the same. Whether there be natu- 
rally degrees in the power of the will, is not easily 
decided; for the apparent difference may be caused, 
to a considerable extent, by imperfect or diseased 
physical organs ; yet it would appear that liberty, in 
all orders of mind, was essentially the same. The 
partially-developed mind, or that of a child, as well 
as the strong mind, enjoys the same liberty. The 
power of the will, as to the quality of its essential 
nature, can not admit of degrees; but it differs in 
different minds as to the degrees of vigor, vividness, 
and strength in its mandatory action. While liberty 
may be regarded as absolute, being opposed to every 
thing like infinite necessity, power may be regarded 
as more dependent. Liberty is without any compul- 
satory infringement in any possible way ; yet power 
is often incumbered by many contingencies. Liberty 
does not appear to be capable of being increased ; 
but power, by repeated efforts, can become more 
vigorous and irresistible. 2. Mr. Upham says, 
" Although the will has power, it is not, therefore, 
independent — it is subject to law." This is in ac- 



POWER OF THE WILL. 443 

cordance with many other writers; but we have 
seen, by previous arguments, that the will is not 
subject to law, as taught by necessitarians. The 
will is independent in its very nature and relation 
to the other powers of the mind. 3. The power 
and freedom of the will is clearly evidenced in self- 
preservation. If I were in a boat, peacefully float- 
ing on the silvery waters of Niagara, above the 
Falls, I feel distinctly that life depends upon the ef- 
forts of myself, and only upon myself. I feel as 
conscious as I can of any thing, that I have power 
either to determine to row to the shore, or to determ- 
ine to go over the Falls without any effort. 4. Con- 
nected with the remembrance of past errors, we 
experience a consciousness, which is clear and posi- 
tive, that, under the same circumstances, we might 
have done differently; and connected with such re- 
called determinations, there is a vivid consciousness 
of the power we had to have determined differently. 
If the affirmations of conscience are uniformly or 
are always wrong, then we may have some ground 
for distrusting the liberty-power of the mind; but 
if such affirmations are true, then the doctrine of 
the liberty of the will is true and irresistible. 



SECTION II. 
1. The will has self-determining power. It is not 
a matter of astonishment that necessitarians should 
doubt the self-determining power of the will ; but 
they acknowledge that the mind, as a whole, has 
self-determining power. So do we; and we hold 
that the will, in its nature and office, presides over 



M4 POWER OF THE WILL. 

all the other faculties, and determines all the proc- 
esses and acts of the mind. JSTo event, object, or 
fact can be made the subject of knowledge only by 
the self-determining power of the mind; for noth- 
ing can be brought under the inspection of the mind 
without mental action, and such action is in the 
mind, and is a result of its self-determining power, 
as no self-action can arise without such a power. 2. 
Mr. Upham says, " If by the phrase self-determin- 
ing power of the will be merely meant that the will 
itself, that distinct susceptibility of the mind which 
we thus denominate, has power of action, we grant 
that it is so;" that is, the will can act, but not au- 
thoritatively — it can only act under the control of 
law or the strongest motive. The freedom of such 
action is in conforming to necessity. But hear him 
again: "The will acts, and with such freedom and 
such power as to lay the basis of accountability." 
With how much freedom does it act ? Let him an- 
swer, "It is free to act according to the law of neces- 
sity." This is the substance, and amounts to the 
fact that such action is coerced by the law of fate. 
Wonderful freedom of volitive action ! Yet, he 
bases our accountability upon the liberty of the 
will, and the will, at the same time, incapable of 
acting only in obedience to the law of eternal fate. 
How is it possible for students to ever gain a correct 
knowledge of self, the powers of mind, and their 
accountability from such logic? 3. Mr. Edwards 
says, "If the will determines the will, then choice 
orders and determines the choice" This might, in 
part, be correct, if we were to acknowledge his pre- 
vious positions on this subject to be correct; but we 



POWER OF THE WILL. 445 

do not acknowledge such positions as true. Then, 
that which would destroy his argument would be 
clear and true with others. First. Why did he 
make the proposition unfair, by lugging in the term 
"orders" in the latter part? This is sophistical, 
whether so intended or not. If the will can determ- 
ine the mind, it certainly can determine the will ; 
for the will is a faculty of the mind, and the self- 
determining power of the mind has been acknowl- 
edged to be true. We have already seen that no 
faculty or faculties of the mind can determine the 
mind except the will ; then the will has power to 
determine both the will and choice : so we have no 
difficulty on the subject. 4. Volitions are spontane- 
ous, and are independent of any law of necessity; 
therefore, the very nature of the volitive power is 
freedom with self-liberty to act in any way. 



SECTION III. 
1. The superior power of the will is that peculiar 
power it possesses by which it is not only distin- 
guished from the other powers of the mind, but 
determines the action of the mental powers as a 
whole, or as united in the acts of the mind. 2. The 
ground of offense in the sight of God, is not only 
our power to perceive the difference between right 
and wrong, and an abiding conviction as to what we 
should do, but it is embraced in the fact that we 
possess the power to do that which is right, and to 
refuse to do that which is contrary to the Divine 
will. 3. Connected with voluntariness is the ground 
of all accountability. Take this away, and it is ut- 
38 



446 POWER OF THE WILL. 

terly impossible for us ever to be called to an account 
for any thought or act. We can neither be ap- 
plauded nor blamed. 4. The doctrine of the will, 
as taught by many writers, has been confused un- 
necessarily. Too many topics have entered into the 
argument; and as we contemplate defining its con- 
nection with and relation to the elements of mind, 
which lie at the foundation of moral action, in the 
second volume, we will close this volume with one 
more general proposition. 






SECTION IV. 

1. The will possesses mandatory power. The 
mind certainly has self-determining power, by the 
consent of philosophers, and in the very nature of 
its being and operations. By general consent, and 
true analysis, this power has not been defined as 
being diffused through the nature and power of all 
the faculties, separately or combined ; but the determ- 
ining power has been referred to some one faculty 
of the mind. 'No faculty, from its essential nature, 
can possess mandatory power but the will. 2. The 
will appears to preside over the combined action of 
the other faculties, and has power to control mental 
action. 3. Some necessitarians have erred in try- 
ing to confound the will with the sensibilities, and 
refused to appeal to special and universal conscious- 
ness. 4. Another evidence of the independence 
and controlling power of the will, is contained in 
the fact that we can will to perform impossibilities; 
that is, we can will the reality of an impossibility. 
The Atheist may finally be possessed of such a hor- 



POWER OF THE WILL. 447 

rible dread of the truths of the Bible, that, with all 
his soul, he may will its annihilation ; yet he knows, 
at the same time, that this is impossible. 5. Such 
is the will, the free liberty-power of the imperishable 
mind. Under its vivid power and mandatory con- 
trol, the minds of the high and the lowly, enkin- 
dling with feelings of lofty and holy aspirations, may 
assert their right to triumph over all embarrassments 
and storms, the mere results of physical tendencies, 
or the requirements of their laws ; but mind, intel- 
lectual and immortal, may determine upon the ad- 
vance of infinite happiness, and the interminable 
progression of imperishable knowledge. How can 
we define the true character of the soul, when per- 
fected in its separation from the imperfection and 
decay of the physical organs which trammeled its 
manifestations in time? Possessed of all the facts 
and knowledge of the past, its thoughts freely range 
all through the boundless future ; but infinitely 
higher, to our conceptions, must be the character of 
that soul perfected in the knowledge, favor, and love 
of God! With holy triumph and increasing joy, 
burn on, thou spirit of endless day ! As the accel- 
erated travel of a star, range the progressive series 
of heavenly knowledge ; and w r hen thy flight has 
surpassed the utmost bounds of unwearied contem- 
plation, still thou art in heaven ! 



INDEX 



Ifflatt. 
INTRODUCTION. 

SECTION I. 

Page. 

1. Man an existent 7 

2. His existence certain. 7 

3. How existing facts are made known to us 7 

4. Reasonableness of our existence — how traced 8 

SECTION II. 

1. His relative existence and liberty of action 8 

2. His inalienable faculties — peculiar natural endowment — self-power 

of action 9 

8. His existence unending 9 

SECTION III. 

1. His being indestructible 9 

2. Matter can change without annihilation 9 

SECTION IV. 

1. The existence of man divided into periods or states 10 

(1.) His primitive state 10 

(2.) His fallen state 10 

(3.) His probationary state 11 

(4.) His future state 11 

section v. 

1. Man compounded of spirit and matter 12 

2. Spirit the principle of life 12 

3 . The soul the intelligent part of our existence 12 

4- Its nature immaterial 12 

5. It is immortal 12 

SECTION VI. 

1. Matter is distinct from mind 12 

2. Matter when inanimate .13 

8. When is it said to be animate ? 13 

38* 449 



450 INDEX. 



SECTION VII. 

Pagb. 

1. Mind is not matter 13 

2. Independence and power of mental action 13 

3. Application of the term mind 14 

4. The essence of mind 14 

5. Process by imagination 14 

SECTION VIII. 

1. Knowledge the result of reasoning and intuition • • • 14 

2. Intuitive sense of difference between mind and matter 15 

3. The power constituting mental action not matter 15 

4. The thinking principle not matter 15 

SECTION IX. 

1. Matter is not mind • • 16 

2. Material elements have a natural tendency to rest 16 

3. Matter presents phenomena distinct from mind 16 

4. Difficulty in defining the essence of matter • • • • 17 

SECTION x. 

1. Doctrine of materialists absurd 17 

2. Impossibility of inert elements acting or knowing 17 

3. The law of attraction or of resistance can not originate action 18 

4. Non-existence of matter more reasonable than that nothing exists 

but matter • • 18 

SECTION XI. 

1. The power of the soul is superior to that of matter 18 

2. Matter not cogitative 19 

3. Mind not a result of a function of the brain 19 

4. Effect of disease upon the brain 19 

SECTION XII. 

1. Existence of mind independent of matter, but dependent on it in 

knowing materialities 20 

2. Matter can exist without either thought or action 20 

3. If matter is incapable of annihilation, then materialists are immor- 

tal • 21 

4. Matter can not always think 21 

SECTION XIII. 

1. Matter incapable of sensations or emotions 21 

2. Septennial changes of the system can not change the identity •• •• 22 

3. If mind is matter we can not recall past events 22 

SECTION XIV. 

1. Mind distinct and dissimilar from matter 23 

2. The body incapable of annihilation 23 

3. No evidence of the annihilation of any thing 23 



INDEX. 451 



SECTION XV. 

Page. 

1. Age and the decay of the body can not be annihilation 24 

2. Phenomena of mind connected with animal life 24 

3. Instinct differs from matter 25 

4. Such traits of the phenomena of mind can not be matter 25 

SECTION XVI. 

1. If matter is immortal, so is the spirit of animals 26 

2. The soul superior to matter in its power of self-knowledge 26 

3. Matter is insensible and motionless 26 

4. Power of action from what we see or hear 27 

SECTION XVII. 

1. Matter can not possess causation 28 

2. Particles of matter have no self-power to change in size or recipro- 

cally , 28 

3. No accident of matter can produce action or cogitation 28 

4. If matter consolidated is mind, then there is but one mind in the 

vast universe. 29 

SECTION XVIII. 

1. Matter can not contain abstract ideas 29 

2. Matter possesses no power to correct appearances and impressions • • 30 

3. Our consciousness of being and liberty 30 

4. No faculty or thinking power could be superadded in constituting 

material elements 31 

section xix . 

1 The soul is neither a faculty of the body nor a result of matter 31 

2. The soul incapable of annihilation 31 

3. No evidence that any thing will pass into nonentity 32 

4. Conscience power of self-action 32 

SECTION xx. 

1. The soul has a conscious knowledge of self and its continued being 33 

2. The high moral obligations resting upon the soul 33 

8. We should cultivate our powers for usefulness 34 

4. It is reasonable for materialists and infidels to believe in the soul's 

immortality 34 

■ 

SECTION XXI. 

1. Atheists and skeptics should adopt the Christian system 34 

(1.) Reason. (2.) Eeason. (3.) Reason. (4.) Reason 35 

2. Man a skeptic, impossible ! 35 

3. Matter belongs to physical science 36 



4:52 INDEX. 



ELEMENTS OE MIND 

WHICH LIB AT THE FOUNDATION OF MENTAL ACTION. 

j@ ihisia n jfirst. 

ELEMENTS OP MENTAL SCIENCE. 

CHAPTER I. 

PRELIMINARY ARGUMENT. 

SECTION I. 

Page. 

1. Mind immaterial in essence or nature 39 

2. Elements which are strictly mental 39 

3. Elements connected with the origin of moral influences 39 

SECTION II. 

1. Powers which lie at the foundation of moral action 39 

2. Elements of mental and moral influence 39 

CHAPTER II. 

INTELLECTUAL OR MENTAL POWERS. 

SECTION I. 

1. Various orders of mind 41 

2. That which resembles mind in inferior orders of beings 41 

SECTION II. 

1. Matter is without either conscious sensation or self-motion 41 

2. That which resembles mind in inferior orders of self-moving beings 41 

CHAPTER III. 

OUR KNOWLEDGE OP THE EXISTENCE AND NATURE OF 
THE HUMAN MIND. 

SECTION I. 

1. Mind immaterial in nature 43 

2. Mind not constituted by thought and feeling 43 

3. Knowledge of the real existence of mind confirmed by intuition- • • 43 

4. Knowledge of mind tested by the known existence of certain facts • 43 

SECTION II. 

1. Mental operations or motion are not the mind itself 44 

2. Relation of primary properties in matter • 44 

3. If mind be only action, its existence is only an accident 44 

4. The cause of mind 45 

5 Essence of mind unknown to us 45 



i x l> e x . 453 



SECTION III. 

Pags. 

1. Mr. Stewart's definition of mind incorrect 45 

2. Axioms in science and mind 46 

3. Power of knowing axioms to be self-evident facts 46 

4. Intuition faculties may have power to know tlieir own existence • • • 47 

CHAPTER IV. 

EXISTENCE AND NATURE OF MIND. 

SECTION I . 

1. Our inquiries as to mental phenomena are more properly confined 

to properties 48 

2. Three-fold division of mind 48 

(1.) Mental elements 48 

(2.) Moral elements of mind 48 

(3.) The action of mind 48 

3. That which the operations of mind involves 48 

(1.) Our duties to Gtod 48 

(2.) Duties to ourselves 48 

(3.) Duties to one another 48 

SECTION II. 

1. Present order of mental and moral science — objections 49 

2. Mental and moral elements 49 

3. Moral action — on what based 49 

4. Power of mind to know and to extend knowledge 50 

CHAPTER V. 

SENSATION. 

SECTION I. 

1. Sensation defined 51 

2. Its connection with physical organs 51 

3. Sensation can not be separated from the mind 51 

4. Sensation is wholly in the mind 52 

SECTION II. 

1. Sensation may be awakened by external objects 52 

2. It is a state of internal feeling 52 

3. Sensations from external things are not the images of such things- 52 

4. Connection between sensations and physical organs 53 

5. In what respect sensation is dependent upon the senses 53 

6. Sensation and primary mental powers 53 

CHAPTER VI. 

SENSE. 
SECTION I. 

1. Sense defined 54 

2. Its relation to physical organs and to sensation 54 

3. Sense is succeeded by sensation 54 



454 INDEX. 



SECTION II. 

Page 

1. Sense< — apprehension 54 

2. It is spontaneous 54: 

3. It is the perception of the senses 54 

4. It is the discernment of the senses 55 

CHAPTER VII. 

THE SENSES. 
SECTION I. 

1. The senses connect sensations 56 

2. The connection between the senses and physical organs of sense 

undefmable 56 

3. Our dependence upon the senses for our knowledge of external 

things 56 

SECTION II. 

1. Our dependence upon the senses for knowledge limited to external 

things 56 

2. The importance of the senses 57 

3. The loss of the senses can not annihilate the mind 57 

4. Five senses — how defined 57 

CHAPTER VIII. 

THE SENSE OP SMELL. 

SECTION I. 

1. The organ of smell defined 58 

2. Sense of smell connected with the nerves 58 

8. Substance and extent of the nerves 58 

4. Union of the nerves and the sense of smell indefinable 58 

SECTION II. 

1. The sensations of smell 59 

2. The nature of the manner in which the organs are affected 59 

3. Limited extent of sensations received by the sense of smell 59 

4. Influence of the sensations of smell upon life 59 

5. Sensations caused by external bodies 60 

SECTION III. 

1. Perceptions of smell impossible 60 

2. Argument differs from former writers 60 

3. Perception of the objects of the sense of smell 61 

CHAPTER IX. 

THE SENSE OP TASTE. 

SECTION I. 

1. Organs of taste defined 62 

2. The sense of taste — how affected 62 



INDEX. 455 

Page. 

3. Sensations of taste 62 

4. Sensations affect the mind in relation to a correct apprehending of 

the qualities of the cause 62 

5. The reverse doctrine absurd 63 

6. Nature of the sensations of taste 63 

SECTION II. 

1. Modifications of taste — how changed 63' 

2. Properties of bodies giving rise to sensations of taste 64 

3. Mental states following sensations of taste 64 

CHAPTER X. 

THE SENSE OF HEARING. 

SECTION I. 

1. The organ of hearing 65 

2. That which continues the power of hearing 65 

3. Sensations of hearing - 65 

SECTION II. 

1. Varieties of the sensation of sound 66 

2. Cause of the sensations of hearing 66 

3. Knowledge from hearing not intuitive 66 

4. Our knowledge of the direction and cause of sounds 67 

SECTION III. 

1. Knowledge of the correct direction of sound — how gained 67 

2. Sensation corresponds to its cause • 67 

3. Further proof of the same fact 68 

4. Importance of the sense of hearing 68 

CHAPTER XI. 

THE SENSE OF TOUCH. 

SECTION I. 

1. The organ of touch 69 

2. Its extent 69 

3. Difference between this power and the physical nerves 69 

4. Office of the sensation of touch 69 

SECTION II. 

1. Extent and variation of the sensations of touch 70 

2. Influence of the qualities of external bodies 70 

3. Primary and secondary properties 70 

4. Knowledge imperfect from only one of the senses 71 

SECTION III. 

1 . Sensation without any external cause 71 

2. Nature of the sensation of touch differs from that of its cause 71 

3. Origin of the idea of qualities connects with this sense 71 



456 INDEX. 

Page. 

4. With this sense is the origin of our knowledge of the temperature 

of bodies s 72 

5. Sensation abstractly is not the idea of heat or cold 72 

SECTION IV. 

1. Our knowledge of the real existence of heat and cold 72 

2. Origin of the idea of external qualities 73 

3. No similarity between sensation and its external cause 73 

4. This sense can not convey to us a matured idea or knowledge of ex- 

ternal entities 73 

CHAPTER XII. 

THE SENSE OF SIGHT. 

section I. 

1. The organ of the sense of sight 74 

2. The retina 74 

3. Importance of the sense of sight 75 

SECTION II. 

1. Mysterious structure of the eye 75 

2. Sense of sight connected with the retina 76 

3. Acute sensitiveness of the optic nerve 76 

4. Sensations of sight — when awakened 76 

5. Perceptions of sight incorrect 76 

SECTION III. 

1. Sensations of sight produced by colors 77 

2. Color of light influenced by objects 77 

3. Sensation caused by light reflected from objects upon the optic 

nerve 77 

4. Degrees of strength in sensations 78 

SECTION IV. 

1. Sight may be modified or changed 78 

2. Knowledge received through the sense of sight 79 

3. Error of philosophers 79 

4. Knowledge of color from sight 79 

SECTION v. 

1. Idea of extension as visual is not wholly original with sight 80 

2. Connection between colors, light, and the objects which reflect 

them 80 

3. Origin of our knowledge of extension 81 

4. Our knowledge of objects from sight only is confused 81 

SECTION VI. 

1. The power of the sense of sight 82 

2. Its power in judging the magnitude of objects 82 

3. Apparent distances of objects 82 

4. Perceptions of the distances to objects of sight principally acquired 82 

5. Perceptions of visual objects and distance original 83 



INDEX. 457 



CHAPTER XIII. 

PRIMARY AND SECONDARY SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE. 

SECTION I. 

Page. 

1. In what respect the senses are a secondary source of knowledge • • • 84 

2. Matter has no self-power to impress or cause motion in matter 84 

3. The senses secondary sources of knowledge 84 

4. The senses limited and deceptions 84 

SECTION II. 

1. Effect of disease upon the senses 85 

2. Belief in the report of the senses 85 

3. The skeptic's belief false 86 

SECTION III. 

1. Primary source of knowledge 86 

2. To reject a reliance on internal intuitions is to reject all knowledge 86 

3. Result of such rejection 87 

4. Knowledge directly evidenced to the mind 87 



CHAPTER I. 

PERCEPTION. 
SECTION I. 

1 . Perception defined 88 

2. Use of perception in arriving at a knowledge of existences 88 

3. It is immediately successive to sensation 88 

4. Perception a sequent of impressions unknown 89 

SECTION II. 

1. Perception a voluntary mental act 89 

2. Sensation not always followed by perception 89 

3. Perception involuntary 90 

4. That which is involved by voluntary perception 90 

SECTION III. 

1. Perception makes us acquainted with facts 90 

2. If perception is only an affection or influence of the mind, it is more 

than secondary in its power 91 

3. From its nature it is connected with primary elements 91 

SECTION IV. 

1. Perceptions of primary properties of matter differ from sensations- 91 

2. Difference of sensation and perception 92 

3. Perception of the difference between primary and secondary proper- 

ties of matter 92 

39 



458 INDEX 



CHAPTER II. 

FALSE PERCEPTIONS. 

SECTION I. 

Pace. 

1. When false perception takes place 93 

2. They can arise in connection with the organs of sense 93 

3. They can arise in connection with the change in the mental states- 93 

4. They can be caused by disease • • 93 

SECTION II. 

1. False perceptions — how corrected 94 

2. Corrected by comparing our perceptions of objects with other ob- 

jects 94 

3. By the exercise of the judgment 94 

4. Perception of two or more objects — how corrected 94 

CHAPTER III. 

PERCEPTION AND SMELL. 

SECTION I. 

1. Perception of objects by means of the sense of smell 95 

2. Habit in relation to smell 95 

3. Origin of our knowledge of odor 95 

SECTION II. 

1. The mind affected in a way corresponding to the object or cause- • • 96 

2. If there be no connection between sensation and perception, then 

perception is an accident 96 

3. Constitutional elements of a sentient being 96 

4. Office of sensation and perception 97 

CHAPTER IV. 

PERCEPTION AND TASTE. 

SECTION I. 

1. The perception of objects reported to the mind by the sense of 

taste 98 

2. Habit in relation to taste 98 

SECTION II. 

1. The law of habit 98 

2. Direction of perception — how guided 99 

CHAPTER V. 

PERCEPTION AND HEARING. 

SECTION I. 

1. Perception of objects which affect the mind by means of hearing- -100 

2. Sensation has no self-perception 100 

3. The effect of degrees in sounds 100 



INDEX. 459 



SECTION II. 

Pack. 

1. Habit iu relation to the sense of hearing 101 

2. Connection of sensation and perception in regard to sound 101 

3. Our knowledge of sonorous bodies commences with the sensations 

of hearing 101 

CHAPTER VI. 

PERCEPTION AND TOUCH. 

SECTION I. 

1. Perception of objects made known by the sense of touch 102 

2. Perception increases in power with repeated efforts 102 

3. Habit in regard to the sense of touch 102 

SECTION II. 

1. Perceptions as manifested in the case of some blind persons 102 

2. Origin of our knowledge of external things 103 

CHAPTER VII. 

PERCEPTION AND SIGHT. 

SECTION I. 

1. Perception of objects of sight • 104 

2. Inclination of the axis of vision important in determining dis- 

tances 104 

3. Intuitive knowledge of distance 104 

SECTION II. 

1. Habit in relation to vision 105 

2. Power of hearing partially supplied by sight 105 

3. Discrimination of the deaf and dumb evidence of improvement • • • -105 

4. Perception of external things — how dependent and affected 105 

CHAPTER VIII. 

HABIT IN RELATION TO PERCEPTIONS. 

SECTION I. 

1. Perceptions by habit in men, children, idiots, and brutes 107 

2. Perceptions dependent upon attention in order to be remembered- -107 

3. A law of habit 107 

SECTION II. 

1. Power of perception increased by repeated efforts 107 

2. Oneness of perceptive acts 108 

3. Vividness of perceptive action 108 



460 INDEX 



Mibisian ®f)ir&. 



CHAPTER I. 

OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE DEFINITE AND CONTINGENT 
PHENOMENA OF THOUGHT. 

SECTION I. 

Page 

1. Thoughts and feelings can not constitute the whole of mental phe- 

nomena 109 

2. Origin of thought 109 

3. Real existence of thought • • • • • 109 

4. Nature of thought 110 

SECTION II. 

1. Thought expresses action or thinking 110 

2. Succession of thoughts 110 

3. Thought separated from the mind can not exist 110 

4. The importance of thought Ill 

CHAPTER II. 

IDEAS. 

SECTION I. 

1. Definition of idea 112 

2. Ideas may vary with the nature of the object 112 

3. Ideas of physical entities contingent 112 

-1. Ideas of material objects relative 112 

5. Idea of duration absolute 112 

SECTION II. 

1. Idea of space necessary or absolute 112 

2. Idea of space absolute, arising from its nature or condition 113 

3. Idea of space implies the absence of limitation 113 

4= Idea of space and infinity necessary and absolute 113 

SECTION III. 

1. Effects and events contingent and relative 113 

2. Idea of personal identity or self necessary 114 

3. The Atheist compelled to acknowledge the existence of self and the 

existence of God 114 

SECTION IV. 

1. Idea of the phenomena of mind contingent 114 

2. Primary elements of mind 114 

3. Intuitrve elements — power of apprehending facts 114 



INDEX. 461 



CHAPTER III. 

POWER OF KNOWLEDGE WITHOUT TESTIMONY. 

SECTION r. 

Page. 

1. Primary elements of mind 115 

2. Primary elements of materiality compared with those of mind 115 

3. Primary elements of mind — how known 115 

SECTION II. 

1. Knowledge of primary elements of mind can not arise from argument 

nor external testimony 116 

2. With them is the origin of the knowledge of their entity 116 

3. Origin of the knowledge of external things • • • • 116 

CHAPTER IV. 

KNOWLEDGE FROM TESTIMONY. 

SECTION I. 

1. Intuitive power to arrive at a knowledge of facts from testimony- • -117 

2. Testimony and evidence 117 

3> Intuitive power to receive facts • 117 

4., Knowledge — when uncertain 118 

SECTION II. 

1. Judging facts from testimony 118 

2. Power to receive facts from testimony 118 

3. The principal ground of our confidence 118 

4. Confidence increased in proportion to the number of witnesses 119 

SECTION III. 

1. A well-regulated mind — how influenced 119 

2. Decisions of the mind — how influenced by known principles 119 

3 . Power of correct knowledge from testimony 120 

4. Assumptions of infidels 120 

SECTION IV. 

1 . Belief in miracles 120 

2. Miracles defined 120 

3. Results connected with the existence of revelation 121 

section v. 

1. Arguments assumed by infidels 121 

2. Mr. Hume's celebrated argument against the resurrection of Christ.121 

3. Christianity true 121 

39* 



462 INDEX. 



ibision jFottrt^. 



Page. 

TOO 



CHAPTER I. 

CONCEPTION. 
SECTION I. 

1. Conceptions arise in connection with peculiar mental states 123 

2. Conception denned 123 

3. Conceptions of ideas and reoccurring events • 123 

SECTION II. 

1. Conceptions differ from sensations and perceptions 123 

2. Conception differs from memory 124 

3. Conceptions can refer to both past and present impressions 124 

CHAPTER II. 

CONCEPTION AND THE SENSES. 

SECTION" I. 

1. Conceptions of objects of sense and sensations 125 

2. Conceptions of objects of taste — when clear •• .125 

3. Conceptions of sound 126 

4. Conceptions of the objects of the sense of touch 126 

SECTION II. 

1. Conception of objects of sight 126 

2. Importance of correctly receiving facts 127 

3. Origin of the power of conceiving facts 127 

SECTION III. 

1. The power of conceiving facts is capable of cultivation 127 

2. The manner of cultivating 127 

3. Different minds manifest degrees of vividness 128 

4. Our conceptions of objects when brought in sudden contact with 

them 128 

SECTION IV. 

1. Our belief— how affected by excited conceptions • 128 

2. Such conceptions give rise to improper feelings 129 

3. Influence of habit on conceptions 129 

CHAPTER III. 

MEMORY. 

SECTION I. 

1. Memory defined 130 

2. The power of memory to contain and retain ideas and events 130 

3. The connection or relation of memory to other faculties " •■ - 131 



INDEX. 463 

PA(5B. 

4. Connection of memory and conception 131 

5. Connection of memory and perception 131 

6. Connection of memory and suggestion 131 

7. Connection of memory and association 131 

8. Imagination dependent upon memory 131 

SECTION II. 

1. Original differences in the power of memory 131 

2. Memory founded upon analogies 132 

3. That which is embraced and implied in the nature of memory 132 

(1.) Sensitive impressions 132 

(2.) Involuntary recurring of impressions 132 

(3.) Kecurring of previous existences 132 

(4.) It implies suggestion, conception, and perception 133 

SECTION III. 

1. Local memory 133 

2. Memory contributes to true knowledge 133 

3. Degrees in the power of memory 133 

4. Philosophic memory 134 

5. Different degrees. 134 

SECTION IV. 

1. A ready memory 135 

2. A retentive memory 135 

3. Artificial memory 135 

4. An efficient memory 136 

5. It acts with readiness and ease 136 

6. Absence of these qualities — how may they take place? 136 

(1.) Weakness 136 

(2.) Insufficiency of the retentive power 136 

(3.) Habit in relation to attention 136 

section v. 

1. Memory of the aged 136 

2. Defects in memory not from perception 136 

3. Memory dependent upon perception 137 

4. Weakened by defects in attention 137 

5. Memory of the aged incapable of destruction • • • 137 

SECTION VI. 

1. The improvement of memory 138 

2. Its retentive power — how cultivated 138 

3. Manner of improvement ' 138 

SECTION VII. 

1. Memory — how aided 138 

2. Retentive power increased by writing our thoughts 138 

3. A want of confidence in memory tends to confusion 139 

4. Constant exercise of memory 139 

6. We should remember things in their natural order 139 



464 INDEX 



CHAPTER IV. 

REMEMBRANCE, RECOLLECTION, AND THE DURA- 
TION OE MEMORY. 

SECTION I. 

Page. 

1. Remembrance denned 140 

2. That which is implied by remembrance 140 

3. Memory is aided by the tenacity with which facts are received •••• 140 

SECTION II. 

1. Recollection defined 140 

2. It differs from remembrance 140 

3. Recollection — when voluntary 141 

4. Memory, remembrance, and recollection 141 

SECTION III. 

1. Duration of memory 141 

2. Power of memory to recall all past events 141 

3. Influence of the physical system upon memory 142 

4. Memory can not be annihilated 142 

SECTION IV. 

1. Influence of disease upon memory 142 

2. Effect of injuries upon the head 143 

3. It can be affected by a diseased body 143 

section v. 

1. Memory not suspended in all cases of mental inactivity or states of 

coma 144 

2. States of stupor or coma often results of intemperance 144 

3. Power of memory to recall that which transpired during delirium 

tremens 144 

SECTION VI. 

1. Importance of the first objects of memory as they are the last 145 

2. From the nature and duration of memory we infer its power in the 

future world 145 

CHAPTER V. 

ATTENTION. 

SECTION I. 

1. Attention defined 146 

2. Attention, or the act of attending to facts 146 

3. If it acts or can be acted upon, it is a real entity 146 

4. It can not be a result of mind 146 

5. It is not wholly an ulterior principle 146 

6. Attention is direction to an object exclusively 146 



INDEX. 465 



SECTION II. 

Page. 

1. Attention — when voluntary 147 

2. When involuntary 147 

3. Degrees in attention 147 

4. Dependence on thorough investigation 147 

SECTION III. 

1. That kind of attention necessary to understand arguments 148 

2. The manner of attending to truths or facts 148 

3. Memory dependent upon attention 148 

SECTION IV. 

1. Attention influenced by disease 149 

2. This faculty first affected by bodily disease 149 

3. Influence of fever, intemperance, and old age 149 

CHAPTER VI. 

ASSOCIATION. 

SECTION I. 

1. The power of association-- 150 

2. Act of associating — how influenced 150 

3. When voluntary 150 

4. When involuntar 150 

SECTION II. 

1. IMse views of philosophers 151 

2. The work of associating not the power or cause of such work 151 

3. How association is furnished 151 

SECTION III. 

1. Objects furnishing association — how related 152 

2. Furnished from resemblance 152 

3 . Contrast contributes to association 152 

4. It is aided from the law of contiguity 152 

SECTION IV. 

1. Natural association 152 

2. It may arise from the natural relationship of facts or existences •• -153 

SECTION v. 

1. When the recalling of a fact is voluntary 153 

2. When facts recur involuntary •> 154 

3. Casual associations 154 

SECTION VI. 

1. Facts associated with places — how revived 155 

2. Associations formed in connection with localities 155 

3. Memory dependent upon association 155 



466 INDEX. 



SECTION VII. 

Page. 

1 . Intentional association involves volitive action 156 

2. Method of associating in order to retain facts 156 

3. Associating with, known facts 156 

4. Different objects excite similar feelings 156 

SECTION VIII. 

1. Intentional association further illustrated 157 

2. Dependence on human testimony 157 

3. Traditional or written testimony 158 

4. Universal belief in the associated events and facts connected with 

revelation 158 

CHAPTER VII. 

ASSOCIATION, CONTINUED. 

SECTION I. 

1. The term law, as applied to association, incorrect 159 

2. The relationship of truths may suggest each other 159 

3. Variation of the associating principle 159 

4. It varies with the strength of the emotions 160 

SECTION II. 

1. Associating principle — how affected by the lapse of time 160 

2. Associated facts of early life — how affected by time 161 

3. How affected by differences in inclinations 161 

SECTION III. 

1. Associations — how revived and recalled 161 

2. Vividness and force of impressions — on what dependent 162 

3. Mental associations under a direct volitive power 162 

4. Associations under indirect volitive power 162 

5. Evidences of skill and design in nature lead us to seek for an ad- 

equate cause 163 

SECTION IV. 

1. Influence of association upon taste 163 

2. Ideas of fashion vary with the influence of association 164 

3. Influence of association in connection with persons 164 

4. Effect of habit on association 164 

SECTION V. 

1. Effects of improper associations -185 

2. Results of correct associations 165 

3. Success depends upon forming associations in connection with cor- 

rect principles 165 



INDEX. 467 



Ribizinn fifty. 

CHAPTER I. 

MENTAL STATES. 

SECTION I. 

Page. 

1. A simple mental state 167 

2. Difference between simple and complex states 167 

3. Simple mental states indefinable 167 

4. Relief and reliance in simple mental states 167 

5. Simple mental states precede those which are complex 167 

SECTION II. 

1. Complex mental states— how affected 168 

2. Thoughts and feelings resulting from different causes unite in the 

mind 168 

3. Complex mental states in reference to external objects 168 

4. How such states exist in regard to the relations of external things • 168 

5. Such states the results of internal influences 169 

CHAPTER II. 

ABSTRACTION. 

SECTION I. 

1. Abstraction defined 170 

2. Method of examining separated or eliminated entities 170 

3. Abstract notions or thoughts — how they arise 170 

SECTION II. 

1. Mental operations in separating certain ideas 171 

2. Abstraction can not apply to simple ideas or elements which are in- 

divisible 171 

3. Abstraction implied in regard to complex ideas 171 

4. Particular abstract ideas 172 

SECTION III. 

1 . The power of abstraction — correct use of it 172 

2. Abstract notions or ideas — how varied 173 

3. Primary truths — how examined 173 

4. General abstraction — how applied 173 

SECTION IV. 

1. General abstraction may apply to classification 173 

2. General abstract ideas will apply to almost innumerable classes of 

objects 174 

3. Abstraction essential to a well-regulated mind 174 

4. Influenced by disease • • • 174 



468 index. 



CHAPTER III. 

IMAGINATION. 

SECTION I. 

Page. 

1. Imagination defined 175 

2. As an ulterior element 175 

3. Its close connection with the understanding 175 

4. It may extend to apprehending and contemplation • • • 176 

SECTION II. 

1. Imagination influences mental states 176 

2. It can not be resolved into any other element or elements com- 

bined 177 

3. Imagination leads in blending diverse existences 177 

SECTION III. 

1. Action of imagination — when involuntary 177 

2. Intentional imagination involves artificial combinations • 178 

3. Fictitious delineations dependent on imagination 178 

4. Productions— when of a high moral character 178 

5. "When they are vile 178 

SECTION IV. 

1. Imagination differs from fancy 178 

2. It differs from admiration 178 

3. It differs from fictions 179 

4. Difference between imagination and bombast « 179 

SECTION v. 

1. Imagination differs from burlesque 180 

2. It differs from sarcasm 180 

3. Feelings of sympathy — how far dependent upon imagination 180 

4. Imagination in relation to works of fiction without injury 181 

5. Influence of fictitious writings upon the imagination 181 

6. Improvement of imagination — how conditioned 181 

SECTION VI. 

1. Utility and improvement of the imagination 182 

2. A vigorous imagination 182 

3. An active imagination essential to true oratory • • • 182 

4. The blendings and descriptions of the poet depend upon imagination -183 

5. The perfection of the sculptor's work depends on imagination 183 

6. It is present in affecting compositions of music -183 

SECTION VII. 

1 . Improvement of the imagination 183 

2. How influenced by disease • • • • • 183 

3. When it tends or leads to misconceptions 183 

4. When it leads to deception 184 

5. Results of a continued love of fiction- 184 



INDEX. 469 



ihision % txtf). 



CHAPTER I. 

INTELLECTUAL STATES OF EXTERNAL ORIGIN, AND IN- 
TELLECTUAL STATES OF INTERNAL ORIGIN. 

SECTION I. 

1. Intellectual states of external origin objected to 185 

2. Ground of objections 185 

3. Certain doctrines absurd 185 

4. Mind is not matter 186 

SECTION Hi 

1. Elements of mhid not of external origin 186 

2. If any mental state is of external origin, bow related to matter?- -186 

3. Connection of faculties with external objects 187 

SECTION III. 

1. Mental states of internal origin 187 

2. Origin of all knowledge 187 

3. Ulterior origin of knowledge 188 

4. Sequence of sensations 188 

5. Origin of simple thoughts and ideas 188 

CHAPTER II. 

SUGGESTION. 

SECTION I. 

1. Suggestion defined 189 

2. Simple suggestion primary and natural 189 

3. Our knowledge of internal action 189 

4. Origin of the notion or idea of self 189 

SECTION II. 

1. Idea of self-existence not original with the senses 190 

2. Origin of tbe idea of mind not original with the senses 190 

3. Internal origin of the idea of personal identity 190 

4. Ideas of real existence — how they arise 191 

SECTION III. 

1 . Simple suggestion — relation to past mental states 191 

2. Simple ideas — how they arise 191 

3. Simple suggestion — application to past thoughts 191 

4. Suggestion in relation to past and future ideas or facts 191 

SECTION IV. 

1. Suggestion involuntary 192 

2. When voluntary 192 

40 



470 INDEX. 

Page. 

3. Importance of this faculty 192 

4. Tendency to relative conceptions 192 

5. Tendency to relative perceptions 193 

SECTION T. 

1. Origin of our ideas of material elements 193 

2. Suggestion — how it involves our experience in relation to mental 

states 193 

3. Dependence upon it for the origin of our idea of motion • • • • 193 

4. Dependence upon it in relation to our idea of cause and effect 194 

SECTION VI. 

1. Origin of the idea of time 194 

2. Duration — when called time 194 

3. Ideas in relation to time and space 195 

4. Resemblance an ulterior law of suggestion 195 

SECTION VII. 

1. Internal action of the suggestive power 195 

2. How influenced by the extremes of conditions 196 

3. Influence of cotemporaneous existences - • • 196 

4. Effect of lively suggestive powers 196 

5. Realities objects of suggestion 196 

SECTION VIII. 

1. Suggestive intellect — how improved 197 

2. Aided by our attention to natural facts 197 

3. Aided by attending to dissimilar facts 197 

4. It can be increased by temperance 197 

5. Its activity 7 dependent on habit 197 

CHAPTER III. 

RELATIVE SUGGESTION. 

SECTION I. 

1. Relative suggestion — how defined 199 

2. Its office and character 199 

3. Influence of relation — how it may arise 200 

4. Terms of correlative character and their power 200 

SECTION II. 

1. Relative suggestion — in what respects not dependent on the senses. 201 

2. How far independent of the senses in the knowledge of realities-. -201 

3. Extent of this power 201 

4. The soul perfected 202 



INDEX. 471 



CHAPTER IV. 

THE JUDGMENT. 

SECTIO H I. 

Pase. 

1. The judgment a real faculty 203 

2. It is the power by which we are enabled to compare ideas or truths -203 

3. It is the determining of the mind 203 

4. It is the act or power of judging 203 

5. It is a power within itself, and is connected with primary elements -204 

6. It has power to analyze, abstract, and classify 204 

SECTION II. 

1. A naturally-defective judgment 204 

2. It presupposes the understanding 205 

3. Importance of the judgment compared with the understanding 205 

4. Its determining power 205 

5. Its connection with various mental operations 206 

SECTION III. 

1. Action of the judgment closely connected with reason 206 

2. Its active power that which can be comprehended 207 

3. A correct development of the relations of resemblance dependent 

upon the judgment 207 

SECTION IV. 

1. A knowledge of agreement and disagreement of properties depend- 

ent upon the judgment 208 

2. Relations of cause and effect tested by the judgment 208 

3. Axioms and relations of existences objects of the judgment 209 

4. Skill and the relation of effect to cause tested by the judgment 209* 

SECTION v. 

1. Action of the judging power — how important 209 

2. The truthfulness or falsehood of decisions — how dependent on the 

judgment 210 

3. Universal adaptation of this power 210 

SECTION VI. 

1. Natural defects in the judgment 211 

2. Correct judgment — how unaffected 211 

3. Relation of classification to the judgment • • • 212 

4. Classification — when involuntary 212 

SECTION VII. 

1. Classification — how dependent upon the judgment 212 

2. Abstraction — how connected with the judgment 212 

3. Generalization — to what extent connected with the judging power -213 

4. The act of judgment preceded by perception 213 



472 JJSDBX, 



SECTION VIII. 

Page. 

1. Judgment differs from the understanding 213 

2. Power of judging closely connected with that of suggestion 214 

3. Relative suggestion differs from the judgment 214 

4. Importance of an active judging power 215 



M tfc isiovi %zbzrtt\\. 

CHAPTER I . 

REASON. 
SECTION I. 

1. Reason defined 216 

2. This principle — how related to the ground of argumentation 216 

3. Existence of ratiocination — how conditioned ■ 216 

4. Reason the power of ideas and facts 217 

SECTION II. 

1. Reason capable of action 217 

2. Character of its action 218 

3. Reason differs from the understanding 218 

4. Ideas of right and wrong — how tested 218 

SECTION III. 

1. Power of reason is in the mind 219 

2. Character of certain intuitive facts 219 

3 . Self-evident truths — how divided into classes 219 

*4. These intuitive principles the origin of knowledge 220 

5. Self-evident facts not the result of reason 220 

SECTION IV. 

1 . Origin of the knowledge of our own existence 221 

2. Original elements of mind — how unchanging 221 

3. With these is self-power of knowledge 222 

4. Origin of the idea of personal identity 222 

5. Origin of the notion of the relation of cause and effect" 222 

CHAPTER II. 

REASON, CONTINUED. 

SECTION I. 

1. Reason a ground of confidence in natural laws 224 

2. Confidence in the uniformity of phenomena 224 

3. Reason indispensably relative to correct ideas of complex entities- -224 

4. Uniformity of external entities to law 225 

5. Our knowledge of the conformity of mind to law • • -226 



INDEX. 473 



SECTION II. 

Pack. 

1. Self-evident truths — how connected with reason 22(» 

2. The power of reason — how dependent 227 

3. The conduct of all persons prove their belief in primary truths- •• -227 

4. Skeptics can not reject such truths 228 

SECTION III. 

1. Difference between the process of argumentation and the action of 

the reasoning power 228 

2. Reason differs from consciousness 229 

3. Its power differs from that of the senses 229 

4. It differs from the judgment 229 

5. It differs from the understanding 229 

SECTION IV. 

1. Convictions of right and wrong connected with reason 230 

2. Right and wrong tested by experience 280 

3. Intuitive conviction in regard to right and wrong 230 

4. Ideas of the beautiful aud sublime — how related 231 

CHAPTER III. 

REASONING. 

SECTION I. 

1. Reasoning defined 232 

2. Atheism — how affected by reasoning 232 

3. Atheism and infidelity — how defeated by two methods of reasoning.232 

SECTION II. 

1. The first method defined 233 

2. An unoriginated being must have unoriginated attributes 233 

3. Such attributes must be absolute and limitless 233 

4. Deity must exist every-where 234 

SECTION III. 

1. Perfections of Deity 235 

2. Such a being can not be materiality 235 

3. Limitation of matter and motion 235 

4. First cause — perfection of attributes 236 

SECTION IV. 

1. Plurality of infinite beings incredible 237 

2. All finite existences in time or duration 237 

3. Such existences imply a cause 238 

4. His acts neither arbitrary nor of necessity 238 

SECTION v. 
i. His knowledge not necessitated 238 

2. His acts according to liberty 238 

3. Wisdom of such acts 239 

4. Object of man's creation inferred 230 

40* 



474: INDEX 



CHAPTER IV. 

REASONING, CONTINUED. 

SECTION I. 

Page. 

1. Second mode of argumentation 240 

2. Conceptions of Deity — how sustained 240 

3. Such knowledge not by the senses 240 

4. Evidences of a first cause • • • 241 

5. Evidences in the structure of the earth 241 

6. Laws of matter — how deficient 241 

SECTION II. 

1. Evidence in the order of Providence 242 

2. Evidence in life, sleep, and action 242 

3. Evidence in the circulation of the blood 242 

SECTION III. 

1. Motion of the heart — how accounted for • • • • • 243 

2. Demonstration (1.) (2.) 244 

3. Evidence in the continued and unwearied action of the heart 244 

4. Action of the heart 244 

SECTION IV. 

1. Reason, or process of argumentation • • -245 

2. Reason applied to investigation 245 

3. Its value 245 

4. Reasoning source of knowledge 246 

5. Exercise of reason — its tendency 246 

CHAPTER V. 

REASONING. CONTINUED. 

SECTION I. 

1 . Effect, the object of reasoning, infers a cause 248 

2. Cause of an effect may be assumed 248 

3. Results when assumed 248 

4. Process of reasoning relative to intuitive articles 248 

5. Power and action of reason — how involved 248 

SECTION II. 

1. Reasoning a prion 249 

2. Reasoning a posteriori 250 

3. Reasoning founded upon facts 250 

4. Reasoning — what involved 250 

SECTION III. 

1. Reasoning requires attention 251 

2 That which is necessary to correct reasoning 251 

3. Three things necessary to reasoning 251 



index. 475 



SECTION IV. 

Pagb. 

1. We must know the premises to be true 251 

2. Facts of the argument must be true 251 

3. Caution in relation to the different steps 252 

4. Reasoning power — how varied 252 

section v. 

1. J )efects of physical organs 252 

2. Manner of storing the mind - 252 

3. Correct reasoning dependent upon attention 253 

section VI. 

1. Mathematical reasoning 253 

2. That which is and is not assumed 253 

3. All facts — how dependent upon intuition 254 

4. Internal reasoning — how the highest order 254 

section vii. 

1. Power and accuracy of mental reasoning 255 

2. Proper use of terms 255 

3. Attention necessary to demonstration 255 

section viii. 

1 . Demonstrative reasoning — importance of 256 

2. Investigative reasoning 256 

3. False investigative reasoning 256 

SECTION IX. 

1. False reasoning by assumption 257 

2. False by assuming incorrect propositions 257 

3. False by confusing each step 257 

4. False by commencing at a wrong point. 257 

5. False in use of petitio principii • 257 

6. False in arguing off an assumed principle • 257 

SECTION x. 

1. False in connection with sophisms 258 

2. Correct reasoning — how effected ♦ 258 

3. False, from improper motive 258 

4. Influence of prejudice 258 



476 INDEX, 



&ibigian 3SC£$t|. 

CHAPTER I. 

DREAMING. 

SECTION I. 

Pack. 

1. Dreaming — two kinds • • -260 

2. It is wholly involuntary • . 260 

3. Involuntary associations of thoughts 260 

4. The mind— how affected 261 

5. It is common to all persons 261 

SECTION II. 

1. Mental dreaming defined < 261 

2. Thoughts in sleep not always results of preceding events 262 

3. Ideas in sleep of things may or may not come true 262 

4. Activity of the mind independent of the hody 262 

SECTION III. 

1. Dreaming caused by physical debility 263 

2. Character of dreaming — how varied 263 

3. Bodily sensations — how recalled 264 

4. Thoughts in dreaming opposite to waking desires 264 

SECTION IV. 

1. No fixed laws of conformity in dreams 264 

2. Conceptions of relations — power of the senses suspended 265 

3. Old associations recalled in dreams 265 

4. Conceptions in dreams of things of which we have had no previous 

knowledge 265 

SECTION v. 

1. Conceptions of the length of time in dreams 266 

2. Mental dreaming — when regarded as true 266 

3. Dreams vary with different persons 267 

4. Dreaming conceptions not confined to old conceptions 267 

SECTION VI. 

1. Dreams which are not remembered 268 

2. When loss of power over our succession of thoughts 268 

8. Causes of dreams — how far definable 269 

CHAPTER II. 

CLAIRVOYANCE. 

SECTION I. 

1. Clairvoyance — why introduced in this work 270 

2. Clairvoyance defined 270 

3. Attributed to persons in a mesmeric state 270 

4. It is not common to all persons 270 



INDEX. 477 

SECTION II. 

Pack. 

1. This power not essential to the existence of mind 271 

2. Clairvoyance true — to what extent 271 

3. True in connection with some minds 272 

4. This natural gift innocent 272 

CHAPTER III. 

SOMNAMBULISM. 

fECTION I. 

1. Somnambulism denned 273 

2. It differs from dreaming 273 

3. Talking in sleep not recollected 273 

4. It is the first degree of somnambulism 274= 

SECTION II. 

1. It differs from dreaming 274 

2. Muscular action in somnambulism, but not in sleep 275 

3. Absence of fear in somnambulism 275 

4. Investigative mental action — how increased 275 

SECTION III. 

1. Singular phenomena in paroxysms 276 

2. How unconscious of external things 276 

3. Contingent feature by somnolency 276 

4. Some kind of perception without the senses 276 

5. Evidence of the character of the soul 277 

CHAPTER IV. 

MESMERISM. 
SECTION I. 

1. Mesmerism defined [ 278 

2. Mesmerizing — how effected 278 

3. Constitutions capable of being mesmerized 278 

4. Somnambulists capable of being mesmerized 279 

5. Degrees of consciousness in such a state 279 

SECTION II. 

1. It does not prove phrenology true 279 

2. How far can we be controlled by the spirit of others 280 

3. Partial consciousness under mesmerism 280 

4. Mesmeric state similar to that of talking in sleep 281 

5. Belief in it — how far true 281 

CHAPTER V. 
PHRENOLOGY. 

SECTIO N I. 

1. Phrenology defined • 282 

2. Dependent on the size and shape of the head 282 

3. What points to be settled in regard to its truthfulness 282 



478 INDEX. 



SECTION II. 

Page. 

1. Truths supporting phrenology should be clear and conclusive 283 

2. Main position should be without doubt 283 

3. We should know the brain to be the organ of the mind 283 

4. Can the skull develop mind 284 

5. Difficulty in its formation 2S4 

6. Difficulty in regard to the lobes of the brain — 284 

secti ox in. 

1. Lobes can not answer to the different powers of the mind 284 

2. The brain — how the organ of the mind 285 

3. Mental action — how dependent on matter 285 

4. This doctrine — when tendency to infidelity 285 

SECTION IV. 

1. Physical organs powerless 286 

2. Outlines of phrenology true 286 

3. Effect of injuries 286 

4. Effect of injuries of the brain 286 

SECTION v. 

1. Removal of portions of the brain — how the mind affected 287 

2. Fracture of the skull— effect of 287 

3. Such effects contrary to phrenology 288 

4. General principle true .288 



^ ii is i on Niittij. 

CHAPTER I. 

REFLECTION. 
SECTION I. 

1. Reflection defined 289 

2. Action of this power 289 

3. When it is involuntary 289 

4. When it is voluntary 289 

5. Connection with memory 290 

SECTION II. 

1. Powers acting with reflection 290 

2. Origin of our belief in external things 290 

3. Belief in the existence of self 290 

4. Convictions as to the report of the senses 290 

5. Importance of reflection 291 



INDEX. 479 



CHAPTEE II. 

CONNECTION AND INFLUENCE OF THE BODY 
UPON THE MIND. 

SECTION I. 

Page. 

1. The mysterious union ^ 292 

2. Power of temporal death 292 

3. Final result of death 292 

4. Its power over the soul 292 

5. Its power over knowledge 292 

SECTION II. 

1. Intellectual action — when imperfect 293 

2. Conceptions of the correctness of such actions 293 

3. Future condition of an idiot 293 

4. Irregularity of mental action when caused by disease 294 

SECTION III. 

1. Internal operations — how affected 294 

2. Extent of the effect caused by disease 294 

3. Nervous system — how affected 295 

4. Mental excitement — effect on the body • • 295 

SECTION IV. 

1. Effects of excited imagination and conceptions 295 

2. Results of such influences 296 

3. Effects of excited imagination caused by disease 296 

CHAPTER III. 
APPARITIONS. 

SECTION I. 

1. Apparitions defined 298 

2. Effect of disease upon the eye 298 

3. Effect of disease upon the nerves 299 

SECTION II. 

1. Affection of the retina or optic nerve 299 

2. Change of the optic nerve by disease 299 

3. Changed by internal excitement 299 

CHAPTER IV. 

SPECTRAL ILLUSIONS. 

SECTION I. 

1. Spectral illusions — how to be regarded 301 

2. An instance recorded 301 

3. They often originate in dreams 302 

4. Impressions in solitude often appear real 302 



480 INDEX 



SECTION II. 

Page. 

1. Spectral images — how accounted for 304 

2. Origin in connection with, mental excitement 304 

3. Majority of them can be accounted for 304 

4 Effect of anodynes and opiates 305 

SECTION III. 

1. Nyctalopia — power or extent of such influence 305 

2. Brain affected by wrong impressions • -306 

3. Influence of epileptic fits 30G 

4. Influence of febrile diseases 30G 

5. Influence of excited imagination 307 

6. The senses — how influenced 307 

7. Evidence furnished by the preceding facts 307 

CHAPTER V. 

S PIE IT-RAP PINGS. 

SECTION I. 

1. Connection of necromancy with mental science 308 

2. Spirit-rapping delusive 308 

3. Mystery of involuntary writing solved 308 

4. Why have spirits delayed their work so long? 309 

SECTION II. 

1. Can spirits reveal facts to us ? 310 

2. Object and character of such messages 310 

3. Ideas of purity— the result 310 

4. Character of such messages 310 

SECTION III. 

1. The result when such tidings are contrary to truth 311 

2. False if from Satan 311 

3. Demonology — how a result 311 

4. Such facts contrary to spirit-rappings 311 

CHAPTER VI. 

EXCITED CONCEPTIONS BORDERING ON INSANITY. 

SECTION I. 

1. Excited conceptions defined 313 

2. Connection of vigorous minds with weak nerves 313 

3. Influence of physical defects 314 

4. Effect of general debility 314 

SECTION II. 

1 . Such conceptions impossible to mind abstractly 314 

2. Such conceptions from sense of sight 314 

3. They may arise with some emotion of spirit 315 

4. They may arise from great joy 315 

5. When caused by grief • 315 



INDEX. 481 

SECTION III. 

Page. 

1. How caused by the effect of disease 315 

2. Origin of excited conceptions of sound 316 

3. Such conceptions — instances given 316 

4. Acute hearing in affliction 317 

SECTION IV. 

1. Excited conceptions and sense of touch 317 

2. Similar facts in regard to other senses 318 

3. Caused by the nervous system 318 

4. Caused by affections of the brain 319 

5. Caused by febrile influence 319 

CHAPTER VII. 

PARTIAL INSANITY. 

SECTION I. 

1. Influence of partial insanity 320 

2. The mind — when partially insane 320 

3. Its relation to recent facts and those of early life 321 

4. Defective action ° 321 

SECTION II. 

1. Insanity caused by the judgment • 321 

2. Its origin with suggestion 322 

3. Caused by imperfect association • 322 

4. Caused by imperfect reasoning 323 

5. Evidenced by hasty reasoning 323 

SECTION III. 

1 . Physical organs of sense — how influenced 324 

2. Insanity not natural to spirit 324 

3. Its connection with belief 324 

4. It exists in loss of confidence 325 

5. Caused by indolent habits 326 

SECTION IV. 

1. Caused by too great physical efforts 326 

2. Caused by too intense study 326 

3. Caused by unnatural excitement 327 

4. Effect of repeated mental excitement 327 

CHAPTER VIII. 

TOTAL INSANITY. 

SECTION I. 

1. Total insanity defined 329 

2. Its influence over mental states 329 

3. Restriction of mental action 329 

4. Influence of only one impression 330 

5. Mental abstraction — how effected • • • 330 

41 



482 INDEX. 



SECTION II. 

1. Mania — how varied 330 

2. Hallucination — when incurable 331 

3. A characteristic of maniacs 331 

4. Total insanity — results 332 

SECTION III. 

1. Degrees of insanity — how connected 332 

2. Unnatural vividness of thought .333 

8. Greatest peculiarity of insanity 333 

4. Indisposition to change belief •• •• 334. 

SECTION IV. 

1. Power of mental hallucinations 334 

2. Extremes and modulations of insanity 335 

3. Insanity in the case of the maniac 336 

4. General character of derangement 336 

5. Malicious insanity 335 

CHAPTER IX. 

INSANITY — MELANCHOLIA. 

SECTION I. 

1. Melancholia defined , 337 

2. Difference between melancholia and mania 338 

8. Tendency of melancholia to suicide 338 

4. Maniacs do not commit suicide 338 

SECTION 11. 

1. Melancholia leads to suicide 339 

2. Suicide a voluntary act . 339 

3. He who commits suicide has the use of reason 339 

4. Proof that they are not insane 339 

5. Such persons know what they are going to do .' 340 

SECTION III. 

1. Melancholia hallucination 341 

2. Intended suicide—when abandoned 341 

3. The mind totally insane can not commit suicide 341 

4. Impression of the criminality of suicide 342 

CHAPTER X. 
INSANITY. 

SECTION I. 

1. Degrees of insanity 344 

2. Slight alienation — how judged 844 

3. Cause of insanity 844 

4. Ambition a cause of insanity .« *.,,=, 345 



INDEX. 483 



SECTION II. 

Page. 

1. Influence of the mind on the body 345 

2. Constitutional tendency to insanity 345 

3. Influence of high fevers 346 

4. Effect of injuries of the skull 346 

SECTION III. 

1. Hereditary insanity — how conditioned 347 

2. Intense action of the mind — when of insane tendency 348 

3. Tendency to insanity by dwelling on only one idea 348 

4. Influence of sudden events • .348 

SECTION IV. 

1. Too intense habit of study 349 

2. Healthy influence of plain facts 349 

3. Highest number of insane are the lovers of fiction 349 

4. Caution in punishing the insane 350 

CHAPTER XI. 
IDIOCY. 

SECTION I. 

1. Idiocy defined 351 

2. Fatuity — that which it includes 351 

3. Cretinism — what its meanings 351 

4. Another class with evidences of intellectual action 351 

5. That which characterizes an idiot 352 

SECTION II. 

1. Condition of an idiot's mind .352 

2. Insanity differs from idiocy ■ 353 

3. Idiocy incurable in this life 353 

4. Extent of physical influence 353 

SECTION III. 

1. Cause of delirium not wholly in the mind 354 

2. The mind not naturally insane 355 

3. Cause of idiocy not in the essence of mind 356 

4. There can be no essential loss of mental elements 356 

SECTION IV. 

1 . Evidence of destructive bodily influence 357 

2. Its effect on the power of hearing 357 

3. Its effect on the organ of sight 358 

4. Cause of idiocy connected with the physical powers 358 



484 INDEX, 



CHAPTER I. 
INTERNAL ORIGIN OF KNOWLEDGE. 

SECTION I. 

Page. 

1. The soul has knowledge in itself • • -360 

2. It has power of knowledge within itself 360 

3. Primary power of knowledge 361 

4. Knowledge from the senses 361 

5. Apprehending of facts internal in origin 361 

SECTION II. 

1. Knowledge is of internal origin « 362 

2. Origin of knowledge 362 

3. Ideas of internal origin 362 

4. They may arise in connection with the power of intuition 363 

5. Primary origin of knowledge 363 

6. Complex ideas of internal knowledge 363 

CHAPTER II. 

THE DOCTRINE OE PSYCHOLOGY AND ANTHROPOLOGY 

CONTRASTED IN THE EXAMINATION OF THAT 

WHICH RESEMBLES MIND IN BRUTES. 

SECTIO JT I. 

1. Extent of our inquiry 364: 

2. Connection of mind and matter — how conditioned 364 

3. Matter without mental power 365 

4:. Life connected with vegetation 366 

SECTION II. 

1. Animated existence or life 36 

2. Brutes either wholly matter or they have minds 36 

3. Inertness essential to matter 36 / 

4. Brutes possess animation different from matter 367 

SECTION III. 

1. Brutes differ from inert entities 367 

2. Their power of self-action — how different from matter 368 

3. Power of the senses in brutes 368 

4. Internal superior power of brutes 368 

SECTION IV. 

1. Volition in reference to animals 369 

2. Their power of self-preservation 369 

3. Their knowledge of courses 369 

4. Knowledge of a horse or dog 370 

5. Their power of judging and comparing • 370 



index. 485 

SECTION V. 

. Paob. 

1. Brutes have some kind of spiritual natures . . • .371 

2. Character of brute intelligence 371 

3. Power to select food— • •• 372 

4. Instinctive intelligence of bees ' 372 

SECTION VI. 

1. Difference between the powers of man and that of brutes 373 

2. Natural inclination to look for the cause of an effect • • 373 

8. Human mind scientific 373 

4. It is capable of progressive improvement 374 

SECTION VII. 

1. That which is essential to the human mind • • - * 374 

2. That which is not possessed by brutes 375 

3. Man subject to moral feelings 375 

4. Contrast of mind in man with that of the brute 375 

5. The brute has a spirit and a body 376 

SECTION VIII. 

1. The brute — how capable of being taught 376 

2. The dog can be taught 376 

3. Animals have been learned to dance 376 

4. Memory in man differs from brute memory 377 

SECTION IX. 

1. Memory of the horse 378 

2. The active power of brutes can not be matter • * 378 

3. Further evidence of brute mind • 378 

SECTION x. 

1. The Hebrew term ruach, in Scripture, proves that brutes have spir- 

its or souls 378 

2. The brute has a soul 379 

3. Beasts, before the fall of man, had purity and freedom from death- -379 

4. They could not have been created only to be annihilated 380 

CHAPTER III. 

INTUITIONS. 

SECTION I. 

1. Mental intuition defined 381 

2. Intuition faculties give origin to original action 381 

8. Powers of the mind can be intuition faculties • •"• • -381 

4. The reciprocal relations of intuitions 381 

SECTION II. 

1. Ideas — relation to original elements 382 

2. Simple ideas — how arise • ■ -382 

8. General ideas — how arise • • • .382 

41* 



4:86 INDEX. 



SECTION III. 

Pagb - 

1. Spontaneous action anterior to attention 383 

2. When such action is voluntary 383 

3. Intuitive conviction of self 383 

4. Origin of self-apprehension 383 

SECTION IV. 

1. Instinct defined 384 

2. Mind with instinctive power 384 

3. Instinct can not be separated from mind 384 

CHAPTER IV. 

COMMON SENSE. 

SECTION I. 

1. Common sense defined 385 

2. The immediate decision of correct reason • • • • 385 

3. This process — how modulated 385 

4. Mental affirmations common to all minds 385 

SECTION II. 

1. Importance of this mental power 386 

2. Common sense is of the real affirmations of the mind 386 

3. It is dependent upon reason and judgment 387 

4. It involves a general understanding of facts 387 

SECTION III. 

1. This power is common to all minds 388 

2. Its use in arriving at facts 388 

8. It can be cultivated..- 388 



pikie inn 3B Itfttntl. 

CHAPTER I. 

VOLITION. 

SECTION I. 

1. Volition denned • 390 

2. The act of willing or of determining choice 390 

3. Criticism on volition 390 

4. Its nature is freedom 391 

SECTION II. 

1. Certainty of such a power 391 

2. Doctrine of necessitarians absurd 391 

3. Volition not simple action only 392 

4. It is an internal power • • • • • * 392 



INDEX. 487 



SECTION III. 

Page. 

1. Volitions differ from volition — in what respects 393 

2. Nature of volition can not be defined 393 

3. Volition can exist either with or without an object 393 

4. If it can only exist with an object, then it may become non-exist- 

ence 394 

5. It can not exist wholly in action 394 

SECTION IV. 

1. It exists of its essential nature 395 

2. It exists either with or without what we believe to be in our 

power 395 

3. Volition differs from volitive action 396 

section v. 

1. Volition differs from desires 396 

2. This power exists in the mind • ■ • 397 

3. Desire defined 397 

4. Desire differs from volition 397 

SECTION VI. 

1. Volition differs from desires in sudden changes 398 

2. It is not governed by the strongest desire 398 

3. Character of motive — how varied 399 

4. Influence of pure motive 399 

CHAPTER II. 
VOLITION, CONTINUED. 

SECTION I. 

1. Volitive power — degrees of strength — how varied 401 

2. Degrees in force of action 401 

3. It can vary with our feelings 402 

4. It differs from feeling 402 

SECTION II. 

1. Relation of volition to self-action 402 

2. Volition implies more than mere action 403 

3. It differs from choice 403 

4. It has power to act or to refuse action 404 

SECTION III. 

1. Volition anterior to choice 404 

2. Antecedent volitive power 405 

3. The act of choosing free 405 

4. Volition has either self- freedom or it is of necessity 405 



488 INDEX 



SECTION IV. 

1. Criticism on a false proposition used by necessitarians 406 

2. Influence of motive on the volitive power 407 

3. The origin of motive-action presupposes volitive action 407 

4. Volitions spontaneous and independent 407 

CHAPTEE III. 

TOLITIOX. CONTINUED. 

SECTION I. 

1. Motive can not control the Divine mind 409 

2. Motive-law leads to materialism as taught by fatalism 409 

3. It can not govern volition 410 

SECTION II. 

1. Motive and choice control contrary to consciousness 410 

2. We feel that our action in choice and in relation to motive is free- -411 

3. Evidence in the impossibility of doubting our accountability 411 

SECTION III. 

1. Voluntary choosing-motive • 412 

2. Resolving to act with the strongest motive 412 

3. Motive-control, impossible ! 413 

4. Evidence in the law of self-preservation 413 

SECTION IV. 

1. The law of motive-necessity contrary to conscious feeling 414 

2. Volitions spontaneous and free 414 

3. Convictions of liberty in relation to past events 415 

4. Consciousness of liberty in deciding upon the acts of others 415 

SECTION V. 

1. Conscious liberty in relation to acts of present time- 415 

2. Criticism on an incorrect proposition 416 

3. Volition is spontaneous liberty-power 416 

4. It is the power of motion 416 

5. Power of determining and enforcing action 416 

6. It is the ground of accountability 416 

7. It is natural to mind > 417 

SECTION VI. 

1. Opinion of Mr. Stewart incorrect 417 

2. Volition is not action only 418 

3. Objections to the opinion of Mr. Upham 418 

4. Volition and the will — how the same 418 

5. That which is implied in the use of the term volition 418 

6. That to which the term will refers 418 



INDEX. 489 



&ibissitm © to jelfifc. 

CHAPTER I. 

THE WILL. 

SECTION I. 

Page. 

1. The -will defined 420 

2. It is in its nature the liberty-power of the mind 420 

3. It is free with determining power ; 420 

4. The mind is controlled by the will 421 

SECTION II. 

1. Connection of the will and the judgment 421 

2. The understanding can not control the will 421 

3. Eeason can not control the will 421 

4. The will is a commanding power 421 

SECTION III. 

1. Objection to the classification of the mental powers as used by 

others 422 

2. Relation of the will to other faculties 422 

3. Feeling, thinking, and willing distinct powers 422 

4. Laws of the will incorrect 423 

SECTION IV. 

1. There is nothing in matter that can control the will 423 

2. Laws of the material universe can not control it 423 

3. Such teachers can not refer this controlling power to Deity 423 

4. It can not be governed by other faculties 424 

CHAPTER II. 

NATURE OF THE WILL. 

SECTION I. 

1. Laws of the will absurd 425 

2. It is governed by its own law 425 

3. Contingent action of the will — how incorrect 425 

4. Freedom the condition of mental action 425 

SECTION II. 

1. Laws of the will preliminary to that of its freedom, as taught by 

Mr. Uphani — how incorrect 426 

2. Mr. Uphani says the will is subject to laws — how incorrect 426 

3. Statement of the condition of such arguments 427 

4. The will is not subject to laws 427 



490 INDEX. 

SECTION III. 

1. The will — how influenced by desire 428 

2. What is desire, and its influence 428 

3. Desires may arise voluntarily and involuntarily 428 

4. Desire can only invoke volitive action 429 

SECTION IV. 

1. The will governed by choice— how incorrect 429 

2. The very nature of choice implies volition .429 

3. Choice is either of natural necessity or the mind has natural volitive 

power 430 

4. Choice can not control the will 430 

SECTION V. 

1. Mr. Upham's view of motive governing the will — how incorrect •••• 431 

2. Motive denned and limited from its very nature 431 

3. If motive could govern the will, how it would be done 431 

4. An inert object can not control the will 432 

SECTION VI. 

1. Incorrect conclusions of Mr. Upham and Mr. Edwards 432 

2. Motive in the Divine mind subordinate to volitions 433 

3. Motive has no power to control the will 433 

4. The will is as the greatest apparent good, according to Mr. Ed- 

wards — how incorrect 434 

5. That the will is free is established by the consciousness of man- 

kind 435 

CHAPTEK III. 

LIBERTY OP THE WILL. 

SECTION I. 

1. The will is strictly neither free nor bound 437 

2. The will subject to the law of self-liberty 437 

3. Doctrine of liberty clearly established by consciousness' 438 

4. Volitive power to choose 488 

SECTION II. 

1. The will knows no law only that of liberty 438 

2. Further proof 438 

3. The effort to sustain the law of necessity involves reasoning in a 

circle 439 

4. The position of Mr. Edwards that every act of the will is excited by 

some motive — how incorrect 439 

SECTION III. 

1. The spirit of dependence can not exist under the law of necessity. 440 

2. This doctrine can not mellow our feelings 440 

3. A dreadful sentiment of Dr. Chalmers 440 

4. A design of man's creation, that he might voluntarily serve God- • -441 



INDEX. 491 



CHAPTER IV. 
POWER OF THE WILL. 

SECTION I. 

Page. 

1. Difference between liberty and power 442 

2. Mr. Upham's view of the will not independent — how incorrect 442 

3. Power and freedom of the will evidenced in self preservation 443 

4. Liberty of the will in the remembrance of past facts 443 

SECTION II. 

1. The will has self-determining power 443 

2. Criticism on a position of Mr. Upham 444 

3. Mr. Edwards's objection to the idea of the will determining the 

will 444 

4. Volitions are spontaneous ? 445 

SECTION III. 

1. The superior power of the will 445 

2. That which is the ground of offense before God 445 

3. It is connected with voluntariness 445 

4. The doctrine of the will — how confused 446 

SECTION IV. 

1. Mandatory power of the will 446 

2. Office of the will 446 

3. Error of necessitarians in confounding the will with the sensibili- 

ties 446 

4. "We can will to perform impossibilities, which is evidence of liberty -446 

5. Such is the will, the free liberty-power of the mind 447 



END OF VOL. I. 



668 







Deacidified using the Book 
Neutralizing agent: Magne; 
Treatment Date: Oct. 2004 



^ Deacidified using the Bookkeeper prooj 
Neutralizing agent: Magnesium Oxide J 
* o h o ' ^ Treatment Date: Oct. 2004 

% J? PreservationTechnologi 

A WORLD LEADER IN PAPER PRESERVA| 

111 Thomson Park Drive 
'-' * ,\V </"* Cranberry Township, PA 16066 I 

(724)779-2111 

,0 . „ . ■?/. - „ \ 







w 



V ,7r; *V 

V" 




LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 




n 



KKJIffJ 

H 



m 



tSStS 



ill 



<M8Siffl 



I 



I 



